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DEAR INTERNET USER:

CONGRATULATIONS! YOU HAVE JUST DOWNLOADED, AT NO CHARGE, A 300 PAGE BOOK
CONTAINING A BRAND NEW  CONSTITUTION.

I HOPE YOU LIKE IT! SEND ME E-MAIL IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. -- B. Krusch
Temporary E-Mail Address: [e-mail]


===========================================================================

BOOK REVIEW FROM "AMENDING AMERICA" (Times Books: 1993)
     by Richard Bernstein (with Jerome Agel)
     pp. 237-8:

"In 1992 as this book was nearing completion, Barry Krusch published
what may well be the most thoughtful and thorough reframing of the
Constitution yet attempted. His study, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION: A
NEW AMERICA FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM, is the first proposed rewriting of the
Constitution to take account of the twentieth-century revolutions in
information and communications technologies; it is also noteworthy for
its intellectual grounding in the American Revolution's series of
experiments in government.
     Krusch, a 34-year-old computer consultant living in New York City,
began his labors in 1987, prompted by the commemoration of the
Constitution's bicentennial. Struck by the contrast between the
political creativity of the Revolutionary generation and the increasing
ineffectiveness of their modern counterparts, Krusch pursued two
complementary lines of research. He steeped himself in the primary
sources produced by the framing and ratification of the Constitution in
1787-1788, and he traced the divergences between the Constitution as
written and the Constitution as administered (the "Empirical
Constitution"). In 1990, Krusch opened a file on rewriting the
Constitution on GENIE, a national computer bulletin board. He posted
draft revisions of selected constitutional provisions and solicited
comments from other users of GENIE, using the accumulating drafts and
comments as the raw material for his first comprehensive presentation of
a clause-by-clause revision of the Constitution.
     Four major themes shape Krusch's proposals. First, emphasizing the
vital role that access to information must play in democratic
governance, he proposes that modern information and communications
technologies be the core of a new constitutional framework.
Technological constitutionalism of this type, he maintains, could make
it possible for all Americans to take part in government. Second, he
seeks to close the gap between the written Constitution and the
Empirical Constitution, so that divergences between theory and practice
in constitutional government no longer would sap the legitimacy of the
constitutional system. Third, Krusch urges the reworking of
constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and checks and
balances, and the recasting of key institutions such as the Senate, to
improve government's responsiveness and efficiency while incorporating
added protections for individual rights. Fourth, Krusch stresses the
dangers to democracy posed by professional politicians and the major
political parties and the need to restore ordinary citizens as the true
sources of sovereign power. His proposals therefore would, for example,
exclude members of the major parties from holding federal legislative,
executive, or judicial posts.
     Krusch's plan of revision differs in several notable ways from all
previous attempts to rewrite the Constitution. His plan is distinct from
the parliamentary tradition (though it shares that tradition's
dissatisfaction with separation of powers) and from Tugwell's executive-
centered model (though, like Tugwell, Krusch seeks to bridge the gap
between the theoretical and actual operation of American government).
While retaining the structure and much of the original language of the
1787 Constitution, Krusch hopes to construct a form of government in
which ordinary citizens retain and exercise power to set national goals
and objectives and to monitor effectively the doings of their elected
and appointed officials. Finally, thanks to his familiarity with modern
computer technology, Krusch has helped to advance the theory of
electronic governance beyond the model of the 'electronic town hall'
familiar to most Americans from the tantalizing 1992 Presidential
initiative of H. Ross Perot."

==============================================================================

THE
21ST
CENTURY
CONSTITUTION

BARRY KRUSCH

STANHOPE PRESS
POB 1177
New York, New York  10163

TEMPORARY E-MAIL ADDRESS: [e-mail]

Note: Due to my busy schedule, I log on infrequently to this
mainframe, so you might be better off sending comments via "snail-mail"
if you don't get a reply within a week.

This ASCII edition contains virtually all of the complete text of the
300 page book THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION originally published in
1992, minus footnotes and certain text in the 1787 Constitution.  It
also incorporates changes to THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION made by the
author, which supersede the text of the 1992 edition.

ASCII Electronic Copyright (c) 1994 by Barry Krusch

This document may be re-transmitted by any person, group, or
organization to any other person, group, or organization in ASCII
ELECTRONIC form via any electronic mode or media, including modem,
storage on a BBS server, CD-ROM distribution, DAT, Syquest, E-Mail,
Ethernet, FTP, ISDN, floppy disc, or any other electronic mode of
transmission without financial compensation to Stanhope Press or Barry
Krusch, provided that no words are added, substituted, rearranged,
omitted or otherwise altered, other than for exclusively personal use,
and that no hard copies are made, other than for exclusively personal
use. This right does not extend to documents saved in a format other
than ASCII.  Both copyright notices must appear at the beginning of this
document.

This ASCII version is 1.1. It was completed and first prepared for
posting on April 15, 1994.

Hard-Copy Copyright (c) 1992 by Barry Krusch

All rights reserved. Except in the case of quotations embodied in
critical articles and reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in
any form without written permission from the publisher. Inquiries should
be addressed to Stanhope Press, P.O. Box 1177, Grand Central Station,
NY, NY 10163-1177.  Phone orders: 800-345-0096.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA

Krusch, Barry 1958 -

Includes bibliographical references and index.

The 21st Century Constitution

1. Constitution -- United States -- Proposals to Amend

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 92-80931

                          NOTES TO THE READER

The heart of this book (the text of the new constitution) begins with
Chapter Two.  To go to some of the key changes to the 1787 Constitution,
select the following text (without selecting the paragraph return
symbol), copy it to your clipboard (if you have one), and then paste the
selection into your "find" or "search" field.

KEY WORDS/PHRASES IN THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION

     abide by the regulations
     alternate
     alternative points of view
     amendments shall be incorporated
     as the national interest requires
     auditor
     authorization of Congress
     chosen every year
     competent counsel
     constituent requests
     constitutional supplement
     defined by statute
     delegate its authority
     democratic form of government
     designate public policy
     discrepant
     disproportionate
     elections commission
     electoral college
     electronic interception
     electronic post office
     eligible to the office
     eligible to vote
     equal access regulations
     ethics legislation
     evaluation of zero
     evaluations
     extended by the people
     federal academy
     federal committee
     financially disadvantaged
     greater than or equal to
     gross national product
     he or she
     hypothetical example
     impeachment
     justiciability
     legislative committee
     legislative review board
     legislative veto
     lobbying
     national channel
     national database
     national initiative
     national objective
     national poll
     national recall
     national referendum
     nominate/nominees
     no person shall serve more than eight years
     numerical rating
     obligation to oversee
     one subject
     performance rating
     plainly worded
     positive obligation
     potential misconduct
     power to change the terms
     presumed innnocent
     primary election
     primary legislative responsibility
     private interests
     publish the voting record
     re-enacted
     representative of the population
     reproduce its programming
     request judicial remedies
     right of access
     right of parents
     right to an education
     right to communicate information
     right to learn to reason
     right to learn to write
     right to privacy
     right to propose legislation
     right to travel
     right to view
     rights enforcement
     rules for the proceedings of Congress
     rules of construction
     second federal convention act
     secondary responsibility
     shall disclose this fact
     staggered
     tax bracket
     timetables
     unconstitutional legislation
     verbatim report
     vote-trading

KEY NAMES TO SEARCH FOR IN THE TEXT OF THE BOOK

HISTORICAL
     Bagehot
     De Tocqueville
     Ellsworth
     Franklin
     Hamilton
     Iredell
     Jackson
     Jay
     Jefferson
     Locke
     Madison
     Marshall
     Martin
     Mason
     Mercy Warren
     Montesquieu
     Randolph
     Sherman
     Strong
     Washington
     Wilson
     Yates

20TH CENTURY
     Biden
     Black
     Boren
     Brennan
     Burton
     Byrd
     Caplan
     Chemerinsky
     Corwin
     Dillon
     Douglas
     Fortas
     Hazlitt
     Hehmeyer
     Hughes
     Kerry
     Ladanyi
     Laski
     Roosevelt
     Tugwell
     Wellstone
     White
     Whicker


     TO VIEW THE CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION ONE AFTER THE OTHER
     1) First find "we the people."  This will take you to the beginning
of the New Constitution.
     2) Put an "=" sign followed by a RETURN (paragraph) symbol in your
find field.  Keep hitting return, and you will scroll through the
constitutional clauses.

PURPOSE OF THE ELECTRONIC ASCII EDITION
     This electronic text is an ADJUNCT to the text version, not a
substitute for it.  All the formatting which enhances readability and
comprehension, such as bold, italic, different fonts, strikethru text,
differing margin sizes, and superscript footnote numbers, are gone from
this edition, since the ASCII format does not allow it.  Consequently,
much of the meaning is lost (the formatting adds another 500K to this
document!), meaning which is, as stated before, critical for
comprehension.  For example, the hard-copy edition uses strikethru type
to indicate parts of the 1787 Constitution removed (those words don't
even appear here), and boldface type to indicate the terms added by the
author (here, the old and new are blended together).  However, the
search capabilities make up for the loss in readability.

READABILITY:

1) This text was set in 10 point Courier with margins set at 0 to 6
inches.  You may change this font, but understand that spacing is set
with this font and font size in mind.

2) Quote paragraphs are indented with tabs.  You can change the tab
settings to improve the look of the document.

ONE FINAL NOTE TO THE READER: THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

One of the chief goals of this constitution is to solve one of the more
critical problems in game theory, and for societies in general, the
"Prisoner's Dilemma."  This theory, which was formally defined in the
fifties by two researchers at the RAND corporation, explains (for this
writer) the decay of societies and the the escalation of violence better
than almost any other theory extant. It also explains why we HAVE
governments, for those of you who were curious regarding this issue, and
why a good government is ESSENTIAL for a healthy nation. Because a
satisfactory account of this theory would have taken far too many pages
in my book, I barely referred to it in the 1992 edition, and assumed,
perhaps erroneously, that people were familiar with it.  I still do not
discuss this theory in Chapter One (choosing instead to focus on more
traditional arguments), but could have easily made it the sole topic of
discussion in that chapter.  Absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence: this theory lies in the background behind virtually every
significant change I have made to the 1787 Constitution.

If you do not understand this theory, I highly recommend the following
sources as essential background for further reading, and as an extension
to Chapter One.  Without an understanding of this underlying problem (a
mathematically based problem which locally manifests itself in
particular, discrete ways, but globally transcends not only local and
national cultures, but also time and space!), there can be no true
comprehension of possible solutions.

     Prisoner's Dilemma by William Poundstone
     Evolution of Cooperation by Anatol Rapaport
     Metamagical Themas by Douglas Hofstadter

                  Outline of THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION

SOCIETAL GOALS
     A MORE PERFECT UNION
    END
         AMERICANS TO ESCAPE NATIONAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA
    MEANS
         PRIMARY LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
         WELL-FUNCTIONING FEDERAL SYSTEM
     INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY
    END
         PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE
         LOW CRIME RATE
         LOW FEAR
    MEANS
         WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT (ALL CONSTITUTIONAL
         PROVISIONS WORKING IN CONCERT)
     PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE
    END
         SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIVING TO OURSELVES AND OUR
         POSTERITY
         HIGH STANDARD OF LIVING
         REDUCTION OF WORK HOURS
         LOW CRIME
         CLEAN ENVIRONMENT
         GOOD MEDICAL CARE
    MEANS
         WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT (ALL CONSTITUTIONAL
         PROVISIONS WORKING IN CONCERT)
     ESTABLISH JUSTICE
    END
         GUARANTEE FAIRNESS TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE
         GUARANTEE ALL THE RIGHTS TO WHICH PEOPLE ARE DUE
         MINIMIZE OR ELIMINATE CORRUPTION
    MEANS
         COMPETENT COUNSEL REQUIREMENT
         PRESUMED INNOCENT REQUIREMENT
         RIGHT TO PRIVACY
         DISPROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT PROHIBITION
         RELAXED STANDING REQUIREMENT
         RELAXED JUSTICIABILITY REQUIREMENT
         EQUAL ACCESS REGULATIONS
         FINANCIAL DISADVANTAGE CONSIDERATION RE: DATABASE
         ACCESS
         CITIZEN VETO POWER
         FILTERING
         TAX LIMITATION
         CHECKS AND BALANCES
     CITIZEN EDUCATION
    ENDS
         INSURE THAT ALL PEOPLE ARE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED
         ACCOUNTABILITY
    MEANS
         RIGHT TO LEARN TO READ
         RIGHT TO LEARN TO WRITE
         RIGHT TO LEARN TO REASON
         RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION
         RIGHT TO NATIONAL DATABASE ACCESS
         NATIONAL DATABASE
         NATIONAL CHANNEL
         RIGHT TO HOME EDUCATION
GOVERNMENT GOALS
     POPULAR REPRESENTATION
    END
         GIVE ALL AMERICANS A STAKE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT
         PROPERTY RIGHT: TAXPAYERS SUPPORT GOVERNMENT, HAVE
         RIGHT TO CONTROL OUTCOMES DERIVED FROM THEIR INCOMES
    MEANS
         ANNUAL TERM
         LEGISLATIVE VETO
         LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
         ELECTORAL COLLEGE ABOLISHED
         CONSTITUTIONAL FORMAL RECOGNITION OF WOMEN
         NATIONAL OBJECTIVE
         NATIONAL POLL
         NATIONAL INITIATIVE
         NATIONAL REFERENDUM
         RIGHT TO PROPOSE LEGISLATION
         ACCESSIBILITY OF CONSTITUTION (PLAINLY WORDED)
     EFFICIENCY
    END
         CONSERVE RESOURCES OF TIME AND MONEY
    MEANS
         INSURE FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
         AUDITOR
         FLEXIBLE AMENDABILITY
         TIMETABLES
         NUMERICAL RATING
         DELEGATION
         PROVIDE FOR EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT
         ELECTRONIC POSTAL SERVICE
         NATIONAL DATABASE
         FEDERAL ACADEMY
         DEFENSE EXPENDITURE CAP
     INTEGRITY
    END
         MAINTAIN CITIZEN CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT
    MEANS
         PERFORMANCE RATING
         RULES FOR THE PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS
         PUBLISH THE VOTING RECORD
         VOTE-TRADING PROHIBITION
         DISCREPANCY PROHIBITION
         EVALUATION
         LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD
         SENATE OVERSIGHT
         ELECTIONS COMMISSION
         DEPARTMENT OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
         VERBATIM REPORT REQUIREMENT
         AUDITOR
         ETHICS LEGISLATION
         POTENTIAL MISCONDUCT PROHIBITION
         LOBBYING RESTRICTIONS
         TERM LIMITATIONS
         PROHIBITION OF SIMULTANEOUS POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP
         AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE
         CONSTITUTIONAL GOALS
     CLARITY
    END
         SPECIFICITY/NON-AMBIGUITY
    MEANS
         SEPARATION OF POWERS
         ENUMERATION OF POWERS
         DIRECT INCORPORATION OF AMENDMENTS
         ONE-SUBJECT REQUIREMENT
         INTERNAL RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES
         FORMAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
         STATUTORY DEFINITION
         CONGRESSIONAL DEFINITION
         HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE REQUIREMENT
     FLEXIBILITY
    END
         KEEP CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT CURRENT WITH CHANGING
         TIMES
    MEANS
         POWER TO CHANGE TERMS
         CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT
     STABILITY
    END
         MAINTAIN FORM OF GOVERNMENT
    MEANS
         PROVIDE A NOMINATING PROCESS FOR ALL BRANCHES OF
         GOVERNMENT
         ENSURE THAT OFFICEHOLDERS ARE ADEQUATELY EDUCATED FOR
         THEIR POSITIONS
         ALTERNATE
     SURVIVABILITY
    END
         MAINTAIN FORM OF CONSTITUTION
    MEANS
         SENATE OBLIGATION TO OVERSEE
         CONGRESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS
         PROVIDE MECHANISMS FOR SELF-ENFORCEMENT
         IMPEACHMENT PROVISIONS
         NATIONAL RECALL


THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION

Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1:WHY WE NEED A NEW CONSTITUTION

Key terms to search for:

     establish justice
     shortcomings in the enactment
     limited number of representatives
     non-functionally specialized houses
     bicameral passage
     permanently divided against itself
     delay
     accountability
     majority rule
     rise of the special interests
     not cost-effective
     keep laws from being made
     incumbency effect
     undue attention to local interests
     delegation and the escape from the constitution
     the empirical constitution
     obsolescence
     end of the line
     seniority system

Chapter 2: THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION

Article 1: The Legislative Power
       Section 1: Allocation of Legislative Power
       Section 2: The House of Representatives
       Section 3: The Senate
       Section 4: Regulation of Elections and the Legislative Session
       Section 5: Rules of Congressional Procedure
       Section 6: Compensation, Privileges, Restrictions, and
             Responsibilities
       Section 7: The Legislative Review Board
       Section 8: Legislative Procedure
       Section 9: Powers of Congress
      Section 10: Obligations of Congress
      Section 11: The Right to an Education
      Section 12: Other Rights of the People
      Section 13: Other Limitations on Federal Power
      Section 14: Other Limitations on State Power
      Section 15: Legislative Powers of the People

Article 2: The Executive Power
     Article 3: The Judicial Power
     Article 4: The Federal Article
     Article 5: The Amending Power
     Article 6: The Supremacy of the National Government
     Article 7: The Constitutional Supplement
     Article 8: Rules of Construction
     Article 9: The Ratification Article

Chapter 3. EPILOGUE

key terms

     psychological and logical impediments
     legal impediments to establishing a new constitution
     the constitutional safety-valve
     what you can do
     the benefits of action
     constitutional criteria

Further Reading

Selected Bibliography

Footnotes

Topical Index

========================================================================

                          INTRODUCTION

========================================================================

    "People are not so easily got out of their old Forms, as
some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend
the acknowledg'd Faults, in the Frame they have been accustom'd to. And
if there be any Original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by
time, or corruption; 'tis not an easie thing to get them changed, even
when all the World sees there is an opportunity for it."

--John Locke, Second Treatise, 1689

    "[A]ll experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed
to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."

--The Declaration of Independence, 1776

A Nation $4,000,000,000,000 in Debt. The Purchase of America by Foreign
Interests. Toxic Waste Dumps. The Rise of a Monolithic and Unresponsive
Government Bureaucracy. The Growing Necessity of a Two-Income Family.
Crack Babies. Unemployment. Dominance of Government by the Special
Interest Groups. Unnecessary and Cruel Animal Research. A Savings and
Loan Crisis. A 30 Percent Functional Illiteracy Rate. An Alarming Rise
in Violence and Drug Abuse. Schoolchildren Scanned by Metal Detectors.
     We have many problems in society, but our worst problem is a
seeming inability on the part of our Government to deal with our
problems. And yet, our form of government was supposed to remediate our
problems. The Preamble to our Constitution states that the Constitution
was established in order to, among other things, "promote the general
Welfare." Yet a cursory analysis reveals that our Government is falling
far short of the mark. Does the existence of a $4,000,000,000,000
National Debt help "promote the general Welfare"? No. Does the purchase
of $640 toilet seats by the Pentagon help "promote the general Welfare"?
No. Does the failure to prevent the leaching of toxic waste dumps into
aquifers help "promote the general Welfare"? No. Does the domination of
Congress by special interests help "promote the general Welfare"? No.
Unfortunately, these problems (and many, many others) have not only
persisted over time, but are getting worse; to the extent that many
people feel that they will never be solved -- that "there's nothing you
can do about it."
     The Framers of our Constitution did not feel this way. They felt
that not only could Government solve these and other problems -- it was
its chief reason for being! In fact, the mark of the success of
Government was the extent to which it solved those problems.
Interestingly enough, the situation confronting the Framers was parallel
to our own. They were also faced with a decaying Nation (which, among
other things, had a National Debt that could not be paid under the
existing Constitution), but their response was different from ours, and
definitive; they lost no time in going to the root of their problem, by
completely revising the existing constitution (known as the "Articles of
Confederation").
     Needless to say, this was a controversial approach. In 1787, many
had argued that the United States was better off remaining a loose
confederation of States, and that a strong National Government was not
desirable. To counter this assertion, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
and John Jay had to devote 36 essays in The Federalist, the political
classic written in defense of the 1787 Constitution, to the topic of the
inadequacy of the Articles for the Union, and the erroneous nature of
the major premise of the supporters of the Articles: that "united we
fall, divided we stand." As the authors of The Federalist conclusively
demonstrated, the more proper formulation was "united we stand, divided
we fall." Due to a phenomenon in game theory known as the "Prisoner's
Dilemma" (intuitively recognized by the Framers in their writings), a
group of confederated States was doomed to inefficient duplication of
resources, an inability to pass legislation for the common good, and a
tendency to interstate conflict that could be resolved only by war. The
Constitution drafted in the Philadelphia of 1787 was designed to solve
the Prisoner's Dilemma problems relevant to 1787 which the Articles did
not, and did so -- dramatically. But the 1787 Constitution was not
designed to solve the Prisoner's Dilemma problems relevant to 1987, and
therefore it should be no surprise that many clauses in the Constitution
are no longer relevant for modern times. Nor should it be surprising
that the Constitution omits many clauses that are necessary for an
Information Age. Designing a political system appropriate for the times
is one of the most important tasks a people can undertake. Our Framers
did so, and we ought to follow their example.
     The issues in this book, needless to say, are serious, and deserve
serious, careful thought. The Framers of our Constitution were well
aware of the enormity of the task they undertook, and fully expected
future generations to evaluate their handiwork in the light of
subsequent experience -- a task we will undertake here. In Chapter One,
Why We Need A New Constitution, we will see why the Constitution drafted
in 1787, while adequate in many respects, has ultimately led to the
violation of seven critical criteria for a just, efficient, and workable
Government -- criteria the Framers themselves saw as legitimate. In
Chapter Two, The 21st Century Constitution, the only democratic
alternative to the 1787 Constitution authored since 1787 is presented --
a constitution far more likely to satisfy the seven critical criteria
enumerated by the Framers than the Constitution they drafted. And
finally, in Chapter Three, the Epilogue, we will see how the New
Constitution will change life in America, and explore strategies to
secure its enactment.
     Let's begin with an analysis of the adequacy of the Constitution in
light of contemporary reality.

========================== CHAPTER ONE ================================

                 WHY WE NEED A NEW CONSTITUTION

========================================================================

    "AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the
subsisting Federal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a
new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks
its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than
the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which
it is composed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most
interesting in the world."

--Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 1

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of the United States, currently residing in a helium-
filled glass case in Washington, D.C., was drafted in 1787. The America
of 1787, a country with a population nearly half that of the New York
City of 1987, was a country predominantly comprised of farmers. For that
pastoral time (a time which saw the creation of idyllic works of music
like Mozart's Eine Kleine Nachtmusik), the form of Government designed
by the Framers was perfectly adequate, allowing America's natural
magnificence to blossom. However, as the Third Millennium approaches,
more and more Americans are beginning to feel that in many critical
respects, our form of Government is now "out of joint" with the times.
We have had, in Hamilton's words, "an unequivocal experience of the
inefficacy of the subsisting federal government." Our problems have
steadily mounted, and it is becoming increasingly clear that our
Government will not, or cannot, deal with these problems. Consequently,
there has been a noticeable increase in frustration with our political
system, as The New York Times reported in 1991:

    "To many Americans, politics has become remote and sterile,
posing false choices. For all the angry abortion debate, as an example,
most Americans could probably agree in two minutes on a six-word policy:
Discourage abortions but don't ban them. Yet in the political arena, the
extremist fury drags on for still more years, oblivious to urgent
concerns like the blazing spread of measles.
    In a sobering new report, the Kettering Foundation's David
Mathews cites reaction 'against a political system that is perceived as
so autonomous that the public is no longer able to control and direct
it. People talk as though our political system had been taken over by
alien beings.'"

     However, dissatisfaction with Government is nothing new in America,
since our complaints with Government are structurally based -- that is,
societal maladies and unrest have arisen directly from the structure of
Government instituted by the Framers. For this reason, historical
criticisms appear contemporary. Consider this paragraph, written by
Frank Cook (editor of the New York World) in 1923:

    "The American people were never before so critical of their
government as they are now. They were never before so cynical about
their government. They rail at the politicians, they jeer at Congress,
they blackguard the President, whoever he happens to be, but they never
stop to inquire whether their government was established to meet the
demands they are making on it. If they did, they would be obliged to
admit that it was not. They ask a rigid, inflexible government to
function as a responsible and flexible government. They ask a government
of checks and balances to function as a political manifestation of
democracy. They ask a government of co-ordinate and independent branches
to function as a unit. It cannot be done. In spite of all their ardent
devotion to the Constitution, it is apparent that they know little about
the Constitution. They have turned it into a fetish and they burn a vast
quantity of incense before it, but they have forgotten its origins and
have lost contact with its purposes. What they think it is, or what they
think it must be, is something that it was never intended to be, and can
never be made to be, except by a process of almost revolutionary
revision."

The more things change, the more they stay the same. Complaining about
Government has become one of the less enjoyable American pastimes. But
as Cook perceptively noted, people have consistently failed to discover
the fountainhead of the American pathology. It has been said that the
one thing people can learn from history is that people have learned
nothing from history, and contemporary experience is providing a ringing
endorsement of that dictum. But somewhere, somehow, the cycle must stop,
and people must heed Cook's advice, and begin the process of
constitutional analysis -- an analysis that of necessity begins with an
examination of the symptoms of deep-rooted troubles: our seemingly
intransigent societal ills.

THE PREAMBLE AND OUR PROBLEMS

    "Government deficits, the spiraling imbalance of trade,
inconsistencies in foreign policy, illegal immigration, unemployment,
the decay of our cities, the abuse of the environment, the staggering
cost of elections, and the piracy of special interest groups -- these
problems and a host of others have led thoughtful citizens to question
whether our political system is capable of meeting the challenge of
modern government.

-- Committee on the Constitutional System

We know what the outcomes of a successful Constitution are, since the
Preamble to our Constitution states that it was ordained and established
"in order to" effect six main goals: "form a more perfect Union,"
"establish Justice," "insure domestic Tranquility," "provide for the
common Defence," "promote the general Welfare," and "secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." Therefore, at
least some of the indicators of Governmental success or failure are the
extent to which the Objectives outlined in the Preamble have been
achieved.
     This measuring rod established in the Preamble is not flattering to
our Constitution: even a cursory analysis of whether or not these goals
have been met reveals serious inadequacies. For example, one of the
primary goals of the Constitution is to "establish Justice." Justice, of
course, must by definition mean justice for all. But as the Brookings
Institution Task Force found in their evaluation of the justice system
in the area of civil litigation, this goal has not been achieved. In
America, "justice" is meted out to those with the most spare time on
their hands and the deepest pockets:

    "In many courts, litigants must wait for years to resolve
their disputes. In the meantime, their attorneys pursue ever more
expensive means of discovery to prepare for trial, often having to
duplicate their preparation when trial dates are postponed. Among the
bulk of cases that are never tried but settled, many are overprepared
and overdiscovered. In short, civil litigation costs too much and takes
too long.
    The high costs of litigation burden everyone. Our businesses
spend too much on legal expenses at a time when they are confronted with
increasingly intense international competition. They pass those costs on
to consumers, who then pay unnecessarily high prices for the products
and services they buy. People who take their cases to court or who must
defend themselves against legal actions often face staggering bills and
years of delay."

Prophetically, Luther Martin, one of the Framers of our Constitution,
indicated that this would be a future concern in an address delivered to
the Maryland Legislature on November 29, 1787. In that address, Martin
referred to an "almost . . . certain prospect of ruin . . . where the
middle and common class of citizens are interested . . .", and stated
that "the citizen . . . even if ultimately prosperous, must be attended
with a loss of time, a neglect of business, and an expense which will be
greater than the original grievance, and to which men in moderate
circumstances would be utterly unequal."
     The area of civil litigation, of course, is not the only area where
injustice is done. The field of criminal "justice" is a world where the
innocent are imprisoned, where people who cannot afford bail are
incarcerated for months, and a world where disproportionate and
disproportionately applied sentences abound. As Anne Strick reported in
her lengthy and extraordinarily detailed book Injustice for All,

    "Defendants from the world of organized crime are let off
five times oftener than are ordinary persons. Black criminals tend to
receive prison terms averaging nearly one third longer than whites. Poor
defendants serve fully twice as long as those with enough money to hire
their own lawyers. Suspects brought into New York's overflowing courts
receive lighter penalties than those unlucky enough to be convicted of
the same crime upstate."

But the failure to "establish Justice" is only one benchmark. A failure
to find solutions for the important social dilemmas of the day -- a
failure to promote "the general Welfare" -- is another key indicator of
structural inadequacy. Consider Hamilton's observation regarding the
"inefficacy" of Government. If even the passage of simple laws like the
Brady Bill (a measure requiring a seven-day waiting period for the
purchase of handguns) presented grave difficulties (as one
Representative said, "[i]t has been frustrating taking a simple
commonsense measure and having to invest such enormous energy and
resources in getting it passed . . . We've had to raise the visibility
of this proposal to an unwarranted level in relation to what it can do."
), it should be no surprise that the more problematic issues of the day
pose even greater difficulties.
     A brief survey of contemporary journalism reveals real shortcomings
in the enactment of the "general Welfare" Clause. Consider, for example,
the environment, and the solution our Government has promulgated to cope
with another fine mess we've gotten ourselves into, toxic waste dumps:

    "The Environmental Protection Agency's 'Superfund,'
established a decade ago as the ultimate solution to the nation's toxic
waste crisis, is mired in billions of dollars in administrative costs
and attorney's fees that threaten to make the program the most expensive
public policy fiasco in U.S. history.
    In dozens of interviews, environmental experts, former
federal officials and industrial leaders across the country told of
litigation costs so staggering that the final Superfund bill could be
double that of the savings and loan debacle.
    Initially, the Superfund's legislative sponsors expected the
cleanup to be accomplished in a single five-year program costing less
than $5 billion. Today, analysts predict that the program could balloon
to $1 trillion in industry and federal spending and take half a century
to complete.
    At least $200 billion of the total, they say, is likely to
be consumed in 'transaction costs' that do not include any spending for
actual cleanup. Most of this amount will be for corporate attorneys'
fees in thousands of lawsuits. . . .
    EPA records show that only 33 toxic waste sites have been
fully cleaned and removed from the agency's National Priorities List of
the 1,236 most hazardous sites.
    'This is a program that hardly ever gets anything right,'
said Joel Hirschhorn, an environmental consultant in Washington, D.C.,
and former chief Superfund researcher at the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment. A 1989 study by the office found that overall,
'50 to 70 percent of spending in the Superfund program is inefficient.'
    Many of those familiar with the program say the Superfund
was doomed to failure from its inception because of fundamental flaws in
the legislation that created it.
    If current projections of Superfund-related expenditures are
accurate, analysts say, the cost will be at least $2,000 for every
American -- reflected in price increases passed along to consumers on
countless chemical and petroleum-based products used in every U.S. home
-- without even covering the removal of hazardous wastes. . . .
    Some analysts believe that an immense government bailout --
at direct taxpayer expense -- will eventually be needed to finish the
toxic cleanup and to provide emergency backing for commercial insurance
companies facing enormous Superfund-related liability.
     'Where is the money? How much has been used? On what?' asked
Carmine Iannuzzi, president of Massachusetts-based Camger Chemical
Systems, which made the protective coating for the mustard gas suits
worn by troops in the Persian Gulf war. 'It seems like a lot of money
has simply vanished without accomplishing anything.'. . . .
    [A]ccording to chemical industry and environmental group
sources, as much as $12 billion has already been consumed in transaction
costs -- primarily feeding an immense new legal industry that has emerged
to negotiate Superfund cases. About $8 billion has been used for clean-
up. . . .
    According to the study by the Office of Technology
Assessment, legal fees and overhead associated with the Superfund could
eventually exceed $200 billion, or 44 percent of anticipated total
costs. Other sources say the transaction costs, most of which will be
borne by private industry, may equal 60 percent of the total.
    The most comprehensive independent research analysis of the
Superfund is a 1989 Rand Corp. study, which is now being updated.
Principal researcher Jan Acton said he could not release the new Rand
data, which are scheduled for publication in August, but added: 'The
numbers (for attorneys' fees and overhead) could be truly staggering.'"

But there are some individuals who enjoy wading in this environmental
quagmire -- the attorneys:

    "It took Dell Perlman 'no longer than my first Superfund
negotiating session' to conclude that the toxic waste crisis is a
bonanza for at least one U.S. industry -- the legal profession.
     The session, a preliminary hearing on a hazardous dump, was
scheduled recently at a high school near a contaminated disposal site.
'EPA had to hold it in the gym, because so many people turned out,' said
Perlman, who is assistant general counsel for the Chemical Manufacturers
Association.
    'I looked around the stands, and I realized they were full
of lawyers, all billing their time at around $200 per hour,' he said.
'Extrapolate those kinds of costs over the next 10 years, and you come
up with quite a figure.'. . .
    [T]here are more than 20,000 U.S. attorneys now specializing
in environmental litigation and issues, up from fewer than 2,000 when
the Superfund was created in 1980. . . .
     Their needs have generated a golden job market where none existed
barely, a decade ago. According to the National Law Journal, attorneys
six years out of law school who have experience in environmental
litigation are being offered salaries of up to $225,000 a year."

The Superfund legislation may furnish livelihoods, even upper-class
livelihoods, but it is not preventing environmental disasters in the
making. For example, the EPA reported in 1991 that 22,650 U.S. plants
and facilities released 5.7 billion pounds of new toxic chemicals into
the environment in 1989 -- new releases and emissions coupled with
Legislative and Judicial delays against combating these emissions means
that "projected costs rise with each day spent in court -- rather than at
the sites themselves -- as untouched toxic wastes seep into groundwater
and increase the size of polluted areas that must be cleaned up."
     In the area of National Health, another intrinsic part of the
"general Welfare," our Government maintained for many years the
existence of a system itself chronically ill:

    "The American Health care system is the most expensive in
the world, but for those not in its mainstream, the care it offers is
among the most unsatisfactory. Americans pay $700 billion a year [and]
[l]ife expectancy in the United States is shorter than in 15 other
nations, and infant mortality is worse than in 22 other countries. . . .
    In any two-year period there are 34 million people without
health insurance. But the number who lose their insurance at least
temporarily is nearly double that many, 63 million.
     For businesses, tension is rising. Companies watch as health care
spending devours ever larger portions of their profits. In the 1960's,
businesses spent about 4 to 8 cents of each dollar of profits on health
care. In 1990, it was 25 to 50 cents per dollar and rising. . . .
    But on the Potomac, when there is too much interest in a
subject a political paralysis can result. In Congress there have been no
fewer than 14 proposals to revamp the national system. At the White
House, there have been no major proposals, as political specialists wait
for the right conservative proposal and the right moment -- just before
or just after the election -- to put it forward."

In the area of National Defense, another aspect of the "general
Welfare," the United States is beset with a military-industrial complex
that has failed to "provide for the common defense" in an efficient
manner, and has instead given us debacles such as $640 toilet seats,
$1,100 stool-leg caps, and $2000 nuts, not to mention pork-barrel
spending like the B-1 bomber:

    "The B-1 was built on time and roughly within cost, but at a
terrible price: it doesn't work as promised. Its electronics system can
jam signals from the airborne radars of Soviet fighters and missiles,
but there are apparently others that the system will not jam without a
complete redesign. . . . The B-1 will probably limp along with Band-Aid
fixes, always a step behind Soviet air defenses, until in a few years it
is replaced by the B-2. That's a huge waste of $28 billion. . . . [and
the reasons?]
    DESIGN DRIVEN BY SERVICE AGENDAS. The Air Force designed the
B-1 first, then its mission. . . .
    CONTRACTS NOT AWARDED ON MERIT ALONE. Sometimes the Pentagon
or a powerful state delegation wants to keep a failing contractor in
business or a production line open. . . .
    CONGRESSIONAL INTERESTS OVERRIDING DEFENSE. Once the
Pentagon has decided on a large program, the contractor can spread
subcontracts to key Congressional districts, building an unstoppable
constituency. Subcontracts for the B-1 stretched across 48 states. . .
."

The B-2, the B-1 replacement, has turned out to be twice the fiasco at
four times the cost.
     The breakdown in the Justice System, the Environment, National
Health, and National Defense represent only a fraction of the more
obvious symptoms of deeply-rooted structural inadequacies. More subtle
and disturbing indicators are on the horizon, like the BCCI and Savings
and Loan Scandals, and the failure of banks in general:

    "As many as 440 banks may fail this year and in 1992,
costing the insurance fund $23 billion and leaving it with a deficit of
nearly $6 billion next year.
    [T]he Band-aid solutions being applied, in the form of
Treasury borrowing, will do no more than postpone the inevitable bill to
taxpayers until after Election Day 1992.
    'We're in the grand denial phase, just like 1987 and 1988,
when Congress and the Administration did nothing about savings and
loans,' said Walker Todd, a lawyer who is on leave from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland to write a book about the Federal Reserve
Board.
    On Capitol Hill, where the House banking committee is to
begin drafting legislation Wednesday to lend billions of dollars of
taxpayer money to the battered deposit insurance fund, lawmakers are
running scared.
    No incumbent sees anything to gain politically by voting to
put more public funds at risk, although everyone recognizes something
has to be done to avoid further damage to the nation's financial system.
Many members blame themselves as much as the regulators and the Reagan
Administration for the savings and loan debacle -- Congress, after all,
approved the industry's deregulation -- and they see the possibility of a
repeat performance. . . ."

And problems that hit even closer to home are ignored. Alarming
statistics have been released in recent years regarding children:
500,000 American children are runaways, 360,000 American children are in
foster care, 14,500,000 American children suffer emotional illness or
developmental deviations, suicide is the second leading cause of death
among children, and 1,000 "crack" babies are born daily. Yet in the face
of these appalling statistics, the Legislative Branch has taken no
decisive action. Nor has the Judiciary, the protector (in theory) of
individual rights. As Judge Charles Gill stated, "It is ironic that,
although corporations in the United States have long been held to be
'persons,' and thus are eligible for constitutional protection, the
extent to which children, as individuals, have comparable constitutional
rights is still not entirely clear." The working-out of ineffectual
social policies continues:

    "In 1989, there were 1,200 babies born in the Yale-New Haven
clinic. Ninety percent of those mothers had used illegal drugs during
their pregnancies. Fifty percent had used cocaine within forty-eight
hours of delivery. Child abuse cases are up eighty-five percent in the
last decade. Sexual abuse cases are up 250% in the same period.
    "Like most states, Connecticut has a child protective
agency. The Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services
(D.Y.C.S) has a child abuse hotline number. It is conceded that sixty
percent of such calls are not afforded any response.

This indicator of social collapse is not confined merely to Connecticut,
according to The United States Advisory Board on Child Abuse and
Neglect, which concluded that "child abuse and neglect in the United
States now represents a national emergency," and made three findings:

    "1. Each year hundreds of thousands of children are being
starved and abandoned, burned and severely beaten, raped and sodomized,
berated and belittled;

    2. The system the nation had devised to respond to child
abuse and neglect is failing; and

    3. The United States spends billions of dollars on programs
that deal with the result of the nation's failure to prevent and treat
child abuse and neglect."

Of course, the "band-aid solutions" America has offered are the only
ones it can offer, in a Congressional world where substantive political
changes are impossible. This litany of infirmities, and their
persistence over time, indicates a causality that is chronic. Something
is wrong at the deepest levels of our Government -- perhaps in that glass
case in Washington, D.C.
     Due to these recent developments, it should be no surprise that the
focus in the academic world has turned to our political structure. Many
academics and former officials of Government have seen the existence of
these social developments as symptoms of a disease in the body politic,
a disease which is itself rooted in the structure of the 1787
Constitution. Few have stated the issue as succinctly as Abe Fortas, the
former Justice of the Supreme Court, who wrote that

    "The controls that the Founding Fathers adopted are no
longer adequate. The balance that the Founding Fathers ingeniously
devised no longer exists. It has been destroyed by the complexities of
modern life, the vast expansion of governmental function, the decline of
Congress . . . and, principally, by its failure to effectively
reorganize its management and procedures, and by the enormous increase
in presidential power and prestige."

Fortas was seconded by C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury
under President Kennedy, who stated that "until we are prepared to
examine the basic structure of our federal system . . . our problems
will remain . . . and, in all probability, increase in severity. Over
time, many in the academic community have attempted to "examine the
basic structure of our federal system" and identify the flaws inherent
in the 1787 Constitution. To give one example, Whicker, Strickland, and
Moore (1987) listed in their book The Constitution Under Pressure five
such structural defects:

(1) Limited number of representatives results in

          (a) higher constituent to representative ratios.
          (b) unreasonable workloads for representatives.

(2) Selecting senators on the basis of states

          (a) violates the democratic criterion of one-person one-
              vote.
          (b) malapportionment biases power against citizens from
              large states.

(3) Non-functionally specialized houses

          (a) leaves citizens unable to effectively disaggregate
              electorally their policy preferences.
          (b) undercuts representative responsibility and
              accountability and leads to single-issue voting.

(4) Bicameral passage of all legislation

          (a) results in lengthy delays in developing programs.
          (b) creates multiple veto points where interest groups can
              wield disproportionate power.

(5) No hierarchical accountability between the Senate and
         the House of Representatives

          (a) undermines long term planning, national interests, and
              coordination.
          (b) leads to internal committee specialization which
              disenfranchises voters from most policy initiation.

This list, of course, is only a starting point. In fact, there have been
several books and many, many articles on the imperfections of our
Constitution. What is interesting is that while there has been
disagreement as to which particular structural feature or features are
primarily responsible for the decay of our Government and society in
general, there is a general consensus as to the genesis of the problem --
the political theory of the Framers, which molded the fundamental shape
of our Constitution.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FRAMERS

    "The very complication of the business, by introducing a
necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies, would of
itself afford a solid objection. . . . [a] source of so great
inconvenience and expense as alone ought to condemn the project."

-- Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 75

The consensus among critics of the Constitution is that many of the
ordeals we are confronted with in our society are directly traceable to
a constitutional structure that was designed by the Framers to be
permanently divided against itself. The structure they instituted has
resulted in paralysis and a lack of governmental accountability, and a
concomitant inability to prevent social breakdown.
     This was not completely the fault of the Framers; after all, they
were not designing a Constitution for the 21st Century. They were simply
trying to create a New Constitution for the 18th Century, since
experience with the previous constitution (the Articles of
Confederation) revealed fatal flaws in that document. Consequently, our
Framers met in the Federal Convention of 1787 to draft a New
Constitution for the United States of America. This 1787 Constitution
was formed under several new theories of Government -- most notably the
Separation of Powers Principle and the need for a Bicameral Legislature
-- which Hamilton enumerated in Federalist 9:

    "The regular distribution of power into distinct departments
-- the introduction of legislative balances and checks -- the institution
of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior
-- the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of
their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their
principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means,
and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government
may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided."

In one of the most famous essays in The Federalist, Federalist 51,
Madison described how the principle of Government divided against itself
into three separate Branches would maintain the integrity of the
individual Branches:

    "To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort for
maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the
several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? . . . [T]he
defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. .
. .
    [E]ach department should have a will of its own; and,
consequently, should be so constituted that the members of each should
have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of
the others."

A system of Checks and Balances was instituted, which allowed each one
of the three Branches of Government, the Legislative (the lawmakers),
the Executive (the enforcers of the law), and the Judicial (the
determinants of whether or not a law was broken) to restrict in some
manner the actions of the other:

    "[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to
the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place."

The Framers knew that it was not enough to rely on politicians to "do
the right thing" and maintain the integrity of the Branches themselves;
even the power of voting politicians out of office was not enough to
secure the constitutional structure. Thus, the Constitution would
contain within itself the means of its self-preservation. Under the
Separation of Powers Principle as instituted in the Constitution, each
Branch would confront the other. Government was weakened under the
divide et impera [divide and rule] maxim referred to by Hamilton in
Federalist 7:

    "This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests,
the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system
of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly
displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a
manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private
interest of every individual may be a centinel over the public rights."

Since the nature of the powers were different, the nature of the checks
also had to be different. Because the Legislative Branch was seen as the
most powerful, it was subdivided (again, divide et impera) into a House
of Representatives and Senate.

    "[I]t is not possible to give to each department an equal
power of self defence. In republican government, the legislative
authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is
to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them,
by different modes of election and different principles of action, as
little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions
and their common dependence on the society will admit."

As if this evisceration of Legislative power wasn't enough to secure the
objective of the Framers, the Executive Branch was given what was
actually a Legislative power, an overrulable veto, to stop
"encroachments" by the Legislative Branch. Thus, the form of Government
given to us by the Framers in 1787 was a Legislative Branch divided into
two separate Branches, with that Branch checked by a President with veto
power, and a Supreme Court with the power (as it subsequently developed)
to determine laws unconstitutional -- a Government permanently divided
against itself. This division sought to preserve the integrity of the
Branches, but at a heavy and unavoidable cost: delay in the face of a
necessity for action.

THE 1787 SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DELAY

    "[I]t would tend to increase the complexity of the political
machine, and to add a new spring to the government, the utility of which
would at best be questionable . . . [it] might in practice be subject to
a variety of casualties and inconveniences."

-- Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 65 (on a separate body for
Impeachments)

The most obvious source of delay in Government due to the Separation of
Powers Principle as instituted in the Constitution is the Bicameral
House -- every law must be passed in identical form by two separate
Legislative bodies, a requirement that allows few laws to emerge
unscathed. Even in 1776, this notion was seen as counterproductive by an
anonymous author, who wrote in "Four Letters on Interesting Subjects"
that

    "The notion of checking by having different houses, has but
little weight in it, when inquired into, and in all cases it tends to
embarrass and prolong business; besides, what kind of checking is it
that one house is to receive from another? or which is the house that is
most to be trusted to? . . . That some kind of convenience might now and
then arise from having two houses, is granted, and the same may be said
of twenty houses; but the question is, whether such a mode would not
produce more hurt than good. . . . a perpetual and dangerous opposition
would be kept up, and no business be got through: Whereas, were there a
large, equal, and annual representation in one house only, the different
parties, by being thus blended together, would hear each others
arguments, which advantage they cannot have if they sit in different
houses. . . .
    The chief convenience arising from two houses is, that the
second may sometimes amend small imperfections which would otherwise
pass; yet, there is nearly as much chance of their making alteration for
the worse as the better; and the supposition that a single house may
become arbitrary, can with more reason be said of two, because their
strength is greater. Besides, when all the supposed advantages arising
from two houses are put together, they do not appear to balance the
disadvantage. A division in one house will not retard business, but
serves rather to illustrate; but a difference between two houses may
produce serious consequences."

This warning, unfortunately, was not heeded by our Framers, even though
Madison acknowledged that "this complicated check on legislation may in
some instances be injurious as well as beneficial . . . ." Over time, a
Committee and Seniority System has been created in both houses of
Congress which has exacerbated the latent defects of Bicameralism. Under
our Bicameral System as it exists in the 20th Century, the delay has
been compounded in a way our anonymous author could not have
contemplated:

    "In order for the average bill to become a law it must be:
(1) introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate; (2)
referred by both houses to separate committees where hearings are held
and recommendations are made; (3) debated and passed in both chambers;
(4) sent to a conference committee if the versions passed in separate
houses are different; (5) approved by each house; and (6) signed into
law by the president. Some bills, which overlap into more than one
committee jurisdiction in each house or must be sent to subcommittees,
have even more obstacles to final passage.
    The passage of legislation is extremely difficult under such
a decentralized system. The multiple decision points through which a
bill must pass require majority coalitions at each gate to push the
measure along. There is a complex division of labor in Congress.
Responsibilities for specific policy areas are delegated among numerous
committees and subcommittees. There are 269 committees and subcommittees
in both houses of Congress. Broader issues, like the national defense,
education and health care are divided into smaller subissue categories
for committee consideration. . . .
    The committees decide which bills will be reported to the
floor for debate and which will be placed on the back burner of the
congressional agenda. Favorable committee reports do not necessarily
ensure the passage of the bill on the floor, but the more favorable the
report from committee, the greater the probability for passage. . . .
    In the Eighty-ninth Congress (1965-1967), 26,566 measures
were introduced, 4,200 were reported from committee and 810 became
public law. A similar trend continued in the Ninety-seventh Congress:
although fewer measures were introduced (only 13,240), 1,877 were
reported from committee and 473 became public law. Thus, the committee
system as a gatekeeper of what is debated and what is not debated
remains extremely important . . ."

As Greenberg (1986) noted, confirming the anonymous author of 1776, the
Bicameral System inevitably led to the postponement of action, and has
even changed the nature of the legislation ultimately passed. The medium
doesn't allow every message:

    "[T]he bicameral nature of Congress and its contrasting
constituency bases [Districts vs. States] not only serve to slow down
the pace of legislation but also significantly decrease the probability
that any general purpose legislation will manage to wind its way to
completion. These elements of the constitutional organization of
Congress make it halting, conservative, and indecisive. The Constitution
further contributes to these characteristics by specifying that only
one-third of the Senate shall be up for election at any one time,
helping to insulate that body from the tides of popular sentiment. By
its constitutional organization, then, Congress faces barriers to
decisive, popular, and unified action."

While the Framers approved Bicameralism, they did so with no empirical
evidence of its ultimate effects, ultimate effects which were, in fact,
seen by them as negative. For example, the result of the Bicameral
process was an enfeeblement of Government, and feeble Government was
seen as bad Government. As Hamilton stated in Federalist 70, "A feeble
execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government
ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad
government." Feeble Government, like a toothless watchdog, would bite
neither mailmen nor burglars. What Hamilton wrote in a different context
applies equally well to the Bicameral System: "The most to be expected
from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative merit
of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good."
     "The positive merit of doing good" was made virtually impossible
because of an institutionalized and debilitating delay, a delay which
was dangerous even in 1787, a far more relaxed time. As Jay stated in
Federalist 64,

    "They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men,
must have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular
in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run
twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by
these tides in national affairs is the business of those who preside
over them; and they who have had much experience on this head inform us,
that there frequently are occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are
precious."

There could be no doubt that the Legislative process, stodgy by nature,
would be rendered even stodgier by the Bicameral requirement. According
to Justice William O. Douglas, "Legislative power . . . is slower to
exercise [than Executive power]. There must be delay while the ponderous
machinery of committees, hearings, and debates is put into motion. That
takes time; and while the Congress slowly moves into action, the
emergency may take its toll." Delay feeds vicious circles, which are
vicious enough without help from Government. Unsolved problems mount. A
failure to combat drug abuse leads to crack addiction. Crack addiction
leads to crack babies. The existence of crack babies leads to a
diversion of medical resources to help the babies. In turn, resources
need to be diverted to schools to help these children, many of whom are
brain-damaged, blind, or otherwise physically or mentally debilitated.
Thus, money that could have been used to create positive effects is
wasted in attempting to counter negative effects. What most people would
see as insane is inevitable, because in Washington, D.C., structural
procrastination impedes fundamental action:

    "A criticism often leveled at the U.S. Congress is its
inability to enact legislation concerned with pressing national problems
without long, arduous delays. It is not unusual for Congress to adjourn
after a long session without having dealt with some urgent matter before
it. In past years it has failed, for example, to pass a fiscal year
appropriations bill until months after the date when the actual fiscal
year began.
    This lack of action handicaps orderly administration. It is
not uncommon for Congress to approve minor, nondivisive measures in
every session; moreover, in crises it can act quickly. But often it is
unable or unwilling to act on pressing problems unless they reach a
crisis stage. . . ."

Hazlitt (1942) understood that institutionalizing delay because it was
occasionally beneficial was like refusing to teach people to think
because some would think about committing crimes: "A nation can erect a
complicated set of hurdles and barriers to compel itself to delay
decisions, but . . . [b]y the obstacles it erects, it discourages itself
from making any new decision, regardless of its merits. The self-erected
barriers tend to bias its decision unduly against . . . proposed
change." And Hamilton's fears that "the positive merit of doing good"
would be in jeopardy have come to fruition. Today, a permanent stasis is
apparent in Congress. As Representative Romano L. Mazzoli (D-KY) stated,
"There's a frustration level. It doesn't seem like any problem is ever
solved around here."
     Thus, the first defect of the Separation of Powers Principle as
instituted in the Constitution is that it creates delay in the face of a
necessity for action. But that's only the first problem.

THE 1787 SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Another problem with the Separation of Powers Principle as it exists
under our Constitution is that the division of responsibility as
instituted obliterated accountability. This effect was noted by Hazlitt:

    "Congress can prevent the President from doing as he wishes
but cannot make him do what it wishes. Responsibility is divided and
lost even within Congress itself. The Senate can block the overwhelming
will of the House, though that will may reflect an equal sentiment in
the country. Worse, a single Senate committee chairman, chosen by
seniority, can often block the expressed will of the House and prevent
the Senate from expressing a will by his mere inaction."

The result of this system, even in their quiet times, as Bryce pointed
out, is that the nation does not know 'how or where to fix
responsibility for misfeasance or neglect,' and 'no one acts under the
full sense of direct accountability.'

According to author Harold Laski,

    "It is desirable that the source of responsibility for
governmental error or wrong should be clear and unmistakable; the
American system so disperses responsibility that its detection is
approximately impossible. It is urgent that the working of institutions
should be conducted in the perspective of discussion which educates and
clarifies the public mind; but the essential tasks of operation in
America are almost wholly concealed from the public view. . . . A
governmental system, moreover, should be sensitive to the opinion of its
constituents, and maximize the opportunity of translating a coherent
body of doctrine into statute; yet it seems the purpose of American
institutions deliberately to avoid the sensitiveness, on the other hand,
and to prevent the making of coherent policy upon the other."

Accountability was one of the chief victims of the Separation of Powers
principle as it was implemented under the 1787 Constitution. According
to Hazlitt, "The great defect of the American system is not merely that
it can bring deadlock between . . . the two houses of Congress . . . but
that it usually becomes impossible to fix the precise responsibility for
that deadlock or to do anything about resolving it." Hamilton viewed
this ultimate consequence of the actions of the Framers in a negative
light. As he stated with regard to division of responsibility in the
Executive Branch, plurality (assigning the execution of a responsibility
to two separate people or bodies) would obliterate accountability:

    "[P]lurality . . . tends to conceal faults and destroy
responsibility. . . . It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual
accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a
pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to
fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and
under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in
suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to
any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated
that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different
degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole
that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to
pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is
truly chargeable.
    'I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided
in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution
on the point.' These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand,
whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the
trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs
of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to
undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be a collusion
between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the
circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was
the precise conduct of any of those parties?
    [T]the people remain altogether at a loss to determine by
whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so
unqualified, and so manifestly improper. . . .
    [P]lurality . . . tends to deprive the people of the two
greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any
delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose
their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure
attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the
uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of
discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons
they trust, in order either to their removal from office, or to their
actual punishment, in cases which admit of it."

     This issue is only too contemporary. Take, for example, the topic
of the National Debt. Congress blames the President. The President
blames Congress. The House blames the Senate, and the Senate blames the
House. The Democrats blame the Republicans, and the Republicans blame
the Democrats. Who's at fault? As Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1886:

    "It is . . . manifestly a radical defect in our federal
system that it parcels out power and confuses responsibility as it does.
The main purpose of the Convention of 1787 seems to have been to
accomplish this grievous mistake. The 'literary theory' of checks and
balances is simply a consistent account of what our constitution-makers
tried to do; and those checks and balances have proved mischievous just
to the extent to which they have succeeded in establishing themselves as
realities. It is quite safe to say that were it possible to call
together again the members of that wonderful Convention to view the work
of their hands in the light of the century that has tested it, they
would be the first to admit that the only fruit of dividing power had
been to make it irresponsible."

Power is divided under our Constitution not only because legislation
must pass two separate Legislative bodies in identical form, and not
only because legislation must also survive a potential Presidential
veto, but because legislation, even if passed, must be enforced by the
Executive Branch. In point of fact, passage of legislation is only the
first hurdle; in actual practice, laws can be vitiated by an Executive
Branch which does not "take care" that laws be faithfully executed, as
required by the Constitution. This Accountability violation was
reflected in the headline to an article appearing in The New York Times
-- "Congress and Administration Trade Blame for Keeping Legislation on
Shelf":

    "Because of bureaucratic foot-dragging, complex directives
from Congress and in some cases ideological hostility, the Federal
Government has failed to carry out major parts of health, environmental
and housing laws passed with much fanfare in recent years.
    The delays have left Congress stymied, consumer groups
frustrated and businesses sometimes paralyzed in the absence of
prescribed regulations. . . .
    Bush Administration officials acknowledge that they have
missed many of the deadlines set by Congress for the new laws. But they
say Congress is partly to blame because it writes laws of impenetrable
complexity with countless mandates and gives Federal agencies
insufficient time to write needed regulations.
    Federal officials say the problem has become more widespread
in recent years. They cite these examples:
    Two decades after Congress ordered the Environmental
Protection Agency to identify and regulate 'hazardous air pollutants,'
the agency has issued emission standards for only seven chemicals.
    In 1987, Congress established a comprehensive program of
assistance to homeless people. But recently Federal District Judge
Oliver Gasch accused the Administration of a 'complete failure' to
comply with the law, saying 'pitifully few' unused Federal properties
had been made available to assist the homeless. . . .
     The Government has yet to issue final regulations for cleaning up
waste storage sites under a 1984 law. As a result, thousands of
companies are operating 'under a cloud of doubt and uncertainty,' said
Theresa Pugh, director of environmental quality at the National
Association of Manufacturers.
    'There are a million ways for recalcitrant Federal agencies
to vitiate a law,' said Representative Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon.
'It is extraordinarily frustrating. Contrary to what civics textbooks
might suggest, passing legislation today is just the very first step.
After that, you have to run through a veritable gauntlet of
administrative processes and procedures to get the law carried out.'
    The Reagan Administration sometimes used administrative
delays as a device to enforce its philosophy of less government and to
save money, and Congress responded by imposing more specific mandates
and tighter deadlines, creating a cycle that aggravated the
     problem. . . .
    Congress, lobbyists, the White House and millions of
Americans typically focus on legislative battles, assuming that a bill
takes effect when signed by the President. But the partisan sparring
over legislation often continues long after it is signed into law.
    James M. Strock, enforcement director of the Environmental
Protection Agency from 1989 through this February, said the delays led
to a vicious circle: When Congress feels that an agency is is moving too
slowly, it sets deadlines. The agency fails to meet them, generating
further disappointment and distrust on Capitol Hill. So lawmakers set
tighter deadlines and more detailed requirements, which the agency finds
even more difficult to meet. . . .
    Disagreements over new laws are common after a decade in
which Republicans controlled the White House and Democrats dominated
Congress. Regulations can be written to distort or even to thwart the
intent of Congress. To prevent such abuse, Congress writes highly
prescriptive laws that read like regulations.
    Even when an agency is eager to carry out a new law, it must
negotiate with the Office of Management and Budget, which often demands
changes in proposed rules to reduce the cost or to minimize the burden
on private industry. Congress itself may not provide the money needed to
carry out or enforce a new law. . . .
    Michael J. Horowitz, counsel to the director of the Office
of Management and Budget from 1981 to 1985, said Reagan Administration
officials often viewed 'nonenforcement of the law' as an easy way to
deal with statutes and regulations they disliked.
    Federal courts recently criticized the Federal Trade
Commission for failing to carry out a simple 1986 law that required
health warnings in all advertisements for snuff and chewing tobacco. The
commission exempted advertisements on promotional products like T-
shirts, beach blankets, baseball caps and coffee mugs.
    The law prescribed the exact text of the warnings, which
said, for example, 'This product may cause mouth cancer.' The F.T.C.
argued that people would misread such warnings to mean that T-shirts and
beach blankets caused cancer when they were emblazoned with
advertisements for tobacco.
    In a study of the Medicaid program, Eleanor D. Kinney, a law
professor at Indiana University, found that Federal officials issued
rules rapidly 'to implement executive branch initiatives.' But she said
officials were 'quite slow' to publish rules needed to carry out laws
opposed by the Administration. Thus, she said, rules intended to save
money were issued promptly, while rules expanding health care benefits
for children and pregnant women were delayed. . . .
    Representative Henry A. Waxman, Democrat of California,
said, 'The E.P.A. often produces carefully considered regulatory
proposals, based on an extensive record and lengthy studies, only to see
them dismissed out of hand by White House officials eager to protect
industry from the cost of regulation.'"

Note that our current Constitution, as it exists in practice, is in
effect a polycameral Government. What began as a separation of powers
developed into a blending of powers, with Legislative power gradually
coming to be vested in the Executive Branch. This development has led to
the demise of yet another critical Principle: the Principle of Majority
Rule.

THE 1787 SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
     MAJORITY RULE

In our modern century, this "complicated check on legislation" has
indeed proven to be "injurious," leading not only to delay and a lack of
Accountability, but also to a departure from the central maxim of
democracy -- the Principle of Majority Rule:

    "The inevitable tendency of our system has been 'to widen
the gulf between the government and the people, to discourage serious
political thinking and debate save at moments of grave crisis, to
increase the power of corrupt machine politics, and to cultivate an
easy-going indifference to abuses. . . . The existing Constitution,
however great its virtues in any particular respect, does not permit of
genuine popular government. The rigidity of the electoral system, the
divorce of the executive from the legislature, and the well-nigh
uncontrollable power of the courts combine to centralize political power
in the hands of a comparatively few individuals who are only remotely
responsible to the people, and whose acts can be reviewed by the people
only at long and fixed intervals.'"

The final consequence of our system has been the subversion of what
Hamilton referred to as "the fundamental maxim of republican government"
-- that "the sense of the majority should prevail." As Whicker (1987)
noted,

    "Bicameralism . . . diminishes accountability and
effectiveness by providing several more decision points at which
powerful special interests may thwart legislation which actually
reflects majority opinion. Bicameralism then serves the interests of
powerful, often economically based minority factions, which can muster
the money, knowledge and resources to engage in machinations in the
halls of Congress. Bicameralism does nothing to serve the interests of
minority interests which have traditionally been excluded from societal
power structures, and often results in thwarting majority rule."

But Hamilton had warned against solutions which violated fundamental
maxims:

    "[W]hat at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a
poison. . . . The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of
something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition
that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to
embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government,
and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an
insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations
and decisions of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of a
nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength, of
its government is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a
necessity for action. The public business must, in some way or other, go
forward. If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a
majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in
order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the
minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of
the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious
delays -- continual negotiation and intrigue -- contemptible compromises
of the public good. . . . upon some occasions things will not admit of
accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously
suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of
obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a
state of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness,
sometimes border upon anarchy. . . .
    When the concurrence of a large number is required by the
constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest
satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely to
be done; but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill
may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be
necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in
which they may happen to stand at particular periods."

Unfortunately, our form of Government has not only allowed a
"pertinacious" Minority to stifle Majority preferences, it has actually
institutionalized the phenomenon. What at first sight seemed a remedy
was, in reality, a poison. The multiple decision points required by the
Separation of Powers Principle as instituted in the Constitution have
given rise to a Government not of, by, and for the People, but of, by,
and for the Special Interest Groups.

The Rise of the Special Interests

Because the Government is complicated and fundamentally unaccountable,
only special interests can afford to get involved in the political
system, since the costs of entry are high, and involvement is not cost-
effective for the average Citizen: according to John Gardner (Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare in the Johnson Administration), it is a
mistake to think of the Federal Government as a unified entity; rather,
"[i]t is a collection of fragments under the virtual control of highly
organized special interests . . . In the special-interest state that we
have forged, every well-organized interest owns a piece of the rock."
     This consequence was known to the Framers, and was properly feared.
In fact, Madison was acutely aware of the threat that special interests
(called "factions" in 1787) would acquire an undue influence over
Government, and even devoted a famous essay, Federalist 10, to an
examination of this concern. To Madison, preventing the threat of
faction control of Government was a key role for any constitution.
Amazingly, however, Madison dismissed the most critical problem society
would face in one sentence! As Elliot (1985) reported,

    "What has not attracted sufficient notice about Madison's
argument in Federalist 10, however, is the cavalier way in which he
dismisses 'minority Factions' as a potential threat to the public
interest:
    If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is
supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to
defeat its sinister views by regular vote, it [a minority faction] may
clog the administration; it may convulse the society; but it will be
unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the
constitution.
    Madison's argument that popular elections are sufficient to
insure that minority interest groups do not pose a serious threat to the
public interest is simply wrong. Madison's argument depends on the
assumption that majorities will take the steps necessary to inform and
organize themselves to protect their self-interest, but this assumption
is demonstrably wrong, as Mancur Olson has shown in his recent book, The
Rise and Decline of Nations.
    Madison was wrong because Majority organization is not cost-
effective when the benefits of organizing are very slight (i.e.,
individual Government actions with potential Majority opposition, such
as tax loopholes for special interests, result in only a slight cost to
individuals who are not a part of the favored Minority) -- and the costs
of organizing a Majority around discrete issues are high. No such
debilitating effects affect the well-organized special interests, who a)
have the funds to organize, b) have a cost-effective financial interest
to organize [e.g., a tax loophole can have enormous short-term financial
consequences for the special interest], and c) are unified on the issue
which most affects them. Compounding these effects, as Elliot further
observed, the passage of time has eroded whatever natural checks there
were against the ability of special interests to capture the Government:
    [The Framers] carefully crafted a political system in which
various elements of the federal government would be elected by different
constituencies in the hope that diversity in the distribution of
interests among the varying electoral constituencies would prevent any
special interest group from exercising undue influence over the
government as a whole. . . .
    The house of Representatives being to be elected immediately
by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by
the electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would be
little probability of a common interest to cement these different
branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.
    The basic institutional checks designed by the framers of
the Constitution to limit the power of interest groups have long since
eroded. First, the seventeenth amendment provided direct popular
election of Senators. Second, the electoral college has now become
largely vestigial, so that as a practical matter, the President is also
popularly elected. Third, a vast "administrative state" with broad
delegated powers has arisen that lies largely outside the system of
checks and balances crafted so carefully by the framers. Finally, as
both the country and the nature of government have changed, the
principle of geographic diversity of interests, upon which the framers
placed primary reliance, is no longer as potent a check on the power of
special interest groups as it may once have been. Today there are many
interest groups that are more or less evenly distributed throughout the
country (social security recipients, for example), and they can bring
potent electoral pressures to bear on Representatives, Senators, and
Presidents alike.
    The cumulative effect of these changes is to render our
political institutions systematically vulnerable to the influence of
well-organized, narrowly-focused groups seeking subsidies or other forms
of preferential treatment from the federal government. The current
deficit is merely the outward symptom of these more fundamental
problems, resulting from the way in which our political institutions
have evolved."

The existence of latent structural flaws became apparent when the Nation
began incurring its first serious budget deficits in the late 60's (as a
consequence of the Vietnam War). The Government began its slow and
inevitable decline, as the special interests began to consolidate their
power. By 1978, the systemic nature of our infirmities had become clear,
and in November of that year, The New York Times devoted a three-part
series to an examination of this breakdown in Government:

    "John Gardner, the founder of Common Cause, the public-
affairs lobby, says the nation is being whipsawed by a multiplicity of
special interest groups, resulting in 'a paralysis in national
policymaking.'
    Daniel Bell, professor of sociology at Harvard, said at a
recent meeting of the American Jewish Congress: 'Our political
institutions do not match the scales of economic and social reality. The
national state has become too small for the big problems of life and too
big for the small problems.' . . .
     Tom Hayden says 'You can take any issue you want, and the system
isn't delivering. There is no glue holding the country together.'
     From the White House, Stuart Eizenstat, President Carter's chief
adviser for domestic affairs, speaks of 'an increasingly fragmented
society.'
    Disarray in government and dissatisfaction with it have
always been part of the American system. John F. Kennedy is remembered,
for example, as a forceful, charismatic President but one who was unable
to effect relatively mild reforms in the early 1960's after having run
on a promise to 'get this country moving again.' . . .
    [T]here is a consensus that no coalition of interests is
strong enough to set priorities for the overall public good to effect
reforms that have wide public support, to root out inefficiency and
corruption in government programs, and to inspire confidence in
political leadership.
    Many see this disunity as systemic, and therefore separate
from, the failures of individual leaders and institutions, the complex
new issues that have arisen in recent years and the voter frustration
and discontent stemming from government failures.
    'I'm not sure anybody could pull this Government together,'
Representative Morris K. Udall, Democrat of Arizona, remarked . . . .
    Congress has decentralized itself until every special
interest has access to policy, but the leadership cannot put broad
policy objectives into effect.
    More and more members of Congress see themselves and present
themselves as ombudsmen for their states or districts, rather than as
representatives trying to effect broad national and foreign policies. .
. ."

     In a telling prediction, Fred Wertheimer, the senior vice president
of Common Cause, noted that:

    "'It is a Congress becoming more and more paralyzed in its
ability to make decisions on behalf of all citizens. It is a Congress
that in the not-too-distant future will be drowning in special-interest
group political money.'
    On July 19, the House declined to bypass its Rules Committee
and vote on legislation to establish public financing of Congressional
campaigns for 1980. The Rules Committee, which clears bills for floor
action, is opposed to the measure.
    Another attempt at passage will be made next year. However,
some supporters fear that the large amount of money poured into the
campaigns of incumbents who won re-election will make passage of the
bill even more difficult, and the phenomenon . . . will go on."

The cycle of our time is that big business requires big regulation -- but
a constitutional structure inadequate for the passage of necessary
legislation means that Legislative power must be delegated to
bureaucrats; and, since bureaucrats are not accountable in the
traditional sense, Congressmen and/or special interest lobbyists must
intervene:

    "The growing numbers and powers of lobbies have been in part
a result of two decades of increased Government involvement in the
affairs of powerful economic interests. Over the last 15 years Federal
laws and regulations have increasingly put the Government in the
business of overseeing or regulating aspects of the automobile, oil,
gas, education, and health care industries among others.
    In turn, each of these interest groups has organized or
expanded its effort to influence Government activities at all levels,
and the success of those efforts has stimulated the organization of
still other lobbies to augment or oppose the presence of the first in
Washington.
    'We have a fragmented, Balkanized society,' Stuart
Eizenstat, President Carter's chief adviser for domestic affairs, has
said, 'with an economic proliferation of special economic interest
groups, each interested in only one domestic program -- protecting it,
having Government spend more for it, unwilling to see it modified.'. . .
    Tom Matthew, a consultant to several public-interest groups
on the political left, says that probably no more than 6 percent of the
population is involved in the whole beehive of activity -- from the
people sending in contributions to some causes to the people traveling
to Washington or to state capitals to do their lobbying.
    The rest of the population only lives with the results."

In what can be referred to as the "pusher" theory of Government, the
Incumbents of Congress have themselves created the conditions requiring
their intervention:

    "'The nature of the Washington system is now quite clear, '
Morris P. Fiorina, Associate Professor of Political Science at the
California Institute of Technology, wrote in a book published last year,
'Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment.'
    'Congressmen earn electoral credits by establishing various
Federal programs,' Mr. Fiorina wrote. 'The legislation is drafted in
very general terms, so some agency must translate a vague policy mandate
into a functioning program, a process that necessitates the promulgation
of rules and regulations and, incidentally, the trampling of numerous
toes. At the next stage, aggrieved and or hopeful constituents petition
their Congressmen to intervene in the complex process of the
bureaucracy.'
    'The cycle closes,' he continued, 'when the Congressman
lends a sympathetic ear, piously denounces the evils of bureaucracy,
intervenes in the latter's decisions, and rides a grateful electorate to
ever more impressive electoral showings. Congressmen take credit coming
and going. They are the alpha and omega.'"

Under the system of rule by special interests, the Congressman has "two
principal functions: to make laws and to keep laws from being made . . .
. The first of these he and his colleagues perform only with sweat,
patience and a remarkable skill in the handling of creaking machinery;
but the second they perform daily, with ease and infinite variety."
Congressmen can protect your industry -- for a price. Here are some
examples:

    "-- '[I]t was found in extensive experiments that cash
housing allowances worked better in many cities than the cumbersome,
costly subsidy programs. But such allowances were not even under
consideration, a White House official said, because the
     commercial and professional interests that feed off the subsidy
programs in effect would surely block such a move.'
    -- 'A number of proposed changes long supported by a
majority of the people, according to polls of public opinion, have never
been enacted because of special-interest pressure. President Carter sent
his tax package to Congress assured, on the basis of polling data, that
more than 60 percent of the people favored most of the bill's
provisions. But in the House Ways and Means Committee, it was turned
into a vehicle for reducing the capital gains tax as well as for general
tax reduction.'
    -- 'In 1974, the Senate passed legislation for no-fault auto
insurance, intended to save the public money. The American Trial Lawyers
Association, whose members earn money for trying negligence suits, set
up a political action committee to contribute to Congressional
candidates. In 1973, the Senate defeated the measure. Common Cause
reported that it found that five Senators who were up for re-election in
1976 switched their votes from 'yes' to 'no' between 1974 and 1975 and,
subsequently, received substantial campaign contributions from the
lawyers, who poured half a million dollars into the 1976 campaigns and
have continued to make contributions. Last summer, the House Commerce
Committee killed a no-fault insurance bill by a vote 22 to 19. The
sponsor, Representative Bob Eckhardt, Democrat of Texas, said opposition
from the lawyers was the chief reason for the bill's defeat.'"

     The Rise of Special Interests and the Incumbency Effect

The rise of Special Interest Rule has created an Incumbency Effect;
special interests give money to Incumbents, who sit on the committees
affecting these interests. A permanent quid pro quo is established --
votes for contributions. More contributions means a greater ability to
defeat challengers. Challengers, who have nothing to "bring to the
table," are at a tremendous disadvantage, as Philip Stern noted in The
Best Congress Money Can Buy:

    "In 1986, out of 214 House contests in which the incumbent
sought reelection, GE [the General Electric Pac] backed the incumbent in
211 (including 34 in which the incumbent had no opponent). That is, GE
selected the incumbent 98.6 percent of the time. Aside from a single
instance where GE backed both the incumbent and the challenger, in only
3 of 214 contests -- 1.4 percent -- did the GE PAC managers find the
challenger preferable to the incumbent. It was as if someone from On
High had issued instructions: 'Never mind candidates' party affiliation,
their attitudes toward big business, or their need for campaign funds.
Whatever you do, support the incumbent.' . . .
    [I]n contests where incumbents were seeking reelection in
1986, PACS overall gave more than 88 percent of their money to them and
only 12 percent to challengers."

The massive influx of cash worked: in 1986, Incumbents had a 98 percent
success rate. Incumbents not only receive money from local interests,
but also National special interests, interests that have a great deal to
gain financially from the "right" votes:

    "Dallas's Democratic Representative Martin Frost offers an
illustrative case study of the dairy PACs' generosity to such an urban
representative. His largely big-city district contains, at most, three
dairy farmers -- and some 527,000 dairy consumers. Many of the latter
have incomes below the official government poverty line and can ill
afford to pay the higher dairy prices the government subsidy program
almost surely causes.
    Therefore, in voting for the higher subsidy level,
Congressman Frost sided with the three dairy farmers in his district
against the interests of the hundreds of thousands of consumers. Why?
    A relevant factor to consider while pondering that question
is the $45,050 the dairy lobby had lavished on this big-city congressman
in the eight years 1979 through 1986. That made him the fifteenth-
highest recipient of dairy money among the 435 members of the House,
rural or urban.
    Perhaps the most dramatic charts in Stern's book are charts
showing extremely disturbing correlations between funds received from
special interests and votes on legislation affecting those interests.
For example, here are the correlations between money received and votes
cast for dairy subsidies:

OF THOSE RECEIVING THIS     . . . THIS PERCENT
     AMOUNT FROM THE DAIRY LOBBY    VOTED FOR DAIRY
     IN 1979 THROUGH 1986 . . .    SUBSIDIES IN 1985

     MORE THAN $30,000        100 %
     $20,000 TO $30,000        97 %
     $10,000 TO $20,000        81 %
     $2,500 TO $10,00        60 %
     $1 TO $2,500        33 %
     ZERO            23 %

This effect, visible on recorded votes, must be even more pronounced
where the votes aren't recorded -- in discussions after-hours and within
the committees. In this manner, the fundamental maxim of Republican and
Democratic Government, Majority Rule, has been entirely subverted.

THE 1787 SEPARATION OF POWERS AND UNDUE ATTENTION TO LOCAL INTERESTS

Delay. Unaccountability. Obliteration of the Principle of Majority Rule.
But these are not the only consequences of the Separation of Powers
Principle as instituted in the Constitution. In addition, the system as
instituted interferes with an essential criterion for a desirable
Legislature: that the Legislature take a National, as opposed to a
Parochial, view.

    "One desirable criterion for national legislatures is the
ability of both individual members and the institution to take a broad
national view of problems and to act in the national interest. . . . A
small benefit for the nation as a whole, for example, should not
necessarily be implemented if serious damage would accrue to a region of
the nation. At the same time, a minor benefit for part of the nation
should not be purchased at the cost of severe hardship to the nation as
a whole.
    The authoritative allocation of resources often occurs in
national legislatures. This is a critical task and when performed poorly
can result in waste. In some instances the resources being allocated are
scarce. The waste of such resources may inflict harsh costs on a
particular segment in a society or on the nation at large. The
thoughtful allocation of resources in an efficient manner can make or
break the welfare of a nation."

The need to restrain the effects of Parochialism were well-known at the
Federal Convention. A susceptibility to parochial interests was, indeed,
one of the fatal flaws of the Articles of Confederation, as pointed out
by Pennsylvania Delegate James Wilson on June 8:

    "We are now one nation of brethren. We must bury all local
interests & distinctions. . . . No sooner were the State Govts. formed
than their jealousy & ambition began to display themselves. Each
endeavoured to cut a slice from the common loaf, to add to its own
morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered down to the
impotent condition in which it now stands. Review the progress of the
articles of Confederation thro' Congress & compare the first & last
draught of it. To correct its vices is the business of this convention.
One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the whole over
its parts. . . . leave the whole at the mercy of each part, and will not
the general interest be continually sacrificed to local interests?"

But the structure of Government given to us by the Framers did not
achieve their stated goal that Government should promote the general
welfare, and not the local welfare. Part of the reason for this is that
even though Congress takes action collectively, voting by Congressmen
takes place individually, a structural phenomenon leading to
Parochialism:

    "While the national legislature as an entity may receive low
popular ratings, it is possible for individual legislators to receive
undeserved high ratings from their states or districts. Many of these
legislators are reelected and as incumbents appear to benefit from
citizen ignorance. Apparently the electorate perceives that the problems
with the national legislature are caused by representatives from
districts or states other than their own, and legislators often
reinforce this view.
    Due to ignorance, citizens may not discern whether or not
their representatives are good legislators who can mobilize support for
their bills and pass legislation, thereby solving problems and
implementing their objectives. Citizens may also have difficulty
identifying merely symbolic action wherein legislators express an
opinion but suggest no policy changes, or make statements of policy
without sponsoring legislation to implement it. . . .
    Members may contribute to voter ignorance and apathy
in a variety of ways. Legislators may stress voter access and
identification with the constituents more than what is going on in the
national legislature."

Our constitutional structure inevitably leads to Parochialism for
another reason -- the delivery of "pork barrel" projects to local
constituents:

    "Congress is often accused of being parochial, reflecting
narrowly based constituent interests rather than assuming a national
view. . . .
    One measure of parochialism in Congress is the delivery of
pork barrel legislation to congressional districts and states. This may
consist of special projects, new programs, or public works or buildings
which benefit constituents in a particular geographic region and do not
benefit other citizens. The conferment of such benefits is a constant
feature of congressional policy making. Particularized benefits have two
properties: they are usually given out to a specific individual group or
geographic constituency and are usually distributed in an ad hoc fashion
so that the member of Congress representing the benefited constituency
can claim credit for the allocation. Representatives and Senators view
pork barrel legislation as crucial to reelection, a perception which
diminishes the incentive among current members to abolish or limit its
use. . . ."

A process which rewards the creation of "pork barrel" legislation must
penalize the creation of legislation in the National Interest, and must
inevitably effect the quality of legislation:

    "Given [the] number of legislative hurdles, important
legislation is often side-tracked, permanently derailed, or
significantly modified by interest groups at any one of the various
gates through which proposed statutes must pass. Interest groups have
become well aware of the lengthy, sequential, internally specialized,
bicameral legislative processes. They often manage to impede or alter
bills at veto points along the process. The length of the process is not
only ponderous, but in the Washington environment where the interest
group legislative 'hunting season' never closes, the long duration of
the process increases bill vulnerability to special interest attacks. .
. .
    For example, in 1965 President Lyndon Johnson suggested a
bold solution to the problems of crime and poverty in inner-city slums.
As the bill was originally drafted, about a dozen cities would have
received large sums of money to be spent under federal supervision in
order to promote racial integration and renovate the slums. Passage of
this program in Congress became a study in compromise. Compromise, in
itself, is not an undesirable value, but it can subvert the original
purpose of legislation. Proponents of the 'Demonstration Cities'
legislation had to compromise extensively. They had to dismiss the goal
of racial integration, loosen federal control over the administration of
the program, and make more cities eligible to participate (approximately
150). What began as a noble attempt to renew decaying urban centers
ended up as another pork barrel project that ineffectively divided funds
among constituencies in Congress. . . ."

According to Lawrence Dodd, the Constitution lacks a centralizing force
which would ameliorate this nascent Parochialism:

    "The Constitution provides no function or structure to
Congress that would create internal congressional incentives supportive
of power centralization, coordination, and institutional integrity. It
merely assumes that these will be maintained by the natural operation of
political life in a simple, agrarian society. When the latter assumption
is no longer valid, when it is no longer true that policy problems will
be simple and congressional life will draw only a few legislators
committed to long-term congressional careers and power, there is no
provision within the constitutional system -- no incentive system -- that
will lead members naturally to sustain mechanisms of institutional
centralization."

A Government without a centralizing force is a Government which
compromises by passing Bills which benefit local areas, but can only
with great difficulty pass Bills in the National Interest.
     Thus the problems that have resulted from the political theory of
the Framers. In review, we find that the Separation of Powers Principle
as implemented in the Constitution has made impossible the fulfillment
of the Preamble strictures that Government must "establish Justice" and
promote "the general Welfare." These two critical criteria have been
violated, and so have four other critical criteria: Efficiency,
Accountability, Majority Rule, and National Interest Representation.
Instead, we universally find in Government Delay, Unaccountability,
Minority Rule, and Parochialism.
     These six criteria violations are serious enough, but there is one
final violation -- in fact, the last that will confront any constitution:
the violation of the Principle of Constitutional Self-Preservation. The
1787 version of the Separation of Powers Principle, in seeking to
preserve the form of Government by crippling Government, made the
formation of a subterranean, unconstitutional Government necessary. As
Hardin (1987) wrote, "It is not simply that the Separation of Powers
leads to deadlock (or gridlock) and stalemate . . . the Separation of
Powers poses a deadly danger to constitutional government itself." A
Principle meant to preserve the Constitution has led inexorably to its
downfall.

DELEGATION AND THE ESCAPE FROM THE CONSTITUTION

    "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
of Representatives."

-- Article One, Section One

    "A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in
dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers
requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once
begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous
extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has
perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on
pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full
exercise of the largest constitutional authorities."

-- James Madison, Federalist 20

Article One, Section One of the Constitution states in no uncertain
terms that "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . ." This reflects John Locke's view,
stated in his Second Treatise, that "the Legislative can have no power
to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other
hands." This Principle was etched indelibly into our Constitution in
Article One, Section One, and was well understood by the authors of The
Federalist. According to John Jay, the Framers had "given the power of
making laws to the legislature . . .", and Hamilton wrote that "the
legislature . . . prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of
every citizen are to be regulated." This was a power that could not be
transferred by the Legislative Branch; according to Madison, "[a]s the
people are the only legitimate fountain of power . . . it seems strictly
consonant to the republican theory to recur to the same original
authority . . . whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or
new-model the powers of government . . . ." Therefore, it was no
surprise when Chief Justice Taft stated in 1937 that "it is a breach of
the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power
and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch . . . ."
     Under our constitutional system, there are sound reasons to
prohibit delegation of this Legislative power. To permit the concept of
Delegation would allow the laws created by delegated authorities to
evade the system of Checks and Balances created by the Framers: under a
constitution of delegated Legislative authority, the People would have
no check against unpopular legislation, a check which was built into the
Constitution expressly for that purpose. According to Madison, the
Bicameral System instituted in the Constitution would insure that "[n]o
law or resolution [would] be passed without the concurrence . . . of a
majority of the people . . . ." But lawmaking by an unconstitutional
"Administrative" Branch would allow evasion of this Bicameral
requirement. If such a Branch were to pass a law that the People did not
approve, the People would be helpless, since not only would they not
know who voted for the law, there would be no one to vote out, since
Administrative officials are appointed, not elected by the People.
Furthermore, even if a counter-law were to be passed by the House of
Representatives, that counter-law could be checked by the Senate,
President, or Supreme Court -- the three checks against popular action in
the Constitution. The same would be true were the Supreme Court given
Legislative power. Again, any attempt by the People to check Judicial
lawmaking[!] directly would itself be checked by the Constitutional
bodies existing for that purpose. For this reason, Delegation was
strictly prohibited by our Framers. As Hamilton stated,

    "[E]very act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor
of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative
act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny
this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal;
that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the
people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue
of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what
they forbid."

     But here was the dilemma: a Government must govern, and a
constitutionally crippled Government could not constitutionally govern.
Thus, a Bicameral Congress hobbled by an institutional delay was forced
to delegate its exclusive Legislative authority. With the rise of
industry in the Twentieth Century came a veritable explosion of
Delegation of Legislative authority by Congress to such entities as the
Federal Communications Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Internal Revenue Service, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration -- the list goes on and on. As Justice White noted in
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), "legislative authority is
routinely delegated to the Executive Branch, to the independent
regulatory agencies, and to private individuals and groups." According
to Justice White, "the effective functioning of a complex modern
government requires the delegation of vast authority which, by virtue of
its breadth, is legislative or 'quasi-legislative' in character . . . ."
And though it was the self-appointed umpire of constitutional
legitimacy, the Supreme Court nonetheless sanctioned this
unconstitutional process: "[T]he Court, recognizing that modern
government must address a formidable agenda of complex policy issues,
countenanced the delegation of extensive legislative authority to
Executive and independent agencies." The scope of Delegation escalated
as initial restrictions began disappearing: "Theoretically, agencies and
officials were asked only to 'fill up the details,' . . . [i]n practice
however, restrictions on the scope of the power that could be delegated
diminished and all but disappeared. In only two instances did the Court
find an unconstitutional delegation." Delegation mushroomed. Over time,
Congress not only forfeited its constitutional role as the exclusive
Legislative body, but also the primary Legislative body. As Justice
White observed,

    "The wisdom and the constitutionality of these broad
delegations are matters that still have not been put to rest. But . . .
by virtue of congressional delegation, legislative power can be
exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments without the
passage of new legislation. For some time, the sheer amount of law -- the
substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the operation
of government -- made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking
engaged in by Congress through the traditional process."

What are generally referred to as Administrative "regulations" or
"rules" are, in fact, laws. As Hamilton stated, the "essence" of the
Legislative authority was "to enact laws, or, in other words, to
prescribe rules for the regulation of the society . . . ." Justice White
wrote that

    "There is no question but that agency rulemaking is
lawmaking in any functional or realistic sense of the term. The
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 551(4), provides that a
'rule' is an agency statement 'designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy.' When agencies are authorized to prescribe law
through substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation is not
only [given] due deference, but is accorded 'legislative effect' . . .
These regulations bind courts and officers of the Federal Government,
may pre-empt state law . . . and grant rights to and impose obligations
on the public. In sum, they have the force of law."

Over time, a new Branch of Government was created without the benefit of
formal approval by the States or the People as required by the
Constitution in Article Five. According to Justice Jackson, "The rise of
the administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal
trend of the last century. . . . They have become a veritable fourth
branch of the government, which has deranged our three-branch legal
theories." On this road there was no terminus. Justice Sutherland, in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 327
(1936), "used language implying that there is virtually no
Constitutional limit to Congress's power to delegate to the President
authority which is 'cognate' to his own constitutional powers.'. . . In
brief, the President's duty 'to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed' becomes often a power to make the laws." And the Executive
Branch did indeed exercise its newly granted power to make laws. As
Senator James Abourezk described the situation in 1975, "[l]ast year the
Congress enacted 647 public laws while approximately 6,000
administrative rules were adopted by 67 Federal agencies, departments,
and bureaus. More law, in the sense of rules governing our society, is
produced by the executive branch than is produced by the national
legislature." According to Levitas and Brand (1984):

    "[I]f Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, or any of the other
Founding Fathers were to visit us today, they would be . . . shocked by
the existence of administrative agencies and by the delegation of
lawmaking power to this part of the executive. . . . As noted by Justice
Jackson, 'administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative,
quasi-executive, or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required in order to
validate their functions within the Separation of Powers scheme of the
Constitution. In effect, all recognized classifications have broken down
and the qualifying prefix 'quasi' is a smooth cover that we draw over
confusion as we might use a counterplane to conceal a disordered bed.'"

Tugwell (1976) viewed the existence of the "fourth branch" of Government
as conclusive proof of the inadequacy of the Constitution, an inadequacy
which made escape from the Constitution necessary:

    "[B]ecause of its own incapacities . . . the Congress has
created the regulatory agencies. They are justified by the implication
that they are necessary to protect the public. They deny altogether the
principle of separation. . . . they carry on highly complicated
technical operations and are largely self-governing. Their immense
bureaucracies constitute a large part of modern government. Their
existence is a constant reminder that escape from the Constitution has
been accomplished on a grand scale and without notable objection."

Because Congress had delegated its exclusive Legislative authority, a
popular backlash arose against Government bureaucracy in the 70's, which
led to the increasing use of a device which would allow the People to
regain control over the unconstitutional Fourth Branch, known as the
one-house Legislative Veto. Utilizing this provision, Congress could
delegate Legislative authority, but any law passed by one of the
Administrative bodies could be vetoed by either House of Congress.
Strictly speaking, the Legislative Veto was unconstitutional, but
Delegation itself was unconstitutional, and the Veto attempted to
restore some sort of balance. Unfortunately for the Democratic Congress,
it decided exercise this power over a Republican Executive Branch. This
attempt by the Legislature to check the Executive led the Executive
Branch to look for a case it could sponsor for review by the Supreme
Court, and hold the Legislative Veto unconstitutional. The Executive
Branch found the case -- I.N.S. v. Chadha. And, in one of its least
shining hours, the Supreme Court held the Legislative Veto
unconstitutional (voiding nearly 200 laws utilizing the Veto in one fell
swoop), while at the same time allowing the unconstitutional Delegations
to continue!
      The Supreme Court rejected the Legislative Veto with this
reasoning: "[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives -- or the
hallmarks -- of democratic government . . . ." The Court, after noting
"the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse" in our
constitutional structure, stated that

    "[T]he Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency .
. . The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional
Convention impose burdens of governmental processes that often seem
clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but . . . [t]here is no support in
the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the
cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit
constitutional standards may be avoided . . . ."

Yet, in a textbook example of the Supreme Court's selective attention,
the Court failed to apply this same reasoning to the Delegation
Doctrine! Justice White, dissenting, attacked this Judicial doublethink
(reasoning which simultaneously held that agency rulemaking was
lawmaking -- and therefore a one-house Legislative Veto DID violate the
Bicameral requirement -- AND that agency rulemaking was not lawmaking --
and therefore DID NOT violate the Bicameral requirement!), and pointed
out the necessity of escaping from the Constitution:

    "Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a
Hobson's choice: either to refrain from delegating the necessary
authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the
requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the
entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its law-
making function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies. To
choose the former leaves major national problems unresolved; to opt for
the latter risks unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill
that role."

The battle over the Legislative Veto and the general acceptance of the
Delegation Doctrine by the Supreme Court reveal that the nature of our
Government has changed dramatically. The Delegation Doctrine is only one
example of the phenomenon of escalation, which as Eliot Aronson
described, is "self-perpetuating. Once a small commitment is made, it
sets the stage for ever-increasing commitments. The behavior needs to be
justified, so attitudes are changed; this change in attitudes influences
future decisions and behavior." And escalation has indeed occurred in
the political arena. According to Justice White, "From the summer of
1787 to the present the Government of the United States has become an
endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers." Aronson's "self-
perpetuating" insight explains this -- people are likely to accept the
political status quo simply because they accepted the status quo before.
The tendency to accept the accepted is accompanied by the quiescent
emergence of rules. New laws are formed. New interpretations are made.
New actions are taken. In this manner, where a Government is allowed to
"evolve," a Government entirely different from the one first conceived
can be established.
     The Framers of our Constitution were well aware of this Escalation
Principle. As Edmund Randolph wrote to the Speaker of the Virginia House
of Delegates on October 10, 1787, ". . . a bad feature in government,
becomes more and more fixed every day." Madison stated in The Federalist
that "abuses . . . of long standing, would [take] deep root, and would
not easily be extirpated," and warned that these abuses would provide
precedents, each one of which would be "a germ of unnecessary and
multiplied repetitions." Thus, these abuses or "usurpations of power"
would be "but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every
subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the
preceding." Hamilton warned that if "an improper spirit of any kind
should happen to prevail" in society, "that spirit would be apt to
infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession.
The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same, assimilating
constantly to itself its gradual accretions." Hamilton reiterated the
"germ" metaphor of Madison: "[t]here is a contagion in example which few
men have sufficient force of mind to resist."
     This ability to surreptitiously change the nature of Government
through escalation meant that Government would not only shift the
allocation of powers through Delegation, but would also gradually assume
new powers, powers not accounted for when the terms of office of our
representatives and our system of Checks and Balances was established.
Due to the Principle of Escalation, people have grown used to
usurpations of power by the Government. Whether the issue is PAC money,
the shift of Legislative power from Congress to the Presidency and the
Supreme Court, the Incumbency Effect, or even unpalatable societal
developments like the ever-increasing National Debt, we have become
inured to regression. And each acceptance of a small digression from the
norm has laid the foundation for our acceptance of future digressions,
leading to the emergence of new rules and, ultimately, a new form of
Government.

THE EMPIRICAL CONSTITUTION

    "I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on
this ground: that 'all powers not delegated to the U.S. by the
Constitution, not prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states or to the people' . . . To take a single step beyond the
boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to
take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of
any definition."

-- Thomas Jefferson, 1791

    "[I]t exceeds the possibility of belief, that the known
advocates in the Convention for a jealous grant & cautious definition of
federal powers, should have silently permitted the introduction of words
or phrases in a sense rendering fruitless the restrictions & definitions
elaborated by them.
    Consider . . . the immeasurable difference between the
Constitution limited in its powers to the enumerated objects; and
expanded as it would by the import claimed for the phraseology in
question. The difference is equivalent to two Constitutions, of
characters essentially contrasted with each other; the one possessing
powers confined to certain specified cases; the other extended to all
cases whatsoever . . . ."

-- James Madison, 1830

The Constitution was evaded not only because of institutional
inefficiency, but because a strict reading of the Constitution would
have crippled the Government. Jefferson's view of a limited Constitution
(i.e., a Constitution that allowed the Federal Government to pass laws
in a particular area only if the power was explicitly granted) was
shattered by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat 316 (1819). As Marshall stated in that famous opinion:

    "We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the
government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended.
But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to
the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will
enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional."

Marshall later stated in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) that
"narrow construction . . . would cripple the government, and render it
unequal to the object for which it is declared to be instituted . . . ."
This view was extremely controversial. As James Madison stated (with
reference to the "Necessary and Proper" Clause in Article One, Section
Eight), the Government could only be given new powers through amendment,
not through Judicial interpretation: "Whatever meaning this clause may
have, none can be admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to
Congress. . . . Had the power of making treaties . . . been omitted,
however necessary it might have been, the defect could only have been .
. . supplied by an amendment to the constitution." But Hamilton,
Madison's contemporary and a fellow Federalist, argued against narrow
interpretation, and introduced the concept of "implied" powers, which
opened a veritable Pandora's Box of potential "interpretations":

    "[T]here are implied, as well as express powers, and . . .
the former are as effectually delegated as the latter. . . .
    The whole turn of the [necessary and proper] clause . . .
indicates that it was the intent of the convention by that clause to
give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the specified powers. . . .
    [A]n adherence to the letter of its powers would at once
arrest the motions of the government."

But Andrew Jackson stated (many years later) that there were natural
limits to the Necessary and Proper Clause -- for example, Delegation: "It
can not be 'necessary' or 'proper' for Congress to barter away or divest
themselves of any of the powers vested in them by the Constitution to be
exercised for the public good." Jackson's view, as we have seen, was
ignored.
     James Madison, writing in 1819, could see the handwriting on the
wall, and argued vehemently that if such a broad interpretation were
given, the Constitution would not have been ratified:

    "[W]hat is of most importance is the high sanction given to
a latitude in expounding the Constitution which seems to break down the
landmarks intended by a specification of the Powers of Congress . . .
    [I]t was anticipated I believe by few if any of the friends
of the Constitution, that a rule of construction would be introduced as
broad & as pliant as what has occurred. And those who recollect, and
still more those who shared in what passed in the State Conventions,
thro' which the people ratified the Constitution, with respect to the
extent of the powers vested in Congress, cannot easily be persuaded that
the avowal of such a rule would not have prevented its ratification."

According to Madison, broad interpretation would eviscerate the concept
of a written constitution:

    "It has been the misfortune, if not the reproach, of other
nations, that their Govt's have not been freely and deliberately
established by themselves. It is the boast of ours that such has been
its source and that it can be altered by the same authority only which
established it. It is a further boast that a regular mode of making
proper alterations has been providently inserted in the Constitution
itself. It is anxiously to be wished, therefore, that no innovations may
take place in other modes, one of which would be a constructive
assumption of powers never meant to be granted. If the powers be
deficient, the legitimate source of additional ones is always open, and
ought to be resorted to. . . ."

This opinion was in line with the views of Jefferson, who had rejected
the road of broad construction, on similar grounds:

    "When an instrument admits of two constructions, the one
safe, the other dangerous, the one precise, the other indefinite, I
prefer that which is safe and precise. I had rather ask an enlargement
of power from the nation where it is found necessary, than to assume it
by a construction which would make our powers boundless. Our peculiar
security is in possession of a written constitution. Let us not make it
a blank paper by construction."

     It was not to be, however. As Marshall and Hamilton saw, Government
could not govern in a growing society under a narrowly construed
Constitution. Consequently, as Tugwell (1976) noted,

    "[A]t the very beginning of the government's operations the
Constitution began to unfold . . . it was in these earliest years that
the compromising began and the Constitution began to soften and lose its
sharp outlines. . . .
    Once strict construction was abandoned, the limits of
implication depended on what powers could be seized and kept.

And this continued over time:

    "The Constitution, as a product of [Supreme] Court
interpretation, became more and more ambiguous. What had begun in the
nation's very administration was relied on more as the years passed and
extrapolations became more numerous. Because they were never certainly
permanent, the nation found itself living with a basic law it revered
but could neither understand nor depend on."

Over time, the Supreme Court developed a body of "law" through the
doctrine of stare decisis (even though Congress was the exclusive
legislative body under the Constitution). Under the policy of stare
decisis ("the decision stands"), law was established by the Judiciary
through the observation of their prior decisions as precedents --
Judicial determinations that had to be obeyed as if they were laws.
This, of course, directly contradicted the provision in Article Six that
the Constitution (and not the opinions of the Supreme Court) was the
"supreme Law of the Land." But, as with the expansion of Congressional
power, there were pragmatic reasons for accepting the doctrine of stare
decisis (and thus expanding the power of the Judiciary). According to
Chief Justice Stone, "the rule of stare decisis embodies a wise policy
because it is often more important that a rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right." A grim truth. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so
does society. The Supreme Court filled the vacuum created by ambiguity
and the exceedingly difficult process of constitutional amendment
contained in Article Five by recognizing its prior decisions as
precedents, even though those precedents may themselves not have been in
line with the written text of the Constitution. This phenomenon,
however, was not intended by the Framers of our Constitution:

    "What [the Framers] did not foresee is that because of this
provision [Article Three, Section One: "The judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme court . . ."], in conjunction with
the extremely difficult arrangements they set up for amending the
Constitution, the federal courts would sometimes pervert and abuse this
power and would in effect write legislation of their own. What they
foresaw still less was that because the members of the Supreme Court as
well as of other federal courts owed their appointments to the President
and the Senate, they would be creatures of the central government; and
therefore their 'interpretations,' over the years, would steadily tend
toward the aggrandizement of centralized federal power at the expense of
states' rights. The Tenth Amendment, in fact, has long been treated by
the Supreme Court as if it did not exist."

Brennan (1982) rejected the notion that the Supreme Court could
legitimately either implement or ratify constitutional revisions:

    "If indeed, courts may appropriately 'apply values not
articulated in the constitutional text'; if they are to act as
'expounders of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair
treatment, even when the context of those ideas is not expressed . . .
in the written Constitution,' . . . then it is literally true . . . that
the Supreme Court exercises veto power over the actions of state
legislatures, executives, and judiciaries, and that the Court is 'a
continuing constitutional convention, updating the meaning of the
Constitution as new times and new situations demand . . . .'"

Indeed, the Supreme Court, in ratifying the usurpations of power by all
Branches of Government, has functioned as a "continuing constitutional
convention":

    "There are those who hold that the American Constitution is
not a written law at all, but is rather the sum total of all those
customs, traditions, institutions and practices which have grown up over
the years, and which influence or control the workings of our national
government. In this view, the Constitution is considered coextensive
with the governing Establishment. It is the way things are. It is the
distribution of power, as it actually exists and is effectively
exercised in modern American society. This might be termed the empirical
constitution. . . .
    It may be that every written code or constitution is
eventually eroded by conflicting customs. It is, however, peculiar to
the American experience that disregard and diminishment of our written
Constitution has been a work of great sophistry, combined with an
incongruous deference to the original text. We have paid lip service to
the immutable words of the Constitution. We have demonstrated great
resistance to constitutional amendments proposed through the processes
established by Article V. At the same time, our courts have shown blithe
disregard for the intent of the authors of the Constitution and the
obvious purposes and understanding of those who ratified the
Constitution, whenever it has seemed practical or expedient to do so."

As Former Chief Justice Hughes stated, "We are under a Constitution, but
the Constitution is what the judges say it is." This was confirmed by
the authors of The Constitution and What It Means Today, who noted that
there has been an "enormous change in the meaning of the Constitution
over the last twenty years. One does not fully appreciate the full
impact of that change until he goes over the Constitution provision by
provision." This would not have surprised Robert Yates, one of the
Framers of our Constitution who later wrote essays against its
ratification. According to historian Jackson Turner Main, Yates observed
in 1788 that

    "[M]ost of the powers [of the Constitution] were granted 'in
general and indefinite terms, which are either equivocal, ambiguous, or
which require long definitions to unfold the extent of their meaning.'
The meaning of the Constitution would be decided by the Supreme Court,
and therefore the judges could 'mould the government, into almost any
shape they please.'"

Vague language gave the green light for Judicial constitutional
revision, a phenomenon which appeared early on in our Republic, as
predicted by Yates. The Supreme Court, the final link in the
constitutional chain, granted itself the power of exclusive
constitutional "interpretation," even though Jefferson had vehemently
argued against the power of the Supreme Court to exclusively interpret
the Constitution -- a power which goes far beyond our traditional
conception of Judicial Review as the power to declare laws
unconstitutional. As Jefferson wrote,

    "In denying the right they [the Judiciary] usurp of
exclusively explaining the constitution, I go further than you do, if I
understand rightly your quotation from the Federalist, of an opinion
that 'the Judiciary is the last resort in relation to the other
departments of the government ['] . . . if this opinion be sound, then
indeed is our constitution a complete felo de se [a suicide]. For
intending to establish three departments, co-ordinate and independent,
that they might check and balance one another, it has given, according
to this opinion, to one of them alone, the right to prescribe rules for
the government of the others, and to that one too, which is unelected
by, and independent of the nation. . . . The constitution, on this
hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the Judiciary, which
they may twist, and shape into any form they please."

In point of fact, the Constitution has indeed become a "mere thing of
wax in the hands of the Judiciary," as the Supreme Court has actually
rewritten provisions of the Constitution by construction, and created an
Empirical Constitution -- that is, the constitution we actually live
under, as opposed to the one contained in that glass case in Washington,
D.C. . To take one of hundreds of examples, the Court has stated on
different occasions that the provision "The trial of all crimes . . .
shall be by jury" in Article Three of the Constitution (and a similar
provision in the Sixth Amendment) really means "The trial of all SERIOUS
crimes . . . shall be by jury." The Judicial Branch, of course, is to be
the arbiter of what distinguishes "serious" from "petty" crimes. In one
of the rare acknowledgments by the Court of the extent to which they
have revised the Constitution by construction, Justices Black and
Douglas stated in their concurrence in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1969) that

    "Many years ago this Court, without the necessity of an
amendment pursuant to Article V, decided that 'all crimes' did not mean
'all crimes,' but meant only 'all serious crimes.' Today three members
of the Court would judicially amend that judicial amendment and
substitute the phrase 'all crimes in which punishment for more than six
months is authorized.' This definition of 'serious' would be enacted
even though those members themselves recognize that imprisonment for
less than six months may still have serious consequences. This decision
is reached by weighing the advantages to the defendant against the
administrative inconvenience to the State inherent in a jury trial and
magically concluding that the scale tips at six months' imprisonment.
Such constitutional adjudication, whether framed in terms of
'fundamental fairness,' 'balancing,' or 'shocking the conscience,'
amounts in every case to little more than judicial mutilation of our
written Constitution. Those who wrote and adopted our Constitution
engaged in all the balancing necessary. They decided that the value of a
jury trial far outweighed its costs for 'all crimes' and '[i]n all
criminal prosecutions.' Until that language is changed by the
constitutionally prescribed method of amendment, I cannot agree that
this Court can reassess the balance and substitute its own judgment for
that embodied in the Constitution."

A rare admission. But every term of the Court brings new changes to our
Constitution. In a remarkable piece of scholarship, Dr. Thomas Ladanyi
bravely attempted to reduce to writing the Supreme Court's hundreds of
constitutional rewrites in his book The 1987 Constitution. The Baldwin
decision explains in part Ladanyi's version of the Sixth Amendment of
the Empirical Constitution, which begins as follows: "In all prosecution
of serious crimes, subject to sentences exceeding six months . . .",
replacing the original, which simply states "In all criminal
prosecutions . . . ." We have previously noted the Delegation Doctrine.
The 1787 Constitution reads as follows:

ALL LEGISLATIVE POWERS HEREIN GRANTED SHALL BE VESTED IN A CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES, WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.

Short, sweet, and to the point. But the Empirical Constitution reads
somewhat differently, after the various Delegations of power have been
factored in:

THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH CONSISTS OF A SENATE AND A
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, POSSESSES ALL LEGISLATIVE POWER HEREIN
GRANTED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOWING, ALL OF WHICH MAY HAVE THE
SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS A LAW DIRECTLY ADOPTED BY THE CONGRESS:
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES INITIATED BY THE PRESIDENT, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL
BY THE SENATE AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER SOVEREIGN STATES
ENTERED INTO BY THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL, BOTH
RELATING SOLELY TO THE EXTERNAL CONCERNS OF THE UNION; EXECUTIVE ORDERS
AND REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES AND REGULATORY
AGENCIES VALIDLY CREATED, AND THE SCOPE OF WHICH IS PROPERLY WITHIN THE
CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE; THE EXERCISE OF WAR POWERS BY THE
PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; FINAL JUDGMENTS OF COURTS OF LAW
CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF ALL LAWS, TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ORDERS,
RULES, REGULATIONS AND OTHER ACTS DEALT WITH IN THIS SECTION; AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S FINAL DETERMINATIONS, IN THE LIGHT OF THE DICTATES AND
THE SPIRIT OF THIS CONSTITUTION, AS TO THE VALIDITY OF ALL OF THE
FOREGOING, AS WELL AS ITS INTERPRETATIONS THEREOF. WHILE THE CONGRESS
MAY NEITHER DELEGATE ITS LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE AND
JUDICIAL BRANCHES, NOR INVEST ITSELF WITH THEIR POWERS, BEING ONE OF THE
THREE CO-ORDINATE BRANCHES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN CARRYING OUT
ITS LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS IT SHALL, WHERE PROPER AND NECESSARY,
COOPERATE WITH, AND, ON A MUTUAL BASIS, PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE OTHER
TWO BRANCHES. SUCH COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE
NARROWLY DEFINED, ESSENTIAL, CONVENIENT AND FULLY REVOCABLE DELEGATION
OF SOME OF ITS LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

Note one of the main failings of Supreme Court re-writes. While some
Court decisions have held that Congress may not delegate its powers, the
majority have. This inconsistency is reflected in Ladanyi's reduction of
the Empirical Constitution on the Delegation issue (may not vs. may).
The Supreme Court is not only poorly equipped to redraft the
Constitution, but their method of operation guarantees an inconsistency
which renders their re-writes permanently ambiguous.
     Of course, it is not only Congress which has had its powers
revised. As Hazlitt (1942) noted,

    "An American President, it is now generally agreed, has too
many powers, some of them grossly excessive. He has them principally
because the federal government itself has assumed excessive powers, and
because Congress, unable or unwilling to issue thousands of regulations
and make a million detailed decisions, delegates its powers to the
President to set up hundreds of regulatory agencies and appoint the
bureaucrats to fill them."

The new powers of the President are dramatically revealed when we
contrast the 1787 Constitution with the Empirical Constitution. Article
Two, Section Two, Clause Two of the 1787 Constitution reads as follows:

HE SHALL HAVE POWER, BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE,
TO MAKE TREATIES, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR;
AND HE SHALL NOMINATE, AND BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE
SENATE, SHALL APPOINT AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS,
JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE UNITED
STATES, WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT HEREIN OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR, AND
WHICH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW: BUT THE CONGRESS MAY BY LAW VEST THE
APPOINTMENT OF SUCH INFERIOR OFFICERS, AS THEY THINK PROPER, IN THE
PRESIDENT ALONE, IN THE COURTS OF LAW, OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS.

But Article Two, Section Two, Clause Two of the Empirical Constitution
is an animal of an entirely different stripe:

HE SHALL HAVE THE POWER, BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT, OR CONSENT
WITH RESERVATIONS AND AMENDMENTS, OF TWO-THIRDS OF A QUORUM PRESENT IN
THE SENATE, TO MAKE BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
NEGOTIATED BY HIM ON PROPER SUBJECTS NOT VIOLATIVE OF FUNDAMENTAL
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS GRANTED HEREIN, BUT OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATES
RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST IF NO FEASIBLE
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION IS AVAILABLE. HE MAY OPTIONALLY EFFECT TREATY AIMS
BY ENTERING INTO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT THE SENATE'S CONSENT,
EXERCISING HIS OWN POWER OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
OR SEEK SUBSEQUENT SENATE RATIFICATION THEREOF, THUS TURNING THEM INTO
TREATIES, BUT SHALL IN ALL CASES PROMPTLY ADVISE THE CONGRESS OF THE
CONTENTS OF SUCH AGREEMENTS. NON-SELFEXECUTING TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS REQUIRING IMPLEMENTATION BY LEGISLATION SHALL BE EFFECTUATED
AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CONGRESS. CLAIMS OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS,
INDIVIDUALS OR OTHER ENTITIES ARISING UNDER THE TERMS OF TREATIES AND
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS SHALL BE RESOLVED, AS THEIR NATURE REQUIRE, BY THE
PRESIDENT, THE COURTS, OR, WHERE LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OR FUNDS ARE
REQUIRED, BY THE CONGRESS. THE PRESIDENT SHALL EXERCISE BROAD POWERS
UNDER TREATIES WITH THE INDIAN NATIONS, AND TO ENTER INTO EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS WITH THEM OVER THE DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS. TREATIES AND
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS SHALL TERMINATE BY THEIR TERMS, RENEGOTIATION OR
DENUNCIATION BY THE PRESIDENT, OR ALTERATION OR REPEAL BY THE CONGRESS,
ALL SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW OF
NATIONS, BUT THE CONGRESS SHALL NOT BE COMPELLED TO LEGISLATE IN ORDER
TO GIVE EFFECT, WHERE REQUIRED, TO ANY RESULTING JUDICIAL DETERMINATION.
THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE, AND BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF
A MAJORITY OF A QUORUM IN THE SENATE, SHALL APPOINT AMBASSADORS, OTHER
PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT,
SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS, AND HEADS OF MAJOR QUASI-DEPARTMENTAL OFFICES ESTABLISHED
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. HE SHALL APPOINT WITHOUT SUCH CONSENT, OR
DELEGATE THE POWER TO APPOINT, MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF, AND THOSE OF HIS
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, HIS PERSONAL AGENTS, INCLUDING HIS DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE
EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES, CONSISTING OF INFERIOR OFFICERS
SUBORDINATE TO HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND OFFICES, CHIEFS OF
FEDERAL COURTS, AND JUDGES OF FEDERAL COURTS INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME
COURT, BUT THE CONGRESS MAY BY LAW MODIFY THIS POWER, AND ASSIGN PARTS
OR ALL OF IT TO THE COURTS OF LAW, OR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
AS WELL. ALL HIS NON-JUDICIAL APPOINTEES, INCLUDING THOSE APPROVED BY
THE SENATE, OR WHOSE DISMISSAL IS EXPRESSLY CONSTRAINED BY IT, MAY BE
REMOVED BY THE PRESIDENT AT WILL, BUT NON-JUDICIAL MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE CAN ONLY BE DISMISSED FOR GOOD CAUSE, WHILE JUDICIAL APPOINTEES
MUST BE TERMINATED BY IMPEACHMENT. HEADS AND APPOINTED OFFICERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND OTHER BODIES CREATED BY CONGRESSIONAL
LEGISLATION SHALL BE REMOVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CAUSES AND PROCEDURES
PRESCRIBED THEREIN. IN MATTERS CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
RELATING TO THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY, AN INCUMBENT PRESIDENT
SHALL NOT BE COMPELLED BY THE CO-EQUAL BRANCHES OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT TO TESTIFY BEFORE THEM OR TO REVEAL THE CONTENTS OF HIS OR
HIS EXECUTIVE OFFICE'S PAPERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, AND THIS PRIVILEGE OF
EXECUTIVE CONFIDENTIALITY EXTENDS TO HIS SUBORDINATES, IF REQUESTED BY
THE PRESIDENT, WHO MAY BE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY ABOUT THEIR CONVERSATIONS
AND ALL OTHER FORMS OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND ABOUT
PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, BUT, EXCEPT IN VITAL NATIONAL
SECURITY, DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY MATTERS, THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF
PROTECTING THE PRIVILEGE MAY CHALLENGED, AND, CONSIDERED IN CAMERA IN
COURT, BE REBUTTED, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ESSENTIAL EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION OR TRIAL. AN INCUMBENT OR FORMER PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE
FROM TORT CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM HIS EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE
POWERS.

The Judicial Branch, needless to say, has also greatly expanded its own
powers. Article Three, Section Two, Clause One, originally twelve lines,
occupies three pages in Ladanyi's book, and is too long to reprint here.
But some of the flavor of the changes to that provision may be seen in
the changes to the Preamble found in the Empirical Constitution:

WE THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO
MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE UNION, REDRAW THE JURISDICTIONAL LINES AMONG
THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, REDEFINE THE RIGHTS OF THE STATES, DETERMINE THE AREAS OF
FINAL AUTHORITY BETWEEN VARIOUS STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THIS
CONSTITUTION, ESTABLISH GREATER, MORE UNIFORM AND EQUAL JUSTICE,
PRESERVE AND ASSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, FACILITATE
THE COMMON DEFENSE, PROMOTE AND EXPAND THE GENERAL WELFARE, BROADEN AND
SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY, AND PROVIDE FOR AFFIRMATIVE JUDICIAL
ACTION TO SECURE AND ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE AIMS, AND IN
LINE WITH THE PRESENT NEEDS, NECESSITIES, HOPES AND DESIRES OF THE
PEOPLE, INCLUDING CITIZENS AND ALL OTHER PERSONS WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS TERRITORIES, LIVING IN DRASTICALLY CHANGED MATERIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES, POSSESSED OF ALTERED AND MORE VARIED IDEOLOGICAL, SOCIAL,
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL VALUES, AND THEIR UNION BEING PART OF A VASTLY
DIFFERENT WORLD, DO ORDAIN THAT THE 1787 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES AND AMENDMENTS THERETO, AND AS IMPLEMENTED BY APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION AND THE PROPER EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWERS, BE INTERPRETED AS REFLECTED IN THE ARTICLES THAT FOLLOW, AND
THAT SUCH INTERPRETATIONS BE RECOGNIZED AS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND
AND BE APPLIED WITH THE SAME AUTHORITY, FORCE AND EFFECT AS THE 1787
CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED, HAS COME TO HAVE IN THE YEARS SINCE ITS
ADOPTION.

Amend the Constitution? What Constitution? Which Constitution? As
Tugwell (1976) stated, "The pretense that a body of agreed higher law
exists is a kind of national conspiracy, maintained because of need. A
Constitution is necessary to the American system. That it no longer
exists is an intolerable thought."

THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE 1787 CONSTITUTION

    "To have anticipated the country's condition in the 1880's
from the situation in the 1780's would have required something more than
foresight. The Framers would have had to be seers."

-- Rexford Tugwell, The Compromising of the Constitution

The existence of the Empirical Constitution is irrefutable evidence that
the Constitution as framed in 1787 is no longer relevant for modern
times:

    "The Constitution . . . has, to put it plainly, become in
many respects obsolete. The succeeding generations still living within
its directives are confronted with conditions radically different from
those known to the original framers. The arguments it emerged from are
no longer relevant and its governance of the nation has become more
mystical than real. . . .
    Does anyone believe that if the Constitution in its entirety
should be submitted to referendum now, and relieved somehow of its
traditional sanctity, it would be ratified? If it would not, and if
constitutional government is desirable, then it follows that an
acceptable one ought to be devised. This simple logic seems irrefutable;
actually it is universally evaded. It is even widely regarded as
reprehensible to make such a suggestion."

But reason must prevail. Brennan (1982), quoting Chief Justice Warren
Burger, observed that

    "'[W]e should examine the changes which have occurred over
two centuries and ask ourselves whether they are faithful to the spirit
and the letter of the Constitution, or whether with some, we have gone
off on the wrong tracks.'
    Justice Burger points out that . . . [c]ongressional staffs
have expanded to the size of George Washington's army. . . . Constituent
services, committee work, and management of administrative staff have
all grown in importance, dwarfing the parliamentary function of
congressmen and senators. At the same time, because of the growth of our
population from three million to nearly a quarter billion, each
congressman and senator must represent vastly more citizens than
originally intended. The corollary of that proposition, of course, is
that each citizen is vastly more remote from the national legislature
than Madison and Hamilton assumed would be the case. The volume of
congressional business is so great that members are physically unable to
read all the bills they are expected to vote upon."

Brennan pointed out further inadequacies, such as the obsolescence of
the $20 guidepost in the civil jury trial provision:

    "Jury trials are assured in suits at common law, but there
are no suits at common law within the Federal Judicial System anymore.
Jury trials are assured where the value in controversy exceeds $20.00.
The jurisdictional minimum in diversity cases in Federal courts is now
$10,000. Modern state constitutions have substantially altered the
common law concept of civil jury trials. In England, jury trial in civil
cases has all but disappeared. With civil litigation mounting, dockets
burgeoning, delay piling upon exasperating delay, modern court systems
seek new methods of dispute resolution which can more adequately serve
the needs of 20th and 21st century society. . . ."

One of the more dangerous obsolescences is the inability of the
Constitution to prevent the existence of the military-industrial complex
President Eisenhower had warned against in his Farewell Address. The
Framers feared standing armies, and for good reason:

    "Whatever the two year limit on army appropriations may be
understood to mean in Washington, D.C. in 1982, it does not seem to have
any restraining force with respect either to appropriations or the
raising and supporting of armies. Certainly the Pentagon would be
stunned to hear that congressional expenditures for land forces were
circumscribed by a term limitation which did not apply to naval forces.
    With the technological advancements which have changed the
entire concept of national defense, the necessity of long range
planning, and the commitment of resources over substantial periods of
time are commonly accepted. But the argument from modern necessity does
not change the plain language of the Constitution. The most ingenious
semantic machinations cannot change the meaning of that restrictive
phrase. . . .
    What a far cry from the focus and concern of the framers are
the words of 10 U.S.C.A 2301 et seq. describing the process of military
procurement. 'The head of an agency may enter into contracts for periods
of not more than five years. . . .' Detailed citation should not be
necessary to support the proposition that American military expenditures
are substantial; that vast standing armies are maintained; that
appropriations are made for the purpose of raising and supporting armies
for longer periods than two years. . . .
    The point need not be belabored further. The founders had a
real distrust of standing armies. As Madison said: 'as armies in time of
peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil, it is well to
discountenance them by the Constitution.' Since the second world war,
the United States has continuously maintained a military establishment
consisting of more than three million persons, of which, in 1978,
757,000 were members of the United States army on active duty. The air
force accounted for an additional 567,000. It is clear that forces of
this magnitude cannot be maintained, equipped, and supplied with short
term appropriations.
    Obviously, the language which Madison and his colleagues
inserted in the Constitution is no longer operating. It is simply being
ignored by the government in Washington. Doubtless, no one now would
argue with much enthusiasm for the enforcement of the two year
limitation. But a limitation ignored is no limitation at all. We permit
our only constitutional protection against standing armies to be
ignored. At the same time, we fret about an international arms race that
imposes enormous economic burdens on the American people. The founding
fathers thought the matter a proper subject for constitutional
legislation. If we do not think ourselves competent to such a task at
this time in history, we ought to say so in clear terms. If we think the
two year appropriation limit too stringent, we ought to remove it,
before some elected officials come along and endanger our security by
the innocent act of obeying the Constitution."

Brennan then cited some of the many areas requiring revision, and called
for action.

    "Jury trials; standing armies; disqualifications for office;
these are but a few areas sorely in need of constitutional attention.
Much of our basic charter has grown pathetically out of date because we
have focused upon a few popular phrases which have been seen as
flexible. . . .
    The Constitution contains many narrow, rigid, outdated
terms. It omits many things which could easily be included, if the
document is to serve our generation and those to come as aptly as it was
conceived to serve those who went before us. There is no call to be shy
or timid. Surely after 200 years, we are not premature to consider
amendments. If anything, we may be too late."

     Brennan's final question is a very important one -- are we too late?

THE END OF THE LINE

     The most visible example of our constitutional inadequacy is the
burgeoning National Debt, which threatens to obliterate our economy
either by "bang" (crash) or "whimper" (foreign ownership). As The Wall
Street Journal reported, since 1980

    "[A]ll debt outstanding -- governmental, business, and
individual -- has swelled to nearly $11 trillion from less than $4
trillion. Today's total -- close to $43,000 for each man, woman, and
child in the U.S. -- exceeds 1.9 times the gross national product, up
from 1.7 in the mid 1980s. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, debt ranged
only from 1.2 to 1.4 times GNP. Just since 1989, the debt load has
mounted nearly $2 trillion. . . .
    The federal budget 'is out of control' says Charles B.
Reeder, an economic consultant in Wilmington, Del., who isn't given to
hyperbole. The deficits 'will be a drag on the economy,' he predicts,
since 'they preclude the possibility of either tax cuts to stimulate
demand or new spending programs to deal with serious social and economic
programs.'
    H. Erich Henemann, economist of Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co.,
worries especially about the deficit's impact on saving and investment.
'The more Washington borrows, the lower national saving will be,' he
warns. 'Low saving equals low investment. In turn, low investment will
lead to slow growth and a decline in the U.S. standard of living
relative to other nations, particularly Japan and Germany.' . . .
    As recently as 1984, state and local governments, taken as a
whole, sported an operating-budget surplus of about $20 billion. Last
year, in sorry contrast, they sustained a record operating deficit of
$34 billion, and many forecasters anticipate still deeper state and
local deficits in the year ahead.
    To help make up the shortfall, 20 to 30 states plan 'major'
tax increases in the year ahead, according to the National Center for
Policy Analysis. This would tend to worsen the federal deficit, since
state and local taxes are largely deductible from federal taxes. The
upshot will be 'leaner and meaner -- not gentler and kinder -- times,'
forecasts Laurence B. Rossbach Jr., and analyst at Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co."

This crisis has been brewing for three decades. In fact, 32 States had
petitioned Congress for a Constitutional Convention for a Balanced
Budget Amendment by 1987. As the Grace Commission reported in 1984, the
problem of inefficiency in Government required "immediate attention.
[Opportunities to make Government more efficient] are dependent on
institutional changes to bring about long-term improvement. If the
problems identified are left uncorrected, they can only deteriorate and
result in 'opportunities lost,' leading to the loss of national vitality
and the erosion of freedoms."
     But in the face of this pressing concern, all Congress could manage
to do was pass the ineffectual Gramm-Rudman bill, the most significant
portion of which was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and
thus eviscerated (the Empirical Separation of Powers Principle in
action). Deprived of even this abortive band-aid remedy, deficits
swelled to new heights: a record $360 billion in 1992 alone. Freed of
any form of structural restraint, Congress was free to be collectively
irresponsible, an irresponsibility which "is most evident when members
express concern over mounting deficits and growth of government but
insist on funding programs that benefit their individual constituencies
. . . ." Vivid evidence of this irresponsibility was displayed on the
floor of the House of Representatives on October 3, 1991, as
Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) argued vainly for fiscal restraint:

    "In this bill we have a ton of pork barrel projects, and I
am going to have other amendments to cut them out. The fact of the
matter is that I know as I stand here, I say to my colleagues, that I do
not have a chance of a snowball in Hades of getting any of these
amendments passed, and that is why I get so frustrated. Members know it
is pork, and I know it is pork, but nobody is doing anything about it.
The reason that happens is that so many of us in this body, and in the
other body, continue to ask for special pork barrel projects. One
subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee in this body had 385
Members ask for over 3,000 special projects. Where is it going to end?
    As I said before, I know that I am now jousting with
windmills, and I know I am just a voice in the wilderness here, but I am
telling the Members that we had better do something about it. We are
mortgaging the future of our kinds, and we are headed for financial
disaster at some point in the future. I do not know where that is, but
it is going to happen. We cannot continue to spend $300 billion, $400
billion, or $500 billion more per year than we take in and incur the
kind of debt we have, a $4 trillion national debt, without some kind of
disaster occurring in the future. And we are all going to be
responsible."

Individually responsible, perhaps, but collectively irresponsible. The
vote was 252 to 162 in favor of the Appropriations -- once again, a
failure to act in the face of a necessity for action, but a mere detail
in a tragic Shakespearian determinism parading before our eyes -- the
working-out of this self-defeating Clockwork Orange known as the United
States Government.
     This failure of our Government to act in the face of a necessity
for action engenders a feeling of helplessness within the populace --
even more incredibly, some people simply become bored with these
important issues. How many times can a person request action on an issue
and get no result without either giving up or losing interest? As The
New York Times reported,

    "This time last year the budget was front page news. . . .
On Monday, Mr. Darman is to release this year's mid-year review. It will
show a deficit of perhaps $315 billion or $320 billion for the next
fiscal year, nearly $100 billion above the figure last July, $35 billion
or $40 billion above what was forecast as recently as February and far
and way the biggest deficit ever. But nobody seems to care. . . .
    The economists and political scientists who filled the
nation's Op-Ed pages last year with doomsday columns about dangers of
the deficit have turned their attention elsewhere. . . ."

"Turned their attention elsewhere." Not surprising. This effect was
known to De Tocqueville over a century ago, who described in his book
Democracy in America that

    "Subjection in minor affairs breaks out every day, and is
felt by the whole community indiscriminately. It does not drive men to
resistance, but it crosses them at every turn, till they are led to
surrender the exercise of their own will. . . . The will of man is not
shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it
to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting: such a power
does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but
it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till
each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of timid and
industrious animals, of which government is the shepherd."

Even Harvard professors are reduced by this phenomenon to the role of
"timid" animals. The Times article continued:

    "Benjamin M. Friedman, a professor of political economy at
Harvard, said he believed just as strongly as he did last year, when he
was writing regularly about the subject, that the deficit was 'ruining
the country.' But he said he felt like someone who had tried
unsuccessfully to persuade an alcoholic friend to stop drinking. 'You've
done absolutely everything you can do, and now it's not at all clear it
will do any good to continue harping.' . . .
    Now, the President's budget director puts forth the biggest
deficit in history. How can the Democrats be silent?. . .
     They signed the deal that put off further debate on the budget
until after the 1992 election. . . . They forfeited their right to
criticize President with a stratospheric popularity rating on the one
issue on which he seems vulnerable."

Indeed, the political parties, accomplices in the budgetary debacle,
colluded on a deal to prevent discussion of the critical issue before
elections. According to Virginia governor L. Douglas Wilder,

    "Washington has so mismanaged the nation's finances that in
order to save their own skins, the elders of both parties met behind
closed doors for weeks and then emerged to join hands in the Rose Garden
to support the most regressive tax package in history, and a set of
budget priorities that lock us into the status quo for several years --
all so everyone can get re-elected."

It is, or ought to be, apparent that the National Debt problem will not,
and cannot, be solved under the present Constitutional structure, a
structure run by entrepreneurial Incumbents and their special-interest
clientele: "the deficit, properly understood, is a surface symptom of
more fundamental problems in our political institutions. . . . we cannot
expect incumbents in Congress to change the present system." Richard
Snelling, the former governor of Vermont, summarized:

    "Four years ago, as chairmen of the National Governors
Association, I met with Congressional leaders to discuss the nation's
economic problems. At one session, within a few minutes' time, I heard
both Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, the chairman of the
Senate Budget Committee, and James R. Jones, Democrat of Oklahoma, then
chairman of the House Budget Committee, declare that the budget and the
debt were wheeling out of control. But they said Congress could not act
in the face of the combined onslaught of the hundreds of big, powerful
special-interest groups based in Washington.
    What was true four years ago remains true today. Each of
these special-interest groups endorses the notion that the deficit must
be shrunk. Some are willing to agree that spending must be cut, others
that revenue must be increased. But each group expects the cuts to be
ways that do not affect its own tax obligations. Mayors, for example,
oppose cuts in urban programs, and the Chamber of Commerce is opposed to
any tax increases its members would have to pay.
    In 1981, Jones summed up the situation: 'There is a
constituency for national defense. There is a constituency for every
item of the domestic budget. There is a loud constituency for tax cuts.
But there really is no constituency for a balanced budget.'"

     For structural reasons, the predicament our officials have placed
us into will not be defused by them. Deficits are created by the
inordinate influence of special interests on Incumbents, and attempts to
cure the defect are fought off by those same special interests:

    "[M]embers of Congress are rational actors who pursue the
self-interested goal of re-election. . . . a rational politician
interested in maximizing the chances of re-election will not pay equal
attention to the preferences of all the district's voters. . . . a
rational, self-interested politician will pay particular attention to
the desires of those citizens who have managed to form themselves into
coherent groups organized around particular issues. . . . organized
citizens have a greater influence on the behavior of politicians, who
must continually seek re-election, than citizens who are not organized.
. . .
     [C]itizens are rational and self-seeking. . . . if a large group of
citizens all share a common interest that can be promoted by forming an
organization, but the additional benefits to each member of the group
from joining the organization will be small, it will be virtually
impossible to form such an organization. This is because it will be
rational for each member of the group to 'let George do it.' But if
everyone depends on someone else to do the dirty work, it never gets
done. Through a series of decisions that are individually rational, a
result is reached that is collectively irrational: the group will not be
formed, even though all of its potential members would be better off if
it were formed than if it were not. . . .
    [A] small group of firms, each one of which is affected in a
relatively significant way by what the government does, is more likely
to organize and expend time, effort, and money to procure and influence
government policy than is a diffuse and disorganized public. . . .
    Most government spending programs provide significant
benefits to relatively concentrated, and, therefore, relatively well-
organized and politically effective constituencies. On the other hand,
the costs of government spending are spread over a large and diffuse
group -- taxpayers. Because the incremental cost of each government
spending decision is relatively insignificant to individual taxpayers,
and because the benefits from organizing to oppose government spending
are speculative and difficult to appropriate, public choice theory
predicts that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to organize the
broad mass of taxpayers, as such, into an effective counterweight to
spending that benefits 'special interest groups' with more narrowly
focused interests. Thus, public choice theory implies that there is an
inherent bias built into the political system in favor of spending to
benefit organized constituencies, even when the total costs of a program
exceed its benefits. . . .
    [G]roups of taxpayers frequently do lobby and engage in
political activities to obtain changes in the tax code that will benefit
them. It is worth noting, however, that most of the tax code issues that
generate robust political activity tend to benefit relatively narrow
groups, such as the oil industry or real estate investors. It is much
rarer that groups are organized successfully to lobby to reduce general
tax rates, as opposed to supporting particular deductions."

A second central problem is that those who are really opposed to the
deficits we are running haven't been born yet!

    "But that alone, if true, would not explain the deficit,
which is the joint product of government decisions as to revenue as well
as spending. . . . politicians 'enjoy' appropriating money to benefit
their constituents, but they do not 'enjoy' taxing them. . . . the
causes are structural -- that is, they inhere in the system of incentives
facing politicians, regardless of personal preferences. . . .
    [B]y creating a deficit and borrowing to finance it,
politicians are able to confer benefits on current voters while imposing
a portion of the costs on future generations who will have to pay the
bill. . . . the interest group that is the weakest politically is one
that is even more difficult to organize than taxpayers -- the unborn.
Future generations are truly subject to 'taxation without
representation,' because today's politicians can vote to implement
programs to benefit today's voters but to be paid for in part by
tomorrow's taxpayers.
    When someone who cannot vote can nonetheless be made to pay
the costs for something that benefits someone who can vote, a powerful
incentive is created for politicians to follow what Bruce Ackerman, John
Millian, and I have called the 'cost-externalization' strategy, the
politician's 'equivalent of a free lunch.' Cost-externalization arises
most frequently in a geographic context, when politicians in one state
seek to obtain benefits for the voters in their state while imposing
disproportionate costs on the citizens of another state. One of the
functions of the commerce clause of the Constitution is to restrain
politicians from pursuing this tempting type of cost-externalization
strategy. Deficit spending provides functionally similar opportunities
for politicians to engage in cost-externalization, but across temporal,
rather than geographic, boundaries. . . .
    [P]owerful incentives are inherent in the existing political
structure for politicians to engage in inter-temporal cost-
externalization. Unlike the commerce clause, which protects (albeit
imperfectly) citizens in other states from geographic cost-
externalization, our Constitution provides no restraints or defenses
against inter-temporal cost-externalization."

The final nail in the coffin is the desire of these Incumbents to stay
in office:

    "The essential reason why we cannot expect Congress to
initiate the kinds of changes that will be necessary to deal with the
deficit is that incumbents are among the prime beneficiaries of the
present system. The present system allows incumbents to enhance their
prospects for reelection by catering to well-organized interest groups
and imposing costs on future generations. There is no reason to assume
that Congress will volunteer to be part of the solution, because
Congress is part of the problem."

After the meticulous cataloguing of these insights by Eliot and others,
it is not surprising that political scientist Laurence Dodd would
observe that "the Madisonian system is self-destructing." Even if an
individual member of Congress did want to solve the problem, s/he would
have to bypass the impassable Constitutional hurdles:

    "As a Congress composed of members who are concerned about
public policy becomes increasingly and necessarily enmeshed in
institutional immobilism . . . Congress faces the external checks and
balances built in the Constitution. Ironically, since the Founding
Fathers thought that Congress was the most dangerous branch, the really
powerful checks, such as veto and judicial review, were given to the
president and the Court to use against Congress. The inability of the
legislature to know its will thus is exacerbated by the ability of the
president and the Court, separately or in alliance, to debilitate any
congressional will that may exist by throwing in front of Congress the
requirement that it make legislative policy not by majority vote but by
two-thirds vote."

In light of all the foregoing, there is only one final question --
whether or not people can or will be able to organize quickly enough to
head off financial disaster.

THE NEED FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION

    "[W]hy is the experiment of an extended republic to be
rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the
glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent
regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not
suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to
overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their
own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?"

-- James Madison, 1787

    "[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and
manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might
as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a
boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their
barbarous ancestors."

     -- Thomas Jefferson, 1816

    "The words of the Constitution as it stands at any given
moment of time, may not . . . suffice to solve the problems of the day.
But to whatever extent our people are competent to solve their problems,
faithfulness to a scheme of government founded upon a written
constitution, and changeable only by deliberate amendment offers the
surest hope for solving them.
    The growth of our population; advances in high technology;
poverty in the cities; racism; pollution; the threat of nuclear
annihilation; these and all the other urgent concerns of today and
tomorrow can only be addressed by a government which functions
consistently, efficiently, and legitimately."

-- Thomas Brennan, 1982

Due to the Debt Crisis, as previously noted, 32 States have requested a
Constitutional Convention to consider a Balanced Budget Amendment. But,
as Pascall (1985) wrote, a Balanced Budget Amendment alone would simply
be "an admission in the Constitution that the form of government
designed by the Constitution no longer worked on budgetary matters." As
we have seen, the source of our infirmities is deep -- very deep: "the
causes of the deficit lie in the structure of our modern political
institutions. Until we resolve the underlying institutional issues, no
stop-gap measure can truly resolve the problem of the deficit."
Unaccompanied "band-aid" fixes such as Balanced Budget Amendments and
Line-Item Vetoes for the President are "solutions" to fundamental
structural inadequacies that are too little, too late. Our maladies can
only be cured by creating a constitution appropriate for our time, and
appropriate for the 21st Century, in line with the dictum in the
Preamble that we should "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity . . . ." Dodd stated the obvious:

    "In light of these considerations, a successful end to the
debilitating cycles of the twentieth century requires that we direct
attention not to internal congressional reform but to fundamental
alterations of the constitutional system itself. We must create an
incentive system within the Constitution that, while sustaining a degree
of congressional decentralization that will allow for innovation and
expertise, will lead members of Congress naturally to support
centralizing mechanisms that can sustain institutional integrity. We
also must reconsider the nature of the checks-and-balances system with
the intent of strengthening the position of Congress. Simultaneously, we
can redirect the values by which we wish institutional politics to be
conducted, shifting from a politics of minority veto and policy inaction
toward majority government and social justice."

Needless to say, devising a proper constitutional form involves much
careful thinking -- it is important, however, to design a Constitution in
line with 21st Century ideals, ideals which are considerably more
progressive than those used by the Framers in a time when an African-
American was considered three-fifths of a person:

    "As we consider movement toward alternative constitutions we
must realize that constitution making is serious and difficult business.
It requires realistic and hard-headed assessment of human nature, of the
implications of different institutional arrangements, of the social
conditions within which politics is to be conducted, and of the
consequences that will derive from the interaction of these three
elements of political life. In many ways Madison's performance in the
Federalist Papers is still the best guide to this type of undertaking. A
proper respect for his intellect is always advisable. Yet we also must
unlock ourselves from the infatuating clarity and logic of Madison's
arguments that continue to exert a seductive hold on our imaginations
long after the supporting conditions assumed by them have passed. The
transformations of our society in the last century undercut the accuracy
of his forecasts. The changes in our values, and hopefully the growth of
a greater commitment to majoritarian government and popular justice,
alter the goals to which anew or modified constitutional arrangement
should be committed."

At a time when we are moving towards crisis scenarios in many segments
of our society, it is imperative that we take this necessary first step:

    "Our Constitution, at the time it was adopted, was a
document far in advance of its age. Even today there could be no nobler
statement . . . than one particular part of that Constitution, the Bill
of Rights. But that part of our Constitution which deals with the mere
machinery of government must now be candidly reexamined . . .
     The Constitution exists for the country, not the country for the
Constitution. We must not make a fetish of a rigid legal document. . . .
We must be at least as ready to make progressive changes in government
as our forefathers were when they framed our basic law. No one today
thinks that the proper way to show our admiration for the Wright
brothers' original biplane would have been never to design anything
better. Nor is this the way to show our admiration for the enterprise of
the men who framed the Constitution."

Here, then, is a Constitution for the 21st Century.




============================== CHAPTER TWO ============================

                      THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION

========================================================================


========================================================================

WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO FORM A MORE PERFECT
UNION, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, PROVIDE FOR THE
COMMON DEFENCE, PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE, AND SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF
LIBERTY TO OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY, DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS
CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

========================================================================

"We the People." Simple words. Elegant words. And what important words
they have proven to be. In just eleven letters the basic political
philosophy of our country is summarized; a political philosophy that, in
1776, rocked the world.
     The importance of retaining a Preamble that so elegantly states the
purposes of Government (while articulating the People's critical right
of self-determination) in a Constitution for any century is, or ought to
be, obvious. Nonetheless, some have maintained that the "Preamble" --
which, incidentally, is not labeled as a "Preamble" in the Constitution
-- should not be considered as part of the Constitution, and thus "has no
importance." This rather curious belief was not held by the Framers of
our Constitution, who recognized its critical importance in getting the
Constitution ratified, in declaring the Objectives of Government, and
even in its role as a substitute for the Bill of Rights, which was not
present in the 1787 Constitution. Hamilton proclaimed the importance of
the Preamble in Federalist 84. In that essay, he stated his belief that
a Bill of Rights was unnecessary, because all the rights of the People
of the United States were granted in the Preamble!

    "Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as
they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservation.
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
constitution for the United States of America." Here is a better
recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make
the principal figure in several of our state bills of rights, and which
would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution
of government."

And James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania, declared in the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention on December 11, 1787 that:

    "[T]his system is not a compact or contract; the system
itself tells you what it is; it is an ordinance and establishment of the
people . . . the force of the introduction to the work, must by this
time have been felt. It is not an unmeaning flourish. The expressions
declare, in a practical manner, the principle of this constitution. It
is ordained and established by the people themselves . . . ."

But what "principle" is declared by the Preamble? In interpreting the
Preamble, it is important to note that certain words were not used: for
example, the introductory words are "We the People," not "We the People
of the States." Our Framers rejected an initial draft of the Preamble
which read as follows:

    "We the People of the States of New-Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut,
New-York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-
Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish
the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our
Posterity."

With their rejection of this initial draft, the Framers declared that
the Constitution was a National Constitution, ordained by the People,
and not the product of the State Legislatures. Note also the replacement
of the words "the following Constitution" for "this Constitution," which
clearly indicates that the Preamble is no mere preface to the
Constitution, but rather, an intrinsic part of it.
     An equally important clue to the meaning of the Preamble is found
in the use of the word "do," in "do ordain and establish," and not
"did." As Jefferson stated in a letter to Madison written on September
6, 1789, "no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a
perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation." In
this regard, note that the Constitution is written in the first person
("WE the People," not merely "The People"), and that "We the People" is
not qualified with "of 1787," but "of the United States," giving spatial
and political location precedence over temporal location. In light of
the foregoing, we can see clearly that the Constitution is written in
the first person and the present tense, and that its authors are THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.
     This insight, that people have an inalienable right to establish
the Government under which they live (no matter what century), and which
is today part and parcel of the American political fabric, was not a new
insight; rather, it was a view directly sprung from those revolutionary
times. Many political writers, including Locke, Montesquieu, and Thomas
Gordon, had avowed their belief in the supremacy of the People, a view
best stated by James Burgh in his Political Disquisitions, written in
1774, two years before the American Revolution:

    "All lawful authority, legislative, and executive,
originates from the people. Power in the people is like light in the
sun, native, original, inherent and unlimited by any thing human. In
governors, it may be compared to the reflected light of the moon; for it
is only borrowed, delegated, and limited by the intention of the people,
whose it is, and to whom governors are to consider themselves as
responsible, while the people are answerable only to God, themselves
being the losers, if they pursue a false scheme of politics. . . .
    As the people are the fountain of power, so are they the
object of government, in such manner, that where the people are safe,
the ends of government are answered, and where the people are sufferers
by their governors, those governors have failed of the main design of
the institution, and it is of no importance what other ends they may
have answered . . . happy is that people, who have originally so
principled their constitution, that they themselves can without violence
to it, lay hold of its power, wield it as they please, and turn it, when
necessary, against those to whom it was entrusted . . . ."

This Principle was affirmed by George Mason, one of the Virginia
delegates to the Federal Convention, who insisted, in his Remarks to the
Fairfax Independent Company in 1775, that a Government must constantly
be evaluated with reference to the Principles under which it was
established: "no institution can be long preserved, but by frequent
recurrence to those maxims on which it was formed. . . ." Mason went on
to state the primary maxims underlying a Government of the People:

    "We came equals into this world, and equals shall we go out
of it. All men are by nature born equally free and independent. To
protect the weaker from the injuries and insults of the stronger were
societies first formed; when men entered into compacts to give up some
of their natural rights, that by union and mutual assistance they might
secure the rest; but they gave up no more than the nature of the thing
required. Every society, all government, and every kind of civil compact
therefore, is or ought to be, calculated for the general good and safety
of the community. Every power, every authority vested in particular men
is, or ought to be, ultimately directed to this sole end; and whenever
any power or authority whatever extends further, or is of longer
duration than is in its nature necessary for these purposes, it may be
called government, but it is in fact oppression."

In this view, people were not only the raison detre of Government (i.e.,
the sole reason for the existence of Government), but the checks on
Government. The politicians elected by the People could not be relied
upon to secure the Government, and to constantly evaluate it with
reference to those Principles under which it was instituted. According
to Jefferson, "[e]very government degenerates when trusted to the rulers
of the people alone. The people themselves are its only safe
depositories. . . . The influence over government must be shared among
all the people. If every individual which composes their mass
participates of the ultimate authority, the government will be safe."
Under this fundamental proposition, expressed by Thomas Gordon in 1721,
it was impossible to assert that the opinion of the representatives of
the People was superior to the judgment of the People themselves:

    "Every Ploughman knows a good Government from a bad one,
from the Effects of it: he knows whether the Fruits of his Labour be his
own, and whether he enjoy them in Peace and Security: And if he do not
know the Principles of Government, it is for want of Thinking and
Enquiry, for they lie open to common Sense: but People are generally
taught not to think of them at all, or to think wrong of them. . . .
    [O]ur whole worldly Happiness and Misery (abating for
Accidents and Diseases) are owing to the Order or Mismanagement of
Government; and he who says that private Men have no Concern with
Government, does wisely and modestly tell us, that Men have no Concern
in that which concerns them most; it is saying that People ought not to
concern themselves whether they be naked or clothed, fed or starved,
deceived or instructed, and whether they be protected or destroyed: What
Nonsense and Servitude in a free and wise Nation!"

The veracity of these Principles hardly in dispute to the Americans of
the 1770's, it was inevitable that they would be contained in the
charters of American Government. Indeed, on June 12, 1776, the Virginia
Declaration of Rights (drafted by Mason) codified these political maxims
for the first time. In that document, the then-colony of Virginia
proclaimed that ". . . all power is vested in, and consequently derived
from, the People . . . magistrates are their trustees and servants, and
at all times amenable to them," and set forth the First Principle of
Government:

    "Government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community; --
of all the various modes and forms of Government that is best which is
capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is
most effectually secured against the danger of mal-administration; -- and
that, whenever any Government shall be found inadequate or contrary to
these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or abolish it, in
such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the publick weal."

Three weeks later, this conviction was re-asserted in the second
paragraph of the primary American document, the Declaration of
Independence, which proclaimed its validity to the world on July 4,
1776, in words dear to all Americans:

    "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends,
it is the Right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness."

Having secured America's independence after winning the Revolutionary
War, the States which comprised America began to codify these precepts
in their own constitutions, including one of the chief inspirations for
our own Constitution, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. The
Massachusetts document codified the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
powers, and declared that they be forever separated, the Preamble held
that "[t]he end of the institution, maintenance and administration of
government, is to secure the existence of the body-politic . . . and to
furnish the individuals who compose it, with the power of enjoying, in
safety and tranquillity, their natural rights, and the blessings of
life; And whenever these great objects are not obtained, the people have
a right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary for
their safety, prosperity and happiness." Articles Five and Seven of the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 further held that the power given to
these separate departments was a grant of authority which could be
retracted at any time:

    "All power residing originally in the people, and being
derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government,
vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are
their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.
. . ."
    Government is instituted for the common good; for the
protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; and not for
the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class
of men; Therefore the people alone have an incontestible, unalienable,
and indefeasible right to institute government, and to reform alter or
totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and
happiness require it."

These beliefs were not lost on the Framers, who modeled the Federal
Constitution in large part on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
Indeed, in their view, the approval of the People via the act of
Ratification was essential to good Government. A Government formed in
any other way was inherently defective, as proven by the history of all
world Governments, and even by our own Articles of Confederation. This
tenet was recognized by Hamilton in Federalist 22: "It has not a little
contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, that it
never had a ratification by the people. . . . The possibility of a
question of this nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations
of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated
authority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid
basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought
to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate
authority."
     Note: consent of the People, not consent of the States, which were
not superior to the People. Consent of the People was required, since
under the original Articles of Confederation, all thirteen States had to
ratify a new Constitution -- a stricture which, if obeyed, would
practically guarantee the preservation of the Articles. Strictly
speaking, the Framers at the Convention were proposing a document that
was unconstitutional. But in the view of Madison, this was not only
necessary, but an ethical obligation, in light of the overriding concern
of the well-being of the People, who were living under a defective
Constitution that promised to live in perpetuity unless action was
taken:

    "[I]f they [the Framers at the Convention] had exceeded
their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the
confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which
they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assumed; and that
finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations,
in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if
it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of
America."

Of course, the People were the "fountains of authority" underlying their
Constitution, and securing their well-being was the primary object of
Government. But, unfortunately, though republican constitutions were
"ordained and established" by the People, they were and are not
administered by the People, but by their representatives. This was
problematic: as Madison said in Federalist 63, "The people can never
wilfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed
by [their] representatives . . . ." This had long been identified as a
problem. John Trenchard, writing in 1721, maintained that "the great
Point of Nicety and Care in forming [a] Constitution," was that "the
Persons entrusted and representing, [should] either never have any
Interest detached from the Persons entrusting and represented, or never
the Means to pursue it." And Mason noted in 1775 that wise Principles
were necessary for the formation of a worthy Constitution, but not
sufficient, since all Governments were administered by men, who, as
Madison stated, were no "angels" :

    "Upon these natural just and simple positions were civil
laws and obligations framed, and from this source do even the most
arbitrary and despotic powers this day upon earth derive their origin.
Strange indeed that such superstructures should be raised upon such a
foundation! But when we reflect upon the insidious arts of wicked and
designing men, the various and plausible pretences for continuing and
increasing authority, the incautious nature of the many, and the
inordinate lust of power in the few, we shall no longer be surprised
that free-born man hath been enslaved, and that those very means which
were contrived for his preservation have been perverted to his ruin; or,
to borrow a metaphor from Holy Writ, that the kid hath been seethed in
his mother's milk."

That this problem needed to be solved was reiterated over and over by
our Framers, who knew that the measure of the strength of a constitution
was the extent to which it was enable to prevent the inevitable attempts
to corrupt it. In Federalist 62, Madison held that "[i]t is a misfortune
incident to republican government . . . that those who administer it may
forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to
their important trust." This reflected his views of an earlier essay, in
which he stated that "Men of . . . sinister designs, may, by intrigue,
by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then
betray the interests, of the people." But, as Hamilton wrote, it was
naive to think that this corruption or encroaching despotism would be
sudden or obvious. Though many saw the use of military force as the
engine of constitutional destruction, Hamilton knew that appropriators
of the People's political power were far more cunning:

    "Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a
numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the
detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do
they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of
power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves
universal hatred and execration? If we were even to suppose the national
rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to
believe that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish
their designs."

One way to measure the extent of this subtle encroachment on the rights
of the People by the "usurpers" is to measure the extent to which the
laws passed do not reflect the Will of the People. According to
Hamilton, "[i]t is not . . . to be supposed that the constitution could
intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their
will to that of their constituents." But, as we saw in Chapter One,
history repeated itself, and the will of the People's representatives
was substituted for the Will of the People, the existence of the
Constitution notwithstanding. The asymmetry of this reality in the
Constitutional scheme of things was noted by Senator Paul Wellstone (D-
MI), in a magnificent and chilling speech on the floor of the Senate on
May 21, 1991:

    "When I came to Washington, D.C. as a candidate I met the
gatekeepers. Those who very early on decide whether or not you as a
candidate will be able to get the money. These are the people with the
purse strings. These are the people who have the big money.
     They are not your next-door neighbors. Who is kidding whom? We know
where the money comes from. . . .
    There is a deep sense of skepticism about politics and
politicians in our country, and the people feel that this Capitol, that
the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, does not belong
to them; it belongs to people with big bucks.
    Let me repeat that. Let us be honest about it. If we want to
talk about low levels of participation and we want to talk about what
people are saying back in cafes and at the grassroots, we can say that
people do not believe any longer that this Capitol, the Senate or the
House, belongs to them. They think it belongs to the people with the big
bucks. They do not think that we any longer have a system where each
person counts as one, and no more than one. They do not think that
democracy is really functioning in our country. And that is not just a
perception. I have heard that word over and over again in the debates.
It is not just people. They are right and that is a reality. . . ."

Senator Wellstone was not alone in his fervent criticism of a system
gone radically wrong. His views were seconded by Senator David Boren (D-
OK), who demanded a return to the Principles on which this country was
based, and action on those Principles by the people paid a salary to
uphold those Principles, and who, indeed, were sworn under oath to
uphold those Principles:

    "Can we really honestly sit here and say it is a good thing
that it now costs an average of $4 million to run for reelection to the
United States Senate; that it is a good thing, and all the time and
attention that it takes to raise that kind of money is being spent by
Members of Congress instead of doing our duty to solve the problems of
this Nation? . . . As long as elections are decided on the basis of who
can raise the most money, it will always favor incumbents, so we do not
have any competition in American politics.
    As long as that goes on we are going to have a deeper and
deeper disillusionment of our own people, especially with more and more
of that money coming from special interests that have no connection with
the home States of those involved. How long are we going to wait, Mr.
President? Are we just going to talk about it? Are we going to get up on
the floor of the Senate and wave our arms, and pound the desk, and talk
about it over and over in sound bites on the nightly news, or are we
going to do something about it? . . .
    We are the trustees of the political process. The American
people have sent us here. And . . . this should be their chamber of
Government. This should be their Capitol building. This should be their
Congress, not the Congress that gives access to those who contribute
more and more of the money to finance political campaigns. It ought to
belong to every American.
    Every American counts and every American should count
equally in the political process, including those who cannot afford to
make large political contributions. That is what this is all about, Mr.
President. It is about a struggle for the soul of this democracy [sic]
itself . . . ."

Unfortunately, this struggle was conducted not by the People (because
America IS NOT a democracy), but by the representatives of the People -
the politicians (because America IS a republic). As Senator Wellstone
revealed, "The people outside of the Senate and the House, the people
who live in the country, want the change, but they do not have the
power. And too many people, I am afraid, in the U.S. Senate -- or at
least some Senators -- have the power but they do not want the change."
     Indeed, this proved to be the case. Notwithstanding the
overwhelming public opinion in favor of this most important proposal,
and notwithstanding the corrupting and debilitating effect on our
political process without its implementation, no Congressional Public
Financing Bill was passed by the United States Congress in 1900, 1910,
1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, or any year before, in-
between, or since!
     In the 17th and 18th centuries, the political writers of the time
knew how to evaluate and handle betrayals of this nature, which strike
at the heart of a supposedly "democratic" process. As Locke stated,
"[I]f a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending
the same way, make the design visible to the People, and they cannot but
feel, what they lie under, and see, whither are they going; 'tis not be
be wonder'd, that they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to
put the rule into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for
which Government was at first erected. . . ." And Hamilton realized that
the People would have no choice but to regain the form of Government
they were promised: "If the representatives of the people betray their
constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that
original right of self-defence which is paramount to all positive forms
of government . . . ."
     The form of "self-defence," of course, was to change the nature of
the political system, to prevent this and similar occurrences from
happening. This philosophy was the "safety-valve" which secured the
First Principle of Government. Indeed, Madison in Federalist 51 referred
to the power of the People as the "primary controul." The fact that the
representatives of the People, or the system under which they performed
their duties, could not be relied upon to achieve the ends of
Government, meant that the power of the People had to be resorted to.
The fact that the People would alter their system was no betrayal of the
system; to the contrary, it was evidence that the system, which was to
serve the People, had itself betrayed its fundamental precepts. As Locke
wrote in his Second Treatise, holding that the People had to support a
defective Government was a notion 180 degrees from the truth:

    "[T]hey have a very wrong Notion of Government, who say,
that the People have incroach'd upon the Prerogative, [of the
Government], when they have got any part of it to be defined by positive
Laws. For in so doing, they have not pulled from the Prince any thing,
that of right belong'd to him, but only declared, that that Power which
they indefinitely left in his, or his Ancestors, hands, to be exercised
for their good, was not a thing, which they intended him, when he used
it otherwise. For the end of government being the good of the Community,
whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an
incroachment upon any body: since no body in government can have a right
tending to any other end. . . . Those who say otherwise, speak as if the
Prince had a distinct and separate Interest from the good of the
Community, and was not made for it, the Root and Source, from which
spring almost all those Evils, and Disorders, which happen in Kingly
Governments. And indeed if that be so, the People under his Government
are not a Society of Rational Creatures entred into a Community for
their mutual good; they are not such as have set Rulers over themselves,
to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked on as an Herd of
inferiour Creatures, under the Dominion of a Master, who keeps them, and
works them for his own Pleasure or Profit. If men were so void of
Reason, and brutish, as to enter into Society upon such Terms,
Prerogative might indeed be, what some Men would have it, an Arbitrary
Power to do things hurtful to the People."

The Framers, who were fighting a defective Government, had to address
the erroneous major premise that the People were bound to support an
obsolescent and/or poorly conceived political structure. In December 11,
1787, at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Wilson questioned any
notion that Governments were superior to the People they were supposed
to serve: "We hear it every time the gentlemen are up, 'Shall we violate
the confederation, which directs every alteration that is thought
necessary to be established by the State legislatures only?' Sir, those
gentlemen must ascend to a higher source; the people fetter themselves
by no contract. If your State legislatures have cramped themselves by
compact, it was done without the authority of the people, who alone
possess the supreme power." To Hamilton, questioning the Principle of
the People's Supremacy was unthinkable: ". . . I trust the friends of
the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies in
questioning that fundamental principle of republican government, which
admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the established
Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness .
. . ."
     Thus the view expressed in our Preamble, that "We the People . . .
do ordain and establish" constitutions. In the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, Wilson indicated that the essential function of the Preamble
was to anchor down this central truth for all time:

    "[T]he leading principle in the politics, and that which
pervades the American [state] constitutions, is, that the supreme power
resides in the people. This Constitution, Mr. President, opens with a
solemn and practical recognition of that principle: -- "We, the people of
the United States," in order to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, &c. do ordain and establish the Constitution for the United
States of America." It is announced in their name--it receives its
political existence from their authority: they ordain and establish.
What is the necessary consequence? Those who ordain and establish have
the power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul. . . . the people
have a right to do what they please with regard to the government. . . .
the fee-simple remains in the people at large, and by this Constitution
they do not part with it. . . . in a government like the proposed one,
there can be no necessity for a bill of rights, for, on my principle,
the people never part with their power. . . .
    That the supreme power, therefore, should be vested in the
people, is in my judgment the great panacea of human politics. It is a
power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, and
indefinite in its extent . . . if there are errors in government, the
people have the right not only to correct and amend them, but likewise
totally to change and reject its form; and under the operation of that
right, the citizens of the United States can never be wretched beyond
reprieve, unless they are wanting to themselves.

With this dictum in mind, let us revise the Constitution.

                            ARTICLE 1

                      THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

========================================================================

Article I, Section 1

ALL LEGISLATIVE POWERS AS GRANTED HEREIN SHALL BE VESTED IN A CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

========================================================================

Notwithstanding the retention of a Senate and House of Representatives,
the requirement of Bicameral passage of legislation as it exists under
the 1787 Constitution has been done away with, with the addition of the
new procedure for the passage of Bills in Section Eight of this Article.
While the Senate retains in part its power to vote on legislation, its
primary function under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION is Oversight of the
Government.
     As we saw in the previous chapter, Congress is unable to to pass
every law and regulation that must be passed in modern industrial
society. Consequently, they have had to delegate authority. Indeed,
Delegation is inevitable. The answer is not to prevent all Delegations,
but to alter the (existing) system of Checks and Balances that makes
Delegation unwise. The newly drafted Article One, Section Nine
legitimizes the practice of Delegation ("as granted herein"), since new
Checks and Balances have been instituted; in addition, Section One
declares that the People, the source of all power, have retained certain
Legislative powers (one of the new checks on Delegation). Because a key
aspect of the new system of Checks and Balances is the Senate's
exclusive Oversight function, the Senate may not delegate its powers.
     The Legislative powers the People reserve for themselves (the
"direct democracy" provisions) are enumerated in Section Fifteen.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 2, Clause 1

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE COMPOSED OF MEMBERS CHOSEN EVERY
YEAR BY THE PEOPLE OF THE SEVERAL STATES. THE TERM OF THE REPRESENTATIVE
MAY BE EXTENDED BY THE PEOPLE TO TWO YEARS, AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION
FIFTEEN OF THIS ARTICLE.

========================================================================

    "[I]n last year's reconciliation bill, the consummation of
months of budget negotiations, Congress departed from habit and
authorized a comparatively huge, $1 trillion-plus increase in the limit,
from $3.123 trillion to $4.145 trillion. Lawmakers thought that would be
plenty to carry things well into 1993, safely past the 1992 elections."

-- Congressional Quarterly

    "[M]embers of national legislatures should be held
accountable. The national legislature ought to be reviewed regularly by
the citizenry. Legislators should feel anxious about their reelection
chances and should feel insecure about possibly deteriorating home-base
support from their constituents. . . .
    If the voters find their representatives lacking, they can
'turn the rascals out.' If the national legislature fails to act or
makes poor policy choices, or if the electorate perceives that members
are acting unethically by placing self-interest above the general public
welfare, then the public should use the ballot box to elect wiser and
more honest representatives. . . ."

-- The Constitution Under Pressure

Inherent in our political system is the idea that "the People are
supreme." Because they are supreme, they decide who will represent them,
in a process analogous to that of corporation stockholders choosing
their board of directors. Since the People are supreme, the concept of
voting necessarily follows when the political power of the People is
delegated to their representatives. Inherent in the concept of voting,
of course, is the length of the term. Note that the vote would be
worthless if the length of the term were, say, twelve years. Such a term
length, would, indeed, defeat the very purpose of voting. In that span
of time, an incompetent representative could do irreparable damage to
the country, and s/he would also be empowered to ignore the Will of the
people s/he supposedly represents. All other factors being equal, the
shorter the term, the greater the probability that the will of the
voters will be considered, and the greater the check on the authority to
whom the power has been delegated. The worth of the vote is inversely
proportional to the length of the term -- the longer the term, the less
the vote is worth; the shorter the term, the more the vote is worth.
This is why many stockholders, eminently interested in preserving their
investment, elect their boards of directors for Annual Terms.
     The concept of voting includes not only the idea of voting in, but
voting out, for reasons of retribution. Long terms make this exceedingly
difficult, due to the recency effect; people tend to remember what the
politician most recently did (voted for new jobs in the District),
versus what the politician did at the beginning of the term (voted for a
higher salary). With longer terms, the framing of reality through
political advertisements has a greater influence on the voters than
reality itself. And, if the term is too long, a politician can say, with
some authority, "I'm different now -- that was the old me." The
combination of forgetting the old and remembering the new works to the
advantage of strategic politicians, and to the disadvantage of voters
held captive by the biological limitation of short-term memory.
     Voting has many purposes, including the opportunity to inject new
ideas into Government. But the fundamental reason for voting is
accountability. As a Senate Select Committee stated in 1826, "This
return to the people, and accountability to them, constitutes the
responsibility of the Representative, and affords the only check and
control over his conduct, which the constituent can possess."
     To secure this responsibility, annual elections were the norm in
the 18th Century. In fact, at the time of the formation of our
Constitution, only South Carolina had elections every two years. The
other States had elections annually, and two States, Connecticut and
Rhode Island, even had elections for State office every six months! This
was a reflection of an old maxim, unfortunately since forgotten, that
"where annual elections end, tyranny begins," which Madison quoted at
the beginning of Federalist 53. George Mason, the author of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights (from which much of our Bill of Rights was
derived), stated in his remarks on annual elections to the Fairfax
Independent Company in 1775 that

    "[T]o restore mankind to its native rights hath been the
study of some of the best men that this world ever produced; and the
most effectual means that human wisdom that ever been able to devise, is
frequently appealing to the body of the people, to those constituent
members from whom authority originated, for their approbation or
dissent. Whenever this is neglected or evaded, or the free voice of the
People is suppressed or corrupted . . . inevitable destruction to the
state follows. . . . North America is the only great nursery of freemen
now left upon the face of the earth. Let us cherish the sacred deposit.
Let us strive to merit this greatest encomium that ever was bestowed
upon any country. In all our associations; in all our agreements let us
never lose sight of this fundamental maxim -- that all power was
originally lodged in, and consequently is derived from, the people. We
should wear it as a breastplate, and buckle it on as our armour. . . .
The proposed interval of a year will defeat undue influence or cabals;
and the capacity of being rechosen afterwards, opens a door to the
return of officers of approved merit, and will always be a means of
excluding unworthy men . . . ."

Benjamin Rush, writing in 1777, foresaw the end of annual elections, and
realized that their demise was the demise of justice: "[T]he rich have
always been an over-match for the poor in all contests for power . . .
The consequence of a majority of rich men getting into the legislature
is plain. Their wealth will administer fuel to the love of arbitrary
power that is common to all men. . . . Farewell now to annual
elections!" John Adams, who later became the Second President of the
United States, was amazed that people throughout history would surrender
their liberties to powerful Government officials who would not always
represent the interests of the general population:

    "Is it not amazing, that nations should have thus tamely
surrendered themselves, like so many flocks of sheep, into the hands of
shepherds, whose great solicitude to devour the lambs, the wool, and the
flesh, scarcely leave them time to provide water or pasture for the
animals, or even shelter against the weather and the wolves? . . . Is is
often said, too, that farmers, merchants, and mechanics, are too
inattentive to public affairs, and too patient under oppression. This is
undoubtedly true, and will forever be so; and, what is worse, the most
sober, industrious, and peaceable of them, will forever be the least
attentive, and the least disposed to exert themselves in hazardous and
disagreeable efforts of resistance. The only practicable method,
therefore, of giving to farmers, &c. the equal right of citizens, and
their proper weight and influence in society, is by elections,
frequently repeated . . . ."

For Adams, and for many other writers, the rights of the common people,
who work long and difficult hours, and who consequently do not have the
time or energy to devote to an understanding of day-to-day Government
operations, were not secure without free and frequent elections. As
Mercy Warren wrote in 1788,

    "All writers on government agree, and the feelings of the
human mind witness the truth of these political axioms, that man is born
free and possessed of certain unalienable rights -- that government is
instituted for the protection, safety, and happiness of the people, and
not for the profit, honour, or private interest of any man, family, or
class of men -- That the origin of all power is in the people, and that
they have an incontestible right to check the creatures of their own
creation . . . .
     Annual election is the basis of responsibility. -- Man is not
immediately corrupted, but power without limitation, or amenability, may
endanger the brightest virtue -- whereas a frequent return to the bar of
their Constituents is the strongest check against the corruptions to
which men are liable, either from the intrigues of others of more subtle
genius, or the propensities of their own hearts . . . ."

These insights were not lost on the Framers of our Constitution. As
Hamilton observed in Federalist 21, "Where the whole power of the
government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretence for
the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the
State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or
representative constitution, is a change of men." Madison well
understood that paper securities such as an ostensible Checks and
Balances System were useless without first securing the Principle of
Accountability:

    "The means relied on in this form of government for
preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various. The most effectual
one is . . . a limitation of the term of appointments, as will maintain
a proper responsibility to the people. . . . [S]ecurities . . . would be
. . . very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. . .
. the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.
Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their
elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be
compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when
their exercise of it is to be reviewed . . . ."

For Hamilton, the power of the People over Government was "essential"
for maintaining the rights of the People: "[T]he whole power of the
proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the
people. This is the essential, and, after all, the only efficacious
security for the rights and privileges of the people which is attainable
in civil society." To Hamilton, frequent elections would help prevent
corruption, due to "the slender interest a man is apt to take in a
short-lived advantage, and the little inducement it affords him to
expose himself, on account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or
hazard." Since "it [was] not . . . to be supposed, that the constitution
could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute
their will to that of their constituents", frequent elections were
necessary to insure not only that rights would be secured, and not only
that Government would remain corruption-free, but that the
representatives of the People actually represented the People, and voted
the collective Will of the People as the National Interest required. The
final rationale for frequency of elections was to furnish a security
that the Constitution would be obeyed. As Madison wrote in Federalist
63, "the house of representatives, with the people on their side, will
at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive
form and principles."
     When the Constitution was drafted, the Framers were well aware that
the People were fond of annual elections. Edmund Randolph, the Governor
and one of the Delegates from Virginia (who gave the opening speech at
the Convention), noted on June 21 that "The people were attached to the
frequency of elections. All the Constitutions of the States except that
of S. Carolina, had established annual elections," and Nathaniel Gorham,
a delegate from Massachusetts, stated that "[t]he great bulwark of our
liberty is the frequency of elections . . . ." For these reasons,
several of the Framers argued for the Annual Term at the Federal
Convention. Wilson said he was "for making the 1st branch an effectual
representation of the people at large, [and] preferred an annual
election of it. This frequency was most familiar & pleasing to the
people." Oliver Ellsworth, a delegate from Connecticut, argued for the
Annual Term and against a motion that had been made to set the term for
Representative at three years. Ellsworth said that "even one year was
preferable to two years," and that "[t]he people were fond of frequent
elections and might be safely indulged in one branch of the
legislature." Ellsworth moved for one year, and was seconded by Caleb
Strong, another delegate from Massachusetts. And finally, Roger Sherman,
another delegate from Connecticut, stated that "I am for one year. Our
people are accustomed to annual elections. Should the members have a
longer duration of service, and remain at the seat of the government,
they may forget their constituents, and perhaps imbibe the interest of
the state in which they reside . . . ."
     However, it is an unfortunate political reality that term lengths,
like taxes, creep ever upward. On June 21, the Federal Convention voted
for the biennial term. The primary reason for not going to one year was
expense. As Strong stated in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention on
January 15, 1788, in response to an inquiry of why two years was
substituted for one year, "it was . . . urged by the Southern States,
which are not so populous as the Eastern, that the expense of more
frequent elections would be great. . . ."
     There were other reasons for the rejection of the Annual Term,
stated by Madison in Federalist 37, 52, 53, and 55 as follows:

1.There would not be enough time to investigate the returns of
     elections.

    "[S]purious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in
time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be
obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who
takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to
answer his purposes. . . . so great a portion of a year would
unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed
of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check to
unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat."

2.The distance Representatives would have to travel was too
     far for Annual Terms.

    "The distance which many of the representatives will be
obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that
circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this
service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years."

3.Annual elections would lead to frequent turnover, and a resulting
     frequent change of laws.

    "A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return
of electors, and a frequent change of measures, from a frequent change
of men . . . ."

4.Senior members would set "snares" for new members.

    "A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies,
will possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, become
members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public
business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those
advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the
information of the bulk of the members, the more apt will they be to
fall into the snares that may be laid for them."

5.Knowledge for the job is important, and the one-year term was
     insufficient for acquiring the necessary knowledge.

    "No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an
upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of
the subjects on which he is to legislate. . . . The period of service,
ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the
extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the
service."

6.The powers of Government were to be limited, so terms could be longer.

    "It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no
other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the
shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the
power, the more safely may its duration be protracted."

7.Constitutional safeguards existed that made the biennial term less
dangerous.

    "[T]he limited powers of the Congress, and the control of
the State legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public
safety might otherwise require . . . ."

When Madison's reasons for rejecting the Annual Term are analyzed in
light of 20th and 21st Century reality, they are found wanting. The
First and Second reasons are obviously obsolete. And, while the
aberrational coincidence of Reapportionment, a Recession, and a Check-
Bouncing Scandal in 1992 will in all probability reduce the Incumbent
return ratio to its lowest percentage in over twenty years, the
historical fact remains that 93 percent of Incumbent Representatives
were, on average, re-elected every term in the 1964 to 1988 time period
-- thus, the Third reason no longer obtains. The Fourth reason is not
really an argument against the one-year term, but against an effect that
would be present with terms of any length if there were no limitations
set forth in the Constitution on the number of terms that could be
served by Representatives and Senators.
     Thus, we are left with the reason of expense cited by Caleb Strong
(this 18th Century concern has a contemporary spin: the advent of
television has made political campaigning more expensive, and more
frequent elections would, if left unregulated, lead to greater campaign
costs), and reasons Five, Six, and Seven. Reason Five, and the reason of
expense, was reiterated (and supplemented) by Henry Hazlitt in his
argument for a four-year term for Representatives in A New Constitution
Now: "A four-year term would give congressmen more time to learn their
job and to acquaint themselves with issues. They would have to devote
less time and expense to getting themselves reelected." For Hazlitt, the
need for a proper education was a compelling reason for longer terms,
along with an additional reason -- politicians were devoting more and
more time to getting re-elected; thus, the shorter the term, the more
campaigning for office, and the less time the politician could devote to
fulfilling his or her duties. To the latter reason of waste of time of
the Legislator in attempting to a) privately finance and b) campaign for
his or her election (and Reasons Six and Seven) may be added an
additional reason, not noted by Hazlitt or Madison: that a short term
length would potentially make Representatives more susceptible to local
interests, such as jobs for defense plants, etc. An undue attention to
the concerns of local interests would lead to violations of the National
Interest.
     The net results of this analysis are six plausible arguments
against the Annual Term:

1.Annual elections are more expensive.

2.The limited powers of Government make Annual Terms unnecessary.

3.Constitutional safeguards make Annual Terms unnecessary.

4.There is a greater susceptibility to local interests with Annual
Terms.

5.More frequent privately-financed elections (and the concomitant need
to devote more time to fund-raising and campaigning) means less time
spent on the job by elected officials.

6.The need for additional legislative knowledge makes the longer term
necessary.

While these arguments are plausible, they are found wanting under closer
scrutiny. The First argument, expense, is spurious. When people refer to
the expense of elections, they are generally referring to the cost of
publicizing elections (with private expenditures for political
advertisements). But elections can, should, and will be financed
publicly under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION (see Article One, Section
Ten, Clause Five), and expenditures and the length of campaigns will be
drastically limited, resulting in savings that will more than pay for
the minimal additional expense of holding elections (setting up voting
booths, etc.) every year instead of every other year (although all
States have off-year elections). More importantly, when we factor in the
savings that will accrue from the avoidance of financial disasters like
the National Debt, the Savings and Loan scandal, $700 screws, the B-2
program, and Star Wars, to name but a few of the literally hundreds of
examples of wasteful Government expenditures our current political
system cranks out on a yearly basis, the additional cost of annual
elections, if present at all, will turn out to be one of the greatest
investments in American History.
     When we examine the next two arguments in light of our recent
history, we find compelling reasons for the Annual Term. Why? Because
the nature of Government has radically changed. Recall that Madison
stated that the Government was one of "limited powers." Madison made
that statement before John Marshall's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland
in 1819, a decision Madison and many others argued fervently against, as
we saw in the earlier chapter. In that decision, John Marshall argued
that the "Necessary and Proper" Clause in Article One, Section Eight,
was a license to the Government to go beyond the strictly enumerated
powers in Section Eight, and to make additional laws that were
"necessary and proper." As Marshall stated,

    "[W]e think the sound construction of the Constitution must
allow to the national legislature that discretion . . . which will
enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
are Constitutional."

Thus, the Constitution was radically transformed. The powers were no
longer limited to those explicitly stated in Article One, Section Eight,
but were expanded to any powers consistent with "the letter and spirit
of the Constitution." Over time, the Federal Government gradually began
to acquire more and more powers, and not only by escalation. Ratified in
1913, the Sixteenth Amendment eliminated the concept of apportionment in
taxation, the constitutional safeguard against higher taxes, and the
Federal Government could boldly tax what no Government had taxed before.
The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified the same year, eliminated the
constitutional safeguard of control by the State Legislatures mentioned
by Madison in his Seventh Reason. Recall again that statement: "[T]he
limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State
legislatures, justify less frequent election than the public safety
might otherwise require . . . ." According to Madison, if the powers of
Congress were not limited (and they were greatly broadened by the
McCulloch decision and the addition of the Sixteenth Amendment), and if
the State Legislatures would lose control of the Senate (as they did
with the Seventeenth Amendment), then "the public safety" could require
more frequent elections. Thus, two of Madison's most compelling reasons
against Annual Terms become, in light of subsequent historical
developments, two of the most compelling reasons for Annual Terms.
Government now has vast new powers, and, as Madison stated, "the greater
the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration."
     Some have argued that a shorter term might lead to an undue
susceptibility to local interests. Indeed it might, but there are better
ways to solve that problem constitutionally than by increasing the
length of the term. Apart from its inherent danger, the longer term has
shown itself to a very poor check against the influence of local
interests, as revealed by our experience with Senators, who serve for
six-year terms. As Glenn Pascall noted in his book The Trillion Dollar
Budget,

    "If the services don't get what they want from the Secretary
of Defense, they can turn to Congress, pointing out to members the
benefits for their districts if projects appear in the budget. Congress
often responds. Senator Barry Goldwater has said, 'I don't care what the
piece of equipment is, or how bad it is, if it's done in his state, the
Senator has to get up and scream for it.'. . . Examples abound, but
perhaps none is more striking that that of Senator Cranston's support
for the B-1B bomber, whose prime contractor is California-based Rockwell
International."

An article in The New York Times on September 6, 1991 vividly revealed
the inadequacy of the six-year term as a solution for the local interest
problem. Titled "Senator Who Brings Home the Bacon," the article read as
follows:

    "Two years after Senator Robert C. Byrd was named chairman
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, he declared that he intended to
become a 'billion-dollar industry.' What he planned to do, he explained
in June 1990, was use his new power to funnel a billion dollars' worth
of Federal projects and agencies into his impoverished state. 'I hope to
become West Virginia's billion-dollar industry,' the Senator told a
crowd in Clarksburg. 'I expect during my term to bring at least a
billion dollars to West Virginia in projects that I put into the bill.'.
. .
    In less than three years as appropriations chairman, Mr.
Byrd has steered more than $750 million worth of Federal projects and
agencies and more than 3,000 Federal jobs out of Washington and toward
his constituents. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's new $185 million
fingerprint center will soon be built in Clarksburg, bringing in 2,600
new jobs. His latest target is the Central Intelligence Agency. He wants
to shift 3,000 of its jobs to West Virginia. . . . Mr. Byrd, who is 73
years old, is demonstrating anew that he can play the Congressional
power game as well as anyone around, especially when it comes to 'pork
barrel' politics. 'This nation is made up of local interests,' he is
fond of saying. . . .
          [N]o one else can claim to have attracted $140 million in
new highway projects this year -- a third of the new highway money put up
by Congress for the entire country. 'What helps West Virginia helps the
nation,' the Senator often says. . . .
    'Byrd has shown himself to be one of the great masters at
making the appropriations process work for himself and for others by
trading favors and building loyalty,' said Joseph White, a scholar at
the Brookings Institution who is writing a book on Congressional
appropriations. 'You don't necessarily make great history doing this,
but it's an inescapable part of the system.'"

Obviously, the six-year term does not prevent an undue attention to
local interests. The six-year term does, however, supply the danger of
long terms, without providing its supposed benefits. The local-interest
problem, however, is a serious one, and must be dealt with. THE 21ST
CENTURY CONSTITUTION contains structural solutions for the problem of
local interests unduly influencing National Representatives in Sections
Three, Six, Seven, and Eight of Article One.
     The final two arguments against one-year terms are that politicians
will always be "running for office," and that politicians need more time
to "learn on the job." These final two arguments, however, are not
compelling reasons against one-year terms. If politicians are always
"running for office," that is only because there is a constitutional
structure that permits them to do so, a problem that can be easily
solved constitutionally without resorting to the dubious remedy of long
terms, which have not solved the problem of "too much time running for
office." In fact, the length of the terms has indirectly increased the
time politicians spend "running for office," by preventing the
legitimate cure for the problem of too much "running for office,"
legislation providing for Public Financing (i.e., long terms have
allowed Senators to ignore the wishes of 80 percent of the People, who
would like to see Public Financing); consequently, Senators and
Representatives spend much of their time fund-raising -- in fact, the
average Senator must raise $10,000 dollars a week to run for re-
election, and indirectly runs for office on a weekly basis by "dialing
for dollars." As Senator Kerry of Massachusetts stated on the floor of
the Senate on May 22, 1991,

    "The growing fundraising burden is something we have all
talked about. I was just sitting here a moment ago making a list from my
own memory. I could not remember all of them but here is where I raised
money in 1990, the Senator from Massachusetts.
    I went to California a number of times. I went to New York,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, Georgia,
Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Washington, Colorado, Nevada, Alabama,
Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina--and I am sure there are some I
have left out. What is a U.S. Senator from Massachusetts doing having to
go to all those States? How many weekends did that take away from my
being in Massachusetts? How many weekends and how many days did that
take away from my ability to meet with the best minds in this country on
health care, on education, on ocean policy, on environment, on the
issues we ought to be voting on here? Instead I was chasing dollars,
living some night in a motel."

But the collective power Incumbent Senators with six-year terms have to
prevent the passage of Public Financing legislation ultimately keeps
even Representatives beholden to the money chase, since the passage of
legislation requires the consent of both houses. As one ex-
Representative stated, "I heard of some guys who call their closest
supporters, their key contributors, on Christmas Day. You never know
when to stop."
     The final argument, the "need for knowledge" is valid, but it too
is hardly a persuasive one against one-year terms. After a year in
office, any competent Representative should have "learned the ropes,"
and so this argument could only be valid for the first year. If people
felt this argument was legitimate, they could re-elect their congressman
because s/he hadn't time to "learn the job." More disturbing, however,
is that this argument justifies a status quo where people who "don't
know what they're doing" are running for office. This would provide a
powerful disincentive for people to remove Incumbents, and would
partially account for the fact that Incumbents are so difficult to
unseat. Why do we have people who "don't know what they're doing"
running for office? To some individuals, the first year of the
Representative is lost due to the need to "learn on the job," and the
second year is lost because the Representative is "running for office."
By this analysis, the first term of a freshman congressman, under our
system, is a complete waste of time! It would be far better to have
either experienced or trained people seeking election -- people who don't
need to "learn on the job," because they've learned what they need to
learn before taking office. If indeed a lack of knowledge is a problem
(and it is), then the far better solution for this problem is
preliminary training for politicians, not a longer term. This problem is
dealt with in Section Ten of this Article.
     When people contemplate the Annual Term, they frequently create an
inaccurate mental model of reality. They assume that a "revolving door"
effect will take place, and that Representatives will serve for one year
and no longer. Nothing could be further from the truth. Extensive
experience with the House of Representatives and the two-year term shows
that just the opposite is the case; year after year, the People re-elect
their Representatives. With the one-year term, however, the People will
not have to remember as long, and as much. A power greater in the threat
than the execution, the Congress will be more directly controlled by the
People, and new benefits will accrue as the effect of learned
helplessness becomes less pronounced. As Hazlitt wrote, in favor of
staggered annual elections, "Annual elections would keep both Congress
and the President in constant touch with and more responsive to public
opinion. It would keep constantly alive the people's interest in the
policies of their government. It would give them a sense of constant
control of these policies." A benefit realized by corporations would be
realized by Government. "[W]e sit everybody down in the dark once a
year," said Dan Burke (the CEO of Capital Cities/ABC), "and show them
what they said they were going to do for the year and what they actually
did. Then we look at what they say they're going to do next year. It's
sort of compelling to know that a year from now you're going to be back
in that same slot."
     Where something as important as term lengths are concerned, there
will always be disputes as to the proper terms. Knowing what the proper
lengths are is not easy, and depends on many variables. As Madison
stated in Federalist 52, "Frequent elections are unquestionably the only
policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.
But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for
the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise
calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it
may be connected." Because the proper term length is uncertain, and,
indeed, may require change over time, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION
gives the People the power to change the term lengths of Senators and
Representatives without requiring a Constitutional Amendment. The
procedure for this is provided in Section Fifteen of this Article.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 2, Clause 2

EVERY PERSON SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO THE OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE WHO SHALL
HAVE ATTAINED TO THE AGE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, AND BEEN SEVEN YEARS A
CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WHO SHALL, UPON AND SUBSEQUENT TO
TAKING THE OATH OF OFFICE, BE AN INHABITANT OF THAT STATE IN WHICH HE OR
SHE SHALL BE CHOSEN, A GRADUATE OF THE FEDERAL ACADEMY, AND WITHOUT
FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY; BUT NO PERSON SHALL SERVE
MORE THAN EIGHT YEARS AS REPRESENTATIVE.

========================================================================

This Clause, as rewritten, achieves nine ends:

1.Establishes qualifications for Representatives.

2.Establishes age as a qualification, and provides a minimum of 25
years.

3.Establishes citizenship as a qualification, and provides a minimum
citizenship requirement of seven years.

4.Establishes inhabitancy as a qualification, and provides that the
Representative be an inhabitant of his or her State (not his or her
District) upon and subsequent to taking the oath of office.

5.In establishing qualifications, removes power from the States to
establish more or less stringent qualifications.

6.Acknowledges and formalizes the increasing role of women in
Government.

7.Establishes education as a qualification, and provides as an
educational minimum graduation from the Federal Academy.

8.Prohibits political party affiliation while serving as a
Representative.

9.Introduces the concept of Term Limitations for the Legislative Branch.

Which qualifications for office will be implemented is one of the most
important issues confronting those drafting a New Constitution. In
addition to acknowledging the increasing role of women in future
Governments, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION adds three absolutely
critical new qualifications for office -- the requirement for Federal
Academy graduation, the prohibition against political party membership,
and a limitation on the number of terms a person may serve as
Representative.

THE FEDERAL ACADEMY

Not all of the poor legislation or absence of adequate legislation in
our political system can be ascribed to our Bicameral System as it is
checked and balanced by the Executive and Judiciary. Many of our
problems can be traced to the fact that our Legislators have simply not
been adequately trained. If we only elected freshmen to Congress, we
would be flown to new destinations by pilots who had never been in a
cockpit. Naturally, this provides a powerful disincentive to toss out
Incumbents, and has helped to maintain the status quo. Yet even
Incumbents are frequently poorly trained, and, in the scramble of
everyday legislative life, lack the time to attain the professional
education necessary for the competent execution of their tasks.
     This is not a new problem. Noah Webster wrote in 1788 that

    "There are some acts of the American legislatures which
astonish men of information; and blunders in legislation are frequently
ascribed to bad intentions. But if we examine the men who compose these
legislatures, we shall find that wrong measures generally proceed from
ignorance either in the men themselves, or in their constituents. They
often mistake their own interest, because they do not foresee the remote
consequences of a measure."

Madison recognized this problem, and saw that its solution must be
constitutional -- as he stated in Federalist 57, "The aim of every
political Constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers
men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the
common good of the society . . . ." According to Madison,

    "A good government implies two things; first, fidelity to
the object of government, which is the happiness of the people;
secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best
attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities: most
governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert that in
American governments, too little attention has been paid to the last."

For example, one of the many areas where knowledge was required was
commerce: as Madison wrote, "A proper regulation of commerce requires
much information . . . ." But Legislators must vote on many Bills, not
just commerce Bills, and not just on those issues upon which they have
formed expertise (generally from serving on a committee). In Federalist
53, Madison took cognizance of the need for additional knowledge: "No
man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright
intention and a sound judgment, a certain degree of knowledge of the
subjects on which he is to legislate."
     If this was true for the 18th Century Legislator, then the 21st
Century Legislator has a far more difficult task. Even at the State
level, the issues are complicated. Miewald (1984) observed with
reference to Nebraska legislators that

    "[L]egislators today are expected to form an intelligent
opinion on groundwater control . . . the educational needs of the
mentally retarded, abortion, [and] minority rights . . . Even a secluded
scholar would be exhausted by the very range of questions now demanding
a legislative answer, and [legislators] are far from seclusion, since
citizens are more vocal than ever in demanding to be heard on issues or
to complain about the action of government . . . [t]he demands of the
job are too much for any single individual."

The truth of this cannot be disputed at the State level; how much more
true it is at the Federal level, which entails an intimate familiarity
with far more complex and far-reaching substantive issues, such as the
environment, defense, taxation, antitrust, patent law, agriculture,
economics, transportation, trade, animal research, international issues,
insurance, crime, labor and management, energy, the Judiciary, social
security, community and regional development, computers, education,
telecommunications, finance, and civil rights, to name a few. Let's
examine some of these topics in depth, to see just how complicated they
are.
     Take, for example, the area of the environment. Just a few of the
many issues in that field which may appear in future legislation on
which the Representative must vote are air and water quality, waste
disposal, noise pollution, radiation, hazardous substances (toxic
materials, food additives, and pesticides), land use planning, Federal
land management, coastal areas, community development, historic
resources, weather modification, watershed protection, fish and wildlife
resources, and natural resources conservation. And these are just broad
categories. Some of the more specific areas that may be affected by
legislation are oil, gas, and sulphur operations on the continental
shelf; visibility and other effects of air pollution on National Parks
and historic sites; control of wind erosion at surface coal mines;
airborne hazards in the workplace; fuel venting and exhaust emission
requirements for turbine-engine powered airplanes; air quality
conformity of transit projects; toxic emissions for consumer products;
discharges of dredged or fill materials into the waters of the United
States; contamination of shellfish with toxics; water pollution from
ships; effluent limitations; sludge application on cropland; the proper
criteria for classification of solid waste disposal facilities;
transportation of hazardous materials; easements or permits for
transmission line rights-of-way across the National Wildlife Refuge; and
underground storage fields leaching into various aquifers, for starters.
And of course, the Representative needs to have a basic familiarity with
the Environmental alphabet, including CERCLA, RCRA, SARA, POTW, TSCA,
HMTA, FIFRA, NEPA, NAAQS, PSD, SPDES, and the FDF.
     The area of defense, of course, is one filled with a veritable
minefield of foreign concepts. The Representative must have a working
familiarity with various issues including, but not limited to, long-
range bomber forces, Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle
(MIRV) warheads, carrier-based nuclear capable aircraft, ICBM's, SLBM's,
ALCM's, BLU's, SUU's, CBU's, deliverable strategic warheads, SRAM
missiles, mortars, howitzers, grenades, mines, and various other
"antipersonnel" weapons, a list which only scratches the surface of
procurement, and omits strategy, history, international relations, and
the economics of military investment, etc. etc.
     The issue of procurement alone is extremely critical in a Nation
which sees an enormous percentage of its budget expended on military
Appropriations. Suppose the issue is Fragmentation Bombs. Which bombs
should be procured? The M83 4-lb Fragmentation Bomb, or the M28A2 100-lb
Fragmentation Bomb? Or will it be the MS9A1 500-lb Fragmentation
Cluster, or the AN-M81 260-lb Fragmentation Bomb? And there's always the
AN-M262A2 500-lb. Fragmentation Cluster and the AN-M41A1 20-lb.
Fragmentation Cluster. Of course, we haven't even begun to discuss the
MK 44 MOD O 550-lb. Lazy Dog Missile Cluster, the BLU-26/B Sadeye 1-lb
Fragmentation Bomb, the BLU-66/B Pineapple 1-lb. Fragmentation Bomb, the
MK 118 2-lb Antitank Fragmentation Bomb, nor the CBU-59/B 750-lb. APAM
Cluster Bomb Unit. It really is tough to decide! How about one of each?
Or will it be five of each?
     How about tanks and armored vehicles? Well, there's the M-48 Patton
II, and the M-41 Walker Bulldog. There's also the M-26 Pershing, the M-
3A1 Stuart/M-5A1, the M-4 Sherman, the XM-1 Abrams, and the M-113A1
Armored Personnel Carrier, not to mention the M-59 Armored Personnel
Carrier, the M-75, the M-114 Command and Reconnaissance Carrier, the M-2
IFV/M-3 CFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the M-2A1 Armored Half-
Track/M16. So many tanks -- so little time!
     Then there's the combat aircraft. Do we order 10 of the Fairchild
Republic A-101A Thunderbolt II and 15 of the General Dynamics F-16, or 5
of the Grumman A-6E Intruder Attack Bomber, and 30 of the Grumman F-14A
Tomcat Fighter Interceptor? How about one of the B-2, and none of the
above? Or will it be 50 of the McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle Fighter
Interceptor, and 20 of the Rockwell International B-1B strategic bomber?
And don't forget the combat support and special mission aircraft, like
the Boeing E-3A AWACS, or the Grumman E-2C Hawkeye, the Lockheed P-3C
Orion, or the Fairchild T-46A Trainer, nor various aircraft modification
programs such as the Boeing B-2-52G/H Stratofortress long-range
strategic bomber avionics modernization program, the Boeing B-52G
Stratofortress modifications to carry the ALCM, the Grumman/General
Dynamics EF-111A electronic counter measures aircraft conversion
program, and the Lockheed C-141A Starlifter fuselage stretch and aerial
refueling modification to the C-141B standard. And what about
helicopters? Well, there's . . . forget it -- we're running out of space!
     Knowledge of all these is important, and a lack of knowledge can be
very costly, in an area where knowledge is power, and power translates
into expenditures for Pentagon "wish lists." As General David Jones
said, if "you don't have the knowledge of all the war plans, the
fundamentals of strategy and weapons and so forth, the services can just
chew you up." Paul Feldman of the Center for Naval Analysis echoed this
concern: "The pros can always beat down critiques by non-specialists.
They just keep tossing technical objections at you."
     And what about the issue of taxation? According to Hamilton,

    "There is no part of the administration of government that
requires extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the
principles of political economy so much as the business of taxation. The
man who understands those principles best will be least likely to resort
to oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any particular class of
citizens to the procurement of revenue."

It's unlikely that even Hamilton could legislate competently in a
conceptual world of "ABC" transactions, ADR's, "bunched income,"
"ordinary income," "gross income," "net income," "one-way street"
provisions, corporate spin-offs, deductions, Subchapter S corporations,
"contemplation of death" rules, "phantom stock" bonuses, depletion
allowances, excess foreign tax credits, gift taxation, dividend credits,
"transfer" payments, "intangible drilling expenses," "minimum" taxes,
domestic international states corporations, tax-free bonds, "sick pay"
exclusions, depreciation, capital gains, stock options, "perks,"
"double-dip" tax advantages, tax subsidies, and unearned income, without
some knowledge of what these terms meant and their impact on society.
     And what about antitrust? Without background knowledge of price
fixing, division of markets, group boycotts and concerted refusals to
deal, joint ventures by competitors, "self-regulation" by trade
associations, the legal definitions of "agreement," "combination," and
"conspiracy," resale price maintenance by sellers, "requirements"
contracts, customer and territorial restrictions, "tying" arrangements,
horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers, the economic analysis of
price discrimination, the various exemptions from antitrust laws, the
Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts, the "rule of reason" test,
conscious parallelism, interlocking directorates, "consignment"
arrangements, product substitutability, the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index,
minimal unintegrated capacity, cost differentials, cross-elasticity of
demand, opportunity and variable costs, "average revenue" curves,
cartels, monopsony, bilateral monopoly, "kinked" demand curves, and
marginal revenue products, the passage of legislation would be
difficult, if not impossible. The same is true of patent law. Could
anyone legislate in that area without knowledge of issues and concepts
such as mechanical, process, combination, improvement, and design
patents, compositions of matter, improvements, "first inventorship,"
diligence, novelty, anticipation, "continuation-in-part" applications,
copending applications, the Milburn rule, utility, nonobviousness,
genus-species, design-design, and design-utility cases, the Muncie Gear
doctrine, abandonment, secrecy orders, examination, codependency
requirements, Rule 131 Affidavits, revival of abandoned applications,
enlarging claims, the doctrine of intervening rights, standing to sue,
assignee's rights against third parties, royalties, divisional
assignments, sublicensing, the doctrine of equivalents, and contributory
infringement?
     And these are just some of the issues on which our Legislators will
be called upon to pass laws. But it is not only issues regarding which
our Federal officials need to have background knowledge. They also need
training in decisionmaking and cost-benefit analysis, how to write
legislation without "loopholes" which is not vague and/or overbroad, the
long-term impact of legislation, and a basic grounding in critical
areas, including but not limited to economics, civil liberties, law,
social problems and their causes, and American and International
History. There also needs to be training for specialized positions under
THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, such as the Legislative Review Board
(e.g., how to evaluate and give Timetables to Bills).
     It is preposterous to assume that in a world where the objects of
legislation have multiplied beyond all comprehension, a world where
there are so many "rippling effects" of legislation, that Legislators
can have time to "learn on the job" all that they need to know. We are
paying, and will continue to pay, a very heavy price for this ignorance.
Madison referred to as a "defect" a "want of due acquaintance with the
objects and principles of legislation." As he stated,

    "It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the
most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment
for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals
of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the
comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to
themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of
their legislative trust. . . . [N]o small share of the present
embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our
governments; and . . . these have proceeded from the heads rather than
the hearts of most of the authors of them."

A Constitution should take, as Jay wrote, the "utmost care" that
Legislators be people of "talents and integrity." Thus, THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION requires that all elected Federal Officials (other than the
President and Vice President, who are not empowered to draft
legislation) be graduates of the Federal Academy, where they will be
formally trained. The Federal Academy is further discussed in Section
Ten.

PROHIBITION AGAINST POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP

One of the most significant changes in THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION is
the prohibition against formal political party membership for our
highest Federal officials.
     The two-party system which has evolved in America has proven to be
a dismal failure. Both parties -- the "low-taxing" Republicans and the
"free-spending" Democrats -- have given us a $4,000,000,000,000 National
Debt, a debt which siphons money away from the poor and middle-classes
in interest payments to the upper class. Yet year after year, the people
of all classes vote in the parties that gave us this National Debt. This
is a structural effect of the Constitution. In a letter to Roger Sherman
written in July of 1789, John Adams predicted the inevitable: "We shall
very soon have parties formed . . . these parties will study with all
their arts, perhaps with intrigue, perhaps with corruption, at every
election to increase their own friends and diminish their opposers." As
we shall soon see, once in, the parties consolidated their power and
precluded meaningful choice.
     It didn't take long after the Ratification of the Constitution, as
Adams predicted, for the debilitating effects of party dominance to
reveal themselves. In one of the most prescient statements in political
history, President George Washington warned us in 1796 of the "baneful
effects" of political parties in his famous Farewell Address, a warning
which has gone unheeded to this day:

    "However combinations or associations . . . may now and then
answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things to
become potent engines by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men
will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for
themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very
engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion. . . .
    I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the
State, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical
discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you
in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of
party generally. . . .
    [T]he common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party
are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise People to
discourage and restrain it.
     It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the
public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded
jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against
another . . . .
    There is an opinion that parties in free countries are
useful checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to
keep alive the spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably
true; and in governments of a monarchical cast patriotism may look with
indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of
the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit
not to be encouraged."

With this statement, Washington was echoing the remarks of the authors
of The Federalist, who despised political parties. As Hamilton had
written in Federalist 1, ". . . nothing could be more ill-judged than
that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political
parties." To Hamilton, party membership led to a fundamental Government
irrationality: "To judge from the conduct of . . . opposite parties, we
shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the
justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts
by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their
invectives." At a certain point, party division in the Legislature would
lead to injustice: ". . . on account of the natural propensity of
[legislative] bodies to party divisions, there will be . . . reason to
fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of
justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides
will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity." Critical
decisions such as Impeachment would "be regulated more by the
comparative strength of parties than by the real demonstrations of
innocence or guilt."
     To Jay and Madison, the two other authors of The Federalist, there
were other problems with political parties. According to Jay, the
existence of political parties would lead to bizarre results such as
Presidents elected by only 27 percent of the voting age population
(e.g., George Bush in 1988): " . . . the activity of party zeal, taking
advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of
the unwary and interested, often places men in office by the votes of a
small proportion of the electors." Jay, like Hamilton, recognized a
Prisoner's Dilemma effect to which political parties were liable: ". . .
the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing
party . . . to swerve from good faith and justice . . . ." This
fundamental tilt towards irrationality was noted by Madison in his
discussion of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors: ". . . it was split
into two fixed and violent parties. . . . passion, not reason, must have
presided over their decisions." The most sinister outcome of party
control was that the People would be subject to Minority Tyranny: "Men
of factious tempers . . . may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other
means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the
people."
     At the Federal Convention, Mason noted that ". . . those who have
power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it. On
the contrary we know they will always when they can rather increase it."
Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. But there was a
necessary lack of corrupting political party membership at the
Convention. Without this absence, we might still be living under the
Articles of Confederation. As Madison wrote, ". . . the Convention must
have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the
pestilential influence of party animosities; the diseases most incident
to deliberative bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings."
Hamilton thought that the fact that Representatives were elected
uniformly would help to prevent this disease: "It is more than possible
that this uniformity may be found . . . to be . . . a security against
the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the
diseases of faction." If this disease was not cured, it could prove to
be fatal: ". . . the diseases of faction . . . have proved fatal to
other popular governments . . . alarming symptoms have been betrayed by
our own."
     Unfortunately, uniformity in the time of elections for the House of
Representatives proved to be a very inadequate cure for this potentially
fatal disease. And, as historical developments have subsequently
demonstrated, the structure of the Constitution led inexorably to the
worst nightmares of the Framers. Whicker (1987) reported that the
effects were discovered not long after the Constitution was ratified,
and the Twelfth Amendment was added to compensate for the effect:

    "The rising strength of political parties and the political
maneuvering surrounding the election of 1800 triggered the process of
Constitutional change which resulted in the Twelfth Amendment. The
framers of the Constitution had . . . assumed that control of the
federal government would be entrusted to nonpartisan elites. No mention
of political parties was made in the Constitution itself and no
recognition of political parties was given in voting procedures for
president and vice-president."

But the structure of the Constitution, perversely, had insured the reign
of the debilitating political parties. According to Domhoff (1983),

    "Two fundamental features of American government lead to a
two-party system. The first is the election of a president, and the
second is the election of senators and representatives from states and
districts. The fact that only one person can win the presidency or be
elected from a given state or district, which seems trivial and is taken
for granted by most Americans, creates a series of 'winner-take-all'
elections in which a vote for a third candidate of the right or left is
in effect support for the voter's least-favored candidate on the other
side of the political spectrum. Because a vote for a third candidate is
a vote for 'your worst enemy,' the most sensible strategy for those who
want to avoid this fate is to form the largest possible preelection
coalition, even if numerous policy preferences must be abandoned . . .
The inevitable result is two coalitional parties that attempt to blur
their differences in order to win the voters in the middle."

     In addition, ". . . the electoral college, along with the single-
member district method of electing members of Congress, promotes a two-
party system to the detriment of smaller third parties. Under the unit
rule winner-take-all system, third parties have virtually no chance of
securing an electoral college victory." In "winner-take-all" systems,
there is a built-in bias against third parties. As Justice Stewart noted
in a footnote to his dissent in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968),

    "Assume a State in which a dissident faction of one of the
two major parties -- party A -- becomes dissatisfied with that party's
nominees and sets itself up as a 'third party' -- party C -- putting
forward candidates more to its liking. . . . A situation is possible in
which party B's candidates poll, for example, 46% of the vote, party A's
candidates 44%, and party C's candidates 10%. Party B's candidates would
in such a situation be elected by plurality vote."

Because of this effect, voters tend to vote for one of the two main
parties, since a vote for the most-preferred candidate may result in the
election of the least-preferred candidate! Assume a three-party
Presidential election consisting of Republicans, Democrats, and
conservative-oriented Libertarians. Assume that 55 percent of the People
support the Republican candidate, but that 15 percent of this support is
"soft." This 15 percent prefers the Libertarian candidate. If, however,
the entire 15 percent defect, the Republican will get 40 percent of the
vote, the Libertarian will get 15 percent, and the Democrat will get 45
percent of the vote. Thus, by defecting, Republicans sacrifice a won
election and gain nothing, and, adding injury to injury, assure the
ascendancy of the party they despise the most! Because of this
structural effect, third-parties are virtually ignored.
     Domhoff acknowledged that this effect was an unintended
consequence:

    "Although the system of presidential elections and single-
member congressional districts generates the strong tendency toward a
two-party system, it was not designed with this fact in mind. The
Founding Fathers wished to create a system of checks and balances that
would keep power within bounds . . . However, the creation of a two-
party system was not among their plans. Indeed, the Founding Fathers
disliked the idea of parties, which they condemned as 'factions' that
were highly divisive. Parties were a major unintended consequence of
their deliberations . . . ."

As it happened, a circularity effect developed. Once in, the parties
were able to secure campaign contributions from the wealthy. According
to Whicker (1987), "U.S. parties are heavily dependent upon
contributions from wealthy members . . . ." As Senator Bill Bradley (D-
NJ) reported on the floor of the Senate on May 21, 1991, out of 240
million Americans, only 179,000 people (less than one-tenth of one
percent) donated over $200 to Federal candidates, and fewer than 9000
individuals contributed more than $95 million to the 1990 congressional
campaign. With financial backing of this nature, the parties have been
able to sustain their hegemony, a hegemony which has lasted over 130
years. Their mere presence on the political scene for that length of
time has legitimized their existence, a legitimacy reinforced by the
media and education:

    "The portrayal of elections by the media, education systems
and by parents as contests between Democrats and Republicans reinforces
the voter's perception of the two-party norm. Voter access to
information about third parties may be limited and voters may find the
process of acquiring information costly . . . Since third parties rarely
get more than five percent of the total vote in presidential elections,
they usually do not qualify for public financing in the next
presidential race."

Matters have gotten so out of hand that the taxpayers are even financing
the conventions of the dominant political parties, which are nothing
more or less than a week of prime-time commercials for these parties,
broadcast over "public" airwaves. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) revealed on
the floor of the Senate on May 22, 1991 that "[e]ach of the parties'
conventions is financed by taxpayers. The Republican Party has accepted
$32.2 million in public money for its conventions since 1976 -- $32.2
million." Since there were four Republican conventions in that time
span, this advertising given to the political parties cost the taxpayers
$8 million for each convention!
     It is hardly surprising that once in power, the parties pass
legislation consolidating their power, to the detriment of third
parties. As Supreme Court Justice Rhenquist noted in his dissent in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) with reference to the Federal
Election Campaign Act,

    "Congress in this legislation . . . has enshrined the
Republican and Democratic parties in a permanently preferred position,
and has established requirements for funding minor party and independent
candidates to which the two major parties are not subject . . . I find
it impossible to subscribe to the Court's reasoning that because no
third party has posed a credible threat to the two major parties in
Presidential elections since 1860, Congress may by law attempt to assure
that this pattern will endure forever."

In power, the parties prevent measures that threaten their power, no
matter how worthy the proposal. According to Cronin (1989),

    "One reason the national initiative and referendum failed to
win widespread support . . . is that . . . [t]he established national
parties, the Republicans and Democrats . . . opposed the idea of a
national initiative and referendum, viewing it not only as unnecessary
but also as a threat to traditional representative principles and to
their own role as policy agenda-setting organizations."

Yet another consequence of party domination is that the balances of the
Constitution are altered by this dominance. Political parties can
prevent the obvious Constitutional necessity of veto overrides. As The
New York Times reported,

    "Thomas Mann, director of Governmental Studies at the
Brookings Institution, observed that the Democrats may 'probably be
better off not overriding.' In defeat, they can claim that Mr. Bush
prevented a problem from being solved. In victory, the public gets to
judge whether their solution has actually solved anything.
     'Sometimes the worst thing you can do is get your bill passed,' Mr.
Mann said."

Party membership also alters the voting pattern of Legislators: "It is
well known that many legislators vote a relatively straight party line
or are sometimes unduly influenced by their peers or senior members.
Some legislators are compelled by binding party caucus procedures to
vote contrary to their consciences." The existence of parties also
prevents the passage of legislation, creating even more inefficiency in
the Legislative Branch than was intended by the Framers -- contributing
to the transfer of Legislative power to an unelected Administrative
Branch. And, the passage of legislation is impeded as endless
irrelevancies are introduced into public debate. As the Times reported,
". . . badly outnumbered House Republicans use meaningless roll-calls as
their stock in trade to get the Democrats' attention and slow down the
majority." Regarding debate on a Civil Rights Bill in 1991, the Times
noted that "[h]ardly anybody took the floor to say what the problem was
and why one approach was better than another. Instead the other side's
motives were almost the only issue."
     Another critical effect of party domination is control over the
public political agenda, and a consequential lack of Accountability:

    "Critics have often described the two major parties as
'Tweedledee' and Tweedledum' to emphasize the centralist, middle-of-the-
road positions they take on most issues. The voter is provided with
limited choices when the two viable candidates take similar and
sometimes almost identical positions. . . . the lack of cohesion within
U.S. political parties contributes to an absence of party discipline and
to failure to deliver the promised platforms. Party platforms are often
ten to fifteen times the length of the Declaration of Independence.
Frequently they are not read, and they are often ignored by the
congressional party. . . . [this] diminishes accountability to the
voter, since any individual politician may not be able to deliver on
campaign promises to approve, modify, or cut programs. Even if elected
officials attempt to their campaign promises, they may be blocked by
other politicians in their own party, as well as by members of the
opposing party."

The issues seen as significant by the political parties are not
necessarily those favored by a Majority of Americans, and this is
reflected by the "membership" of the people in the parties. The combined
results of eleven polls taken in 1991 revealed that 31 percent of
Americans referred to themselves as "Republicans," 34 percent called
themselves "Democrats," and 29 percent said they were "Independents." 6
percent answered "Don't know." There are two interesting points about
this poll. The first is that 34 percent of Americans refer to themselves
as "Democrats." Many of these people call themselves "Democrats" because
if they didn't, they would lose their right to vote in one of the
primary elections! This trick of the political parties gets people to
form the conception "I am a Democrat," even though that person has never
contributed a dime to the Democrats, nor has read their campaign
platforms. Thus, people are forced to identify psychologically with the
political parties to retain their right to vote. Ultimately, Americans
may see attacks on parties, who do not represent their long-term
interests, as attacks on themselves.
     The second interesting aspect of this poll is that even though a
plurality of those polled (35 percent) do not identify with either
party, this 35 percent is virtually unrepresented in Congress. In the
102d Congress, 100 percent of the Senate was affiliated with the two
major parties, and 99.8 percent of the House of the Representatives was
affiliated with these parties. What happened to the representation of
the 35 percent of those people, a plurality, who were (and are) not
affiliated with either party? Their representation was obliterated by
the "winner-take-all" effect (leaving aside the regulatory barriers to
third party competition passed into legislation by the major parties).
The existence of this plurality indicates significant dissatisfaction
with the views of the parties (and doesn't even factor in the number of
people who have not bothered to register to vote at all). In fact, there
is dissatisfaction even among people who claim to identify with the
parties. As the Times reported, a black Democrat, Gloria Hackman, said
"They're doing terrible jobs, Democrats and Republicans.'" A white
Republican, Joseph Carp, said "'Neither party looks after my interests.
They just don't get anything accomplished.'"
     One of the sources of this dissatisfaction may be that, as with any
cartel, there is collusion instead of competition, and this collusion
may lead to effects such as personality voting and/or voter apathy, to
mention only the most minor problems. Domhoff (1983) catalogued the
techniques of collusion:

    "[T]here is evidence that the parties sometimes collude
rather than compete . . . collusion between the two parties often makes
better sense for them than competition if they are interested in rewards
other than winning, as indeed they often are:

The parties may find many ways of restricting competition with each
other: bipartisanship, promotion of mutually acceptable ideologies,
marginal changes in the previous administration's policies, and
recruitment of those who are not antagonistic to the other party. Even
the belief in the impossibility of certain platforms being able to win
the election may be a form of implicit collusion if there is more
fiction than substance to the belief. Thus the parties compete more with
the voters than for the voters or with each other.

    "[T]here is no a priori theoretical reason to believe that
political parties and their candidates will reflect out of necessity the
policy preferences of the majority of the voters. Candidates and parties
are relatively free to say one thing and do another. . . .
          It even may be that a two-party system discourages policy
discussion, political education, and an attempt to satisfy majority
preference . . . The need for a majority vote where the stakes are high,
such as the presidency, may lead to campaigns in which there are no
issues but personality, even when voters are extremely issue conscious.
. . .
          [T]here is evidence that a two-party system discourages
voting, for those in a minority of even 49 percent receive nothing for
their efforts . . . ."

Collusion leads to the development of a "cult of personality," where
people become the focus instead of issues -- and the only people upon
whom the public spotlight shines are those financed by special
interests:

    "In a system where policy preferences become blurred, the
emphasis on the images of individual candidates becomes very great.
Individual personalities become more important than the policies of the
parties. . . . the same people who direct corporations and take part in
policy groups play a central role in the careers of most politicians who
advance beyond the local level in states of any size and consequence."

Perhaps the worst effect of collusion (leaving aside the effects of log-
rolling, to be discussed in a later section), is that it aborts ex post
facto criticism in scandals where both parties were involved (virtually
all of them), resulting in losses of billions, even trillions, to the
taxpayers: "In 1987 and 1988, hundreds of S & L's across the country
began losing money. . . . As the situation worsened, Washington
pretended there was nothing wrong. A bipartisan conspiracy of silence
kept the scandal off the front pages and out of the presidential race."
     Another familiar and socially debilitating effect of political
parties is the phenomenon of patronage, which the Supreme Court defined
as "the right to select key personnel and to reward the party
'faithful.'" This concept of patronage is the very antithesis of a merit
system, as Hamilton observed in 1788:

    "[I]n every exercise of the power of appointing to offices
by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the
private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies,
attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose the
assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such
circumstances, will of course be the result either of a victory gained
by one party over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In
either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out
of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the
suffrages of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the
person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn
upon some interested equivalent -- 'Give us the man we wish for this
office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.' This will be the
usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the
advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of
party victories or of party negotiations."

In Federalist 77, Hamilton indicated that patronage might lead to
oligarchy, or rule by the few:

    "Every mere council of appointment, however constituted,
will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full
scope. Their number, without an unwarrantable increase of expense,
cannot be large enough to preclude a facility of combination. And as
each member will have his friends and connections to provide for, the
desire of mutual gratification will beget a scandalous bartering of
votes and bargaining for places. The private attachments of one man
might easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of a
dozen, or of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal
employments of the government in a few families, and would lead more
directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy than any measure that could
be contrived."

Hamilton was not alone in noting this effect. Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, observed the
effect of parties on political appointments:

    "[I]n a public body appointments will be materially
influenced by party attachments and dislikes . . . and will be generally
founded in compromises, having little to do with the merit of
candidates, and much to do with the selfish interests of individuals and
cabals. They will be too much governed by local, or sectional, or party
arrangements."

But, the structure of the Constitution insured that parties would
continue, and therefore that the practice of patronage would continue.
As Justice Powell observed in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980),

    "Patronage is a long-accepted practice . . . Patronage
appointments help build stable political parties by offering rewards to
persons who assume the tasks necessary to the continued functioning of
political organizations. 'As all parties are concerned with power they
naturally operate by placing members and supporters into positions of
power . . .' . . . The use of patronage to fill . . . positions builds
party loyalty . . . The failure to sustain party discipline, at least at
the national level, has been traced to the inability of successful
political parties to offer patronage positions to their members or to
the supporters of elected officials."

Over the course of time, patronage became the "way of the world" in the
United States, and blurred the Separation of Powers by transferring
power to the Executive Branch:

    "While the Constitution forbids congressmen to hold other
federal jobs, it doesn't forbid appointment of his friends, family and
supporters. With the emergence of political parties in the first
decadeof government under the Constitution, party loyalists started
demanding federal jobs. . . .
          Franklin Roosevelt . . . made effective use of his patronage
power. His patronage chief, Postmaster General James A. Farley, asked
patronage seekers such questions as 'What was your pre-convention
position on the Roosevelt candidacy?' and 'How did you vote on the
economy bill?' If a member was asked to vote for a presidential measure
against local pressures, the matter was put 'on the frank basis of quid
pro quo.'"

It goes without saying that patronage (and the party system fueling
patronage) leads inevitably to the most egregious forms of corruption.
Consider this report from The New York Times on September 11, 1991:

    "In theory, voters are supposed to choose the successor to
Louis Laurino, who stepped down last month from the powerful post of
Queens County Surrogate. But with millions of dollars of court patronage
at stake, the Queens Democratic organization isn't taking any chances.
Presiding over the probating of wills and estates, the Surrogate has the
power to award lucrative fees to lawyers acting as conservators,
guardians and trustees. Mr. Laurino, not known for his ethical
sensitivity, made his resignation effective Aug. 3 -- just past the
deadline for filing petitions for tomorrow's primary election.
    In cases where it's too late to choose nominees through
primaries, party leaders select the candidates. As a result, the
Democratic nominee for Surrogate in this overwhelmingly Democratic
borough will be chosen not by voters but by Representative Thomas
Manton, the Queens Democratic leader. His choice may not even face token
Republican opposition in the general election.
    Mr. Laurino became Surrogate by a similar act of timing that
avoided any primary challenge 20 years ago. But that hardly excuses this
farce of democracy -- a farce that ought to give pause to even the most
ardent supporters of New York's system of judicial elections."

In absolutely essential reading for students of the American political
system, George Washington Plunkitt in Plunkitt of Tammany Hall gave
dozens of examples of the myriad ways in which political corruption is
manifested by the existence of parties in our society:

    "There's an honest graft, and I'm an example of how it
works. I might sum up the whole thing by sayin': 'I seen my
opportunities and I took 'em.'
    Just let me explain by examples. My party's in power in the
city, and it's goin' to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well,
I'm tipped off, say, that they're going to lay out a new park at a
certain place.
    I see my opportunity and I take it. I go to that place and I
buy up all the land I can in the neighborhood. Then the board of this or
that makes its plan public, and there is a rush to get my land, which
nobody cared particular for before. Ain't it perfectly honest to charge
a good price and make a profit on my investment and foresight? Of
course, it is. Well, that's honest graft."

As Plunkitt noted, ". . . parties can't hold together if their workers
don't get the offices when they win . . . ." Under the party system,
workers who receive jobs have to "pony up" in support of the party:

    "Even candidates for the Supreme Court have to fall in line.
A Supreme Court Judge in New York County gets $17,500 a year, and he's
expected, when nominated, to help along the good cause with a year's
salary. Why not? He has fourteen years on the bench ahead of him, and
ten thousand other lawyers would be willin' to put up twice as much to
be in his shoes. Now, I ain't sayin' that we sell nominations. That's a
different thing altogether. There's no auction and no regular biddin'.
The man is picked out and somehow he gets to understand what's expected
of him in the way of a contribution, and he ponies up -- all from
gratitude to the organization that honored him, see?
    Let me tell you an instance that shows the difference
between sellin' nominations and arrangin' them in the way I described. A
few years ago a Republican district leader controlled the nomination for
Congress in his Congressional district. Four men wanted it. At first the
leader asked for bids privately, but decided at last that the best thing
to do was to get the four men together in the back room of a certain
saloon and have an open auction. When he had his men lined up, he got on
a chair, told about the value of the goods for sale, and asked for bids
in regular auctioneer style. The highest bidder got the nomination for
$5000. Now, that wasn't right at all. These things ought to be always
fixed up nice and quiet."

At the lower levels of political life, and perhaps beyond, these
practices continue. As Waldman (1990) reported with regards to the
Nassau County (New York) Republican political machine, "the party raised
funds through a 'one-percent' system, in which county employees gave one
percent of their salaries to the GOP . . . ."
     The final, and perhaps worst effect of the party system is that it
destroys the concept of Separation of Powers, a Principle which, as
implemented in the Constitution, made Government unworkable, as we saw
in the earlier Chapter. A truly divided Government could not govern;
consequently, the parties filled in a gap existing under the present
Constitution, and fostered cooperation between the Branches -- in so
doing, however, obliterating a fundamental constitutional Principle. As
Justice Powell noted,

    "Although the Executive and Legislative Branches of
Government are independent as a matter of Constitutional law, effective
government is impossible unless the two Branches cooperate to make and
enforce laws. Over the decades of our national history, political
parties have furthered -- if not assured -- a measure of cooperation
between the Executive and Legislative Branches."

The Framers, however, did not intend for there to be any "common
interest" between the Branches. In fact, as Hamilton asserted in
Federalist 60, the system of Checks and Balances was designed under the
assumption that there would be no such common bond:

    "The House of Representatives being to be elected
immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the
President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would
be little probability of a common interest to cement these different
branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors."

The political party concept is clearly an idea whose time has gone, and
the answer to this problem is clear. As Madison observed in Federalist
10, because "the causes of faction cannot be removed . . . relief is
only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects." Since
political parties will be formed under any Constitution which recognizes
the People's right to associate, the only way to insure that political
parties do not dominate Government and obliterate the new system of
Checks and Balances instituted in THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION is to
mandate that our elected officials may not belong to any political party
while they are holding office. The Supreme Court recognized the logic of
this position in upholding the Hatch Act:

    "It seems fundamental . . . that employees in the Executive
Branch of the Government, or those working for any of its agencies,
should administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress,
rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a political
party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of
the Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political
party or group or the members thereof . . . it is essential that federal
employees . . . not take formal positions in political parties . . . and
not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities
like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government."

As the Court noted, "Neither the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute . . . ." The right of
politicians to belong to political parties has been conclusively
demonstrated to interfere with the right of Americans to an efficient
and fair Government. When rights clash, the common good must take
precedence, in line with the stricture of the Preamble that the primary
role of Government is to "promote the general Welfare." As Madison
wrote, "[n]o axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason,
than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized . . .
." If an individual who seeks to run for office values his or her right
to belong to a political party more than the common good, that person is
free to join a political party; however, s/he will not be allowed to
serve as an elected Federal official. Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), in
speaking on the issue of Public Financing, spoke of the need for
dramatic reform -- mild reform was no reform at all:

    "[W]e should stop kidding the American People and answer two
basic questions: Do we want to both in fact and in appearance free any
candidate . . . from the appearance of being beholden to anyone? . . .
There was an English writer and cleric, I believe, in the 17th century,
who said, 'Moderate reform is like moderate justice or moderate
chastity.' There ain't no such thing. Either reform the system or be
quiet."

TERM LIMITATIONS

As a final check on the powers of Incumbents to secure an invincible
political base by using the political power they have consolidated over
the years to pander to local interests, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION
introduces the concept of Term Limitation to the Federal Legislative
Branch. Certain politicians and establishment organizations have
referred to Term Limitations as "undemocratic." But, from a long-term
perspective, nothing can be more democratic than Term Limitations.
Incumbents use their political power to secure private contributions,
and use these funds to stay in office. Challengers are handicapped, and,
consequently, the People have no substantive choice. Without substantive
choice, there can be no such thing as a democratic election. The Term
Limitation requirement, like the other qualifications for office, has as
its final goal the attainment of more choice for the People, and, in
addition, is institutional insurance that new ideas will be presented in
Congress over the decades. According to Cronin (1989), ". . . the
advantages of incumbency may thwart an infusion of new blood and fresh
ideas." The Term Limitation provision is the ultimate insurance that the
Government will not be run by public officials whose primary goal is to
secure a power base built up over many years.
     And, in light of the earlier remarks by Senator Byrd, West
Virginia's self-proclaimed "billion-dollar industry," Term Limitations
may be essential for the survival of the country.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 2, Clause 3

REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY THE SENATE WITHIN EQUIVALENT AND
CONTIGUOUS DISTRICTS AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED
WITHIN THIS UNION, ACCORDING TO THEIR RESPECTIVE NUMBERS, WHICH SHALL BE
DETERMINED BY ENUMERATION IN A NATIONAL CENSUS. THE ACTUAL ENUMERATION
SHALL BE MADE WITHIN FIVE YEARS AFTER RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION,
AND WITHIN EVERY SUBSEQUENT TERM OF FIVE OR TEN YEARS, IN SUCH MANNER AS
THE LAW SHALL DIRECT. THE NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE NOT LESS
THAN ONE FOR EVERY THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND CITIZENS, AND THE
INITIAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ONE THOUSAND. EACH STATE
SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE REPRESENTATIVE.

========================================================================

This Clause contained the infamous "three-fifths" compromise, which
mandated that African-American slaves be counted as three-fifths a
person for the purposes of apportioning Representatives and direct
taxes. This compromise was made necessary by the conflicting interests
of the North and South: the North, recognizing that slaves in the South
were treated as property and had no rights, didn't want the South to
increase its power by getting additional Representatives in Congress by
being allowed to count slaves as "persons": the Northern view was that
Slaves shouldn't count as people at all! The South, on the other hand,
which in other respects gave slaves no legal rights, wanted to increase
its influence, and have the slaves counted as what they actually were,
people, solely for the purposes of allocating representation. One of the
ironies of history. Yet the taint of that astonishing compromise remains
today, in language which is still part of our Written Constitution.
Quite properly, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION will strike out this
offensive language.
     The representation in the House under this Clause is proportional;
that is, each State is allocated a number of Representatives (as
controlled by the Senate, to prevent the effect of gerrymandering, where
House Incumbents attempt to have Districts re-drawn to secure their re-
election) based on its percentage of the population of the United
States, assuring that the concept of "one person, one vote" is
maintained in at least one Branch of Government.
     THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION increases the number of
Representatives to 1000, since the workload of Congress has greatly
expanded. According to Whicker (1987),

    "The expansion of the work load of Congress, especially in
recent decades, has further undermined the accountability of
representatives to citizens. The work of Congress has grown
dramatically, but the number of representatives elected to do the work
has not. . . . The number of constituents served by each member has also
increased with national population growth, increasing the demands for
constituent service."

The new provisions also insure that the Representative/Constituent ratio
will never drop below one Representative for every 350,000 Constituents:

    "In order to enhance accountability, increased numbers of
representatives would prevent distance between constituents and
important decision-makers. In an extreme scenario, without an increase
in the number of representatives, national policies would most likely be
established more frequently by anonymous staffers who never appear on
the ballot. A concomitant increase in the number of representatives
would prevent this undercutting of democratic principles. Lines of
accountability would be shorter and more obvious."

Under this Clause of THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, the
Representative/Constituent ratio is permanently established, and not
subject to the will of elected officials.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 2, Clause 4

EVERY REPRESENTATIVE SHALL APPOINT AN ALTERNATE, WHO SHALL SERVE FOR A
SINGLE ONE-YEAR TERM. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO THE OFFICE OF
ALTERNATE WHO SHALL HAVE ATTAINED TO THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE YEARS, AND
BEEN SEVEN YEARS A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WHO SHALL, UPON AND
SUBSEQUENT TO BEING APPOINTED, BE EITHER IN ATTENDANCE AT OR A GRADUATE
OF THE FEDERAL ACADEMY, AND WITHOUT FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANY
POLITICAL PARTY. THE ALTERNATE SHALL SERVE IN THE DISTRICT OF THE
REPRESENTATIVE AS THE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE CONSTITUENTS OF THE
DISTRICT AND THE REPRESENTATIVE, AND SHALL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY OVER
SERVICES FOR CONSTITUENTS. THE ALTERNATE SHALL REFER CONSTITUENT
REQUESTS FOR PARTICULAR LEGISLATION TO THE APPROPRIATE LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE. IF NO LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE EXISTS, THE ALTERNATE SHALL REFER
THE CONSTITUENT TO THE FEDERAL COMMITTEE. NO ALTERNATE SHALL BE ELIGIBLE
TO THE OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE UNTIL ONE YEAR HAS ELAPSED FROM THE END
OF HIS OR HER TERM, SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTION OF VACANCY. WHEN VACANCIES
HAPPEN IN THE REPRESENTATION FROM ANY STATE, THE AGE REQUIREMENT FOR
REPRESENTATIVE SHALL, IF NECESSARY, BE SUSPENDED, AND THE ALTERNATE
SHALL ASSUME THE VACANCY. THE ALTERNATE SHALL BE ELIGIBLE FOR RE-
ELECTION.

========================================================================

Vacancies may happen from various causes; resignation, disability,
death, or expulsion. The power to provide for vacancies is an obvious
one, and this Clause formerly assigned the power to the Governors of the
States. Unspecified in the Clause of the 1787 Constitution are the
necessary temporal parameters regarding the issuance of "writs of
election" -- will a vacancy be filled if there are only six months left
in the term? Ten? Twelve? Generally, Governors did not call elections
unless the unexpired term was over twelve months, due to the expense of
a special election. Consequently, under this Clause, a District could
conceivably be without representation for as long as one year.
     The addition of the Alternate supersedes this passage. In this
regard, the Alternate functions for the Representative in the same
manner as the Vice-President functions for the President -- vacancies
will be filled immediately. However, the Alternate has additional
obligations: the responsibility for constituent services, while serving
as the intermediary between the constituents of the District and the
Representative, who is based in Washington, D.C. Thus, constituents will
have direct contact with a Federal official. Additionally, it gives the
Alternate, who will either be a graduate of the Federal Academy or a
third-year student, and who will in all likelihood be a future candidate
for Representative, the opportunity to see first-hand the impact of
Federal policies on the lives of everyday people. With this opportunity,
the future candidate is out of the world of abstractions and raw data
and in the world of living, breathing human beings. Along with this
valuable "reality check," the Alternate is exposed to the concerns of
the people who live in the District, the people s/he will one day serve.
     Because the Alternate will be performing constituent services
(freeing the Representative from this time-consuming and potentially
corrupting task), the Alternate will become well-known in the District,
and be able to build a "political base" from which to run for office.
Thus, a potential animosity may arise between the Representative and the
Alternate. To ameliorate this potentially unhealthy situation, the
Alternate is limited to a single one-year term (this also allows for
more nominees to be exposed to the problems of the District). As an
additional precaution, the Alternate is not allowed to run for election
until one year after his or her term has expired, putting temporal
distance between the services performed for constituents and the
Alternate's views on National Policy. Thus, the Alternate is more likely
to be elected for his or her views, and not for services rendered to
certain influential residents of the District.
     In addition to performing constituent services, the Alternate will
refer constituents who are either concerned with social problems, or who
have proposals for future legislation, to the Legislative Committees set
up for the purpose. For example, a constituent concerned with the
literacy problem will be referred to the Committee on the Monthly Book
Program for Elementary School Children, or any one of the other
Committees established to deal with the problem. If the constituent is
not satisfied with any or all of these existing approaches, the
constituent is invited to submit his or her proposal for legislation
dealing with the problem to the Federal Committee, which is responsible
for the establishment of new Committees, subject to the rules
established in Section Fifteen of this Article. Under these Clauses,
every taxpaying Citizen has the same freedom and authority granted to
today's lobbyists and special interests: the opportunity to place a
proposal on the Public Agenda.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 2, Clause 5

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CHOOSE THEIR SPEAKER AND OTHER
OFFICERS AND THE NOMINEES FOR SENATORIAL ELECTIONS UNDER THE GUIDELINES
ENUMERATED IN SECTION A-100, PROVIDED THAT THERE SHALL BE NOT LESS THAN
THREE AND NO MORE THAN SIX NOMINEES FOR EACH SEAT IN THE SENATE, AND
THAT NOMINATIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF SENATOR SHALL BE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE POPULATION TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH REGARD TO SEX, RACE,
NATIONAL ORIGIN, AND OTHER FACTORS THE CONGRESS SHALL DESIGNATE AS THE
NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES.

========================================================================

Under the current system, nominations for key political offices are in
the hands of a) the media, who decide to recognize candidate A over
candidate B, and give that particular candidate air time, and thus brand
him or her as "legitimate," and b) political parties. In essence,
approval by the media and the parties is necessary to attain office:
without this approval, private and PAC financing is virtually impossible
to obtain, and a political campaign cannot be conducted. The net
consequence of this unholy alliance is that if the media and the two
political parties do not discuss the issues which are most critical for
the long-term interests of the American people, or recognize the
candidates who discuss these issues, an essential political power has
been impermissibly granted to private -- not public -- concerns.
     This Clause pulls the nominating process out of the hands of the
media (which collectively receives hundreds of millions of dollars in
revenue from political advertisements, and which is thus more likely to
legitimize the candidates who attract the most financing), and puts the
nominating process exclusively in the hands of elected officials who are
not allowed formal party membership, who owe no allegiance to private
concerns, who must make their nominations from the pool of the best and
brightest individuals in the country (trained for their positions at one
of the Country's finest academic institutions), and who may be removed
from office if the quality of the nominees does not reflect the wishes
of the People. In addition, the Clause helps to insure diversity and
representation in Government, by providing that nominations be
representative of the population with regard to the designated factors.
In his essay Thoughts on American Government, John Adams had written
that a representative assembly "should be in miniature an exact portrait
of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like
them." On June 6 at the Federal Convention, Wilson said that "[t]he
Govt. ought to possess not only 1st the force but 2ndly. the mind or
sense of the people at large. The Legislature ought to be the most exact
transcript of the whole Society." In light of this consideration,
Hamilton stated in Federalist 35 that

"It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have
some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their
feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to. . .
. But . . . [t]he idea of an actual representation of all classes of the
people . . . is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly provided
in the Constitution . . . the thing would never take place in practice."

Taking Hamilton's advice, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION expressly
provides for an increase in the probability of equal representation, a
hallmark of every Government that wishes to call itself democratic.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT

The Constitutional Supplement ("Section A-100" means Constitutional
Supplement Section A-100) is one of the most important new additions to
the Constitution. Under the concept of the Constitutional Supplement,
certain critical provisions, such as the guidelines discussed in this
Clause, are easier to amend than other provisions of the Constitution.
There are three Sections of the Constitutional Supplement: those in
Section A are the most difficult to amend, and require the consent of a
Majority of the People -- the provisions in Section C are the easiest to
amend, and do not require the consent of the People. The Constitutional
Supplement is discussed further in Article Seven.
     Interestingly enough, an ersatz Constitutional Supplement exists
today: the decisions of the Supreme Court. One of our Government's
"dirty little secrets" is that there are two Constitutions in America
today: the Written Constitution (the one we all studied in 8th grade),
and the Empirical Constitution discussed in the previous chapter. They
are not the same. For example, under the Written Constitution, Congress
shall pass no law abridging the Freedom of Speech. Yet under the
Empirical Constitution, Congress is empowered to pass laws abridging the
Freedom of Speech whenever it feels such laws are "necessary and
proper." For details, see the Hatch Political Activity Act (5 U.S.C.A.
7324 et seq.) and the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.A. 151 et
seq.). There are hundreds of examples of other Constitutional rewrites,
too many to list here. Interested readers should consult Dr. Ladanyi's
book, The 1987 Constitution (the First Amendment, which typically
occupies 4 lines of written text, occupies 10 pages of his book!).
     Under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, the power to rewrite the
Constitution by historical practice (i.e., if the Government ignores the
Constitution long enough, historical practice becomes law) is
terminated. Unquestionably, a Constitution must evolve with the times,
but this "evolution" must itself occur constitutionally. The concept of
the Constitutional Supplement is that the provision supplemented needs
to change with the times; but the change must occur on a formal, and not
ad hoc, basis.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 1

THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL BE COMPOSED OF TWO SENATORS FROM
EACH STATE, ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE THEREOF, FOR TWO YEARS; AND EACH
SENATOR SHALL HAVE ONE VOTE. THE TERM OF THE SENATOR MAY BE EXTENDED TO
FOUR YEARS, AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION FIFTEEN OF THIS ARTICLE.

========================================================================

The Senate's role is vastly changed under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION.
Because it has been given more power, the length of the term for each
Senator must be reduced to reflect the new power. This term length is
initially set at two years, but may be changed to four years by the
People as provided under Section Fifteen.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 2

WHEN VACANCIES HAPPEN IN THE REPRESENTATION OF ANY STATE IN THE SENATE,
THE AGE REQUIREMENT FOR SENATOR SHALL, IF NECESSARY, BE SUSPENDED, AND
THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OF SUCH STATE SHALL APPOINT AN ALTERNATE TO FILL
SUCH VACANCIES FROM ONE OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICTS. THE ALTERNATE SHALL BE
ELIGIBLE FOR RE-ELECTION.

========================================================================

The deletion of the Second Clause from Article One, Section Three of the
1787 Constitution eliminates the concept of staggered terms for
Senators. If the People find that the Senate has gone beyond its
Constitutional powers, a Majority of the Senate (or the entire Senate)
may be removed in any one election. The Governor of each State still has
the power to make vacancy appointments, but the Governor must make his
or her choice from the pool of Alternates serving in the Federal
Districts.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 3

EVERY PERSON SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO THE OFFICE OF SENATOR WHO SHALL HAVE
ATTAINED TO THE AGE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, AND BEEN SEVEN YEARS A CITIZEN
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WHO SHALL, UPON AND SUBSEQUENT TO TAKING THE
OATH OF OFFICE, BE AN INHABITANT OF THAT STATE FOR WHICH HE OR SHE SHALL
BE CHOSEN, A GRADUATE OF THE FEDERAL ACADEMY, AND WITHOUT FORMAL
AFFILIATION WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY; BUT NO PERSON SHALL SERVE MORE
THAN EIGHT YEARS AS SENATOR.

========================================================================

These are essentially the same qualifications for office as required for
Representatives, and are instituted for the same reasons.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clauses 4-5

THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL BE PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE, BUT SHALL HAVE NO VOTE, UNLESS THEY BE EQUALLY DIVIDED.

THE SENATE SHALL CHOOSE THEIR OTHER OFFICERS, AND ALSO A PRESIDENT PRO
TEMPORE, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, OR WHEN HE OR SHE SHALL
EXERCISE THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

========================================================================

The Fourth and Fifth Clauses preserve the power of the Vice President to
break tie votes in the Senate, and the power of the Senate to choose its
own Officers.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
     Subclauses 1-3

THE SENATE SHALL HAVE THE EXCLUSIVE POWER AND OBLIGATION TO OVERSEE THE
OPERATIONS OF GOVERNMENT, AND INSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THIS CONSTITUTION;
AND TO

APPOINT AN AUDITOR TO SERVE FOR FOUR YEARS OR UNTIL A SUCCESSOR HAS BEEN
APPOINTED. EACH YEAR THE AUDITOR SHALL CONDUCT A THOROUGH AUDIT OF ALL
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS AND OPERATIONS, AND SHALL SUBMIT THESE AUDIT
REPORTS TO THE SENATE, WHICH SHALL MAKE THESE REPORTS AVAILABLE TO THE
PUBLIC; AND TO

PUBLISH A QUARTERLY STATEMENT AND ACCOUNT OF ALL RECEIPTS AND
EXPENDITURES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND QUARTERLY REPORTS OF
CONGRESSIONAL PROGRESS AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS; AND TO

========================================================================

The First Subclause of the Sixth Clause introduces the first fundamental
structural differences between the 1787 Constitution and THE 21ST
CENTURY CONSTITUTION. Under this Subclause the Senate has exclusive
Legislative powers and obligations. Thus, the New Constitution mandates
that certain critical laws be passed. If the laws are not passed, the
People know who are responsible, and may vote out the lawbreakers at
their discretion (if they haven't been impeached first).
     The Second and Third Subclauses insure that the People, who pay
taxes to support the Government, know where their money is going and how
it is spent. (The Third Subclause was formerly Section Nine of Article
One). If money is being spent unwisely, or is otherwise unaccounted for,
the People will be informed, and thus be able to take action to correct
the problem.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
     Subclauses 4-5

ESTABLISH A FEDERAL COMMITTEE, CONSISTING OF ONE SENATOR FROM EACH
STATE, WHICH SHALL CREATE AND DISBAND THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
DESCRIBED UNDER SECTION FIFTEEN OF THIS ARTICLE; AND TO

     ADMINISTER AND REGULATE THE NATIONAL DATABASE, THE NATIONAL POLL,
THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES, THE NATIONAL INITIATIVE, THE NATIONAL
REFERENDUM, AND THE NATIONAL RECALL; AND TO

========================================================================

These Subclauses establish the power of the Senate to provide
regulations for the "direct democracy" provisions in THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION. The Federal Committee has Oversight of the Legislative
Committees, groups of Citizens who propose, research, and draft
legislation (discussed further in Section Fifteen).

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
     Subclauses 6-8

NOMINATE CANDIDATES FOR THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED IN SECTION
A-105, PROVIDED THAT THERE SHALL BE NOT LESS THAN THREE AND NO MORE THAN
SIX NOMINEES FOR EACH SEAT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND NOT LESS
THAN TEN AND NO MORE THAN TWENTY NOMINEES EACH FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE
PRESIDENT; AND PROVIDED THAT ONE-HALF THE NOMINEES FOR THE PRESIDENCY
AND VICE PRESIDENCY SHALL BE GRADUATES OF THE FEDERAL ACADEMY, AND THAT
NOMINATIONS FOR ALL OFFICES SHALL BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POPULATION TO
THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH REGARD TO SEX, RACE, NATIONAL ORIGIN,
AND OTHER FACTORS THE CONGRESS SHALL DESIGNATE AS THE NATIONAL INTEREST
REQUIRES; AND TO

SUPERVISE AND PROVIDE GUIDELINES FOR THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION,
TO BE ENUMERATED IN SECTION C-100, WHICH IS AUTHORIZED TO AND SHALL
ENACT ELECTORAL LEGISLATION SECURING THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN SECTION
TEN OF THIS ARTICLE; AND TO

COMPILE, PRIOR TO ELECTIONS, A PERFORMANCE RATING FOR EACH
REPRESENTATIVE DETERMINED BY DIVIDING THE SUM OF THE EVALUATIONS OF
VOTES CAST BY THE REPRESENTATIVE BY THE NUMBER OF VOTES CAST BY THE
REPRESENTATIVE, PROVIDED THAT A REPRESENTATIVE IS GIVEN ZERO POINTS FOR
"NAY" VOTES; A PERFORMANCE RATING COMPRISED OF THE AVERAGE OF THE
EVALUATIONS OF "YEA" VOTES CAST BY THE REPRESENTATIVE; AND A PERFORMANCE
RATING COMPRISED OF THE SUM OF THE EVALUATIONS OF "YEA" VOTES CAST BY
THE REPRESENTATIVE. THE SENATE SHALL PUBLISH THE VOTING RECORD OF EACH
REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS OR HER PERFORMANCE RATINGS ON THE NATIONAL
DATABASE, AND SHALL UTILIZE THESE PERFORMANCE RATINGS IN ANY SUBSEQUENT
LEGISLATION TO WHICH THEY MAY APPLY; AND TO

========================================================================

The Sixth Subclause provides for nominations of important officers of
Government by elected officials, and for the same reasons given earlier.
The nomination process insures that half the nominees for President be
graduates of the Federal Academy, even though there is no Federal
Academy graduation requirement for that office. Nominations for the
office of President must be representative of the population to the
greatest extent possible.
     The Seventh Subclause allocates to the Senate the exclusive power
of supervision over the Federal Elections Commission, which is charged
with the responsibility of insuring fair elections.
     The Eighth Subclause gives the voters three objective appraisals of
the performance of their Representative. Under Section Six of this
Article, the primary Legislative responsibility of Representatives is to
vote for Bills in the National Interest. How is this to be determined?
Section Seven of this Article establishes a Legislative Review Board,
which provides Evaluations for Bills based on the extent to which they
serve the National Interest -- and provides those Evaluations before the
Representatives vote on the Bills. A Bill given an Evaluation of 85
would be much better, from this standpoint, than a Bill with an
Evaluation of 10.
     As an example, assume that the Representative has cast 4 votes, as
follows:

    Vote by Representative    Evaluation of Bill    Net Points
     Vote 1    For        40        40
     Vote 2    For        - 30        - 30
     Vote 3    Against        60        0
     Vote 4    Against        - 15        0

     Total Points for Representative        10

The first time s/he voted for a Bill with an Evaluation of 40, and was
given 40 points; the second time s/he voted for a Bill with an
Evaluation of - 30, and was given - 30 points (i.e., 30 points was
subtracted from his or her total); the third time s/he voted against a
Bill with an Evaluation of 60, and was given no points (no points are
given or subtracted for "nay" votes -- see Subclause Eight); and the
fourth time s/he voted against a Bill with an Evaluation of - 15, and
was given no points.
     When his or her four votes are totaled, the Representative has 10
points. Under the First Performance Rating, this number is divided by 4
(the number of votes cast). Thus, this Rating of the Representative
would be 2.5. Not very good, considering that under this Constitution a
Zero Rating may be considered evidence of unconstitutionality. When it
comes time to face the voters, the Representative will have to explain
why this Performance Rating is so low. His or her opponent may also have
some questions.
     The Representative did not have to have such a low Rating, however.
Had the Representative wanted to improve his or her Performance Rating,
s/he would have voted for the Bills with positive Evaluations, and
against the Bills with negative Evaluations, as follows:

    Vote by Representative    Evaluation of Bill    Net Points
     Vote 1    For        40        40
     Vote 2    Against        - 30        0
     Vote 3    For        60        60
     Vote 4    Against        - 15        0

     Total Points for Representative        100

Had s/he voted in this manner, s/he would have received points as
follows: 40, 0, 60, and 0. The total would have been 100, and the First
Performance Rating would have been 25, a Rating ten times better than
the one s/he actually received!
     Thus, the Representative has a very powerful incentive to vote for
Bills in the National Interest, and against Bills which are not in the
National Interest. The First Performance Rating alone greatly increases
the probability that the Representative will consider the National
Interest when voting, and not local interests, which lead to high
deficits, poorly drafted legislation, and undesirable social
consequences that result from the misallocation of funds. Because the
Senate has the power to rank Representatives by their Performance
Ratings, Representatives who consistently disregard the Evaluations of
the Legislative Review Board will find themselves at the "bottom of the
class": not only embarrassing, and not only penalizable by the Senate,
but also a potentially fatal obstacle to re-election hopes.
     Under this Subclause, the Representative retains his or her power
to vote to keep a military base in his or her District, even though the
base is unnecessary, or to vote for a weapons program that provides jobs
for the Lockheed workers in his or her District, even though the weapons
program is obsolete. However, the Representative must pay a price for
the exercise of this power. In voting to keep his or her constituents
happy from the point of view of their short-term self-interest, the
Representative makes it less and less probable that s/he will be re-
elected, instituting a necessary balance our current Constitution does
not provide. It goes without saying that it will be the rare
Representative who will vote for a Bill with a negative Evaluation that
does not benefit his or her constituents directly. The Performance
Rating System thus insures that Representatives who vote for Bills
against the National Interest will be in the minority, and that such
legislation will either not be, or rarely be, passed.
     The next two Performance Ratings are designed to prevent
"strategic" voting by Representatives to achieve high Evaluations
without regard to their own personal political convictions and/or the
convictions of their constituents. If only the First Performance Rating
were used, it is possible (however unlikely) that a Representative would
vote for every Bill with a Rating higher than Zero, and against every
Bill with an Evaluation of Zero (or less than Zero). The Representative
(voting strategically) would do this to prevent Zero points (or less)
from being averaged into his or her Performance Rating. Thus, a
Representative would vote for a Bill with an Evaluation of 5, because to
vote against the Bill would mean having Zero points averaged into his or
her Rating. This would obviously be counterproductive; in this case, the
Representative would be penalized for a potential exercise of good
judgment.
     The Second Performance Rating provides a different criterion for
the evaluation of performance. Under the Second Performance Rating,
"nay" votes are not considered. So, were a Representative to vote for a
Bill with an Evaluation of 5, and had his or her other two positive
votes been 20 and 50, the Representative would lower his or her Second
Performance Rating from 35 to 25. Thus, the Second Performance Rating
discourages the Representative from voting for Bills with low
Evaluations.
     Another potential (though equally improbable) strategy would be to
vote for a Bill with an Evaluation of 100, and then refuse to vote on
any other legislation. Under this strategy, a Representative would
achieve a Rating of 100 on his or her First and Second Performance
Rating, but only because no other votes had been averaged in! To prevent
this final form of strategic voting, the Third Performance Rating is
simply the sum total of all the votes by the Representatives. Thus, a
vote total of 100 in a Legislative world where the vote totals are in
the tens of thousands would be potentially disastrous for the
Representative.
     The three Ratings together are greater than the sum of their parts.
Imagine five Representatives A, B, C, D, and E, and their voting
records, as follows ("0" signifies a "nay" vote):

    A    B    C    D    E

Vote 1    25    0    0    25    0
Vote 2    - 10    0    0    no vote    - 10
Vote 3    50    50    0    no vote    0
Vote 4    5    0    0    no vote    0
Vote 5    95    95    95    95    0
Vote 6    0    0    0    - 10    - 10
Vote 7    15    15    0    0    0
Vote 8    10    10    0    10    0
Vote 9    - 50    0    0    0    - 50
Vote 10    75    75    75    75    0

Their Performance Ratings are as follows:

    A     B     C     D     E

P.Rating 1    21.5    24.5    17    28    -7
P.Rating 2    24    49    85    41    - 23
P.Rating 3    215    245    170    195    - 70

When all the Performance Ratings are taken into account, we see that
Representative B may marginally be considered the finest, from the
standpoint of votes for the National Interest. B was at the top of
Rating 3, and second in Ratings 1 and 2. The worst Representative was
"nightmare Representative" E, who was last in all the Ratings. The job
of the Representative is to vote for Bills in the National Interest, and
by every measurement E was derelict in that duty. A Representative who
is at the bottom of all three Performance Ratings will have a lot of
explaining to do, and may even be liable to Impeachment.
     With three Ratings, each voter can decide for him or herself which
ranking is the most important, in those situations where a
Representative is in the highest percentile on one Rating, the middle on
another, and the lowest on a third. At the same time, Representatives
who are highest on all three will be seen as objectively good
Representatives, and Representatives who are lowest on all three will be
seen as what they are -- objectively bad Representatives.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
     Subclauses 9-12

ENACT CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST AND ETHICS LEGISLATION WHICH SHALL APPLY TO
ALL ELECTED AND APPOINTED FEDERAL OFFICIALS OR STAFF MEMBERS IN THE
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. THE
CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST AND ETHICS LEGISLATION SHALL INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE
LIMITED TO, REQUIREMENTS FOR MANDATORY ANNUAL DISCLOSURE BY PUBLIC
OFFICIALS OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND SOURCES OF INCOME, AND SHALL BE
DESIGNATED IN SECTION C-105; AND TO

REGULATE OR FORBID ALL LOBBYING OTHER THAN IMPERSONAL CONTACT THROUGH
THE PRESENTATION OF LETTERS, MEMORANDA, STUDIES, OR OTHER WRITTEN OR
ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED MATERIALS; AND TO

PASS REGULATIONS AGAINST VOTE-TRADING AND CAUCUS MEMBERSHIP BY
REPRESENTATIVES, SENATORS, AND DELEGATES; AND TO

CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MISCONDUCT OR POTENTIAL MISCONDUCT OF
ANY REPRESENTATIVE, SENATOR, ALTERNATE, DELEGATE, PRESIDENT, OR OFFICER
OF GOVERNMENT; AND TO

========================================================================


     Another factor leading to outrageously high deficits and poorly
drafted legislation is institutionalized corruption, otherwise known as
the private financing of elections. Under this system of quasi-bribery
which our current Constitution obviously lacks the power to prevent, the
National Association of Auto Dealers can give $5,000 for the re-election
of Representative X, who just happens to head the committee which has
jurisdiction over "lemon law" legislation. As Chairman of that
committee, this Representative could conceivably work to make sure that
the Bill is not "reported out," (which means that it would not be voted
upon). Thus, hundreds of thousands of purchasers of automobiles would
have to endure needless frustration and wholly unjust and potentially
debilitating repair bills, and all because one Representative wanted to
place a half-page ad in the local paper!
     The four Subclauses of this Section are the first part of the
solution to this problem. Under these Subclauses, conflicts-of-interest
will not be tolerated (and receiving private funds from a concern while
voting on legislation affecting that concern is an inherent conflict-of
interest). The Senate has the power to prevent personal lobbying, which
can include, among other things, "wining and dining" Federal officials.
     The Eleventh Subclause declares that the practice of logrolling, or
trading votes, is an unconstitutional practice. "Logrolling" is a
political phenomenon wherein Representative X votes for Representative
Y's pork-barrel project, or Representative Y's special-interest
legislation, if Y will do the same for X. As a consequence it will
frequently happen that two laws favored by a Majority of the People are
rejected in favor of two Bills that favor a Minority of the People.
Consider the following report of a swap of "corn for porn" from The New
York Times:

    "A provision to prohibit government financing of 'patently
offensive' sexual exhibits was removed from an Appropriations bill, as
part of a deal with Western senators to preserve low grazing fees on
Federal land in 16 states. Representative William Dannemeyer (R-CA)
called the deal a 'swap of corn for porn.'
    'Grazing fees can buy anything,' complained Representative
Mike Synar, Democrat of Oklahoma, the author of a provision passed by
the House that would have increased the charges by more than 400
percent.
    'This year the Senate traded anti-pornography language for
no increase,' he said. 'Last year it was the Outer Continental Shelf oil
and gas program. Maybe I should put grazing fees on the defense bill and
eliminate the B-2 bomber.'"

The worst aspect of "logrolling" is that it is the engine behind deficit
spending, since the only incentive a Representative from Kansas has to
vote for a pork-barrel project favoring a Representative from Wisconsin
is that the "favor" will be returned. This results in a reversal of
Bernard Mandeville's doctrine (rationalizing laissez-faire economics) of
"Private vices, Public benefits" -- logrolling insures that America will
have private benefits at the cost of public vices (like deficit
spending). Needless to say, this phenomenon must be stopped. The
Performance Rating System makes this practice improbable, and Subclause
Eleven makes this practice illegal. If a Representative even attempts to
"logroll," his or her job will be on the line. Since caucus membership
can exacerbate the "logrolling" effect by unifying Representatives along
the lines of special interests, it too is forbidden.
     The Twelfth Subclause grants to the Senate the necessary power to
conduct investigations into all such infractions (or potential
infractions).

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
     Subclauses 13-14

ESTABLISH TIMETABLES  FOR BILL CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE TO BE APPLIED
BY THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD, PROVIDED THAT NO TIMETABLE OTHER THAN
AN INDEFINITE TIMETABLE BE SHORTER THAN THIRTY DAYS NOR LONGER THAN ONE
HUNDRED AND EIGHTY DAYS, THAT THERE BE NOT LESS THAN FOUR CATEGORIES OF
TIMETABLES, AND THAT ALL BILLS MUST BE VOTED UPON BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE TIMETABLE;

ASSIGN PENALTIES FOR THOSE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RESPONSIBLE WHEN
LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD TIMETABLES ARE NOT MET, AND PENALTIES FOR THOSE
OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSIBLE IN THE EVENT LAWS ARE NOT
EXECUTED BY THAT BRANCH; AND TO

========================================================================


     The Senate has extensive regulatory powers over the Legislative
Review Board, and the Thirteenth Subclause regulates the power of the
Legislative Review Board to put Timetables on legislation. Under the
current Constitution, good legislation can, and does, "die in
committee": that is, it never gets reported out to the floor of the
House, where it would be voted upon. To take one of thousands of
examples (as reported in Congress and the Nation),

    "Legislation (HR2382) sponsored by 232 members of the House,
never got out of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
Telecommunications in 1984 because some members demanded public interest
guidelines for programming that the industry would not accept. After
nearly a year of on-and-off negotiations, subcommittee members gave up
their efforts to reach agreement on a deregulation bill."

From a Judicial standpoint, this is akin to unjustly empowering a court
to hear certain cases to the exclusion of others. Yet this is the
current Legislative System -- a system which is, however, changed by the
Timetable requirement. Under this requirement, the Legislative Review
Board gives each Bill a time frame for consideration (authoring the
bill) and passage (voting upon the bill). At the expiration of the first
time frame (for example, three months) the Bill must be voted upon by
the committee. With pre-legislative Timetables in place, the vast
majority of Bills will be considered, preserving the right of all
Americans (and the issues with which they are concerned) to have their
day in the Legislative court.
     The Timetable concept also solves the problem of undue delay.  At
the expiration of the second time frame, the Bill must be voted upon by
the House of Representatives (the Senate's timetable is covered in
Clause One of Article One, Section Eight).  One of the tactics of
Congress is to delay voting on important Bills which have left
committees until the "heat is off." For example, after a particularly
horrific case of police brutality reported in the media, a
Representative might introduce a Bill providing funding for some form of
solution for the problem, which a committee might report out to the
floor. Because the allocation of funds is a zero-sum game, however, and
because money for project A (the program regulating police brutality) is
less money for project B, the supporters of project B will oppose
spending for project A, no matter how worthwhile the project. The
Representatives and Senators, funded by these special interests, act
accordingly. A simple tactic is to wait until the People "cool off," and
simply refuse to act on the Bill -- in this case, an obviously
intolerable situation.
     Because there may be times, however, when the temporary passions of
the People do not conform to the National Interest, the Legislative
Review Board can give a Timetable of 180 days to legislation, providing
a six-month "cooling-off" period for those cases where a cooling-off
period is desirable. The Legislative Review Board is also empowered to
give indefinite Timetables to one-fifth the legislation it considers
(some complicated matters, such as health care, may require more than
180 days to examine and report out). If a Bill is given an indefinite
Timetable, it may, at the discretion of the committee to which the Bill
has been assigned, "die in committee." Generally, Bills given indefinite
Timetables for this reason will also be given low Evaluations, making
the passage of such legislation even more improbable.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
     Subclause 15

PROVIDE PENALTIES FOR THOSE DELEGATES WHOSE EVALUATIONS ARE DISCREPANT
WITH THE AVERAGE OF THE EVALUATIONS GIVEN BY THE OTHER DELEGATES ON THE
SAME LEGISLATION, PROVIDED THAT THE MINIMAL DISCREPANCY IS NOT LESS THAN
TWENTY-FIVE POINTS, AND THAT DISCREPANCIES BY TWO HUNDRED POINTS AND
OVER MUST BE CONSIDERED IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES, IF AND ONLY IF THE
AFORESAID DISCREPANCIES OCCUR AS A SPECIFIED PERCENTAGE DEVIATION WITHIN
ANY GROUP OF ONE HUNDRED CONTIGUOUS VOTES, AND THAT THE UNACCEPTABLE
DEVIATION IS NOT LESS THAN TEN PERCENT AND NO GREATER THAN FIFTY PERCENT
FOR ANY PENALTY; AND TO

========================================================================


     The Fifteenth Subclause insures that individual members of the
Legislative Review Board (called "Delegates") cannot disrupt the
integrity of the Bill Evaluation process. Under the procedure as
outlined in Section Seven, the Evaluation is derived from the individual
votes of Delegates, who are authorized to give a Rating of anywhere from
100 to - 1000 to any individual piece of legislation. To insure that no
one Delegate can skew the Evaluation dramatically upward or downward,
the highest and lowest Ratings of Legislative Review Board members are
discarded. As an additional precaution, Subclause Fifteen authorizes the
Senate to provide penalties for those Delegates whose voting habitually
deviates from the norm.
     Here's how it works. Under this Subclause, the Senate can penalize
a Delegate only when both of two factors are present: first, the
discrepancy of an individual vote by the Delegate must be more than 25
points away from the average of the votes cast by the other members.
Thus, if Delegate X votes to give a Bill an Evaluation of 60, and the
average vote of the other members is 80, the vote is only 20 points away
from the average, and therefore does not and cannot count against the
Delegate. If, on the other hand, the Delegate has voted to give the Bill
an Evaluation of 50, the vote is 30 points away from the average, and
the Senate may provide a penalty ("average vote" = the average of the
vote by the other Delegates):

Delegate Vote    Average Vote    Prohibited Discrepancy?
60        80        No (under 25 points)
50        80        Maybe (under 25 points)

But the extent of discrepancy is only one factor. The Senate can
penalize the Delegate only when the second factor is also met -- that the
Delegate has voted against the grain too many times. Under this
Subclause, discrepancy is expressed as a percentage, and ten percent is
the minimum percentage required for penalizable discrepancy. So, if a
Delegate has voted 100 times, then the Delegate must be discrepant by
over 25 points at least ten times for any penalty to be levied. If the
Delegate has voted over 100 times (e.g., 350 times), the Delegate must
be discrepant ten times or over in any contiguous grouping of 100 votes
for a penalty to be levied: for example, the Delegate may not be
sufficiently discrepant in votes 126 to 225 (eight prohibited
discrepancies), but might be sufficiently discrepant in votes 166 to 265
(twelve prohibited discrepancies).
     Assume that the following are the results of the first four votes
in a Legislative session by a discrepant Delegate and the other Members
of the Legislative Review Board:

    Delegate Vote    Average Vote    Prohibited?
     Vote 1    30         60        Maybe (under 25 points)
     Vote 2    - 100         - 80        No (less than 25 points)
     Vote 3    50         - 200        Yes (over 200 points)
     Vote 4    75         65        No (less than 25 points)

In this example, the individual voting of the wayward Delegate is
discrepant with the average vote of the other Delegates by greater than
25 points two of four times. The Delegate has been (possibly) discrepant
fifty percent of the time (depending on the regulations passed by the
Senate), and even discrepant by over 200 points one time, but since only
four votes have been taken into account, no penalty can be levied. So,
until eight more votes have taken place, the Delegate cannot possibly be
penalized.
     The Fifteenth Subclause also states that discrepancies over 200
points must be considered impeachable offenses if they occur between ten
and fifty percent of the time (not more, not less), So, if any Delegate
is discrepant by 200 points or over at least ten, but not greater than
fifty times in any grouping of 100 contiguous votes, that Delegate must
be impeached under this Constitution (and discrepancies less than 200
points and greater than 25 points may be declared impeachable offenses
by the Senate).
     Thus, the Fifteenth Subclause gives the Senate a great deal of
flexibility in insuring that Delegates cannot impose their own personal
political philosophies on the Nation as a whole, while preventing the
Senate from granting the Legislative Review Board too much leeway, or
from unduly restricting the disparity of opinions of Delegates, a
disparity essential for preserving the integrity of the process.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
     Subclauses 16-17

PROVIDE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FAITHFUL EXECUTION OF THE ABOVE
PROVISIONS; AND TO

DESIGNATE THE REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE ABOVE POWERS AND ANY OTHER
POWERS GRANTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE SENATE UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION IN
SECTION C-100 THROUGH SECTION C-199. LEGISLATION TO BE DESIGNATED IN
SECTION C-100 THROUGH SECTION C-199 SHALL BE SIGNED INTO LAW BY THE
PRESIDENT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER PASSAGE BY A FULL MAJORITY VOTE OF
THE SENATE.

========================================================================

The Sixteenth Subclause, in adherence to the Accountability Principle,
gives the power to the Senate to provide the funds necessary for
insuring that the provisions of this Section are given effect. Because
neither the President nor the House of Representatives are entitled to
veto the provisions passed by the Senate, the Senate has total
responsibility for Oversight of Government, without the danger that the
Branches of Government they are overseeing can prevent investigations
into and regulations of their conduct. The Senate itself is responsible
to the ultimate authority: the People.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 3, Clause 7

THE SENATE SHALL HAVE THE SOLE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT AND THE TRIAL OF ALL
IMPEACHMENTS. WHEN SITTING FOR THAT PURPOSE, THEY SHALL BE ON OATH OR
AFFIRMATION. NO PERSON SHALL BE CHARGED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A
MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS PRESENT, AND NO PERSON SHALL BE CONVICTED
WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF TWO THIRDS OF THE MEMBERS PRESENT. THE VICE
PRESIDENT SHALL BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE ON IMPEACHMENT FOR, AND
CONVICTION OF, TREASON, BRIBERY, OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS OF THE
LAW, AS ENUMERATED IN SECTION B-105. REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS MAY BE
REMOVED FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, FOR VIOLATION OF CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST
AND ETHICS LEGISLATION PASSED BY THE SENATE, FOR FAILURE TO FULFILL
THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS DEFINED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, AND FOR FAILURE
TO REPORT VIOLATIONS BY OTHER ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICIALS OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. DELEGATES MAY BE REMOVED FOR THE
FOREGOING REASONS, AND FOR VIOLATION OF LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD
REGULATIONS PASSED BY THE SENATE. ALL CIVIL OFFICERS OF THE UNITED
STATES, INCLUDING THE JUDICIARY, MAY BE REMOVED FOR GOOD CAUSE. INFERIOR
OFFICERS, AS DEFINED AND REGULATED IN SECTION B-100, MAY BE REMOVED BY
THE SENATE FROM OFFICE BY FULL MAJORITY VOTE, WITHOUT IMPEACHMENT.
JUDGMENT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT SHALL NOT EXTEND FURTHER THAN TO
REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, AND DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD AND ENJOY ANY OFFICE
OF HONOR, TRUST OR PROFIT UNDER THE UNITED STATES: BUT THE PARTY
CONVICTED SHALL NEVERTHELESS BE LIABLE AND SUBJECT TO INDICTMENT, TRIAL,
JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT, ACCORDING TO LAW. THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
SHALL NOT EXTEND TO CASES OF IMPEACHMENT.

========================================================================

The Seventh Clause consolidates the Impeachment powers provided for in
our Constitution, which currently does not allow for the Impeachment of
Representatives and Senators. Consequently, Senators like the "Keating
5," who helped to create financial debacles like the Savings and Loan
scandal which will end up costing the taxpayers $500 billion, are
reprimanded (if they are punished at all) for what should be impeachable
offenses. As James Iredell stated in debate at the North Carolina
Ratifying Convention on July 24, 1788, "A man in public office who knows
that there is no tribunal to punish him, may be ready to deviate from
his duty; but if he knows there is a tribunal for that purpose, although
he may be a man of no principle, the very terror of punishment will
perhaps deter him."
     Consistent with its exclusive power of Oversight, the Senate is
charged with this responsibility. Under the Seventh Clause the Senate
can not only remove Officers of Government by the formal process of
Impeachment, but can also remove "inferior Officers" by full Majority
vote, without Impeachment, allocating the Senate a larger measure of
control over an unelected bureaucracy.
     This Clause also mandates that impeachable offenses be defined in
the Constitutional Supplement. The current Constitution allows
Impeachment for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," too vague a formulation
for such a serious matter. If a Judge commits a crime, and the Congress
doesn't want to impeach, it need only say that the crime was not a
"high" crime. Or, if a Judge commits a minor crime, and Congress wants
to impeach, Congress need only say that the minor crime was a "high"
crime. We can do better.
     One notable change in the new Impeachment Clause is that the
President of the United States is no longer impeachable (though s/he is
still removable from office by reason of incapacity -- see Article Two,
Section One, Clauses Three through Nine). The power to remove the
President of the United States directly has been given to the People of
the United States, in Section Fifteen of this Article, for the reasons
outlined there.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 4, Clause 1

     THE TIMES, PLACES AND MANNER OF HOLDING ELECTIONS FOR SENATORS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, SHALL BE PRESCRIBED IN EACH STATE BY THE LEGISLATURE
THEREOF; BUT THE CONGRESS MAY AT ANY TIME BY LAW MAKE OR ALTER SUCH
REGULATIONS, PROVIDED THAT NO LAW OR REGULATION MAY BE PASSED WHICH
VIOLATES ANY RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION. THE PRIMARY
ELECTION SHALL BE HELD THE SATURDAY AND SUNDAY NEXT AFTER THE FIRST
MONDAY IN SEPTEMBER. THE GENERAL ELECTION SHALL BE HELD THE SATURDAY AND
SUNDAY NEXT AFTER THE FIRST MONDAY IN NOVEMBER.

========================================================================

The New Constitution preserves the power of the States and Congress to
regulate elections, as long as no rights granted under the Constitution
are violated. For example, a State cannot pass a law requiring passage
of a literacy test for the right to vote.
     The First Clause also formally establishes the days when the
Federal Primary and General Elections will be held. Elections are held
on weekends in several countries in Europe, a practice which thus allows
the average working person to more easily vote, a practice which thus
increases the probability of voter participation, and a practice which
is thus mandated under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION. Since Saturdays
are a religious holiday for many Americans, Elections will also be held
on Sundays.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 4, Clause 2

THE CONGRESS SHALL ASSEMBLE AT LEAST ONCE IN EVERY YEAR, AND SUCH
MEETING SHALL BEGIN AT NOON ON THE THIRD DAY OF JANUARY. THE TERMS OF
SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES SHALL END AT NOON ON THE THIRD DAY OF
JANUARY.

========================================================================

This Clause formally incorporates a portion of the Twentieth Amendment
into the New Constitution.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 5, Clause 1

THE SENATE SHALL BE THE JUDGE OF THE ELECTIONS, RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. THE SENATE IS NOT EMPOWERED
TO EXCLUDE ANY PERSON, DULY ELECTED BY HIS OR HER CONSTITUENTS, WHO
MEETS ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFICE EXPRESSLY PRESCRIBED UNDER
SECTIONS TWO AND THREE OF THIS ARTICLE. A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE OF
CONGRESS SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO BUSINESS; BUT A SMALLER NUMBER
MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO DAY, AND MAY BE AUTHORIZED TO COMPEL THE
ATTENDANCE OF ABSENT MEMBERS, IN SUCH MANNER, AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES
AS THE SENATE MAY PROVIDE.

========================================================================

The First Clause in this Section gives the Senate the sole power to
judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of
Congress, consistent with its general Oversight function. However, the
Senate is not empowered to exclude anyone from office who meets the
Constitutional requirements.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 5, Clause 2

THE FEDERAL ACADEMY SHALL PROPOSE THE RULES FOR THE PROCEEDINGS OF
CONGRESS, WHICH SHALL BE VALID UPON RATIFICATION BY A FULL MAJORITY OF
THE SENATE, AND WHICH SHALL BE DESIGNATED IN SECTION C-110. THE
PROCEDURE BY WHICH THE FEDERAL ACADEMY PROMULGATES AND PROPOSES THE
RULES SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY A MAJORITY OF THE SENATE, AND SHALL BE SET
FORTH IN SECTION C-110.

========================================================================


     The House and Senate Rules are extremely important -- the Rules can
be used to speed or slow down the passage of legislation; to make the
passage of "pork barrel" legislation more or less inevitable; to
increase the chances of Incumbent's re-election, and so forth. In fact,
they are so important that they will become a part of the Constitution
proper (in the Constitutional Supplement). Letting either House of
Congress propose their own Rules has been shown to be an exceedingly
poor policy, the most obvious example being the Senate's power to
filibuster (i.e., stall for time by talking endlessly, or until
"cloture" is invoked). Another congressional disaster is the Committee
System as it is presently constituted. Woodrow Wilson attacked the
Committee System in 1886 in his classic text, Congressional Government,
and Alexander Hehmeyer stated in 1943 that

    "No part of our governmental machinery is in greater need of
reform than the Congressional committee system as it now functions. In
the first place, there are far too many standing committees . . . The
chairmen of these committees, who dominate them, receive their position
because of the rule that the chairmanship automatically goes to the
senior committee member of the majority party. In the Senate this has
been the case without exception since 1846. Thus, in practice, the
committee chairmen are drawn exclusively from those members coming from
safe districts or States who are also adept at keeping their home
political fences mended. . . . Senators from pivotal States and
Representatives from districts where the vote is usually close hardly
ever reach the coveted and important chairmanship, for they rarely
acquire the necessary seniority. Ability, capacity or political stature
go for naught. Congress is probably alone among all private or
governmental bodies charged with any kind of responsibility which lets
leadership depend exclusively on the accident of tenure."

The Committee System as it is presently constituted exacerbates an
already parochial orientation in Congress, and the Seniority System
created by the Rules of Congress contributes to Parochialism, as well as
the Incumbency Effect. According to Whicker (1987),

    "Several factors have exacerbated the parochial orientation
of Congress, including the internal congressional committee structure,
the maintenance of the seniority system and the power of special
interest groups in the national political process. . . . In the mid-
1980s, the House had twenty-two standing committees and about 135
subcommittees, while the Senate had sixteen standing committees and
about ninety subcommittees. Typically, members attempt to secure
positions on committees of the greatest importance to their
constituents, making committees a vehicle for the expression of
particularized rather than generalized or national views. Congressional
subcommittees and committees join with the bureaucratic agencies they
authorize, oversee and fund. Along with the clients of the bureaucracies
and congressionally funded programs, they form the classic 'iron
triangle' of special interests.
    The seniority system in Congress (the means used to select
committee and subcommittee chairs) contributes to the particularized and
parochial rather than national and generalized views of Congress.
Through the seniority system, members from noncompetitive and relatively
homogenous districts rise to power within Congress. Not only do the
district characteristics of senior members often distinguish them from
members from more competitive districts, but the seniority system itself
diminishes leadership turnover, assuring the long-term and meaningful
representation of some parochial interests at the expense of others. . .
.
    The speed with which legislation is passed, or more
accurately, the lack of speed, is a major problem with congressional
performance. In addition to the difficulty of obtaining rapid agreement
in a pluralistic environment, structurally rooted phenomena have also
contributed to delays in legislative outcomes. Internal specialization
within each house of Congress has led to a lengthy sequential process,
with hearings, investigations and debates occurring at the subcommittee,
committee and full house levels. In the House of Representatives, the
House Rules Committee which functions as a traffic regulator through
which all committee-originated legislation must pass, serves as an
additional level between full committee hearings and full debates.
Spending measures must sometimes pass through authorizing subcommittees
and committees as well as a network of appropriations subcommittees and
committees in each house. . . .
    Another problem with the implementation of citizen
preferences under the current congressional system is the internal
committee specialization within Congress. Not only does such
specialization lengthen the time frame for legislation, but it also
serves to effectively disenfranchise most constituents from legislation
initiation in most policy areas. Even constituents who are fortunate
enough to have a congressional representative whose policy positions are
similar to their own preferences on a particular issue are not
guaranteed a meaningful legislative expression of those preferences. . .
.
    Members of Congress are primarily limited to effectively
initiating legislation in the policy areas covered by the subcommittees
and committees on which they serve. Recognizing this political reality,
most members of Congress strive to acquire memberships on committees
dealing with legislation of particular salience to their own
constituencies. The consequence of this functional specialization . . .
is that constituents cannot effectively initiate new policies in issue
areas where their own legislative representative has no committee
membership and therefore little clout.
    While the internally specialized committee structure is the
primary culprit in the inability of Congress to meet the criterion of
approximating citizen preferences, the seniority system contributes to
the flaw. Under the seniority system, the most important and desirable
committee assignments have traditionally been acquired by older
congressional members from noncompetitive districts whose views are
frequently out of step with national sentiment and trends."

Note that the Seniority System is a self-sustaining system. Such a
system would not only be proposed and supported by the most senior
members of Congress, but once enacted it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to change.
     Under this Clause, the Federal Academy proposes the Rules of
Congress, under regulations written by the Senate. This provides an
excellent opportunity for students of the Federal Academy to receive
first-hand experience with the composition of legislation, frees the
Senators and Representatives from the task, and greatly increases the
probability that the Rules will not be to the exclusive benefit of any
particular class of Legislators, such as senior members, and members of
States who represent powerful special interests. The Senate approves the
Rules, again consistent with its Oversight function, retaining a measure
of control by the Citizens over the creation of Congressional Rules.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 5, Clauses 3-4

A VERBATIM REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS SHALL BE PRINTED IN THE
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD AND MADE AVAILABLE ON THE NATIONAL DATABASE ON A
DAILY BASIS, SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS ENUMERATED IN SECTION A-110. THE
VOTES OF BOTH HOUSES, AND THE NAMES OF THOSE VOTING OR ABSTAINING, SHALL
BE RECORDED ON ALL LEGISLATION, NOMINATIONS, ORDERS, AND RESOLUTIONS.
VOICE VOTES ARE PROHIBITED.

NEITHER HOUSE, DURING THE SESSION OF CONGRESS, SHALL, WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE OTHER, ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER
PLACE THAN THAT IN WHICH THE TWO HOUSES SHALL BE SITTING.

========================================================================

One of the "tricks of the trade" in Congress is avoiding roll call votes
on important legislation. As Whicker (1987) wrote,

    "Many voters are not aware of the most visible acts -- roll
call votes -- or of how their own representatives perform on recorded
votes. Nor are members of Congress supportive of the standard of
accountability. To avoid accountability, members often exploit the
decentralized nature of the institution, acting incongruently by
denouncing a bill in committee and later supporting it in a roll call
vote. . . ."

This Clause subdues the Congressional tendency to avoid Accountability
by insisting that every vote be recorded.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 6, Clause 1

THE REPRESENTATIVES, SENATORS, ALTERNATES, AND DELEGATES SHALL RECEIVE A
COMPENSATION FOR THEIR SERVICES, TO BE ASCERTAINED BY LAW, AND PAID OUT
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES. THEY SHALL IN ALL CASES, EXCEPT
THOSE VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION B-105, BE
PRIVILEGED FROM ARREST DURING THEIR ATTENDANCE AT THE SESSION OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE HOUSES, AND IN GOING TO AND RETURNING FROM THE SAME; AND FOR
ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN EITHER HOUSE, THEY SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL
OR CIVIL PROSECUTION OR LITIGATION.

========================================================================

This Clause states that our most important Officers of Government will
be paid for their services. It further states that these Officers may be
arrested only for committing certain offenses (which are more specific
than "breach of the peace"). To prevent a "chilling effect" on their
speech in Congress through litigation from private or State interests,
they are given immunity from prosecution or other forms of litigation
for anything they say in Congress. Because "any other place" may be
construed to be a newspaper or other media, this Clause is stricken.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 6, Clause 2

NO REPRESENTATIVE, SENATOR, ALTERNATE, NOR DELEGATE SHALL, DURING THEIR
TERM, BE APPOINTED TO ANY POSITION UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED
STATES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE ENUMERATED IN SECTION B-110, UNTIL
THE EXPIRATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM IN WHICH SUCH PERSON SHALL HAVE
BEEN DESIGNATED TO SERVE; AND NO PERSON HOLDING ANY OFFICE UNDER THE
UNITED STATES, SHALL BE A MEMBER OF EITHER HOUSE DURING HIS OR HER
CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE.

========================================================================

To prevent an unhealthy intermixture of the Legislative and Executive
powers, the additional language does not allow our highest officials to
serve as Officers of Government in any other capacity unless 1)
exceptions have been enumerated in Constitutional Supplement Section B-
110, AND 2) the President's term has expired. So, if Ms. X, a Senator,
Representative, Delegate, or Alternate, is appointed by the President to
serve as Secretary of Treasury in the year 2018, Ms. X cannot serve
until 2020, when a new President will be elected. Thus, the Executive's
power to influence the Legislative Branch is greatly curtailed.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 6, Clauses 3-4

THE PRIMARY LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS
SHALL BE TO VOTE FOR THOSE BILLS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST, AS DETERMINED
BY THE EVALUATIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD, AND TO PROPOSE OR
PASS ALL LEGISLATION NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR CARRYING INTO EXECUTION THE
OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THIS CONSTITUTION; AND THEIR SECONDARY
RESPONSIBILITY SHALL BE TO VOTE FOR THOSE BILLS WHICH REFLECT THE
PARTICULAR CONCERNS OF THE DISTRICT OR STATE THEY REPRESENT.

A REPRESENTATIVE, SENATOR, OR DELEGATE WHO HAS PERSONAL OR PRIVATE
INTERESTS, AS DEFINED IN SECTION C-115, IN ANY PROPOSED OR PENDING BILL,
SHALL DISCLOSE THIS FACT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OR PRESIDENT PRO
TEMPORE, AND SHALL NOT VOTE ON THAT BILL; AND SHALL ABIDE BY ALL
CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST AND ETHICS LEGISLATION PASSED BY THE SENATE, UNDER
PENALTY OF LAW.

========================================================================

Representative Richard Gephardt, the House Majority Leader of the 102d
Congress, stated that "[w]e were elected to do what we think is in the
highest and best interests of the country . . . ." Indeed. However,
under the 1787 Constitution, there is no such job requirement set forth
in writing, nor any means of enforcing any such job requirement. Thus,
Senator Byrd's remark that he would become West Virginia's "billion-
dollar industry." If all Representatives and Senators made similar
remarks, and voted along similar lines, the country would sink (and is,
in fact, sinking) under the weight of its deficit spending, as each
Representative and Senator strives to "bring the pork home," without
levying taxes to pay for this spending. Consequently, over a quarter of
a trillion dollars is paid by taxpayers every year on interest on the
National Debt. By the year 2000, if current trends continue, well over
half of our individual income tax dollars will go towards the payment of
this interest. The Third Clause makes language such as Byrd's a highly
suspect activity, and voting like Byrd's a potentially impeachable
offense.
     The Fourth Clause of this Section is a conflict-of-interest
provision, which prohibits Representatives, Senators, and Delegates from
voting on Bills in which they have "personal or private" economic
interests.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 7, Clauses 1-4

THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NINE DELEGATES CHOSEN
BY A FULL MAJORITY OF THE SENATE. THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD MUST BE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POPULATION TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH
REGARD TO SEX, RACE, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION.

EACH DELEGATE SHALL SERVE FOR A SINGLE THREE-YEAR TERM, AND SHALL
RECEIVE FOR HIS OR HER SERVICES A COMPENSATION, THE VALUE OF WHICH SHALL
NEITHER BE INCREASED NOR DIMINISHED DURING HIS OR HER CONTINUANCE IN
OFFICE, OTHER THAN FOR VIOLATIONS OF REGULATIONS PASSED BY THE SENATE
UNDER SECTION THREE, CLAUSE SIX, SUBCLAUSE FIFTEEN OF THIS ARTICLE.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DELEGATES SHALL BE ASSEMBLED IN CONSEQUENCE AFTER
THE FIRST APPOINTMENT, THEY SHALL BE DIVIDED INTO THREE CLASSES. THE
SEATS OF THE DELEGATES OF THE FIRST CLASS SHALL BE VACATED AT THE
EXPIRATION OF THE FIRST YEAR, OF THE SECOND CLASS AT THE EXPIRATION OF
THE SECOND YEAR, AND OF THE THIRD CLASS AT THE EXPIRATION OF THE THIRD
YEAR, SO THAT ONE THIRD MAY BE CHOSEN EVERY YEAR; AND IF VACANCIES
HAPPEN BY RESIGNATION, OR OTHERWISE, THE SENATE MAY MAKE TEMPORARY
APPOINTMENTS UNTIL THE NEXT MEETING OF THE CONGRESS, WHEN THEY SHALL
FILL SUCH VACANCIES.

EVERY PERSON SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO THE OFFICE OF DELEGATE WHO SHALL HAVE
ATTAINED TO THE AGE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, AND BEEN SEVEN YEARS A CITIZEN
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WHO SHALL, UPON AND SUBSEQUENT TO TAKING THE
OATH OF OFFICE, BE A GRADUATE OF THE FEDERAL ACADEMY, AND WITHOUT FORMAL
AFFILIATION WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY.

========================================================================

One of the most important additions made by THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION is the Legislative Review Board, which, along with the
Federal Academy, prevents undue influence by local interests, and thus
makes the critical Annual Term for Representatives possible.
     As mentioned earlier, no Bill will be passed without a prior
Evaluation by the Legislative Review Board, and an assignment of a
Timetable to that Bill. Clauses One through Four indicate the makeup of
the Legislative Review Board. They will be appointed for single three
year terms, making them accountable to National, and not local,
interests. The short term prevents any one Delegate from dominating via
Incumbency, and the one-third rotation in membership allows the Senate
to maintain balance on the Legislative Review Board every year. Fixed
compensation prevents an undue control of the Delegates by salary hikes
or cuts; however, the Senate is empowered to fine Delegates on an
individual basis if they violate their mandated duty to obey Senatorial
(and Constitutional) regulations. To prevent undue attachment to any
particular demographic category, the composition of the Legislative
Review Board must be as representative of the population as possible.
Thus, if 51 percent of the population are women, then one year there
will be five female delegates and four male delegates, and the next year
four female and five male delegates, to approximate the 50 percent
representation as much as possible over time. Since African-Americans
make up 14 percent of the population, and one-ninth is roughly
equivalent to 11 percent, there will be at least one African-American
delegate every year.
     The Third Clause mandates staggered terms. Because there are Fifty
States, each year the new Delegates will be from States which were not
represented the previous year, and each Delegate will represent a
particular region of the country (e.g., the Southwest, Northeast, etc.).
     Because the Legislative Review Board plays a critical role in the
New Government, and because there are many issues that must be
understood before a person will be qualified to serve on the Legislative
Review Board, Federal Academy graduation is required of Delegates.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 7, Clauses 5-7

THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD SHALL PROVIDE A TIMETABLE FOR THE
CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE OF EACH BILL UNDER THE REGULATIONS SET FORTH
IN SECTION C-120, PROVIDED THAT NO MORE THAN ONE-FIFTH OF THE BILLS
SUBMITTED BE GIVEN AN INDEFINITE TIMETABLE; AND

EVALUATE THE QUALITY OF A BILL REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT SERVES
THE NATIONAL INTEREST BY EITHER IMPLEMENTING THE GOALS IN THE PREAMBLE
OR THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, OR BOTH, WHILE
PRESERVING THOSE INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES ENUMERATED IN THIS CONSTITUTION,
BY PROVIDING A NUMERICAL RATING FOR EACH BILL UNDER THE GUIDELINES SET
FORTH IN SECTION C-125, WITH ONE HUNDRED BEING THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE
RATING, AND MINUS ONE THOUSAND BEING THE LOWEST POSSIBLE RATING. ALL
RATINGS BETWEEN MINUS ONE HUNDRED AND MINUS ONE THOUSAND ARE TO BE
RESERVED FOR OBJECTIVELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL BILLS, OR BILLS EXCESSIVELY OR
COMPLETELY DETRIMENTAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST. EVERY DELEGATE MUST
GIVE A RATING OF TWENTY-FIVE OR GREATER TO ANY BILL REQUIRED BY THIS
CONSTITUTION, AND A RATING OF ZERO OR GREATER TO ANY BILL WHICH SERVES
TO IMPLEMENT A NATIONAL OBJECTIVE. NO DELEGATE CAN GIVE A RATING HIGHER
THAN ZERO TO ANY BILL THAT, IN HIS OR HER JUDGMENT, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST RATINGS GIVEN BY THE DELEGATES SHALL BE
ELIMINATED, AND THE AVERAGE RATING OF THE SEVEN REMAINING DELEGATES
ROUNDED DOWN TO THE NEAREST INTEGER SHALL CONSTITUTE THE EVALUATION.

EVERY DELEGATE SHALL ABIDE BY THE REGULATIONS RESTRICTING THEIR BEHAVIOR
SET FORTH IN SECTION C-130.

========================================================================

The Fifth Clause mandates that every Bill be given a Timetable. This
reduces the power of committees in Congress to "bottle up" legislation,
which makes vote-trading a more probable occurrence (i.e., X agrees to
report or not report out a Bill from his or her committee if Y will
reciprocate). The ability of committees to abort the consideration of
necessary legislation violates the Accountability Principle, and gives a
great deal of power to special interests (violating the Fourteenth
Amendment requirement that the People receive the equal protection of
the laws). Under Section Three of this Article, there must be at least
four categories of Timetables, and no Timetable can be shorter than 30
days or longer than 180 days. An indefinite Timetable is also permitted.
Longer or indefinite Timetables will be given for more complicated
legislation, and/or legislation the Legislative Review Board views as
undesirable.
     The Sixth Clause is without question one of the five most important
Clauses in THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION. This Clause accomplishes four
significant goals; 1) solving the local interest problem, 2) preventing
the passage of unconstitutional legislation, 3) providing the basis for
the "slow," "medium," and "fast" track legislation processes contained
in Article One, Section Eight, and 4) providing a basis for the
Performance Ratings of Representatives. Consequently, it is important to
analyze them in some depth.
     The first goal is solving the local interest problem. Because
Representatives come from Districts of less than 350,000 people, and
because they are elected for Annual Terms, there is a danger of an undue
attachment to local interests: for example, people may vote for their
Representative because s/he has voted to keep an unnecessary military
base in the District. What is the check against this sort of voting? The
Evaluation of the Legislative Review Board. The mandate of the
Legislative Review Board is to give high Evaluations to Bills which
either serve the National Interest, or implement the National Will of
the People. At the same time, the Legislative Review Board must satisfy
the second goal, and give low Evaluations to Bills that
unconstitutionally infringe on individual liberties. Thus, individual
rights will be protected, while at the same time there will be a proper
attention to the Will of the People of the United States. Because the
Evaluation is given before the Bill is considered by the House of
Representatives, the passage of unconstitutional legislation will be
made extremely difficult, if not impossible. Under the current system,
unconstitutional laws are passed, and a person can fight the law in
court only if wealthy enough to afford the legal fees (and if the person
can cross the Judiciary's jurisdictional thresholds [such as "non-
frivolity"]). If one is not wealthy enough to mount a legal battle of
this nature, and if one's cause does not fit into the political agenda
or limited budget of the ACLU and similar organizations, that person
must obey an unconstitutional law. The Evaluation requirement prohibits
this unjust and unconstitutional situation.
     An Evaluation is derived from the individual votes of Delegates.
Assume the following votes on a Bill:

Delegate    Rating Given to Bill by Delegate
     1    85
     2    45
     3    98
     4    - 30
     5    20
     6    55
     7    31
     8    5
     9    60

     Under the procedure outlined in Clause Six, the highest and lowest
Ratings are discarded. In this case, the high vote (Delegate 3) is 98,
and the low vote (Delegate 4) is -30. These votes are not used, and the
seven remaining votes are totaled. The sum is 301. This result is
divided by seven, and the resulting Evaluation is 43, a number between
25 and 50. What does this mean? It means that under Section Eight of
Article One, the Bill must not only pass the House, but also the Senate
(the "medium" track). If the Senate also approves, the Bill must be
signed into law by the President. The collective determination of the
Legislative Review Board is that though this Bill is too important to
risk a veto by the President, it nonetheless warrants review by the
Senate.
     Thus, the third goal of the Evaluation is to streamline the passage
of worthy and important Bills, while at the same time placing
constitutional barriers to Bills of questionable necessity or
desirability. Bills with Evaluations over 50 that are passed by a Quorum
Majority of the House of Representatives must be signed into law by the
President (the "fast" track). Bills with Evaluations less than 25 have
to pass not only the House of Representatives and the Senate, but can
even be vetoed by the President (the "slow" track). In addition, Bills
with Evaluations of less than Zero that happen to pass the
constitutional barriers do not have to be enforced by either the
Executive or Judicial Branches ("off the track").
     The fourth role of the Evaluation is to provide a basis for the
Performance Ratings of Representatives. Imagine that you are a
Representative. Here's a Bill that will bring jobs to your District, but
which has an Evaluation of -50. How will you vote? If you vote for the
legislation, fifty points will be subtracted from your total, and your
Performance Ratings will be lowered. You know that few, if any other
Representatives have any reason to vote for the Bill, since vote-trading
has been prohibited, and there is no party membership creating a
collegial atmosphere encouraging such vote-trading. In addition, the
Third Clause of this Section has made voting for the National Interest a
job requirement. Other Representatives are constitutionally required to
vote against this legislation, and will undoubtedly do so, given that
they can improve their Ratings by fulfilling their constitutional duty.
You also know that even if passed by the House, the Bill will have to
pass the Senate, and is even liable to veto by the President.
Furthermore, if you vote for the Bill, you know your opponent in the
next election will point out that you have violated your responsibility
by voting for legislation which is not in the National Interest. All the
above will be taken into account by all the other Representatives, and
you realize that if you vote for the Bill, there is an excellent chance
that, if all vote, the vote will be 1 in favor, 999 against. You will
look extremely foolish, and even unpatriotic.
     How would you vote?
     Because the Legislative Review Board has a great deal of power,
this power must be checked. The Discrepancy requirement of Section Three
is one check, and the other is provided by the Seventh Clause. The
Senate is empowered to author regulations governing Delegate behavior,
and empowered to enforce those regulations.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1-4

ALL BILLS OTHER THAN THOSE ORIGINATING IN LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES AND IN
THE NATIONAL INITIATIVE SHALL ORIGINATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND NO LAW SHALL BE ENACTED EXCEPT BY BILL, SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS
ENUMERATED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION. NOMINATIONS BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OR SENATE FOR ANY OFFICE, ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS, AND
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY AGENCIES CREATED UNDER CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED BILLS. THE SUBJECT OF EVERY BILL SHALL
BE CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN ITS TITLE. EACH BILL SHALL HAVE AN ENACTING
CLAUSE AS FOLLOWS: "BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA." NO BILL EMBRACING MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT SHALL BE PASSED,
EXCEPT APPROPRIATIONS BILLS. BILLS ORIGINATED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OR
COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE SHALL
BE SUBMITTED FOR EVALUATION TO THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD PRIOR TO
CONSIDERATION BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES. WHENEVER A LAW OR SECTION OF LAW OR THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT IS AMENDED, IT SHALL BE RE-ENACTED AND
REPUBLISHED ON THE NATIONAL DATABASE, AND IN BOUND FORM OR AS A POCKET
PART, WITH THE AMENDED OR REPEALED LAWS ANNEXED IN AN APPENDIX. EVERY
BILL SHALL BE PLAINLY WORDED, SHALL BE PUBLISHED WITH ITS EVALUATION,
AND SHALL SET FORTH HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES IN
ALL CASES OTHER THAN THOSE DESIGNATED IN SECTION B-115. THE TIMETABLES
FOR CONSIDERATION OF BILLS ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD
MUST BE FAITHFULLY OBSERVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES UNLESS THE
SENATE, IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, GRANTS AN EXEMPTION BY A FULL
TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. BILLS WHICH SHALL HAVE PASSED THE NATIONAL
INITIATIVE OR WHICH ARE TO BE ENUMERATED IN CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT
SECTIONS A AND B, AND SECTIONS C-100 TO 200, ARE TO BE GIVEN EVALUATIONS
BY THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD, BUT OTHERWISE SHALL BE SIGNED INTO LAW
BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS IF PASSED UNDER THE RULES AS
PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, AND ARE EXEMPT FROM THE FOLLOWING
REQUIREMENTS:

EVERY BILL WHICH RECEIVES AN EVALUATION BY THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD
WHICH IS GREATER THAN FIFTY, AND WHICH SHALL HAVE PASSED THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, SHALL BE SIGNED INTO LAW BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THIRTY
DAYS AFTER PASSAGE BY THAT HOUSE.

EVERY BILL WHICH RECEIVES AN EVALUATION BY THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD
WHICH IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO TWENTY-FIVE AND LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO
FIFTY, AND WHICH SHALL HAVE PASSED THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SHALL
BE PRESENTED TO THE SENATE WITHIN TEN DAYS, AND THE SENATE SHALL
CONSIDER IT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS. IF THE SENATE SHALL PASS THE BILL, IT
SHALL BE SIGNED INTO LAW BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER
PASSAGE BY THE SENATE.

EVERY BILL WHICH RECEIVES AN EVALUATION BY THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD
WHICH IS LESS THAN TWENTY-FIVE, AND WHICH SHALL HAVE PASSED THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE, SHALL, BEFORE IT BECOMES A LAW, BE
PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; IF HE OR SHE APPROVE HE
OR SHE SHALL SIGN IT, BUT IF NOT HE OR SHE SHALL RETURN IT, WITH HIS OR
HER OBJECTIONS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WHO SHALL ENTER THE
OBJECTIONS AT LARGE ON THEIR JOURNAL, AND PROCEED TO RECONSIDER IT
WITHIN TEN DAYS. IF AFTER SUCH RECONSIDERATION TWO THIRDS OF THAT HOUSE
SHALL AGREE TO PASS THE BILL, IT SHALL BE SENT, TOGETHER WITH THE
OBJECTIONS, TO THE SENATE, BY WHICH IT SHALL LIKEWISE BE RECONSIDERED,
AND IF APPROVED BY TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. IF
ANY BILL SHALL NOT BE RETURNED BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN TEN DAYS (SUNDAYS
EXCEPTED) AFTER IT SHALL HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO HIM OR HER, THE SAME
SHALL BE A LAW, IN LIKE MANNER AS IF HE OR SHE HAD SIGNED IT.

========================================================================

Another of the five most important new provisions is the re-writing of
the procedure by which proposed legislation becomes actual legislation.
The First Clause of this Section establishes the ground rules: all laws
originate in the House of Representatives or Legislative Committees or
through the National Initiative process, not with the Senate or the
President. If a Bill is to be considered, one of the members of the
House or one of the Legislative Committees must propose it, or it must
make its way through the aforementioned Initiative Process.  Bills must
be submitted for timetables 1) prior to being considered by House
committees and 2) after being considered by House committees. However,
this Clause also allows the Senate to grant exceptions to Timetables,
since there may be occasions when the House is unable, for one reason or
another, to vote on the legislation within the stated time period. In
addition, it states that provisions to be enumerated in specified
Sections of the Constitutional Supplement are exempt from the
requirements in the following three Clauses. Without this exemption, the
concept of varying amendability as instituted in the Constitutional
Supplement would be negated.
     In addition, the "one subject" requirement contained in this Clause
eliminates the concept of "Riders," the practice of attaching one
completely different and unpopular Bill to a popular Bill, in the hopes
that it will be passed. The Rider concept violates the Accountability
Principle, since a Representative can always argue to his or her
constituents, "I had to vote for that unpopular Bill"; in addition,
Riders would wreak havoc on the new system of Evaluations for Bills.
Laws will be published with their Evaluations, so that Judges will know
whether the law is enforceable or not. Laws must be plainly worded (for
obvious reasons), must be published on the National Database, and must
contain hypothetical examples to anchor the meaning of the legislation
to some external referent. For example, if the law states "Arson is the
crime of burning materials within the confines of an edifice," a
hypothetical might be "Mr. X pours gasoline inside a house and lights a
match. The house burns for one minute, and the fire is put out. Mr. X is
guilty of Arson," or "Mr. X lights a cigarette inside a building. A is
not guilty of Arson." This requirement increases the probability that
vague laws, constitutionally prohibited, will not be passed.
     The Second through Fourth Clauses establish the parameters for the
Legislative Review Board, and create the processes for "slow," "medium,"
and "fast" track legislation. Bills with Evaluations higher than 50 need
not be approved by the Senate or the President to be passed into law.
Consequently, the Bill must truly be necessary or desirable and in the
National Interest to get such a high Evaluation and, consequently, to be
placed on the "fast" track. If the Legislative Review Board has qualms
about the legislation, it can give the Bill an Evaluation between 25 and
50 (inclusive), which means that Senate approval is also required (the
"medium" track). If the Legislative Review Board has serious doubts
about the legislation, it can give it an Evaluation of less than 25, and
the President's approval will then also be necessary (the "slow" track).
Individually, the Delegates (as provided under Section Seven of this
Article) may give a Rating as low as - 1000 to the absolutely worst
legislation, which not only makes passage highly unlikely, but
enforcement if passed extremely improbable.
     If the President vetoes a piece of legislation, it goes back to the
House and Senate, where, if it is re-passed by a two-thirds Majority of
both Houses, it will become law. This isn't very likely. In 203 years of
our Republic, there have been 2497 vetoes, and only 100 overrides. Thus,
in the history of our country, only 4 percent of vetoes have been
overridden. (This effect has been remarkably consistent over time. For
example, in the period of 1801 to 1901, .04004577 of the President's
vetoes were overridden, and in the period of 1901-1991, .04009870 of the
President's vetoes were overridden, a difference of only .00005293! It's
difficult to imagine more compelling evidence of an institutional
effect.)

========================================================================

Article I, Section 8, Clause 5

ALL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BECOME LAW UPON APPROVAL BY A FULL MAJORITY OF THE
SENATE. IF DISAPPROVED BY THE SENATE, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
STYLE THE RESOLUTION AS A BILL AND SUBMIT IT TO THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
BOARD. IF THE SENATE APPROVES THE RESOLUTION, THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE
IS NOT REQUIRED.

========================================================================

This Clause allows the Senate to prevent the House from passing
legislation by styling the legislation as an "Order" or "Resolution" to
evade the above requirements (consistent with the existing
Constitutional provisions).

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clause 1

THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE POWER TO LAY AND COLLECT TAXES, DUTIES, IMPOSTS,
AND EXCISES, PROVIDED THAT ALL DUTIES, IMPOSTS AND EXCISES SHALL BE
UNIFORM THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, AND TO LAY AND COLLECT TAXES ON
INCOMES, FROM WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED, WITHOUT APPORTIONMENT AMONG THE
SEVERAL STATES, AND WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY CENSUS OR ENUMERATION,
PROVIDED THAT PERSONAL INCOME TAXES ARE LEVIED ON NOT LESS THAN THREE-
FOURTHS OF THE CITIZENS WITH THE HIGHEST NET INCOME; THAT THE RATE OF
THE HIGHEST TAX BRACKET SHALL BE NO MORE THAN TWICE THAT OF THE LOWEST
TAX BRACKET; AND THAT THE LOWEST BRACKET SHALL BE NO LOWER THAN ONE-
TENTH OF NET INCOME, AND THE HIGHEST BRACKET SHALL BE NO HIGHER THAN
ONE-HALF OF NET INCOME; AND TO PAY THE DEBTS AND PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON
DEFENSE AND GENERAL WELFARE OF THE UNITED STATES;

========================================================================

This Section was formerly Section Eight of the 1787 Constitution, and
lists the powers of Congress. The First Clause of this Section
establishes Congress' power to tax and spend, with more severe
limitations on this power than currently exist. For example, the Clause
allowing Congress to borrow money on the credit of the United States has
been extensively modified (see the next Clause) to greatly increase the
probability that future revenue will come from taxes (and not
borrowing). With this modification, the Annual Term for Representatives
insures that a free-spending (i.e., free-taxing) Congress will not meet
with public approval.
     The Clause also links Americans together on the issue of taxation.
If an income tax is to be levied, it must be levied on at least three-
fourths of the population. In addition, the highest tax bracket cannot
be higher than fifty percent, which guarantees that as long as the
Constitution is in place, the Federal Government can never take more
than half a person's income in taxes. In addition, the lowest tax
bracket must be at least half that of the highest. So, for example, if
the highest tax bracket is thirty percent, the lowest bracket must be at
least fifteen percent (and can be higher). This Clause, by linking the
fate of Americans on the issue of taxation, and by radically decreasing
the power to borrow, thus provides a structural limitation on spending
by foreclosing the source of revenue.
     To insure that a substantial percentage of revenue is derived
within this limitation, and not from other sources, the one-tenth
minimum requirement has been instituted.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clauses 2-4

TO BORROW MONEY ON THE CREDIT OF THE UNITED STATES SOLELY UPON THE
ASSENT OF TWO-THIRDS OF THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS, AND A
TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY OF VOTERS IN THE GENERAL OR A SPECIAL ELECTION;

TO REGULATE COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS, AND AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES,
AND WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES;

TO ESTABLISH AN UNIFORM RULE OF NATURALIZATION, AND UNIFORM LAWS ON THE
SUBJECT OF BANKRUPTCIES THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES;

========================================================================

The power to borrow money is the power to sink the United States into an
ever greater debt, a debt upon which interest must be paid. Yet the 1787
Constitution contained a general and virtually unlimited power to borrow
money, the only check being a requirement that direct taxes be
apportioned among the States -- a check that, in 1913, was removed by the
Sixteenth Amendment. This virtually unlimited power to borrow was
criticized in 1788 by Robert Yates, one of the New York delegates to the
Federal Convention, in a prediction of uncanny accuracy:

    "The power to borrow money is general and unlimited . . . .
Under this authority, the Congress may mortgage any or all the revenues
of the union, as a fund to loan money upon, and it is probably, in this
way, they may borrow of foreign nations, a principal sum, the interest
of which will be equal to the annual revenues of the country. -- By this
means, they may create a national debt, so large, as to exceed the
ability of the country ever to sink. I can scarcely contemplate a
greater calamity that could befal this country, than to be loaded with a
debt exceeding their ability ever to discharge. If this be a just
remark, it is unwise and improvident to vest in the general government a
power to borrow at discretion, without any limitation or restriction.
     It may possibly happen that the safety and welfare of the country
may require, that money be borrowed, and it is proper when such a
necessity arises that the power should be exercised by the general
government. -- But it certainly ought never to be exercised, but on the
most urgent occasions, and then we should not borrow of foreigners if we
could possibly avoid it. . . . it would certainly have been a wise
provision in this constitution, to have made it necessary that two-
thirds of the members should assent to borrowing money -- when the
necessity was indispensable, this assent would always be given, and in
no other cause ought it to be."

Yates' suggested amendment was also proposed by New York and Rhode
Island, but was not sent by Congress to the other States for
ratification -- and, as Yates correctly forecast, America began to amass
a huge National Debt, a debt that in the latter half of this century
reached colossal proportions -- so large, in fact, that in 1988, 45
percent of each person's individual income taxes went not to health
care, not to education not to the arts, and not to research and
development, but interest: or rather, to individuals and institutional
investors predominantly located in America, but over time more likely to
be located overseas. And how is this interest to be paid? In one of two
ways: either through taxes or through inflation, a hidden tax, and a tax
which hurts poor people and middle-income people disproportionately. The
power to lavish money on local interests by locally elected officials,
coupled with the power to borrow, is a structural formula for disaster.
Establishing in the Constitution that if you spend, you must tax (with a
moderate safety-valve for the rare circumstances when borrowing may be
necessary that are significant enough to build both a two-thirds
Congressional and National coalition), and that no less than three-
fourths of the Americans must pay this tax, is the best way to insure
that Government spending is kept to a minimum, and that such spending
only goes for the most worthy proposals. It's one thing to support "Star
Wars" knowing that you won't have to pay for it this year in taxes; it's
another to know that you will have to pay for it this year. Under the
new system, the $640 toilet seat will become a dinosaur. Will the People
continue to support unnecessary animal research knowing that this year
they will have to foot the bill, and that there is no need whatsoever
for this spending? This scenario is highly unlikely. On the other hand,
legitimate expenditures such as spending for education or necessary
research and development will be seen in a different light. Every dollar
spent will be evaluated in light of its necessity and desirability. But
the days of outrageous waste and pork barrel spending, and spending on
the unnecessary pet programs of special interests, will be gone for good
under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION.
     Due to the structural limitation on spending through what will
functionally amount to a prohibition on borrowing, we will cut interest
payments entirely out of the budget, thus freeing more than 250 billion
dollars a year in 1991 dollars for worthy Government programs and
operations, or a reduction in taxes.
     The Third and Fourth Clauses are unchanged, and continue Congress'
power to regulate commerce (i.e., environmental legislation, food and
drug laws, etc.), and to regulate Naturalization and Bankruptcy.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clauses 5-6

TO ISSUE CURRENCY IN PAPER OR COINS OR THROUGH ELECTRONIC MEANS,
REGULATE THE DOMESTIC PURCHASING POWER THEREOF, SET THE RATES OF
EXCHANGE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY, AND FIX THE STANDARD OF WEIGHTS AND
MEASURES;

TO PROVIDE FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF COUNTERFEITING THE SECURITIES AND
CURRENT COIN OF THE UNITED STATES;

========================================================================

The Fifth Clause acknowledges and certifies our present monetary system,
and allows for the creation of a checkless and cashless society, a
system which is technologically possible, and which is being partially
implemented in certain areas of the United States. Of course,
counterfeiting remains illegal.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clause 7

TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A POSTAL SERVICE, WHETHER CONVENTIONAL,
ELECTRONIC, OR BOTH, WHICH IS AUTHORIZED TO PROMULGATE ALL THOSE
REGULATIONS CONSONANT WITH ITS AUTHORITY; HOWEVER, NO POSTAL SERVICE
REGULATION MAY VIOLATE RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION, INCLUDING
THOSE RIGHTS DESIGNATED IN SECTION A-115.

========================================================================

Under the Seventh Clause, Congress is empowered to create an Electronic
Post Office. Under this system, each person will have an electronic
address, and mail will be sent over telephone wires, thus reducing the
hazards to the environment through the use of fossil fuels to transmit
hard-copy mail (a/k/a "snail mail"), and the paper on which hard-copy
mail is printed. Under the new system, letters will be transmitted
instantly. Furthermore, one letter may be sent to thousands of people.
For example, an organization of coin collectors could mail its
newsletter to all of its members in one instant, and at a fraction of
the cost of current postal rates. Or, a stereo manufacturer could send
materials to all people who requested information on the topic the week
before. Obviously, there must be certain restrictions on this right, and
the People of the United States must be consulted and will be consulted
when such restrictions are to be made (since the restrictions are to be
enumerated in Constitutional Supplement Section A). For example, there
may be restrictions on electronic "junk mail" (e.g., a particular
business may be entitled to send a generalized mailing only once per
year to a designated number of people, and subsequent mailings only to
those persons who have requested additional mailings).
     This Clause alone will greatly increase the flow of information in
an Information Society, by radically reducing the cost of transmitting
that information, and will reduce the hazards to the environment which
come from transporting information by truck or plane, when a telephone
wire, fiber-optic cable or satellite can do the job far more quickly and
efficiently. At the same time, the quality and integrity of the
information transmitted will be maintained by reasonable regulations
against the transmission of certain kinds of information (see Section
Eleven of this Article).

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clause 8

TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS, BY SECURING FOR
LIMITED TIMES TO AUTHORS AND INVENTORS THOSE RIGHTS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE
WRITINGS AND DISCOVERIES DESIGNATED IN SECTION B-120. NOTWITHSTANDING
THE PROVISIONS IN SECTION B-120, THOSE AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS WHO
REQUEST COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, SHALL,
AS A CONDITION FOR THE GRANTING OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, CONSENT TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR NON-FICTION MATERIAL ON THE NATIONAL DATABASE AS
DESCRIBED UNDER SECTION ELEVEN OF THIS ARTICLE, PROVIDED THAT REASONABLE
COMPENSATION IS MADE THEREFORE AS MANDATED IN SECTION C-135;

========================================================================

The Eighth Clause re-establishes the right of copyright, patent, and
trademark, but with a twist: publishers who request copyright protection
from the Government must simultaneously grant the Government the right
to post their non-fiction publications on the National Database, a
National source of information. These publishers and authors must be
compensated when Citizens "download" the information (i.e., transmit the
information from the Government's mainframe computers into the computers
in their home), as provided under Section Eleven of this Article

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clauses 9-11

TO IMPLEMENT TRANSPORTATION, ENERGY, HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND ARTS AND
SCIENCES POLICIES, AND OTHER POLICIES IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST;

TO REGULATE THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS;

TO CONSTITUTE TRIBUNALS INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT;

========================================================================

The Ninth Clause re-establishes Congress' current power to set National
Policies in important areas. The Tenth Clause is a revision of the
Second Amendment, and indicates that the right of the People to keep and
bear arms is a right that can be regulated by Congress. For example,
Congress can declare that no convicted felons are allowed to own weapons
after serving their prison terms, or that there must be a waiting-period
before purchasing a handgun, or that the possession of certain weapons,
such as AK-47s, bazookas, or hand grenades, may be outlawed entirely.
The Eleventh Clause maintains the Congressional power to create various
courts, such as Courts of Appeal, District Courts, Workman's
Compensation courts, and various bodies of arbitration.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clauses 12-13

TO DEFINE AND PUNISH PIRACIES AND FELONIES COMMITTED ON THE HIGH SEAS,
AND OFFENSES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS;

     TO DECLARE WAR, PURSUANT TO THE GUIDELINES IN SECTION A-120, AND
MAKE RULES CONCERNING CAPTURES ON LAND AND WATER, WHICH SHALL BE
DESIGNATED IN SECTION A-125;

========================================================================

Under the Thirteenth Clause, Congress can declare war only under a set
of circumstances approved by the People. Taken in conjunction with
Article Two, Section Two, Clause One, the power of the President to
commit American troops to military action is greatly curtailed, and the
existence of debacles like Vietnam is thus made much less probable.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clause 14

TO RAISE AND SUPPORT AN ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE, BUT NO APPROPRIATION
OF MONEY TO THAT USE SHALL BE FOR A LONGER TERM THAN THE NUMBER OF YEARS
INDICATED IN SECTION A-130, AND NO MILITARY EXPENDITURES SHALL EXCEED
ONE-TWENTIETH OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS
ENUMERATED IN SECTION A-135;

========================================================================

The Fourteenth Clause insures that the People of the United States will
be able to control the military through Appropriations. Currently
weapons systems are funded far in excess of the two years mandated by
the Constitution, which takes control away from the Constitution and
gives it to the military; because Congress must disobey the
Constitution, the military can draw up its own "wish lists," and the
constitutional guidelines are forgotten. The Fourteenth Clause also
limits military expenditures to no more than five percent of the Gross
National Product, unless the People have approved exceptions (such as
the inception of war, etc.).

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clauses 15-18


     TO MAKE RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND REGULATION OF THE LAND AND
NAVAL FORCES;

TO PROVIDE FOR CALLING FORTH THE MILITIA TO EXECUTE THE LAWS OF THE
UNION, SUPPRESS INSURRECTIONS AND REPEL INVASIONS;

TO PROVIDE FOR ORGANIZING, ARMING, AND DISCIPLINING, THE MILITIA, AND
FOR GOVERNING SUCH PART OF THEM AS MAY BE EMPLOYED IN THE SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES, RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY, THE APPOINTMENT OF
THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE
DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS;

TO EXERCISE EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION IN ALL CASES WHATSOEVER, OVER SUCH
DISTRICT (NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILES SQUARE) AS MAY, BY CESSION OF
PARTICULAR STATES, AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF CONGRESS, BECOME THE SEAT OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TO EXERCISE LIKE AUTHORITY OVER
ALL PLACES PURCHASED BY THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE IN
WHICH THE SAME SHALL BE, FOR THE ERECTION OF FORTS, MAGAZINES, ARSENALS,
DOCK-YARDS, AND OTHER NEEDFUL BUILDINGS;

========================================================================

These Clauses extend the power of Congress to provide for military
expenditures and author regulations, and provide for a seat of
Government.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clauses 19-20

TO DELEGATE ITS AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH UNDER THE
GUIDELINES ENUMERATED IN SECTION B-125, AND TO UTILIZE THE LEGISLATIVE
VETO, IN WHATEVER FORM, WHEN THE NATIONAL INTEREST SO REQUIRES;

TO DELEGATE ITS AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE TO THE PEOPLE IN THE NATIONAL
INITIATIVE; AND

========================================================================

In an extensive and complicated society, it is and will be impossible
for Congress to pass each and every necessary law and regulation. Go to
your local library and read through the Code of Federal Regulations, and
ask yourself how a 1000 person Congress could ever have the time or
expertise to pass the volume of legislation found in eight library-
shelves worth of books. The fact of the matter is that Congress will not
have the expertise, nor the time to pass such regulations. Consequently,
some Legislative power will have to be delegated to agencies such as the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and
the Federal Communications Commission, etc. Because of this Necessity
Principle, Congress has unconstitutionally delegated their exclusive
Legislative power (granted in Article One, Section One of the 1787
Constitution), without the alteration of the system of Checks and
Balances required to lend legitimacy to this ratification. The
Nineteenth Clause legitimizes the Delegation Doctrine, since new Checks
and Balances have been placed into THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, and
reverses the Chadha decision by the Supreme Court, which held that while
Congress could unconstitutionally delegate authority to legislate to the
Executive Branch, it could not retain some measure of control over these
agencies by empowering itself to veto regulations passed by them. The
Nineteenth Clause gives a greater measure of control over an unelected
bureaucracy to the People.
     The Twentieth Clause gives Congress the power to allow the People
to vote directly on certain critical issues, as provided under Section
Ten of this Article.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 9, Clause 21

TO MAKE ALL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS WHICH SHALL BE NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR
CARRYING INTO EXECUTION THE FOREGOING POWERS, AND ALL OTHER POWERS
VESTED BY THIS CONSTITUTION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, OR
IN ANY DEPARTMENT OR OFFICER THEREOF, AND FOR SECURING THE OBJECTIVES IN
THE PREAMBLE, THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES SPECIFIED IN SECTION C-1, AND ANY
RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION.

========================================================================

In the decision of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), Chief
Justice John Marshall greatly expanded the power of Congress to
legislate through his interpretation of the "Necessary and Proper"
Clause. This Clause formalizes that interpretation.
     The National Objectives are further discussed in Section Fifteen of
this Section.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 10, Clauses 1-3

THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO:

ESTABLISH AND PROVIDE FOR A FEDERAL ACADEMY TO EDUCATE FUTURE OFFICIALS
AND OFFICERS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE CURRICULUM THAT THE PEOPLE DEEM
NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR SECURING THE NATIONAL INTEREST. CONGRESS SHALL
DETERMINE AND SET FORTH THE CURRICULUM OF THE FEDERAL ACADEMY IN SECTION
C-205, AND PROVIDE COMPLETE ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR ALL TENURED PROFESSORS,
WHO SHALL CONSIST OF ONE-FOURTH THE FEDERAL ACADEMY FACULTY AFTER THE
SEVEN YEARS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, AND
EVERY YEAR THEREAFTER, PROVIDED THAT TENURE IS LIMITED TO SEVEN YEARS;
AND TO

REGULATE ADMISSIONS AND ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL ACADEMY,
WHICH SHALL BE DESIGNATED IN SECTION C-210, PROVIDED THAT APPOINTMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL ACADEMY BE MADE ON PREDOMINANTLY OBJECTIVE CRITERIA SUCH
AS GRADES AND ENTRANCE EXAMINATIONS; THAT WHEN NOMINEES TO THE FEDERAL
ACADEMY ARE BEING CONSIDERED, THEIR NAMES SHALL BE WITHHELD FROM THE
COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS, AND THAT NO OFFICER OF GOVERNMENT SHALL BE
EMPOWERED TO MAKE PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADMISSIONS TO THE FEDERAL
ACADEMY; THAT THE TIME REQUIRED TO SERVE IN THE FEDERAL ACADEMY BE THREE
YEARS, AND THAT THE LAST YEAR BE CLINICAL IN NATURE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, APPOINTMENT AS AN ALTERNATE; THAT THE TUITION FOR THE
FEDERAL ACADEMY BE PUBLICLY FUNDED, PROVIDED THAT THE INITIAL SALARIES
OF FEDERAL ACADEMY GRADUATES WHO ASSUME OFFICES ARE REDUCED UNTIL PARITY
FOR TUITION RECEIVED IS ACHIEVED, AND THAT TWO YEARS OF GOVERNMENT
SERVICE BE REQUIRED FOR EVERY YEAR OF ATTENDANCE; AND THAT THE STUDENT
BODY BE PROPORTIONALLY REPRESENTED WITH REGARD TO SEX, RACE, NATIONAL
ORIGIN, GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION, AND OTHER FACTORS THE CONGRESS SHALL
DESIGNATE AS THE NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES. THE FEDERAL ACADEMY SHALL
BE LOCATED IN THE CAPITOL AND SHALL BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC, PROVIDED THAT
COURSES ARE SUBJECT TO NO MORE THAN MINIMAL DISRUPTION; AND TO

========================================================================

The Tenth Section lists the obligations, as opposed to the powers of
Congress. Under this Section, the exercise of power by Congress is not
discretionary -- Congress must pass the legislation in this Section.
     The Second and Third Clauses give the Congress as a whole the power
to establish the Federal Academy and to provide regulations for the
Federal
     Academy. Because the curriculum of the Federal Academy is
designated in Section C-205 (see Section Fifteen, Clause One of this
Article), the People of the United States retain the power to create the
curriculum of the Federal Academy, if they desire to supplant Congress'
power to create this curriculum.
     Some of the many courses that may be contained in this curriculum
are The Legislative Process (exposure to the pitfalls of writing good
legislation, correctly defining the problem to be solved, solving
problems in the most cost-effective way, constructing alternative
solutions, educating constituents as to the legitimacy of legislation,
the art of compromise, calculating the cost of legislation, avoiding
ambiguity, proper legislative form, etc.); Negotiation (learning basic
negotiating techniques, such as separating the people from the problem,
delineating issues, forging creative alternatives, etc.); The
Constitution (analysis of the differences in the past and present
Constitutions with an eye towards understanding how future improvements
may be realized); American History (analyzing the key issues in American
history, such as the American Revolution, the promulgation and
ratification of the 1787 Constitution and the Civil War, as well as
recurring themes throughout that history with a focus on the historical
circumstances necessary for the full comprehension of future Legislative
initiatives, such as revision of the tax code, environmental
legislation, reduction of waste in Government, etc.); International
History (with particular attention to the historical background of "hot
areas" such as the Middle East, Russia and South America); The
Legislative Review Board (learning how to calculate Ratings and
determine proper Timetables, with extensive empirical experience); The
Judicial Process (studying the civil and criminal justice system, and
analyzing statistical data with an eye towards reforming injustices);
Social Problems (learning about the causes of and potential solutions
for contemporary horrors such as "crack babies," child abuse,
illiteracy, pollution, crime, violence, drug abuse, homelessness, etc.);
and other important courses, such as economics and decisionmaking, and
specialty areas like patent law, telecommunications, environmental law,
research and development, education, and so forth.
     Academic freedom is provided for tenured professors; however,
tenured professors cannot consist of more or less than 25 percent of the
faculty, and tenure can last only for seven years. This provision
insures a measure of stability and freedom, while allowing evolution in
the composition of the faculty over time. The student must attend the
Federal Academy for three years to graduate, and the last year will
consist of hands-on experience in Government. To insure that poor people
have the same chance to get into the Federal Academy as the wealthy,
tuition will be publicly funded. This is not a "freebie," however, since
the tuition owed will be repaid to the Government in the form of lower
salaries. So, for example, if the tuition owed to the Government after
three years was $45,000, and if the salary of the Representative was to
be $125,000 annually, that Representative would only receive $110,000
for the first three years, until the tuition was repaid.
     The Federal Academy will consist of students who statistically
represent a cross-section of the American people, insuring that no one
demographic category will dominate, and will be open to the public.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 10, Clause 4

ESTABLISH A DEPARTMENT OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, WHICH SHALL INVESTIGATE
AND PROSECUTE ALL VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES GRANTED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION BY ANY INDIVIDUAL, GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS, ASSOCIATION, LEGAL
ENTITY, OR ANY OFFICIAL OF ANY GOVERNMENT ENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES.
THE DEPARTMENT OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT SHALL BE VESTED WITH ALL THE POWERS
NECESSARY FOR SECURING ITS MANDATE, AND SHALL BE ALLOCATED ALL FUNDS
NECESSARY FOR THE FAITHFUL EXECUTION OF ITS CHARTER, AND THE JUDGMENTS
OF THE DEPARTMENT SHALL BE APPEALABLE TO ANY STATE OR FEDERAL COURT; AND
TO

========================================================================

Under the Empirical Constitution, the Government not only has the power
to pass an unconstitutional law, but if it does pass such a law, and if
you are convicted under that law, you must expend funds to attempt to
get that law, and your conviction, overturned. This is an obvious
violation of the Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment that each person
receive the equal protection of the laws, since only the wealthy can
afford to expend the time, money, and energy to fight laws of this
nature, and endure prolonged legal battles of three years or more. The
poor and middle-classes must submit, unless they are lucky enough to
have their issue fit into the political agenda and budget of the ACLU or
similar organizations.
     Even worse, if the Government passes an unconstitutional law and
enforces it, neither the Legislators nor enforcers are liable to any
penalties under the present Constitution(s), increasing the probability
that unconstitutional legislation will pass. Under the Eighth Clause of
this Section, Congress is obligated to provide penalties for violations,
providing a necessary disincentive for the passage and enforcement of
unconstitutional laws.
     The Department of Rights Enforcement will enforce the penalties
provided under the Eighth Clause. If, for example, a person is arrested
for passing out leaflets in a park, that person need only report the
arrest to the Department of Rights Enforcement. The Department will
examine the arrest record and testimony of witnesses, and, if it decides
that the arrest was unjustified, will fine the parties responsible.
Police brutality, such as that which happened to Rodney King in Los
Angeles, will become an extremely rare occurrence. Under THE 21ST
CENTURY CONSTITUTION, violators of rights are violators of the law; in
other words, criminals. As such, they will be treated as criminals.
     Under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, rights will be enforced, and
rights will be taken seriously.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 10, Clause 5

ESTABLISH A FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION, WHICH SHALL SECURE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS BY PASSING THOSE REGULATIONS
NECESSARY TO SECURE LIMITED, EFFICIENT, AND IMPARTIAL CAMPAIGNS, AND TO
INSURE DISCUSSION OF ALL ISSUES SIGNIFICANT TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST; AND
TO INSURE THAT ALL COSTS OF ELECTORAL PROCEDURES SHALL BE PAID FROM
PUBLIC FUNDS, AND THAT THERE SHALL BE NO PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
CANDIDATES; NOR ANY PRIVATE EXPENDITURES ON BEHALF OF CANDIDATES; NOR
ANY PRIVATE LABOR INVESTED IN BEHALF OF CANDIDATES, UNLESS THE CANDIDATE
IS WHOLLY UNAWARE OF THE LABOR EXPENDED. NO CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE MAY
MAKE ANY PERSONAL EXPENDITURES IN BEHALF OF HIS OR HER CAMPAIGN. ALL
COMMUNICATIONS FRANCHISES LICENSED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHALL ABIDE
BY THE ELECTORAL REGULATIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION C-140. ALL MEDIA SHALL
MAKE AVAILABLE ADVERTISING SPACE FOR CANDIDATES AT THE LOWEST UNIT RATE
MADE AVAILABLE TO COMMERCIAL CUSTOMERS, AS DETERMINED BY THE SENATE, AND
SHALL OBSERVE ALL EQUAL ACCESS REGULATIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION C-145;
AND TO

========================================================================

The Federal Elections Commission established under this Clause will
insure that elections are fair, and the Commission will supplement and
enforce the regulations established by the Senate. Private financing of
elections is eliminated; no money from special interests
(institutionalized bribery) is permitted. Because people sometimes work
for political candidates in the hopes of getting a job later on, which
allows for patronage or a "spoils system," they are not allowed to
inform the candidate they are working for his or her candidacy. If
people want to work for candidates, they should work for the candidate
because they believe in him or her, not because they want to be rewarded
with a job if the candidate wins.
     This Clause incorporates the Majority view that Representatives and
Senators should have their campaigns paid for by the public. Private
financing leads to enormous advantages for Incumbents, and prevents
worthy challengers from competing on the same playing field. As former
Senator Barry Goldwater asked in 1986,

    "What are we doing? Are we saying that . . . only the people
who have influential friends who have money can be in the Senate? We're
excluding a lot of young people that I think would make damn good
additions to this body by not giving them access to
     money . . . ."

And Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MI) stated on the floor of the Senate on
May 22, 1991 that

    "There is no question in my mind that the people in this
country would give public financing overwhelming support. . . . Money
determines who gets to run. . . . Money determines who the gatekeepers
are. . . . The system is wired for incumbents. I do not know why in the
world, except for the fact there are so many incumbents here, why
anybody would not want to have a level playing field to give challengers
a chance. . . . All too many Senators and Representatives are
accountable to not real constituencies, not the vast majority of people
-- that is, democracy -- but to cash constituencies. That is an unpleasant
truth."

The polls supported Senator Wellstone, according to Senator John Kerry
(D-MA):

    "Since 1973 through 1990, this was the question:

    'It has been suggested that the Federal Government provide a
fixed amount of money for the election campaigns of candidates for
Congress and that all private contributions be prohibited. Do you think
this is a good idea or a poor idea?'

    From 1973 until 1990, the American people have never been
less than 60 percent in affirmative answer to that question. Today the
American people, 88 percent, say there is too much money influence in
politics and they would like to have some kind of public funding
involvement."

     Under this Clause, the media must sell advertising space to
political candidates at the lowest rate they give to their best
customers. Each candidate will get equal time. Elections will no longer
be decided on the basis of which campaign is the best-financed, a system
which puts complete political power in the hands of those most capable
of financing political campaigns.
     To prevent political campaigns of inordinate length, the Commission
is also empowered to regulate their time frames (e.g., all campaigns for
the office of Representative must be conducted within four weeks).

========================================================================

Article I, Section 10, Clauses 6-8

PASS LEGISLATION IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES; AND TO

PASS LEGISLATION REGARDING THE JUSTICIABILITY OF CASES AND CONTROVERSIES
UNDER THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISDICTION; AND TO

ENACT PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION OF RIGHTS, AND TO PASS THOSE LAWS
NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR SECURING THE RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION, OR BY LAW.

========================================================================

The National Objectives, established in Section Fifteen of this Article,
are Objectives established by the People that must be implemented by
Congress. If, for example, one of the National Objectives is "Reduce the
illiteracy rate in the population to less than one percent by the year
2040," Congress must pass legislation implementing that Objective.
Congress has a whole arsenal of Legislative weapons at its disposal
necessary for achieving the Objective, including tax credits for the
purchase of books, distribution of books to children in elementary
schools, remedial learning programs for adults, educational programs
over the National Channel, etc.
     The Seventh Clause of this Section eliminates the power of the
Supreme Court to create the rules that determine the cases it hears. The
current Constitution gives Congress the power to create these rules, but
the Congress has been derelict in its duty. Consequently, a vast and
unintended power has been transferred to the Supreme Court. This Clause
restores the former balance to the Constitution.
     The Eighth Clause obligates Congress to provide penalties for the
infraction of rights to be levied by the Department of Rights
Enforcement, and to pass laws necessary or proper for securing the
rights granted under the Constitution, or by law. Without penalties for
the violations of rights, the concept of a "right" is a meaningless one.
According to Madison, " . . . a right implies a remedy . . .", and
Hamilton stated in Federalist 15 that

    "It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended
with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for
disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the
resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount
to nothing more than advice or recommendation."

========================================================================

Article I, Section 11, Clauses 1-2

THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION, AND EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY TO
THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE, IS GUARANTEED TO ALL PERSONS REGARDLESS OF
SEX, RACE, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, CITIZENSHIP, FINANCIAL STATUS, AND
CONDITION OF DISABILITY. THE UNITED STATES MAY BE SUED FOR DEFAULT OF
THIS GUARANTEE, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IS AUTHORIZED
TO PASS ALL REGULATIONS NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR SECURING THIS RIGHT.
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, THE RIGHT OF PARENTS TO PROVIDE FOR
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN IN THEIR HOMES SHALL NOT BE INFRINGED, PROVIDED
SUCH EDUCATION MEETS THE MINIMUM STANDARDS REQUIRED BY LAW. STATISTICAL
DATA AND RESULTS OF COGNITIVE TESTS, INCLUDING TESTS OF READING,
WRITING, AND REASONING SKILLS, MAY BE UTILIZED AS EVIDENCE OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RIGHT.

THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION SHALL CONSIST, AT MINIMUM, OF THE FOLLOWING
RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO LEARN TO READ; THE RIGHT TO LEARN TO WRITE; THE
RIGHT TO LEARN TO REASON; THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGINATION;
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO BOOKSTORES AND LIBRARIES; THE RIGHT TO HEAR
OTHERS WHO WISH TO COMMUNICATE THEIR OPINIONS, OR COMMUNICATE THOSE
FACTS WHICH DO NOT DISTORT OR DENY OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE REALITY; THE
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ALL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION COMPILED BY THE
GOVERNMENT NOT PROTECTED BY THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY; THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
THE NATIONAL DATABASE; AND THE RIGHT TO VIEW THE NATIONAL CHANNEL AND
REPRODUCE ITS PROGRAMMING.

========================================================================

The portion of the First Amendment referring to the freedoms of speech
and press reads as follows: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ." (emphasis supplied). While
the simplicity of this Amendment is a virtue, it has proven to be
unworkable. The First Amendment is framed in absolute terms; yet if
observed, would lead to such absurdities as the abolition of laws
against libel, slander, plagiarism, "snuff films," the advocacy of
Presidential assassination, child pornography, advertisements in the
local paper for "hit men," (since the Supreme Court has held that the
First Amendment applies to State and Local Governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment), and laws regulating commercial speech and
broadcasting. Because these absurdities would result, the Supreme Court
has re-written the First Amendment, and stated that it is "not
absolute." The problem is that it is absolute! Section Eleven
incorporates many of the Supreme Court's exceptions to the First
Amendment, while at the same time overturning many rulings of the Court
which have turned the First Amendment into a property right: not freedom
of the press, but freedom for those who own the press, to the exclusion
of everybody else.
     The First and Second Clauses of this Section establish the
framework for what is basically a new First Amendment in the area of
Freedom of Speech. The First Clause declares that the Right to an
Education is a right guaranteed to all persons residing in the United
States. Before speech can take place, education must take place. Without
education, a person can neither listen nor speak coherently. Since the
foundation of speech is education, the Right to an Education comes
first. The new approach centers the right on the receiver of information
as opposed to the communicator of information, by indicating that the
right of access to information is at least as important as the right to
communicate that information.
     The Right to an Education includes, but is not limited to, the
right to learn how to read, write, reason, and think imaginatively.
Without the ability to think logically, creatively, and/or analytically,
a person can be captured by illogical and unsubstantiated conceptions.
Logical fallacies are used today because they persuade. Once people have
learned to ferret out logical fallacies, however, a very heavy risk will
entail if the fallacies are used -- namely, that the credibility of the
speaker will be severely damaged. Because people are currently
untrained, there is currently no credibility penalty for the use of
these fallacies. Education will alter the balance. The integrity of the
information communicated will be preserved.
     Under the Second Clause, people have the right of access to
information compiled by the Government, which is only proper, since they
have paid for the gathering of this information. There is an exception
for classified information, but this exception, given the greater
control by the People over the Government, will be less likely to be
used in the future as is presently the case. In addition, people have
the right of access to bookstores and libraries, which means that
Congress is obligated to pass legislation insuring the existence of
these two critical sources of information in local communities.
     To preserve the free flow of worthwhile information, a right of
access to the opinions of others is protected, as well as the right to
hear others communicate facts, provided that the facts do not "distort
or deny objectively verifiable reality." For example, an oil company
will be allowed to communicate that nuclear power is an option for our
future energy requirements, provided that the oil company does not
exclude the viability of solar power, if in fact solar power is also a
viable option.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 11, Clauses 3-5

TO SECURE THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION, THE SENATE SHALL MAINTAIN A
NATIONAL DATABASE, WHICH SHALL CONTAIN IN ELECTRONIC FORM THE FOLLOWING:
STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ENACTMENTS; STATE AND FEDERAL
COMPILATIONS OF INFORMATION, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, STATISTICAL
DATA, CENSUS REPORTS, CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES;
STATE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL OPINIONS; PUBLIC DOMAIN MATERIAL; ALL NON-
FICTION COPYRIGHTED BOOKS, SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS ENUMERATED IN
SECTION C-150; THE FULL TEXT OF ALL THE MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS
DESIGNATED IN SECTION C-150; TRANSCRIPTS OF SPECIFIED TELEVISION NEWS
PROGRAMS; TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES; AND RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL POLL,
VOTING RECORDS OF CONGRESS, ALL REPORTS PREPARED BY THE SENATE, CERTAIN
MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY THE PUBLIC AT LARGE, AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS
DESIGNATED IN SECTION C-150. ACCESS TO THIS DATABASE SHALL BE PROVIDED
VIA MODEMS OR OTHER ELECTRONIC RETRIEVAL OR DATA-STORAGE DEVICES.
BOOLEAN LOGIC OR SUPERIOR DATA-RETRIEVAL ALGORITHMS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED
BY CONGRESS, AND RESEARCH ASSISTANCE SHALL BE PROVIDED, IF NECESSARY OR
PROPER FOR SECURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RIGHT.

THE RATES FOR ACCESS TO AND DOWNLOADS FROM THE NATIONAL DATABASE SHALL
BE CONTAINED IN SECTION C-155, BUT THESE RATES SHALL UNDER NO
CIRCUMSTANCES RESULT IN A NET PROFIT TO PUBLISHERS AND AUTHORS LESS THAN
THAT AVAILABLE TO THEM THROUGH THEIR PRIMARY MARKETS. CONGRESS MAY
PROVIDE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED GROUPS WHO
WISH TO ACCESS THE DATABASE, AND MAY SET SEPARATE RATES FOR DAY, NIGHT,
AND WEEKEND SERVICE. THE NATIONAL DATABASE SHALL BE FINANCED EXCLUSIVELY
FROM REVENUES ACCRUED FROM SERVICES PROVIDED, PROVIDED THAT THOSE
REVENUES ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF SERVICE GUARANTEED IN
THIS SECTION.

THE NATIONAL DATABASE SHALL OPERATE TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A DAY, AND ACCESS
IS GUARANTEED TO ALL CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.

========================================================================

    "A popular government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who
mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives."

-- James Madison, 1782

The right of access to information is worthless unless there is a means
of accessing that information. In hundreds, if not thousands of towns
across the Country, there are no bookstores. And of those towns with
bookstores, few of these bookstores are of the quality and scope of
those found in Boston, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Chicago. These bookstores, if found at all, are typically one to a town
and generally stock bestsellers; but only a small percentage can afford
to carry an extensive non-fiction back catalog, due to the lack of a
substantive market. Many towns have libraries, but unless the town is a
large one, the size of the library is necessarily limited. Consequently,
the majority of the Citizens of the United States are cut off from
substantive access to important sources of information.
     The National Database dramatically solves this problem. To receive
copyright protection, publishers must consent to the distribution of
their nonfiction materials over the Database, which will operate as
follows:
     You are a person researching the Constitution. You access the
database from your computer, and type (or say) the word "Constitution."
You are then given a list of books and articles with either the word
"constitution" in the title, or in the text of the document, as you
choose. Each book and article has a number. Suppose you want to read The
Federalist. You type number 6 (the number that appeared by The
Federalist), and within seconds the first page of The Federalist comes
up on your screen. You then have three options: to restrict the search
to only those paragraphs or pages of The Federalist which have a
specific set of terms (for example, "bill of rights"), to read The
Federalist screen by screen ("browsing"), or to download The Federalist
into your computer for later study and printout. Boolean logic
algorithms will allow the user to combine search terms using various
connectors such as "and" and "or" (e.g., "find all paragraphs with the
words 'constitution' AND 'rights'").
     If you decide to read The Federalist while connected to the
mainframe over 800 numbers or local interfaces (reading "online"), you
will pay an hourly rate, which will vary depending on the day and/or
time. Assume that the rate for access is $6.00 an hour. If you are
interested in reading the entire book, you are better off downloading
the book. Because the book is in the public domain, you will be billed
only for the time it takes to download (i.e., bring the text of the book
into your computer for later study or printout). The Federalist is a 1.3
megabyte file (1,300,000 bytes). If you can download information at 40K
per minute, it will take a little over thirty minutes to bring the book
into your computer. However, data compression technologies can reduce
this by at least half, and a great deal more than half in the very near
future. With the help of fiber optics and ISDN technology, and the
ultrafast speeds that come with them, you will be able to purchase books
the size of The Federalist (that are in the public domain) for less than
$.25. If a book is not in the public domain, the publishers and authors
will need to be compensated for their efforts (based on a royalty per
download). However, the cost will still be substantially less than
purchasing the book new, since the cost of printing the book has been
eliminated.
     Here the National Database will solve many important problems at
once. It will allow for a truly unbelievable Knowledge Explosion, since
research will no longer be a tedious (and sometimes impossible) task.
Businesses will be able to perform various research tasks at a fraction
of the cost; schools will be able to give their students access to the
world's largest library, a library that is searchable by term; writers
can write incredibly well-documented books; and the average Citizen will
have instant access to a world of knowledge. The National Database will
be 1000 times larger than the existing Internet, and 10 times easier to
use, a superb benefit for those receiving information.  At the same
time, publishers and authors will receive compensation for their labors.
Today people make photocopies of materials, and the money goes not to
publishers and authors, but to the makers and owners of photocopying
machines. Under the new system, money will flow to the producers of
information. Greater reward means greater incentive to produce more
information. Books that will never be written under the current system
will flourish when the National Database is instituted, as information
is compiled and organized in thousands of different ways. The National
Database will have profound and far-reaching effects in our society, and
will substantively change its nature for the better, since the average
Citizen will be exposed to the level of knowledge, and beyond,
accessible to any college student or professor in the United States.
And, as a final bonus, it will enable the average Citizen to get a grasp
on Government, since the whole world of information assembled by
Government is literally at his or her fingertips. This lack of knowledge
has handicapped the average Citizens in their interactions with
Government. The failure of people to understand the working of
Government and its laws has contributed to inequality. As Brennan (1982)
put it:

    "This disparity between the words of the Constitution and
the actually enforceable rights of the citizens contributes to the
mystification of law. Those who know what the law is become the oracles
of those who don't know. There is a merger of law and authority. Instead
of obedience to the law, people learn to obey the policemen, obey the
judge, obey the computer-printed official-looking notice which comes in
the mail."

And getting knowledge as to what one's actual legal rights are is today
financially prohibitive. As Whicker (1987) observed, "[b]eing informed
is not cost-effective for voters without special political connections
or personal links to politicians." The National Database, by reducing
the cost of acquiring information, greatly increases the probability
that being informed will be cost-effective for voters -- all voters.
     The beauty of the National Database is that, in all likelihood, it
will be a financially self-sustaining system, with the revenues required
for operation received from the rates of access. If 1,000,000 people
access the Database one hour a day (not unlikely, given the number of
students, law firms, Government agencies, and businesses in the United
States), and the rate averages $10.00 an hour (the daily rate will be
higher than the evening rate), this will be $10,000,000 a day, or
$3,600,000,000 a year to fund the Database, an amount which should be in
excess of that required. Because the materials that will actually be
contained on the Database are under the control of the Senate, the
actual size of the Database will be as large or as small (within the
limits of the Third Clause) as the American people want it to be.
     As Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1786, "I think by far the most
important bill in [the Virginia] code is that for the diffusion of
knowledge among the people. No other sure foundation can be devised for
the preservation of freedom, and happiness." In the 21st Century, this
foundation for progress will be more necessary than it ever was. The
National Database is the ultimate assurance that this critical goal will
be achieved.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 11, Clause 6

TO SECURE THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION, CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE NON-
REPETITIVE PROGRAMMING FOR THE NATIONAL CHANNEL, WHICH SHALL BE ARCHIVED
AFTER INITIAL BROADCAST. NINE-TENTHS OF THE PROGRAMMING MUST BE NON-
FICTIONAL, AND ALL PROGRAMMING MUST SERVE A LEGITIMATE EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSE. PROGRAMMING SHALL INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, COURSES ON
REASONING SKILLS, AMERICAN HISTORY, LEGAL RESEARCH, PARENTING, SOCIAL
PROBLEMS, TRADITIONAL ACADEMIC SUBJECTS, AND MATTERS OF PRACTICAL
INTEREST TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. ONE-HALF OF THE PROGRAMMING MUST
REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AS DETERMINED BY THE JUNE NATIONAL POLL.
THE SENATE MAY, AT ITS DISCRETION, USE THE NATIONAL CHANNEL BETWEEN THE
HOURS OF EIGHT AND ELEVEN P.M. TO DISSEMINATE NEWSWORTHY INFORMATION,
AND TO ALLOW CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES TO COMMUNICATE ALTERNATIVE
POINTS OF VIEW.

========================================================================

The National Channel is the visual version of the National Database, and
will become America's National Video University. The National Channel
will contain courses on various areas of interest, including: how to
raise children; background history on certain problem regions in the
world, such as the Middle East; social problems such as unnecessary
animal research, pollution, and the Greenhouse effect; and courses in
art appreciation, literacy, music, computer programming; health care,
how to build a solar house, and many, many other topics, including
traditional academic subjects. For less than $1 a month per person (an
amount much less than the $200 a year most people pay for basic cable
service), the People of the United States will have access to 8760 hours
of varied and non-repetitive programming a year -- without commercials!
If a person videotapes only two hours of these programs, he or she will
have received more than his or her money's worth. For those who missed
the programs the first time around, all broadcasts over the National
Channel will be archived for future purchase.
     The National Channel will also give Citizens of the United States
the opportunity to sound off on a variety of topics important to them
and which are not already extensively covered in the media, producing a
very wide spectrum of communicated points of view.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 11, Clause 7

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS A POSITIVE OBLIGATION TO SECURE THE RIGHT TO
COMMUNICATE INFORMATION, AND TO DEFEND PROTECTED SPEAKERS AGAINST
HOSTILE AUDIENCES, AND AGAINST THE ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS OF
INDIVIDUALS, OR LEGAL ENTITIES; TO INSURE THAT ALL POINTS OF VIEW ARE
ALLOWED PUBLIC EXPRESSION, AND TO INSURE THAT ALL POINTS OF VIEW
CRITICAL TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST ARE PROVIDED EQUAL TIME TO THE GREATEST
EXTENT POSSIBLE; TO PROVIDE CITIZENS WITH ACCESS TO NON-CLASSIFIED
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS WHICH DO NOT VIOLATE THE LEGITIMATE PRIVACY RIGHTS
OF INDIVIDUALS; TO DISCERN THE OPINIONS OF THE CITIZENRY THROUGH USE OF
THE NATIONAL POLL; AND TO TAKE THOSE ACTIONS NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR
SECURING PROTECTED SPEECH.

========================================================================

The Seventh Clause mandates that the Federal Government has an
obligation to secure protected speech. With this obligation must come
enforcement. Without enforcement, a right is not a right.
     This Clause turns a negative responsibility (do no harm) into a
positive responsibility (prevent others from doing harm). It obliterates
the false distinction between acts and omissions, a distinction which
has proved fatal to the preservation of our rights.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 11, Clauses 8-9

THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION BEING OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE, THE RIGHT TO
COMMUNICATE INFORMATION AND HAVE THAT INFORMATION RECEIVED SHALL BE
INFRINGED ONLY IF NECESSARY TO SECURE THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND ONLY
UNDER SUCH REGULATIONS AS SET FORTH IN THIS CONSTITUTION.

GOVERNMENT, IN SECURING THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION AND TO HAVE
THAT INFORMATION RECEIVED, AND WHILE SECURING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
AGAINST THE COMMUNICATION OF ANY INFORMATION VIOLATIVE OF THAT INTEREST,
MAY NOT IMPOSE ANY PRIOR RESTRAINT ON ANY COMMUNICATION BY
INSTITUTIONALIZED OR INFORMAL CENSORSHIP OR COERCION, WITH THE EXCEPTION
OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY; NOR ABRIDGE THE FREEDOM TO PUBLISH BOOKS IN ANY
FORMAT, OTHER THAN FOR EXCESSIVE OBSCENITY AND EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE AS
DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION; NOR ABROGATE THE RIGHTS TO PICKET, BOYCOTT,
OR DISTRIBUTE HANDBILLS ON STREETS; NOR ABRIDGE THE CONTENT OF SPEECH
THAT IS OR CAN BE OBJECTIVELY VERIFIED AS TRUE WHICH SERVES TO HIGHLIGHT
OR REMEDIATE UNDESIRABLE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OR CIRCUMSTANCES; NOR
ABRIDGE THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUALS TO DETERMINE WHO MAY SEND
COMMUNICATIONS TO THEIR MAILBOXES, WHETHER CONVENTIONAL OR ELECTRONIC;
NOR IMPOSE ANY OTHER RESTRICTION DESIGNATED IN SECTION A-140.

========================================================================

The Eighth Clause is the recognition in the Constitution that, since no
right is absolute, the right to communicate information is not absolute.
Managing the extent to which Government can manage the communication of
information is one of the most important, delicate, and difficult areas
of constitutional draftsmanship.
     The Ninth Clause provides express limits on the manner in which
Government may regulate unprotected speech. For example, the Government
is not allowed to use the remedy of prior restraint. It cannot forbid
the publishing of material (unless that material is child pornography).
It can, however, punish publication after the fact. Governments can
regulate the right to distribute handbills, picket, and boycott, but
cannot ban those activities; nor are they empowered to regulate the
content of true speech which serves to highlight or remediate
undesirable social consequences or circumstances.
     Under the Supreme Court's ruling in U.S. v. Greenburgh Civic
Assns., 453 U.S. 114 (1981), a Citizen is not empowered to allow other
people to put materials in his or her mailbox without going through the
U.S. Postal Service. This Clause reverses that decision, and gives
control of the mailbox back to the Citizens.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 11, Clause 10

GOVERNMENTS ARE PERMITTED TO USE AGAINST UNPROTECTED SPEECH ONLY THE
LEAST RESTRICTIVE, MOST EFFICIENT, AND MOST APPROPRIATE REMEDIES OF THE
FOLLOWING LISTED, AND IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER, AND ONLY WHERE NECESSARY
OR PROPER FOR SECURING THE FOREGOING RIGHTS OR PUBLIC INTEREST:
COMPETING PUBLICATION; EQUAL ACCESS REGULATIONS; TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER
RESTRICTIONS, INCLUDING LICENSING, IF THE FOREGOING RESTRICTIONS ARE
CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND NARROWLY TAILORED TO SECURE A COMPELLING PUBLIC
INTEREST; FINES, IF NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR PREVENTING UNPROTECTED
SPEECH; TAXES, IF NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR PREVENTING UNPROTECTED SPEECH;
AND ARREST, BUT ONLY IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO PREVENT UNPROTECTED
SPEECH. BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY TYPICALLY OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
SHALL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE EXERCISE OF FREEDOMS HEREIN GRANTED,
SUBJECT TO REGULATIONS SERVING A SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC INTEREST, ON THE
BASIS OF UNAMBIGUOUS, NON-DISCRETIONARY, AND REASONABLE TIME, PLACE, AND
MANNER REGULATIONS.

========================================================================

The Eleventh Clause enumerates the kinds of speech that can be
regulated, and the Tenth Clause indicates the means by which Government
is empowered to regulate. First, the Government can regulate only
unprotected speech, and must use the least restrictive method of
regulating speech; for example, if the Government wishes to reduce the
use of cigarettes, and decides that regulating cigarette advertisements
is one way to achieve that goal, it must use the least restrictive
remedy necessary for achieving the target. Banning cigarette
advertisements entirely is prohibited; therefore, the Government must
consider the use of competing publication as its first remedy. Under the
remedy of competing publication, the Government would place a counter-ad
saying "don't smoke" for every ad the cigarette company placed. But this
would be extremely expensive, obviously, and would therefore not be
efficient. The next remedy would be to use equal access regulations; in
every ad the cigarette company placed, a warning label would have to
appear. If this did not work, Government could move to the next remedy:
time, place, and manner restrictions. For example, only two cigarette
ads per magazine, or one if necessary. If this did not work, Government
could fine or tax the cigarette companies, to reduce the quantity of the
placement of ads. As a final remedy, the Government could arrest tobacco
company executives if the executives did not comply with the prior
remedies. In all probability, the remedies would not go beyond the time,
place, and manner stage.
     Thus, the Government may regulate certain kinds of speech, but how
it achieves this regulation is itself highly regulated.
     The final sentence in this Clause states that persons who own
property that is typically open to the public may be asked to provide
space for speech purposes. For example, individuals may pass out
leaflets in malls, or in mall parking lots (this Clause thus reverses
the Supreme Court's decision to the contrary in Lechmere v. National
Labor Relations Board, No. 90-970 (1992). Again, the Government must use
the least restrictive remedy necessary for achieving the goal of
communication of information.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 11, Clause 11

THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT, AND
THEREFORE GOVERNMENTS ARE ENTITLED TO REGULATE THE FOLLOWING WHEN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST SO REQUIRES: MALICIOUS OR DEFAMATORY SPEECH WHICH HARMS
INDIVIDUALS AND LACKS SIGNIFICANT REDEEMING SOCIAL VALUE; SPEECH WHICH
KNOWINGLY OR NEGLIGENTLY OMITS, DISTORTS, DENIES, OR MISSTATES, TO THE
SIGNIFICANT DETRIMENT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST, THOSE ASPECTS OF REALITY
WHICH HAVE BEEN OR CAN BE OBJECTIVELY VERIFIED AS TRUE; ADVOCACY OF
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WHEN SIGNIFICANTLY DISRUPTIVE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST;
SPEECH BY POLITICAL CANDIDATES OR CITIZENS WHICH, BY DENYING OR
SERIOUSLY DISTORTING OBJECTIVE REALITY, DISRUPTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS; THE RIGHT OF THE MEDIA TO REFUSE THE ACCEPTANCE OF
POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS, WHERE SUCH REFUSAL OPERATES TO THE DETRIMENT
OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST; SPEECH WHICH HAS A FUNDAMENTAL COMMERCIAL
PURPOSE; SPEECH TRANSMITTED AT DECIBEL LEVELS HIGHER THAN NECESSARY FOR
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION, AND WHICH BREACHES THE PUBLIC PEACE; BROADCAST
MEDIA LICENSED TO USE PUBLIC AIRWAVES BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION; AND SEXUAL OR VIOLENT CONDUCT DESCRIBED OR DEPICTED IN A
PATENTLY OFFENSIVE MANNER, AND WHICH LACKS SIGNIFICANT REDEEMING SOCIAL
VALUE, AS DETERMINED BY THE APPLICATION OF CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS. THE
CORRUPTION OF MINORS, BY EXPOSURE TO OBSCENITY OR EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE,
SHALL BE AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR SUPPORTING THE DENIAL OF FREEDOMS GRANTED
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION. BUT NO LAW PROSCRIBING PORNOGRAPHY OR VIOLENCE,
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OR THE EXCESSIVE DESCRIPTION OR
DEPICTION OF VIOLENCE, SHALL BE MADE THAT INVADES THE PERSONAL RIGHT OF
PRIVACY EXERCISED IN NON-PUBLIC PLACES AND BY THOSE WHO ARE NOT
DOMICILING MINORS, OTHER THAN REGULATION OF TELEVISION AND OTHER
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, WHETHER TRANSMITTED BY ANTENNA, CABLE, SATELLITE, OR
ANY OTHER MEANS. TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS,
CURTAILMENTS ON THOSE COMMUNICATIONS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE FAIR TRIALS
MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW. ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON AND CLARIFICATIONS
OF THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION SHALL BE ENUMERATED IN SECTION
A-145, PROVIDED THAT THE PROVISIONS SERVE A COMPELLING PUBLIC INTEREST.

========================================================================

The Eleventh Clause incorporates several of the exceptions the Supreme
Court has written into the First Amendment. Under Clause Eleven, the
right to communicate information does not include the right to lie, the
right to deceive, the right to defame reputations, the right to tell
others to break certain laws, the right to blare a message over
loudspeakers that unreasonably infringes on the rights of others, nor
the absolute and unfettered right to broadcast commercials, violence, or
pornographic images over the airwaves. While the Supreme Court has ruled
that the media has the right to refuse political advertisements, this
Clause reverses those decisions, to secure the goal of providing access
of the People to all legitimate points of view.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 11, Clause 12

TO SECURE THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE INFORMATION, THE SENATE SHALL POLL A
STATISTICALLY REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF NOT LESS THAN TWELVE HUNDRED AND
NO GREATER THAN THIRTY-SIX HUNDRED PEOPLE MONTHLY ON THEIR OPINIONS ON
VARIOUS TOPICS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THEIR SATISFACTION WITH
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES ON A SPECIFIC OR GENERAL BASIS,
OR BOTH. THE RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL POLL SHALL BE CONSIDERED EVIDENCE
OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. IN JUNE, THE NATIONAL
POLL SHALL BE CONDUCTED THREE TIMES WITHIN A TWENTY-FOUR HOUR PERIOD,
ONCE BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND TWICE BY PRIVATE CONCERNS, AND SHALL POLL A
TOTAL OF TEN THOUSAND CITIZENS. IF THE RESULT OF ANY POLL IS DISCREPANT
BY MORE THAN TEN PERCENTAGE POINTS FROM THE AVERAGE OF THE OTHER TWO
POLLS ON ANY QUESTION, THE SENATE SHALL CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION TO
DETERMINE THE SOURCE OF THE DISCREPANCY. THE RESULTS OF THE FOREGOING
THREE POLLS SHALL BE AVERAGED, AND SHALL CONSTITUTE THE FINAL RESULT OF
THE JUNE NATIONAL POLL. THE JUNE NATIONAL POLL SHALL CONTAIN THE
FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: "SHOULD THE PRESIDENT BE RECALLED?" "ARE YOU
SATISFIED WITH THE TERM FOR REPRESENTATIVES?" "ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH
THE TERM FOR SENATORS?", WITH "YES," "NO," OR "NOT SURE" BEING THE ONLY
THREE RESPONSES. THE JUNE NATIONAL POLL SHALL ALSO BE USED TO DETERMINE
THE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES TO BE VOTED ON IN THE GENERAL ELECTION,
NOMINATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL INITIATIVE AND NATIONAL REFERENDUM, AND
PROGRAMMING FOR THE NATIONAL CHANNEL.

========================================================================

The Twelfth Clause includes within the right to communicate information
the right of the People to transmit their opinions to their politicians.
Every month a statistically representative sample of the People will be
asked their opinion on various topics; for example, which are the most
significant problems facing the country, what event of the last month
has disturbed you the most, how do you feel about the performance of the
Legislative Review Board and the Federal Academy, what matters would you
like the Senate to investigate, etc. The results of the National Poll
will be considered evidence of the Will of the People.
     The June National Poll is the most significant. In that Poll will
be asked the three very critical questions enumerated. Because these
questions are of the utmost importance, it will be necessary to insure
that the results of the Poll are as accurate as possible. If only the
Government conducted the Poll, and 67 percent of the People replied that
the President should be recalled, there would be statistical room for
doubt, and the credibility of the Poll would suffer with regard to this
very critical issue. To insure the integrity of the polling process, the
results will be averaged with the results of private concerns. In the
event of discrepancies that are not statistically explainable, the
Senate will conduct an investigation into the source of the
discrepancies.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 12, Clauses 1-2

ALL PERSONS BORN OR NATURALIZED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND SUBJECT TO THE
JURISDICTION THEREOF, ARE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE
WHEREIN THEY RESIDE.

NO GOVERNMENT SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW WHICH SHALL ABRIDGE THE
PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES, OR RIGHTS OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES
GRANTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION, OR RIGHTS GRANTED BY THE LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, NOR MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW WHICH IS SO IMPRECISE OR
OVERBROAD IN ITS TERMS THAT IT PROVIDES A PRETEXT FOR ARBITRARY OR
DISCRIMINATORY LAW ENFORCEMENT, OR UNCERTAINTY IN THE MINDS OF PERSONS
OF COMMON INTELLIGENCE AS TO THE MEANING OF THE LAW AND NATURE OF THE
CONDUCT PROHIBITED, AND WHICH WOULD HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON THE
EXERCISE OF CONDUCT NOT CLEARLY PROSCRIBED; NOR DENY TO ANY PERSON THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

========================================================================

Section Twelve is the second part of the Bill of Rights incorporated
into the Constitution.
     The First and Second Clauses contain the essence of the very
important Fourteenth Amendment, especially the very important Equal
Protection Clause, with the addition of language against the use of
vague terms in statutes (a violation which will inevitably lead to Equal
Protection violations).

========================================================================

Article I, Section 12, Clauses 3-4

THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED,
UNLESS WHEN IN CASES OF REBELLION OR INVASION THE PUBLIC SAFETY MAY
REQUIRE IT.

NO BILL OF ATTAINDER OR EX POST FACTO LAW SHALL BE PASSED.

========================================================================

The writ of habeas corpus is a formal order requiring a person to be
brought before a Judge or court to investigate the restraint of a
person's liberty.
     A bill of attainder is a law which inflicts punishment without a
Judicial trial. An ex post facto law is a retroactive law which punishes
past behavior which was legal at the time it was performed. These
Clauses formerly appeared in Article One, Section Nine, and have been
transferred to this Section.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 12, Clause 5

NO LAW SHALL BE MADE RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, OR
PROHIBITING THE FREE EXERCISE THEREOF. THE TERM "ESTABLISHMENT" SHALL
NOT BE CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT THOSE TRADITIONAL PRAYERS AT THE OPENING OF
LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS, WHICH DO NOT AMOUNT TO RELIGIOUS ENDORSEMENT OR
INDOCTRINATION; NOR THE AUTHORIZATION BY STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF A
"MOMENT OF SILENCE" IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL HOMEROOMS, PROVIDED THAT THE
MOMENT OF SILENCE IS NOT IDENTIFIED WITH ANY RELIGION OR RELIGIOUS
CONCEPT; NOR THE VOLUNTARY RECITATION OF THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE; NOR
THE USE OF THE PHRASE "IN GOD WE TRUST" ON MONEY; NOR THOSE PUBLIC
DISPLAYS AND OFFICIAL PROCLAMATIONS RECOGNIZING THE EXISTENCE OF CERTAIN
RELIGIOUS OR SECULAR HOLIDAYS FALLING IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, PROVIDED
THAT THOSE PUBLIC DISPLAYS PROMOTE RELIGION ONLY IN AN INDIRECT AND
LIMITED MANNER, AND ARE CONFINED TO THOSE TRADITIONAL HOLIDAYS. IN TIME
OF WAR, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS MAY SUBSTITUTE PUBLIC SERVICE FOR
MILITARY SERVICE. THE GRANT OF TAX EXEMPTION TO RELIGIOUS PROPERTY SHALL
BE UPHELD, SUBJECT TO THOSE EXEMPTIONS ENUMERATED IN SECTION A-150, AND
PROVIDED THOSE EXEMPTIONS AFFECT ALL RELIGIONS EQUALLY. INCOME TAX
DEDUCTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS OR SECULAR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION TUITION, AND
OTHER EDUCATION EXPENSES AVAILABLE TO ALL TAXPAYERS, SHALL BE ALLOWABLE
ONLY IF DESIGNATED AT SECTION A-115.

========================================================================

This Clause, formerly contained in the First Amendment, incorporates
modifications to the Written Constitution subsequently made by the
Supreme Court.
     There are two issues that can sabotage a New Constitution, and
religion is one of them. Consequently, the most controversial section of
THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION will be the "moment of silence" provision.
This provision has been added as a compromise between two opposing
factions in the U.S.. The "moment of silence" provision attempts to meet
each of these groups halfway, and head off a potentially divisive
struggle at the pass. The abstract nature of the Moment of Silence is
its strength. While no religious concept is allowed to be attached to
this moment of silence, it nonetheless allows State Legislatures, if
they desire, to pass it (for elementary school homerooms only). Given
that students utter every day (when reciting the Pledge of Allegiance)
the state-enforced belief that America is a Nation "under God," the
Moment of Silence is certainly a great deal more secular, and certainly
more tolerable from the standpoint of an establishment of religion.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 12, Clauses 6-7

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE OR ASSOCIATE SHALL BE
PROTECTED; HOWEVER, MEMBERSHIP IN OR COLLABORATION WITH ASSOCIATIONS
ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL ADVOCACY OR ACTIVITY MAY CARRY THE PRESUMPTION OF
SHARING IN THE ASSOCIATION'S CULPABILITY WHERE A MEMBER OR COLLABORATOR
POSSESSES SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH ADVOCACY OR ACTIVITY, AND A CLEAR
INTENT THAT THE AIMS BE REACHED OR THE ACTIVITIES BE CARRIED OUT.
ASSOCIATIONS ENGAGED IN UNLAWFUL ADVOCACY OR ACTIVITY MAY BE COMPELLED
TO DISCLOSE THE NAMES OF THEIR MEMBERS IF SUCH DISCLOSURE IS ESSENTIAL
TO SERVE A SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST.

THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUALS TO POLITICALLY ORGANIZE SHALL BE PROTECTED,
PROVIDED THAT NO TIME OR MONEY EXPENDITURES, OF INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS,
SHALL BE MADE WHICH VIOLATE ANY LAW OR REGULATION PERTAINING TO THE
INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

========================================================================

The Sixth Clause was formerly contained in the First Amendment, and
protects legitimate law-abiding organizations, while allowing the law to
break up unlawful organizations like mobs or gangs.
     Under the Seventh Clause, the People retain the right to organize
politically. But no expenditures by private groups may be made in behalf
of particular candidates running for Federal Office. The advertisements
funded by these private expenditures have been demonstrated to be
woefully lacking in informational integrity, partly due to the cost of
transmitting information (there is not enough money to present every
side of the story), and partly due to the inherent bias in human beings.
To allow distorted information to be disseminated among the population
is to circulate a cancer through the body politic, and reduce the
probability that well-informed decisions will be made. The net result is
a society held hostage by ignorance and disinformation, a society doomed
to pursue a wrong course of action throughout perpetuity.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 12 Clauses 8-13

NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY, WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS,
AND EFFECTS, AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES, SEIZURES, ELECTRONIC
INTERCEPTION OR RECORDING OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS, OR OTHER ACTIONS OF
GOVERNMENT DESIGNATED IN SECTION A-155, SHALL NOT BE VIOLATED, AND NO
WARRANTS SHALL ISSUE, BUT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE, SUPPORTED BY OATH OR
AFFIRMATION, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND
THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED, OR THE PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS AND
PARTIES TO BE RECORDED. NO SEARCH OTHER THAN THOSE ENUMERATED IN SECTION
B-130 SHALL ENSUE EXCEPT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A VALID WARRANT ISSUED
BY A JUDICIAL OFFICER, OR UNLESS THERE IS INFORMED CONSENT OF THE
INDIVIDUAL WHO IS THE SUBJECT OF THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AND PROVIDED
THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN FULLY INFORMED OF THE RIGHT TO WITHHOLD
CONSENT. THE OFFICIAL CONDUCTING THE SEARCH BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING
FULLY INFORMED CONSENT. INADVERTENT DISCOVERY OF ILLEGAL MATERIALS
PURSUANT TO THE EXECUTION OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT SHALL BE HELD
ADMISSIBLE IN COURT, PROVIDED THERE ARE NO OTHER COMPELLING REASONS FOR
THE INADMISSIBILITY OF SUCH EVIDENCE, AND SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS
ENUMERATED IN SECTION B-135. EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM ANY UNLAWFUL
INTRUSION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE IN ANY LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, OR
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING.

IN ALL CRIMINAL MATTERS, ALL PERSONS HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE BY
COMPETENT COUNSEL FROM COMMENCEMENT OF A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION, DURING
TRIAL AND APPEAL, AND WHENEVER THEY ARE SUBJECT TO A DEPRIVATION OF
LIBERTY. WHEN ARRESTED THEY SHALL BE READ THE INSTRUCTION OF THEIR
RIGHTS AS DESIGNATED IN SECTION B-140, WHICH SHALL INCLUDE BEING
INFORMED OF THE RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH COUNSEL.

NO PERSON SHALL BE HELD TO ANSWER FOR A CAPITAL, OR OTHERWISE INFAMOUS
CRIME, UNLESS ON A PRESENTMENT OR INDICTMENT OF A GRAND JURY, EXCEPT IN
CASES ARISING IN THE LAND OR NAVAL FORCES, OR IN THE MILITIA, WHEN IN
ACTUAL SERVICE IN TIME OF WAR OR PUBLIC DANGER. IN ALL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS, THE ACCUSED SHALL ENJOY THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY, FAIR, AND
PUBLIC TRIAL. THE ACCUSED SHALL ENJOY THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY,
UNLESS EXCEPTIONS TO THE JURY TRIAL REQUIREMENT HAVE BEEN ENUMERATED IN
SECTION A-160. ALL JURIES SHALL BE IMPARTIAL, SHALL CONSIST OF THE
NUMBER OF PERSONS DESIGNATED IN SECTION A-165, AND SHALL BE DERIVED FROM
THE STATE AND DISTRICT WHEREIN THE CRIME SHALL HAVE BEEN COMMITTED,
WHICH DISTRICT SHALL HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ASCERTAINED BY LAW. THE
ACCUSED HAS THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION; TO BE CONFRONTED WITH THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM OR HER; TO
THE DISCOVERY OF ALL THE EVIDENCE POSSESSED BY THE STATE; AND TO HAVE
COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR OBTAINING WITNESSES IN HIS OR HER FAVOR. ALL
ACCUSED PERSONS SHALL BE PRESUMED INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY. NO
PERSON SHALL BE SUBJECT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE TO BE TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY
OF LIFE OR LIMB; NOR SHALL BE COMPELLED IN ANY CRIMINAL CASE TO BE A
WITNESS AGAINST HIM OR HERSELF. EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED,
NOR EXCESSIVE FINES IMPOSED, NOR CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL NOR DISPROPORTIONATE
PUNISHMENTS INFLICTED, AS DEFINED IN SECTION B-145. THE CONGRESS SHALL
HAVE POWER TO DECLARE THE PUNISHMENT OF TREASON. TREASON AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES, SHALL CONSIST ONLY IN LEVYING WAR AGAINST THEM, OR IN
ADHERING TO THEIR ENEMIES, GIVING THEM AID AND COMFORT. NO PERSON SHALL
BE CONVICTED OF TREASON UNLESS ON THE TESTIMONY OF TWO WITNESSES TO THE
SAME OVERT ACT, OR ON CONFESSION IN OPEN COURT.

     IN CIVIL LAWSUITS, WHERE THE VALUE IN CONTROVERSY SHALL EXCEED THE
AMOUNT DESIGNATED IN SECTION B-150, OR WHERE THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE
CONTROVERSY IS THAT DESIGNATED IN SECTION B-155, THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY
JURY SHALL BE PRESERVED, AND NO FACT TRIED BY A JURY, SHALL BE OTHERWISE
RE-EXAMINED IN ANY COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THAN ACCORDING TO THE
RULES OF LAW. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
IS GUARANTEED TO EVERY PERSON, AND CONGRESS SHALL ASSURE ACCESS TO
COURTS AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS FOR FINANCIALLY DISADVANTAGED
LITIGANTS. NEITHER COURT NOR TRANSCRIPT COSTS SHALL BE REQUIRED OF THOSE
LITIGANTS UNABLE TO AFFORD THEM.

EVERY CRIME SHALL BE DEFINED BY STATUTE; NO PERSON SHALL BE ARRESTED,
TRIED, OR CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF COMMON LAW CRIMINAL OFFENSES. EVERY
CIVIL WRONG SHALL BE DEFINED BY STATUTE, AND NO PERSON SHALL SUE, BE
SUED, OR BE SUABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW. THIS CLAUSE SHALL
BECOME EFFECTIVE WITHIN SEVEN YEARS AFTER RATIFICATION.

========================================================================

Clauses Eight through Thirteen incorporate the remaining provisions of
the Bill of Rights, with several important additions (some from
Ladanyi's codification of the Empirical Constitution).
     The Ninth Clause gives the People the power to provide restrictions
on the extent and kind of Government searches.
     The Tenth Clause incorporates the right to counsel and Miranda rule
into the Constitution. The Eleventh Clause adds the "innocent until
proven guilty" language to our Constitution that does not currently
appear there. It also prohibits disproportionate punishments (e.g.,
eight years for child abuse resulting in death, and a life sentence for
possession of one and one-half pounds of cocaine). The National Poll may
be used to determine disproportionality.
     Since jury trials delay the process of justice, and can thus
interfere with the "speedy trial" requirement, the Twelfth Clause gives
the power to the People to decide which criminal and civil cases will be
tried by jury, within limits. All Citizens are guaranteed access to the
courts.
     The Thirteenth Clause is extremely important. The current Judicial
system allows for what is known as the "common law," or Judge-made law.
Under this system, law is made by Judges who render decisions in
individual cases. These decisions then become what is known as
precedent, or decisions that must be followed by future Judges. Because
Judges are obliged to follow precedent, laws grow out of these decisions
reached by Judges.
     The important question is, why are Judges allowed to make law?
Isn't this a violation of the Principle of Separation of Powers? Simply
put, yes. A Legislature certainly has the ability to pass a law allowing
minors to void their contracts (a law written by Judges), and there is
no evidence that "Judges" are inherently wiser than "Legislators." Many,
many factors have to be considered when writing a law, and Judges are
poorly equipped for the task -- Judges don't conduct hearings, haven't
been educated for the responsibility, haven't been supplied with the
necessary staff and resources, and can only author "laws" on the basis
of those individual cases which happen to come before them. Due to the
circumstances under which they are compelled to "legislate," they are
unable to consider the total picture -- the interests of society as a
whole. This is not the way to write law.
     Another onerous feature of the common law is that is frequently
difficult, if not impossible, to determine what the law is! When laws
are codified in statutes, you simply go to the statute book, where you
read that "contractual clauses limiting the liability of landlords for
their negligent acts are prohibited." With the common law, on the other
hand, to find out what the law is you must read cases. When you go to
the casebooks, you often find two conflicting "lines" of cases; one line
which holds that such clauses are prohibited, and another which allows
their use. If you are about to sign a contract with a clause like this,
how do you know that the court will enforce your contract? You don't.
According to Madison, "[l]aw is defined to be a rule of action; but how
can that be a rule, which is little known and less fixed?"
     The common-law approach, needless to say, provides a never-ending
source of revenue for attorneys who are hired to write "briefs"
(frequently anything but), the essential purpose of which is to convince
a Judge what the law is on a particular issue. Unfortunately, sauce for
the goose is a cost for the gander -- an unnecessary and unjust expense,
since only those who can afford attorneys can afford to convince a Judge
that the law is on his or her side. The common law system is a system
which dovetails perfectly into a system which, yet again, gives
influence to the wealthy at the expense of the rest of society -- and is
prohibited under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 12, Clauses 14-17

NO PRIVATE PROPERTY SHALL BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION, AS DEFINED IN SECTION B-145.

THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL SHALL NOT BE INFRINGED, SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS
ENUMERATED IN SECTION A-170.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY SHALL NOT BE ABROGATED. THE RIGHTS TO PRIVACY
RECOGNIZABLE BY THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE DESIGNATED IN SECTION A-175.

NEITHER SLAVERY NOR INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, EXCEPT AS A PUNISHMENT FOR
CRIME WHEREOF THE PARTY SHALL HAVE BEEN DULY CONVICTED, SHALL EXIST
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, OR ANY PLACE SUBJECT TO THEIR JURISDICTION.

========================================================================

Since the term "just compensation" is vague, provision for its
definition is made in the Constitutional Supplement.
     The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Clauses formally include rights that
have been recognized by the Supreme Court, but which are not explicitly
enumerated in the present Constitution. Under the Fifteenth Clause, the
right to travel may only be infringed as Congress and the People may
concur (for example, you cannot travel unless you first secure a
passport).
     The Sixteenth Clause recognizes a right of privacy. The extent to
which this right of privacy is recognizable may be determined by
Congress or established by the People and Congress in Constitutional
Supplement Section A. It is under this Clause that any future
legislation regarding that most divisive issue of all, abortion, will be
decided. In all likelihood, the legislation passed by the Congress
and/or the People will attempt to find some middle ground between the
hard-line positions on both sides that a Majority of the People can live
with. Note that the Clause is written in such a way as to favor neither
the "pro-life" nor "pro-choice" position. Abortion is the second issue
which can sabotage a New Constitution, and for that reason the chances
of the word "abortion" appearing in any future Constitution are
virtually nil.
     Of course, slavery is prohibited.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 12, Clauses 18-19

EVERY CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES IS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE, PROVIDED THAT
THE CITIZEN DOES NOT CLAIM THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN ANY OTHER STATE,
TERRITORY, OR COUNTRY; IS AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD ON THE DATE OF THE
ELECTION; IS REGISTERED TO VOTE AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION; AND IS NOT
MADE INELIGIBLE DUE TO MENTAL INCAPACITY OR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, AS
REGULATED IN SECTION B-160.

EVERY PERSON HAS THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES. PERSONS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY ANY CLAIMED BREACHES OF THIS
SECTION, OR PERSONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY AFFECTED WITH REGARD TO THOSE
ISSUES DEEMED OF SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL INTEREST BY A THREE-FIFTHS
MAJORITY OF THE CITIZENS AS DETERMINED IN THE NATIONAL POLL, SHALL HAVE
STANDING TO COMPLAIN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, OR TO
REQUEST JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN ANY STATE OR FEDERAL COURT.

========================================================================

Everyone in the United States who meets the qualifications in the
Eighteenth Clause is eligible to vote; consequently, literacy tests,
poll taxes and the like are unconstitutional. Congress retains its
current power to regulate the voting rights of individuals confined in
institutions and prisons.
     The Nineteenth Clause addresses the issue of standing, which is
addressed in our present Written Constitution. Under the First
Amendment, the People have the right to "petition the government for a
redress of grievances" (that is, they have "standing" to adjudicate
their claim in court). Perhaps because of this language, Justice William
O. Douglas stated in 1970 that

    "We have never ruled, I believe, that when the Federal
Government takes a person by the neck and submits him to punishment,
imprisonment, taxation, or to some ordeal, the complaining person may
not be heard in court. The rationale . . . is that government cannot
take life, liberty, or property of the individual and escape
adjudication by the courts of the legality of its action."

Perhaps, on these narrow facts (taking a person by the neck), Douglas is
correct. This does not mean, however, that the Court has always taken
seriously the right of the People in the First Amendment to "petition
the government for a redress of grievances." According to the Supreme
Court, a person does not have standing to sue unless there is a direct
and immediate personal injury to the person in question; that is, a
person must have a requisite personal stake in the outcome of the case.
But while on the surface this requirement may seem reasonable, it has
led to dozens, if not hundreds, of extremely questionable decisions by
the Supreme Court and lower courts. For example, in United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), the Court held that an average Citizen
does not have standing to compel Congress to obey the Constitution! In
that case, William B. Richardson, suing as a Federal taxpayer, claimed
that Congress' statutory refusal to disclose the expenditures of the CIA
violated the requirement of Article One, Section Nine that "a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time." But the Court held that
Richardson's grievance was merely a "generalized grievance," and not a
specific injury to him. In other words, since every Citizen was hurt by
the decision, no Citizen, including Richardson, would have the power to
sue! The Court stated this even though in an earlier case, United States
v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), it held that "[t]o deny standing to
persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also
injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government
actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that
conclusion." But the Court did accept that conclusion, as it continued
to issue similarly flawed decisions. Along the same lines of reasoning,
the Court held that Citizens did not have the standing to compel
Congressmen to obey the Incompatibility Clause in Article One, Section
Six of the Constitution. But the "direct and personal interest"
requirement utilized by the Court was a smokescreen, since it later
refused to hear a case involving persons who most definitely had a
"direct and personal interest" in an outcome, Vietnam draftees who
sought to prevent their shipment overseas. The most obvious example that
the standing requirement has been used by the Court to evade deciding
significant issues (and thus letting the status quo stand) was reached
in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970), where the court refused
to allow the State of Massachusetts to get a ruling on the
constitutional ability or inability of the Executive Power to send
Massachusetts Citizens overseas to engage in armed hostilities, without
a congressional (and constitutional) declaration of war. When even a
State cannot be heard in our highest court, it becomes clear, as Justice
Douglas stated in his dissent to Schlesinger, that the standing
requirement "protects the status quo by reducing the challenges that may
be made to it and to its institutions. It greatly restricts the classes
of persons who may challenge administrative action." Therefore, as long
as the Empirical Constitution (and the standing requirement contained
within it) is allowed to stand, there can be no liberty and justice for
all in America.
     Notwithstanding the above decisions, the Court has relaxed the
requirement when it has so desired. For example, in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), the Court held that a vendor of beer had standing to
assert the constitutional rights of males under the age of twenty-one
against the laws prohibiting the sale of beer to them. And in the area
of the environment, the Court held in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972) that injury to "aesthetic and environmental well-being" could
constitute an injury in fact, so that persons who use national forests
would have standing. As the Court stated, "[a]esthetic and environmental
well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does
not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial
process." It is this latter line of reasoning that is adopted in THE
21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION.
     The relaxed standing requirement in the Nineteenth Clause gives
private Citizens the power to enforce the edicts of Government in those
areas of significant National Interest (not just the environment), in a
variant of the concept of "citizen arrest." This is a right currently
available to major law firms, who will act as private "attorney's
general" in lucrative securities cases (in these cases law firms will
seek out stockholders to get the standing requirement).
     But securities law, as we have seen, is not the only area that
requires enforcement of the law by private Citizens. A relaxed standing
requirement is the People's safeguard against runaway Government action,
and a powerful means of insuring that the Constitution will be enforced.
All persons directly affected by breaches of their constitutional rights
will have standing to complain to the Department of Rights Enforcement.
Citizens will not have to hire an attorney to enforce their rights. In
addition, those persons indirectly affected by Section violations will
also have standing, if that issue (or any other issue) is deemed of
significant National Interest by a three-fifths Majority of the Citizens
as determined in the National Poll. So, if sixty percent of the People
(or over) believe that dumping toxic wastes into the river without a
permit is of significant National Interest, any Citizen is empowered to
sue that company on behalf of him or herself, and all other Citizens who
are directly or indirectly affected.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 12, Clauses 20-21

THE ENUMERATION IN THIS CONSTITUTION OF CERTAIN RIGHTS SHALL NOT BE
CONSTRUED TO DENY OR DISPARAGE OTHER RIGHTS. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES MAY SUPPLEMENT THIS SECTION WITH ADDITIONAL RIGHTS, TO BE
ENUMERATED IN SECTION A-115, AND TO BE DULY INCORPORATED IN THIS SECTION
AS IF SET FORTH HEREIN, PROVIDED THAT NO RIGHT SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHES
ANY OF THE POWERS EXPLICITLY GRANTED TO THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION, OR ANY RIGHTS EXPLICITLY GRANTED TO
ANY PERSON UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION. THE POWERS NOT DELEGATED TO THE
UNITED STATES BY THE CONSTITUTION, NOR PROHIBITED BY IT TO THE STATES,
ARE RESERVED TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY, OR TO THE PEOPLE.

NO RIGHT UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION OR UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY BE VIOLATED BY ANY INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS.

========================================================================

The Twentieth Clause incorporates the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the
Bill of Rights. The revision of this Clause insures that entities other
than people may legitimately be seen as having rights (for example,
deceased persons who make requests after their death, small businesses,
political organizations, etc.). The People are free to add additional
rights to the Constitution, provided that no right is articulated which
substantially diminishes any of the powers explicitly granted to the
Federal, State, and Local Governments under the Constitution, or
violates any of the rights explicitly granted to any person under the
Constitution.
     The Twenty-First Clause is an important addition. Under the
existing Bill of Rights, only the Government may not (in theory) deprive
you of your rights; but there is no restriction on acts by individuals.
Under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, a right is a right. No one may
deprive you of your legitimate rights, regardless of their legal status.
From the standpoint of THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, a policeman or
private Citizen who prevent you from passing out leaflets in a park are
one and the same. Anyone who violates those rights explicitly enumerated
in the Twelfth Section will have to pay a penalty if found guilty by the
Department of Rights Enforcement.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 13, Clauses 1-2

NO TAX OR DUTY SHALL BE LAID ON ARTICLES EXPORTED FROM ANY STATE,
SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS ENUMERATED IN SECTION B-165.

NO PREFERENCE SHALL BE GIVEN BY ANY REGULATION OF COMMERCE OR REVENUE TO
THE PORTS OF ONE STATE OVER THOSE OF ANOTHER: NOR SHALL VESSELS BOUND
TO, OR FROM, ONE STATE, BE OBLIGED TO ENTER, CLEAR, OR PAY DUTIES IN
ANOTHER.

========================================================================

Section Thirteen contains additional restrictions on the powers of the
United States Government, formerly contained in Section Nine of the
Written Constitution. The slavery clause is stricken, and the addition
in the First Clause formally recognizes Supreme Court rewrites found in
the Empirical Constitution.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 13, Clause 3

NO MONEY SHALL BE DRAWN FROM THE TREASURY, BUT IN CONSEQUENCE OF
APPROPRIATIONS MADE BY LAW.

========================================================================

The modifications to this Clause, found in Section Three, Clause Six of
this Article, mandate that the People of the United States be given a
Quarterly report of the financial status of the Nation, essential for
preserving the Principle of Accountability.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 13, Clause 4

NO TITLE OF NOBILITY SHALL BE GRANTED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ANY STATE:
AND NO PERSON HOLDING ANY OFFICE OF PROFIT OR TRUST UNDER THEM, SHALL,
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE CONGRESS, ACCEPT OF ANY PRESENT, EMOLUMENT,
OFFICE, OR TITLE, OF ANY KIND WHATEVER, FROM ANY INDIVIDUAL, ASSOCIATION
OF INDIVIDUALS, OR GOVERNMENT, WHETHER DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN.

========================================================================

The "title of nobility" Clause is essentially obsolete, but since one
reason for this obsolescence is the existence of this Clause, it is
retained. The second part of this Clause prevents the acceptance of
gifts, and is an important foundation for future ethics legislation.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 14, Clauses 1-3

NO STATE SHALL ENTER INTO ANY TREATY, ALLIANCE, OR CONFEDERATION; ; COIN
MONEY; OR EMIT BILLS OF CREDIT.

NO STATE SHALL, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE CONGRESS, LAY ANY IMPOSTS OR
DUTIES ON IMPORTS OR EXPORTS, EXCEPT WHAT MAY BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY
FOR EXECUTING ITS INSPECTION LAWS: AND THE NET PRODUCE OF ALL DUTIES AND
IMPOSTS, LAID BY ANY STATE ON IMPORTS OR EXPORTS, SHALL BE FOR THE USE
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES; AND ALL SUCH LAWS SHALL BE SUBJECT
TO THE REVISION AND CONTROL OF THE CONGRESS.

NO STATE SHALL, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, LAY ANY DUTY OF
TONNAGE, KEEP TROOPS, OR SHIPS OF WAR IN TIME OF PEACE, ENTER INTO ANY
AGREEMENT OR COMPACT WITH ANOTHER STATE, OR WITH A FOREIGN POWER, OR
ENGAGE IN WAR, UNLESS ACTUALLY INVADED, OR IN SUCH IMMINENT DANGER AS
WILL NOT ADMIT OF DELAY.

========================================================================

Section Fourteen restricts the power of the States. The language is
essentially the same as that appearing in the Written Constitution,
although the language in the First Clause that is obsolete or
repetitious has been stricken.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 15, Clauses 1-2

THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES RESERVE TO THEMSELVES THE POWER TO
CHANGE THE TERMS OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS, TO DESIGNATE PUBLIC
POLICY, AND TO PROPOSE, ADOPT, AND REPEAL LAWS, INCLUDING THOSE
PROVISIONS IN SECTION C OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT SUBSEQUENT TO
200, AS PROVIDED BY THIS ARTICLE. THE PEOPLE ALSO RESERVE TO THEMSELVES
THE POWER TO REMOVE FROM OFFICE THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE PEOPLE HAVE AN INALIENABLE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE TERMS OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS AS PROVIDED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION. IF
THREE-FIFTHS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE JUNE NATIONAL POLL ANSWER "NO"
TO THE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE TERM LENGTHS OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
SENATORS, THE QUESTION OR QUESTIONS "SHALL THE TERM OF THE
[REPRESENTATIVES/SENATORS] BE [EXTENDED/REDUCED] TO [ONE/TWO/FOUR]
YEARS?" SHALL BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT OF THE GENERAL ELECTION, WITH THE
ONLY TWO RESPONSES BEING "YES" OR "NO." IF A THREE-FIFTHS MAJORITY OF
THE VOTERS ANSWER "YES," THE NEW TERM SHALL BE EFFECTIVE WITH THAT
ELECTION.

========================================================================

Section Fifteen contains the "direct democracy" provisions of THE 21ST
CENTURY CONSTITUTION, and stipulates the precise nature of the
Legislative Power of the People referred to in Article One, Section One.
Over 25 States utilize one or more of these provisions in their State
Constitutions, and THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION brings these to the
Federal level, while creating three democratic provisions new to
constitutional draftsmanship: Variable Term Lengths, the National
Objective, and the Legislative Committee.

The Second Clause institutes the procedure for changing the term length
of Representatives and Senators. Term length is one of the critical
variables in a constitution, perhaps the most critical, and this Clause
gives the People the opportunity to change the term lengths if they feel
a change is necessary and/or desirable.
     Under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, there are four combinations of
term lengths:

Combination 1 (total 3 years)     Combination 2 (total 4 years)
     Representative    One Year    Representative    Two Years
     Senator    Two Years    Senator        Two Years

Combination 3 (total 5 years)     Combination 4 (total 6 years)
     Representative    One Year    Representative    Two Years
     Senator    Four Years    Senator        Four Years

The People are empowered to choose the term length combination that, in
their opinion, is best for the country.
     If only a simple Majority were required to decide this issue, a 51
percent Majority could change the terms, and due to the variability of
opinions in the population, these terms could conceivably alternate
every two to four years, without any chance to gauge the effects of the
term length on the operation of the Government. The three-fifths
requirement insures that each term gets its day in the court of public
opinion.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 15, Clause 3

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DESIGNATE PUBLIC POLICY WHEN THE POLICY
DESIGNATED IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST IS A PREEMINENT RIGHT. TO SECURE
THIS RIGHT, THE PEOPLE SHALL DETERMINE NOT LESS THAN TWO AND NO MORE
THAN FIVE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES ANNUALLY, WHICH MAY BE EXPRESSED IN
SPECIFIC OR GENERAL TERMS, AND WHICH SHALL BE NOMINATED BY PLURALITY
VOTE IN THE NATIONAL POLL, SECONDED BY PLURALITY VOTE IN THE PRIMARY
ELECTION, AND DETERMINED BY MAJORITY VOTE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION. NO
PROPOSAL SHALL BE PLACED ON THE NATIONAL POLL OR BALLOT WHICH RELATES TO
THE APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATIONS, TENURE, REMOVAL, OR COMPENSATION OF
JUDGES; TO THE POWERS, JURISDICTION, CREATION, OR ABOLITION OF COURTS OR
ANY RULES THEREOF; TO THE APPROPRIATION OF MONEY OR THE RATES AND FORM
OF TAXES; OR TO THE PASSAGE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION. THE
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES MAY BE CARRIED FORTH FROM YEAR TO YEAR.

========================================================================

The Third Clause solves a critical problem. The People will have certain
goals they would like to have implemented; however, there are times when
it might be impractical for the People to propose specific legislation.
For example, they may be united in their desire to see illiteracy
eliminated, yet divided as to the method for attaining this goal. The
National Objective allows People to specify a goal without requiring
agreement on the means. Under the concept of the National Objective, the
People determine the destination, and the Legislature takes them there.
     The National Objective(s) may be framed in specific or general
terms: "reduce unemployment," "reduce unemployment by five percent,"
"achieve a twenty-five percent reduction in heroin use by 2022,"
"develop alternative fuels." There is a very wide range of options open.
The check on the power of the People is the Constitution itself.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 15, Clauses 4-7

THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO PROPOSE LEGISLATION TO
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND TO HAVE THAT LEGISLATION VOTED UPON,
PROVIDED THAT THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION IS NOT GIVEN AN INDEFINITE
TIMETABLE BY THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD.

THE SENATE SHALL APPOINT A FEDERAL COMMITTEE AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION
THREE OF THIS ARTICLE, WHICH IS EMPOWERED TO ANNUALLY RECOGNIZE BETWEEN
ONE HUNDRED AND ONE THOUSAND LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES, AS PROVIDED BY LAW
IN SECTION C-160.

A LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED WHEN NOT LESS THAN ONE
THOUSAND AND NO GREATER THAN TEN THOUSAND CITIZENS PETITION THE FEDERAL
COMMITTEE, AS PROVIDED BY LAW IN SECTION C-165. LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
SHALL CONSIST OF ALL CITIZENS WHO HAVE PETITIONED THE FEDERAL COMMITTEE
FOR PASSAGE OF A PARTICULAR BILL, AND THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE SHALL
RESEARCH, DISCUSS, AND DRAFT THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION. UPON COMPLETION,
THE PROPOSED BILL AND ALL MATERIALS USED TO CONSIDER THE BILL, INCLUDING
RESEARCH AND DRAFTS, SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD,
WHICH SHALL TRANSMIT THE MATERIALS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WITH
THEIR EVALUATIONS. NO LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE MAY BE AUTHORIZED WHICH
ADVOCATES THE PASSAGE OF ANY BILLS WHICH RELATE TO THE APPOINTMENT,
QUALIFICATIONS, TENURE, REMOVAL, OR COMPENSATION OF JUDGES; TO THE
POWERS, JURISDICTION, CREATION, OR ABOLITION OF COURTS OR ANY RULES
THEREOF; TO THE APPROPRIATION OF MONEY OR THE RATES AND KIND OF TAXES;
OR TO THE PASSAGE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION.

IF THE BILL IS VOTED UPON, THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE SHALL BE DISSOLVED
BY THE FEDERAL COMMITTEE. IF THE BILL IS NOT VOTED UPON, THE LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE SHALL BE DISSOLVED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE FEDERAL COMMITTEE.

========================================================================

The third new democratic provision involves the proposal of legislation.
Under the present Constitution, anyone may submit a draft of a
particular piece of legislation to their Representative. The power to
submit a piece of legislation, however, is not the power to have
hearings held on that legislation, nor the power to have that
legislation voted upon. Requests such as these are generally ignored
(unless the constituent has an "in" other constituents don't have). If a
Representative does decide to sponsor the legislation it is sent to a
committee, where it is either (generally) amended beyond all
recognition, or simply contained. If the Bill does pass the House and
Senate, it goes to a conference committee, where it is again subject to
amendment. Note that there is nothing "democratic" about this process;
to the contrary, the process is republican both in spirit and execution.
The odds of a Citizen-proposed Bill emerging from this process unscathed
are close to zero, even though the Bill were a model of prospective
legislation.
     The Legislative Committee System reduces the power of individual
congresspeople and/or a Seniority System and/or a subcommittee chairman
to "bottle up" legislation. Under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, any
Bill that between 1,000 and 10,000 Citizens would like to have passed
(and care enough to have passed that they will research and draft it)
may be submitted to the Legislative Review Board, provided that the
legislation does not advocate any legislation prohibited by the
Constitution. The proposed Bill will be researched and drafted by these
Citizens, and the initial judge of the quality of their legislation will
be the Legislative Review Board -- the ultimate judge, of course, will be
the House of Representatives and
     possibly the Senate and President, who will either vote or not vote
the legislation into law.
     Here is one example of how this may work in the future. A group of
parents are concerned with illiteracy, and begin to look for ways to
solve the problem. Discussion takes place over a period of months over
the Electronic Post Office. At some point, one person suggests a
solution, called the Monthly Book Program for Elementary School
Children. Under that proposal, each elementary school child would be
given a book a month (for eight months). At an average cost of $1 per
book (mass production will decrease manufacturing costs dramatically),
and with 23 million elementary school children, the cost of the program
would be less than $300,000,000 -- an insignificant price to pay for the
societal good it would do (if every person dropped a $1 bill into a hat,
the program would be funded -- to put it another way, if one B-2 bomber
were scratched, the program would be funded for four years).
     The initial group of parents decides that the idea is worth
exploring. The message goes out over the Electronic Post Office, the
National Database, the National Channel, or all three -- "those people
who are interested in forming a committee to draft this particular
legislation contact [the person designated the head of the committee]."
9,000 people reply that a) they think the proposal is an excellent idea,
and b) they would be willing to work towards passage of the legislation.
If the requisite number of people are interested, the Senate's Federal
Committee will form a Legislative Committee, provided that the maximum
allowable number of Legislative Committees has not been exceeded.
     The Citizens comprising the Legislative Committee on the Monthly
Book Program for Elementary School Children will do their research over
the National Database, gather testimony from experts, and discuss their
proposals via the Electronic Post Office. After the Legislative
Committee has researched the Bill, they will submit their final draft
(along with all materials used to draft the legislation) to the
Legislative Review Board, which will provide an Evaluation and a
Timetable. Congress, at its option, may hold further hearings, but as
with any piece of legislation they must vote on the Bill within the
mandated time frame.
     The Legislative Committee System can potentially save Congress a
great deal of time and money, since much of the necessary legislative
work of researching and draftsmanship will be done by volunteers, which
will reduce the ultimate cost to Government (i.e., the taxpayers) of
passing legislation.
     Because there is an inherent limitation on the number of
Legislative Committees that can be formed, the Senate has a perfectly
legitimate reason to not allow the formulation of a committee whose Bill
may not be in the National Interest. This structural limitation allows
the Senate to legitimately filter out the inevitable poorly conceived
proposals. Yet under no circumstances will less than 100 proposals be
allowed, which deprives the Senate of total power to prevent the work of
Legislative Committees, and the power of the People to propose
legislation and to have that legislation voted upon.
     If the Bill is voted upon, there is no reason to keep the
Legislative Committee alive: in addition, there are other Legislative
Committees which will have been waiting in line to form. If a Bill is
given an indefinite Timetable, the Senate may, at its discretion,
continue to recognize the Legislative Committee involved.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 15, Clause 8

THE NATIONAL INITIATIVE ESTABLISHES THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES TO DIRECTLY ENACT LEGISLATION. THE PEOPLE SHALL DETERMINE
NOT LESS THAN TWO AND NO MORE THAN FIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE NATIONAL
INITIATIVE ANNUALLY, WHICH SHALL BE NOMINATED BY PLURALITY VOTE IN THE
NATIONAL POLL, SECONDED BY PLURALITY VOTE IN THE PRIMARY ELECTION, AND
DETERMINED BY MAJORITY VOTE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION. NO PROPOSAL SHALL
BE THE SUBJECT OF ANY INITIATIVE IF IT RELATES TO THE APPOINTMENT,
QUALIFICATIONS, TENURE, REMOVAL, OR COMPENSATION OF JUDGES; TO THE
POWERS, JURISDICTION, CREATION, OR ABOLITION OF COURTS OR ANY RULES
THEREOF; TO THE APPROPRIATION OF MONEY OR THE RATES AND FORM OF TAXES;
OR TO THE PASSAGE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION. AN INITIATIVE
APPROVED BY A MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE
LEGISLATIVE REVIEW BOARD FOR AN EVALUATION AND SIGNED INTO LAW BY THE
PRESIDENT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER CERTIFICATION BY THE SENATE.

========================================================================

Another way for the People to implement their Will is through a
democratic device known as the Initiative. As of 1977, 21 States and the
District of Columbia had adopted the Initiative, from South Dakota
(1898) to Oklahoma (1907) to Massachusetts (1918) to Illinois (1970).
This device provides for a direct vote by the People on a particular
piece of legislation. Under the system of representative Government,
only the men or women elected by voters determine the laws, and the only
remedy for a voter who disapproved of his or her Representative's vote
on a particular piece of legislation is to vote for the opposition on
Election Day. The problem with this method is that it forces the voter
either to 1) become a single-issue voter or 2) to take the "bad" with
the good. Under either of these scenarios, the voters must order their
priorities. If the issue on which the voter disagrees is LESS
SIGNIFICANT to that voter than other issues of greater significance on
which the voter agrees, the voter is forced to cast his vote for a
disliked candidate. Skillful politicians can hold society "hostage" by
appealing to a Majority of the voters on certain "hot" sentiments like
"being tough on crime" (and providing more funds for jails and stiffer
penalties for crimes), while at the same time refusing to allocate funds
that would obliterate crime at the source -- not to mention the passage
of more subtle and devious laws which are not in the interests of
society, nor in the interests of that person. In addition, it forces
Legislators to take "safe" positions, or NO position at all, on
potentially divisive issues. This has a potentially destabilizing effect
on society, as Citizens are forced into vigilantist remedies when
Government refuses to act. In matters such as these, where a Legislature
has refused for political reasons to resolve the issue, the Judiciary
has typically assumed jurisdiction.
     Neither of these two alternatives are preferable. If the
Legislators refuse to pass legislation, the status quo is maintained,
and those upset with the status quo resort to extra-legal means to
achieve their objectives, such as picketing, strikes, boycotts, and even
bombings. The second alternative, legislation by the Judiciary, is
slightly better, but because Supreme Court justices are (in effect)
appointed for life, they aren't obligated to be responsive to the
constituents. Consequently, they can rule in favor of a proposal seen as
valid by only forty percent, or for that matter, five percent, of the
population. Sometimes this works for the better, and sometimes not, but
the underlying problems are not solved. The net result is divisiveness,
a divisiveness which can have a negative impact on the rights of others.
Divisive issues are time-thieves, and time is a precious commodity in a
society which moves as quickly as ours. Tangential to all discussions
regarding rights is the collective right of the Citizenry to have every
significant issue be placed on the public agenda. But this right is
impossible when divisive issues dominate that agenda.
     For example, imagine that in the decade of the 80's not a day goes
by without a Letter to the Editor, a news report, or some other
manifestation of social unrest stemming from the issue of abortion.
Imagine, impossible as it may seem, that Supreme Court candidates are
selected or not selected predominantly with regard to their opinion on
this, and only this, issue. All other issues have faded into the
background, and a candidate who holds other opinions noxious to both
abortion supporters and opponents may be selected; for example, this
appointee may be against antitrust laws, against pollution laws, and
against rights for victims. And both Mr. A and Ms. B, opponents on the
abortion issue, may disagree with the appointee on all these other
issues.
     Thus, the Initiative is necessary not only for the obvious reason
of helping to secure Majority preferences, but also because it helps to
remove "wedge issues" from the Legislative process. Divisiveness is a
potential tool in the hands of unscrupulous politicians, and by removing
this tool from the politician's arsenal, the Initiative helps to prevent
this divisiveness.
     The prevention of divisiveness is not the only reason to implement
the process of initiative, however. Another of the chief arguments of
proponents of the initiative is that it allows the People to circumvent
corrupt or inept Legislatures, which not only improves the quality of
legislation passed, but increases the speed with which legislation is
passed. North Dakota farmer Lars A. Ueland, a Republican disillusioned
by the domination of his party by trusts and corporations, wrote that

    "When I first became familiar with the principles of the
initiative and referendum I was impressed with a sense of their value.
The more I study these principles the more I am convinced that they will
furnish us the missing link -- the means needed -- to make popular self-
government do its best. Programs and reforms will then come as fast as
the people need them, as fast as these changes are safe -- only when a
majority of the people are behind them. I would rather have the complete
initiative and referendum adopted in state and nation than the most
ideal political party that could be made, put into power, if one or the
other could be secured."

An obvious objection presents itself, however. Couldn't the Initiative
be used by "the Majority" (or "the Minority," for that matter) to
achieve some sort of unconstitutional goal? The short answer is NO. Why
not? Because the Eighth Clause is constituted to prevent the
consideration of any unconstitutional Initiatives, which, by definition,
are null and void. No unconstitutional Initiative will pass because no
unconstitutional Initiatives will be allowed on the ballot by the
Senate. The question then becomes, what Initiatives are
unconstitutional? And the answer is, all those laws forbidden by
Sections Eleven and Twelve of Article One, and the Constitutional
Supplement. In addition, all Initiatives which are approved by the
People shall receive an Evaluation by the Legislative Review Board; if
the Evaluation is less than Zero, the Law need not be enforced by the
Executive and Judicial Branches. This triple security (Senate approval,
Constitutional restrictions, and Legislative Review Board Evaluation)
virtually insures that no Initiatives will pass, or will be enforced,
which do not have a proper respect for the rights of individuals.
     But not everyone is for power to the People. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, some will rehash the old arguments given against the
Initiative (and democracy in general), and claim that it will be used as
a tool by the poor and disenfranchised against the richest members of
society. The facts, however, provide no evidence for this hypothesis.
There have been hundreds of Initiatives considered by the States and
Local municipalities, and such proposals have been virtually non-
existent (unless tax reduction Bills are seen as "against the interests
of the wealthy"). Other than the tax issue, few proposed Initiatives
could be seen as infringing on private wealth. Here are some issues at
the State level which have gone before the voters:

     -- taxing and spending limitations
     -- legalized gambling
     -- smoking in public places
     -- abolition of poll taxes
     -- establishment of the Nation's first Presidential primary system
     -- campaign finance reform
     -- "sunshine" laws for Legislatures
     -- prohibition and antiprohibition measures
     -- drinking age
     -- nonbinding nuclear freeze resolutions
     -- land use
     -- environmental concerns (such as bottle deposits and regulation
of toxic wastes)
     -- terms of office for State officials
     -- bans on leghold animal traps
     -- eliminating sales taxes on food purchases
     -- streamlining State Government practices
     -- passing "conflict-of-interest" statutes
     -- antipornography measures
     -- educational vouchers

Hardly the picture of a rabid, propertyless Majority seeking to
confiscate the wealth of "the Minority." Fears such as these have proven
utterly groundless, and, in fact, sometimes the opposite is true: for
example, in many of these Initiatives, such as California's famous
Proposition Thirteen, the wealth of "the" Minority (and "the" Majority)
has been increased, through a reduction of property taxes.
     That the above issues are the type which go before the voters is
compelling evidence against one of the central premises arguing against
a more democratic Constitution. And, in fact, anyone opposing a more
democratic Constitution on the basis of confiscation of Minority wealth
by "the Majority" must confront the reality of thousands of state-years
of completely contrary experience, as well as one of the more curious
ironies of our time -- that much of the support for the democratic and
progressive device of the Initiative comes from conservatives such as
Jack Kemp, Barry Goldwater, Phil Gramm, Howard Jarvis, Patrick Buchanan,
and Arthur Laffer, who in 1978 supported a movement to get a National
Initiative adopted.
     Once confronted with this strange reality (conservatives advocating
progressive legislation) some critics of the Initiative then make the
same argument from the opposite end of the political spectrum, which is
that the Initiative will be used by "the Majority" to infringe on the
rights of demographic Minorities, outside the realm of economic issues.
Could this prediction be true? As it turns out, these fears are also
groundless, as an examination of the above list shows. The issues cover
a wide variety of concerns, but few of them, if any, are aimed at the
reduction of existing "Minority" rights (demographic or otherwise).
Moreover, even in philosophically and/or demographically homogenous
societies (an event which becomes increasingly less probable as the
geographic area of legislation increases) it is difficult to predict how
a predominantly conservative population, or a predominantly liberal
population, will vote. As Cronin (1989) stated:

    "The initiative and referendum mechanisms are used by a
variety of interest groups. Their diversity defies easy generalization,
[and] it is . . . nearly impossible to predict how voters in certain
states and communities will vote. Voters in normally progressive
California and Massachusetts have adopted major property tax reduction
measures. Voters in normally conservative Alaska, Montana, and North
Dakota voted to endorse the proposed mutual, verifiable nuclear freeze.
Voters in normally progressive Oregon have approved the death penalty,
while those in traditionally conservative Utah voted against banning
pornographic programming on cable television. Liberal Oregon voted no on
legalizing the growing of marijuana. Liberal California voted for the
questionable "English only" initiative . . . . Voters have passed bottle
bills in several states but defeated them elsewhere. Voters have
streamlined and opened up the political process in a number of
instances. Time and again they have endorsed a tougher criminal justice
system and have given greater consideration to the rights of the victim.
Voters in several states have defeated proposals to prohibit state-
funded abortions, although this was approved by a slim majority in
Colorado. Voters have approved state-run lotteries as a convenient means
to raise revenues despite the view that it is apt to place a heavier
burden on low- and moderate-income people. Voters have used the
initiative to send a message to their national leaders that they want
more arms control progress (although these measures failed in Arizona
and South Dakota)."

     In reality, the problem facing Minorities is not a directly
democratic political system, nor in fact a representative one, but the
lack of a strong bill of rights (framed as specifically as possible,
with sanctions for violations) which prevents Legislators or
constituents from passing anti-minority legislation in the areas of
individual rights. In these cases, the "cure" (a purposefully
inefficient and undemocratic Legislative System designed to ignore
Majority Will) can not only be insufficient to cure the "disease," but
can even exacerbate existing problems by leading to "side effects" worse
than "diseases" which never existed in the first place!
     For those concerned with the most important right of all, the
critical right of self-determination, it is important to note that there
has traditionally been much public support for the Initiative. In 1977,
Pollster Patrick Caddell's survey firm, Cambridge Reports, Inc. found
that America's desire for a National Initiative was double that of the
opposition:

     Public Support for a National Initiative, 1977 (%) (n = 1500)

"Would you favor a Constitutional amendment, similar to the laws which
23 states already have, that would permit the citizens of the United
States to place a proposed law on a national ballot by collecting a
specified number of signatures on a petition and have that law take
effect if approved by a majority of the nation's voters at the next
general election or not?"

    Yes    57
    No    25
    Not Sure    18

Of course, no National Initiative Amendment was forthcoming, since an
amendment of that nature would not have served the interests of the
people in charge of our Government. History has shown that an amendment
like this is too important to leave to the discretion of future
Legislators, which is why it is included in THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 15, Clause 10

THE NATIONAL REFERENDUM ESTABLISHES THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES TO DIRECTLY REPEAL OR PREVENT THE ENACTMENT OF
LEGISLATION. THE PEOPLE SHALL DETERMINE NOT LESS THAN TWO AND NO MORE
THAN FIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE NATIONAL REFERENDUM ANNUALLY, WHICH SHALL BE
NOMINATED BY PLURALITY VOTE IN THE NATIONAL POLL, SECONDED BY PLURALITY
VOTE IN THE PRIMARY ELECTION, AND DETERMINED BY MAJORITY VOTE IN THE
GENERAL ELECTION. NO PROPOSAL SHALL BE THE SUBJECT OF ANY REFERENDUM IF
IT RELATES TO THE APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATIONS, TENURE, REMOVAL, OR
COMPENSATION OF JUDGES; TO THE POWERS, JURISDICTION, CREATION, OR
ABOLITION OF COURTS OR ANY RULES THEREOF; TO THE APPROPRIATION OF MONEY
OR ANY LEGISLATION AFFECTING TAXES; OR TO THE DIMINISHMENT OF THE RIGHTS
AND PROTECTIONS OF ANY PERSONS AS ENUMERATED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, OR
PROVIDED BY LAW. A REFERENDUM APPROVED BY A MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS SHALL
BE SIGNED INTO LAW BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER
CERTIFICATION BY THE SENATE.

========================================================================

The Referendum instituted in THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION is
essentially a "people's veto," and a final, limited check against the
passage of Bills against the National Interest. If the Congress
appropriates funds for a data network that only benefits large
corporations, and not the general populace, the People can directly veto
this legislation, if that measure is put on the ballot. The check on the
People, besides the explicit prohibitions against various proposals that
may legitimately be the subject of veto, is that the number of proposals
for a Referendum may be limited to two annually, if the Senate so
provides -- a significant check, since hundreds of laws will be passed in
any given year.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 15, Clause 11

THE NATIONAL RECALL ESTABLISHES THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM OFFICE. THE
SENATE SHALL SUPERVISE THE PETITION PROCESS, INCLUDING CERTIFICATION OF
THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF SIGNATURES, OR OTHER MEANS AS ESTABLISHED IN
SECTION C-170, AND SHALL PREPARE A RECALL PETITION IN CONVENTIONAL OR
ELECTRONIC FORM WHEN TWO-THIRDS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE JUNE NATIONAL
POLL ANSWER "YES" TO THE QUESTION REGARDING PRESIDENTIAL RECALL. THE
ISSUE OF RECALL SHALL BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT OF THE GENERAL ELECTION
WHEN THE RECALL PETITION CONTAINS NOT LESS THAN ONE-TWENTIETH OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF ALL VOTES CAST IN THE MOST RECENT ELECTION, OR NOT LESS
THAN ONE-FOURTH OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST IN THE MOST RECENT
ELECTION IF DONE BY ELECTRONIC MEANS, AS DESIGNATED IN SECTION C-175. IF
THE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET, THE QUESTION "SHOULD THE PRESIDENT BE
RECALLED?" SHALL BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT OF THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION,
WITH "YES" OR "NO" BEING THE ONLY TWO RESPONSES. IF A MAJORITY OF THE
VOTERS ANSWER "YES," THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL ASSUME THE POSITION OF
PRESIDENT IMMEDIATELY UPON VERIFICATION OF THE RETURNS OF THE GENERAL
ELECTION BY THE SENATE, OR NO LATER THAN TEN DAYS AFTER THE GENERAL
ELECTION, AS THE LAW MAY PROVIDE. NO RECALL SHALL BE INITIATED WITHIN
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS NOR THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
TERM, NOR UPON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION DURING THAT TERM.

========================================================================

As Jefferson observed in a letter to Judge Spencer Roane in 1819, the
power of Impeachment provided in the 1787 Constitution was (and is) "not
even a scarecrow." Even during the Watergate episode (which nearly led
to the Impeachment of President Nixon), an historical aberration made
possible only because ex-President Nixon a) taped his conversations and
b) was forced to make the tapes public, the House of Representatives
refused to make Nixon's secret bombing of Cambodia one of the Articles
of Impeachment. The President's vast Executive powers, and the need of
individual Legislators to secure the President's cooperation in running
interference with the Executive Branch, makes his or her Impeachment and
removal from office an extraordinarily unlikely eventuality.
     The power of Recall, though a greater threat than Impeachment, will
rarely be used, due to several safeguards against ill-considered Recall
attempts:

--  Two-thirds of the participants in the June National Poll must
request a Recall petition.

--  No less than one-twentieth or one-fourth of the voters (depending on
the means utilized to fill out the Recall petition), as the Senate
decides, must append their names to a written or electronic petition.
The Senate has complete control over the Recall process, and will set
the limit at a level that accords with the National Will and Interest.

--  A Majority of the voters in the General Election must Recall the
President.

--  The time frame of Recall is limited to a two and one-half year
window.

--  Only one Recall attempt is allowed per term.

The Recall, not only a greater threat than the "scarecrow" of
Impeachment, will also focus the attention of the President on public
opinion, and not the opinions of the Legislative Branch, which of
necessity will make him or her more responsive to the popular Will.

========================================================================

Article I, Section 15, Clause 12

THE SENATE SHALL PUBLICIZE ALL INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, OR RECALL
MEASURES REFERRED TO THE VOTERS WITH STATEMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE
MEASURES SO REFERRED ON THE ELECTRONIC POST OFFICE, THE NATIONAL
DATABASE, AND OVER THE NATIONAL CHANNEL.

========================================================================

This provision recognizes the obvious obligation of publicity for the
foregoing measures.


            Article II

               The Executive Power

========================================================================

Article II, Section 1, Clause 1

THE EXECUTIVE POWERS AS GRANTED HEREIN SHALL BE VESTED IN A PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT SHALL
HOLD THEIR OFFICES DURING THE TERM OF FOUR YEARS, AND SHALL BE ELECTED
BY MAJORITY VOTE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE GENERAL
ELECTION. THE TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT SHALL END AT
NOON ON THE TWENTIETH DAY OF JANUARY.

========================================================================

Under the political theory of the Framers, the President was to have
limited powers, not the extensive powers of a Monarch. But the
Presidency of today has changed dramatically. How dramatically may be
seen when we compare the powers of the President described in Federalist
69 by Hamilton with the powers of the President today. For example,
under the 1787 Constitution the President was not able to declare war:

    "The President is to be Commander in chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be
nominally the same with that of the King of Great-Britain, but in
substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first
General and Admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British King
extends to the declaring of war . . . ."

However, as history has demonstrated, the President has been able to
take many actions leading to war, up to and including the ability to
wage "covert operations" against foreign Governments. And there is no
significant check in the Written (or Empirical) Constitution against
this usurpation of power, as the failure of the House of Representatives
to impeach President Nixon for the secret bombing of Cambodia clearly
shows. Theoretically the President was not above the law; according to
Hamilton, "The President . . . would be amenable to personal punishment
and disgrace: the [King] is sacred and inviolable." But no President has
been removed from office by the process of Impeachment, no matter how
scandal-ridden his administration (in our own time, the Iran/Contra
affair, the BCCI scandal, and the "October Surprise" situation have
created potentially impeachable offenses, with no formal action against
the President).
     Supposedly, the President's veto power was limited: "The
[President] would have a qualified negative upon the acts of the
legislative body: the [King] has an absolute negative." The Framers of
our Constitution were dead set against giving the Executive an absolute
negative. Benjamin Franklin, one of the Delegates from Pennsylvania, had
argued against the absolute veto, stating that "[n]o good law whatever
could be passed without a private bargain with [the President]." Roger
Sherman, the Connecticut Delegate who authored the "Great Compromise,"
was "agst. enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole."
According to Sherman, "[n]o one man could be found so far above all the
rest in wisdom." Gunning Bedford, a delegate from Delaware, stated
unequivocally that "[t]he Representatives of the People were the best
judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external
controul whatever." But it was Mason who made the most vociferous
attack:

    "The probable abuses of a negative had been well explained
by Dr. F as proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the
same door be opened here. The Executive may refuse its assent to
necessary measures till new appointments shall be referred to him . . .
We are Mr. Chairman going very far in this business. We are not indeed
constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous monarchy, an
elective one."

Thus, when the Framers cast their June 4, 1787 vote on the issue, the
vote was zero States for an absolute veto, ten against. Yet as history
has developed, the present Monarch of England, the Queen, vetoes no act
of the Legislature (she would dare not), while in our country the
President has vetoed legislation 2497 times -- with 96 percent of those
vetoes upheld! Today, Presidential veto threats are an omnipresent part
of the American political scene. The President's veto is not "absolute,"
but it is close enough. The threat of a veto which has so much "sticking
power" is that the Executive can wield the veto as a club, and force
changes in legislation by Congress, a power which Madison referred to on
September 12 at the Federal Convention as a "danger," and which South
Carolina Delegate Charles Pinckney called "dangerous." North Carolina
Delegate Hugh Williamson, arguing against a three-fourths veto override
requirement, said it would put "too much in the power of the President,"
since a three-fourths requirement would produce an absolute or near-
absolute veto power. But the two-thirds requirement has also produced
this effect, and the net result of the "sticking-power" of the veto, as
predicted, has been a dangerous transfer of power from the Legislative
to the Executive Branch.
     The President was to have no power to make agreements with other
Nations ("treaties"), without the consent of the Senate: "The
[President] would have a concurrent power with a branch of the
Legislature in the formation of treaties: the [King is] the sole
possessor of the power of making treaties." Yet under the Principle of
the Executive Agreement, Presidents have evaded the constitutional
requirement the old-fashioned way -- via semantic subterfuge. Ostensibly,
there are distinctions between the treaty and the Executive Agreement,
and the State Department has even fashioned a set of guidelines to
differentiate between the two, but as Pyle and Pious (1984) reported,

    "In practice, none of these textbook distinctions have
withstood the demands of political expediency. Between 1789 and 1939,
over 1,300 agreements were concluded with foreign countries without the
consent of the Senate. Between 1946 and 1971, the United States entered
into 361 treaties and 5,559 executive agreements. Of the 4,359
agreements in force in 1972 . . . 400 of these involved major
commitments and de facto alliances with other nations. . . . Executive
agreements have dealt with grave issues of national importance. For
example, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 disarmed the Great Lakes. The
Root-Takahira and Lansing-Ishii agreements established American policy
toward the Far East for decades, while the 'Gentleman's Agreement' of
1907 limited Japanese immigration into the United States. . . . McKinley
contributed troops to protect Western legations in China from the Boxer
Rebellion. In addition to the Lend-Lease Agreement, Roosevelt made
executive agreements with Churchill and Stalin that helped to reshape
world politics after the Second World War. Truman followed suit."

The President's new monarchical power developed over the years as the
creation of a party system led to patronage power, a power the President
was not supposed to have: "The [President] would have a like concurrent
authority in appointing to offices; the [King is] the sole author of all
appointments." Yet the constitutional safeguard supposedly existing
against this power proved to be a toothless watchdog. Consider this
excerpt from the Guide to Congress:

    "[President Eisenhower's] patronage dispenser, Postmaster
General Arthur Summerfield, frequently set up shop in the office of
House Minority Leader Charles A. Halleck, R-Ind. (1935-69), and berated
Republican representatives who broke party ranks. Insurgents were warned
that key jobs such as postmasterships might be cut back unless they got
behind the president's program . . . .
    [C]lever use of patronage swayed votes on several key bills
. . . .
    According to Nelson W. Polsby, a president can use this
power 'to reward and punish congressional friends and foes quite
vigorously. . . . Small Business Administration and Area Redevelopment
Administration loans to certain areas may get more and more difficult to
obtain, as applications fail to qualify. Pilot programs and
demonstration projects may be funneled here rather than there. Defense
contracts and public works may be accelerated in some areas, retarded in
others.'"

Supposedly, the President was to have no power under the Constitution to
confer privileges on anybody or anything. As Hamilton wrote, "The
[President] can infer no privileges whatever . . . ." But as a Senate
Select Committee reported in 1826,

    "It is no longer true that the President . . . will be
limited, as supposed in the Federalist, to the inconsiderable number of
places which may become vacant by the ordinary casualties of deaths and
resignations; on the contrary, he may now draw, for that purpose, upon
the entire fund of Executive patronage. Construction and legislation
have accomplished this change. In the very first year of the
constitution, a construction was put upon that instrument which enabled
the President to create as many vacancies as he pleased, and at any
moment that he thought proper. This was effected by yielding to him the
kingly prerogative of dismissing officers without the formality of a
trial. The authors of the Federalist had not foreseen this construction;
so far from it, they had asserted the contrary, and arguing logically
from the premises, "that the dismissing power was appurtenant to the
appointing power," they had maintained, in No. 77 of that standard work,
that, as the consent of the Senate was necessary to the appointment of
an officer, so the consent of the same body would be equally necessary
to his dismission from office. But this construction was overruled by
the first Congress which was formed under the constitution; the power of
dismission from office was abandoned to the President alone, and, with
the acquisition of this prerogative, the power and patronage of the
Presidential office was instantly increased to an indefinite extent, and
the argument of the Federalist against the capacity of the President to
corrupt the members of Congress, founded upon the small number of places
which he could use for that purpose, was totally overthrown. So much for
construction . . . this single act, by vacating almost the entire civil
list once in every period of a Presidential term of service, places more
offices at the command of the President than were known to the
constitution at the time of its adoption, and is, of itself, again
sufficient to overthrow the whole of the argument which was used in the
Federalist."

The President, contrary to Hamilton's assertion, has been able to confer
privileges through the use of this patronage power, and, in fact, has
been able to make appointments to Branches of Government which were not
even contemplated by the Framers, through the Delegation Doctrine.
     This latter observation leads us to the next violation of the
theory of the Framers: "The [President] can prescribe no rules
concerning the commerce or currency of the nation: the [King] is in
several respects the arbiter of commerce . . . ." Yet the rise of the
Administrative Branches, as we saw in Chapter One, has resulted in a
huge transfer of power to the President, as rulemaking officials
beholden to the President for their positions carry out his wishes (or
the wishes of the special interests who have put the President in
office). As Pyle and Pious (1984) reported,

    "In the 'Constitutional Revolution of 1937' the Supreme
Court gave up its resistance to the creation of large bureaucracies with
the power to make policy through the issuance of rules and regulations.
These executive-made policies, which have the force of law, are
published first in the Federal Register and then collected and
republished topically in the Code of Federal Regulations. The Code of
Federal Regulations today is many times larger than the United States
Code of federal statutes."

In light of these developments, Hamilton's summation is truly ironic:

    "What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us
that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be
given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which
would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the
people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism."

An aristocracy -- a monarchy -- a despotism. These would be the
consequences if the safeguards in the Constitution against excessive
Executive power were ignored. As Mason stated on June 4 at the Federal
Convention, "[i]f strong and extensive powers are vested in the
Executive . . . the government will of course degenerate (for I will
call it degeneracy) into a monarchy -- a government so contrary to the
genius of the people that they will reject even the appearance of it."
But degeneracy into a variant of monarchical power was inevitable, since
there were no safeguards against this eventuality written into the
Constitution. As Cooke (1983) noted,

    "Notice the difference in language between [Article Two,
Section One, Clause One] and the first clause of the legislative
Article. Compare 'the executive power shall be vested in a President'
with 'all legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress.' The executive power is not modified or confined to only those
specific powers which follow. This means that the President possesses
vast and general powers which have never been defined in the
Constitution."

Hamilton obviously disagreed with this interpretation, as the excerpts
from Federalist 69 conclusively demonstrate, but there was no mechanism
in the Constitution to prevent this interpretation from predominating.
And that this interpretation has been given the greatest weight is a
Separation of Powers violation that must be addressed.
     The revised power of the Legislature in Article One of THE 21ST
CENTURY CONSTITUTION addresses the imbalance of power that has resulted
over the years. And, in subsequent Sections, some of the Presidential
powers have been reduced. The addition of the "as granted herein"
language binds the Executive power in the same way the Legislative power
is bound.
     This Clause abolishes the Electoral College, an unnecessary and
undemocratic device (the archaic language describing the process [itself
overruled by the Twelfth Amendment] may be found in copies of the
Constitution, and is omitted here for reasons of brevity). Under the
Electoral College System, it is theoretically possible that a future
President would have a Majority of the popular vote, yet not be elected.
This is undemocratic in spirit, as well as a violation of the central
paradigms used to create THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, and is thus
eliminated.

========================================================================

Article II, Section 1, Clause 2

EVERY PERSON SHALL BE ELIGIBLE TO THE OFFICES OF PRESIDENT AND VICE
PRESIDENT WHO SHALL HAVE ATTAINED TO THE AGE OF THIRTY FIVE YEARS, AND
BEEN FOURTEEN YEARS A CITIZEN AND RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND WHO
SHALL BE WITHOUT FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY; BUT NO
PERSON SHALL BE ELECTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT MORE THAN TWICE,
AND NO PERSON WHO HAS HELD THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, OR ACTED AS
PRESIDENT FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF A TERM TO WHICH SOME OTHER PERSON
WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT, SHALL BE ELECTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MORE THAN ONCE.

========================================================================

The addition eliminates the "natural-born" requirement, which could
conceivably be interpreted to mean that a child born of American parents
overseas could not be President.
     There is no Federal Academy graduation requirement to be President,
although half the nominees for the office of President must be Federal
Academy graduates.
     The Second Clause also incorporates the Term Limitation provision
of the Twenty-Second Amendment.

========================================================================

Article II, Section 1, Clauses 3-9

IF, AT THE TIME FIXED FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT,
THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE DIED, THE VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL
BECOME PRESIDENT. IF A PRESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN BEFORE THE
TIME FIXED FOR THE BEGINNING OF HIS TERM, OR IF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
SHALL HAVE FAILED TO QUALIFY, THEN THE VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ACT AS
PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED; AND THE CONGRESS MAY
BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE CASE WHEREIN NEITHER A PRESIDENT-ELECT NOR A VICE
PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, DECLARING WHO SHALL THEN ACT AS
PRESIDENT, OR THE MANNER IN WHICH ONE WHO IS TO ACT SHALL BE SELECTED,
AND SUCH PERSON SHALL ACT ACCORDINGLY UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR VICE
PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED.

THE CONGRESS MAY BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE CASE OF THE DEATH OF ANY OF THE
PERSONS FROM WHOM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY CHOOSE A PRESIDENT
WHENEVER THE RIGHT OF CHOICE SHALL HAVE DEVOLVED UPON THEM, AND FOR THE
CASE OF THE DEATH OF ANY OF THE PERSONS FROM WHOM THE SENATE MAY CHOOSE
A VICE PRESIDENT WHENEVER THE RIGHT OF CHOICE SHALL HAVE DEVOLVED UPON
THEM.

IN CASE OF THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT FROM OFFICE OR OF HIS OR HER
DEATH OR RESIGNATION, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME PRESIDENT.

WHENEVER THERE IS A VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE
PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE A VICE PRESIDENT WHO SHALL TAKE OFFICE UPON
CONFIRMATION BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS.

WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITS TO THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE
SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS OR HER
WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT HE OR SHE IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND
DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, AND UNTIL HE OR SHE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN
DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE DISCHARGED
BY THE VICE PRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT.

WHENEVER THE VICE PRESIDENT AND A MAJORITY OF EITHER THE PRINCIPAL
OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OR OF SUCH OTHER BODY AS CONGRESS
MAY BY LAW PROVIDE IN SECTION C-215, TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT PRO
TEMPORE OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL IMMEDIATELY
ASSUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE AS ACTING PRESIDENT.

THEREAFTER, WHEN THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITS TO THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF
THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS OR HER
WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT NO INABILITY EXISTS, HE OR SHE SHALL RESUME THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE UNLESS THE VICE PRESIDENT AND A MAJORITY
OF EITHER THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OR OF SUCH
OTHER BODY AS CONGRESS MAY BY LAW PROVIDE, TRANSMIT WITHIN FOUR DAYS TO
THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE
TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE. THEREUPON CONGRESS
SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE, ASSEMBLING WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS FOR THAT
PURPOSE IF NOT IN SESSION. IF THE CONGRESS, WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS AFTER
RECEIPT OF THE LATTER WRITTEN DECLARATION, OR, IF CONGRESS IS NOT IN
SESSION, WITHIN TWENTY-ONE DAYS AFTER CONGRESS IS REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE,
DETERMINES BY TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF BOTH HOUSES THAT THE PRESIDENT IS
UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE, THE VICE
PRESIDENT SHALL CONTINUE TO DISCHARGE THE SAME AS ACTING PRESIDENT;
OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL RESUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE
OFFICE.

========================================================================

This Clause formally incorporates the Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth
Amendments into the Constitution, with minor modifications.

========================================================================

Article II, Section 1, Clauses 10-11

THE PRESIDENT SHALL, AT STATED TIMES, RECEIVE FOR HIS OR HER SERVICES, A
COMPENSATION, THE VALUE OF WHICH SHALL NEITHER BE INCREASED NOR
DIMINISHED DURING THE PERIOD FOR WHICH HE OR SHE SHALL HAVE BEEN
ELECTED, AND HE OR SHE SHALL NOT RECEIVE WITHIN THAT PERIOD ANY OTHER
EMOLUMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES, OR ANY OF THEM.

BEFORE HE OR SHE ENTER ON THE EXECUTION OF HIS OR HER OFFICE, HE OR SHE
SHALL TAKE THE FOLLOWING OATH OR AFFIRMATION: -- "I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR
AFFIRM) THAT I WILL FAITHFULLY EXECUTE THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, AND WILL TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, PRESERVE, PROTECT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES."

========================================================================

Many other countries have had female heads of state, to their credit.
The People of America, however, have not had the opportunity to vote for
a female Presidential candidate in the General Election. The additions
to this Section acknowledge the reality that under THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION, the election of a female President will (and should)
become a far likelier eventuality than is presently the case.

========================================================================

Article II, Section 2, Clauses 1-3

THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY AND NAVY OF THE
UNITED STATES, AND OF THE MILITIA OF THE SEVERAL STATES, WHEN CALLED
INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT SHALL HAVE NO POWER TO
DECLARE WAR OR TO COMMIT TROOPS IN ANY ADVISORY OR MILITARY CAPACITY
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF CONGRESS, AS REGULATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS
SET FORTH IN SECTION A-120. THE PRESIDENT MAY REQUIRE THE OPINION, IN
WRITING, OF THE PRINCIPAL OFFICER IN EACH OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
UPON ANY SUBJECT RELATING TO THE DUTIES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES, AND
SHALL HAVE POWER TO GRANT REPRIEVES AND PARDONS FOR OFFENSES AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT.

THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE POWER, BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF
THE SENATE, TO MAKE TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, PROVIDED A
MAJORITY OF THE SENATORS CONCUR; AND SHALL NOMINATE, AND BY AND WITH THE
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, SHALL APPOINT AMBASSADORS, OTHER
PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND ALL OTHER
OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT HEREIN
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR, AND WHICH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW, PROVIDED
A MAJORITY OF THE SENATORS CONCUR: BUT THE CONGRESS MAY BY LAW VEST THE
APPOINTMENT OF SUCH INFERIOR OFFICERS, AS THEY THINK PROPER, IN THE
PRESIDENT ALONE, IN THE COURTS OF LAW, OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS.

THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE POWER TO FILL UP ALL VACANCIES THAT MAY HAPPEN
DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE, BY GRANTING COMMISSIONS WHICH SHALL
EXPIRE AT THE END OF THEIR NEXT SESSION.

========================================================================

The new language in THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION (mandating the
creation of a War Powers Resolution ratified by the People) makes
absolutely clear that the President has no power to declare war unless
both Congress and the People approve. By requiring the approval of the
People, it decreases the probability that there will be military
interventions in foreign countries, since it is the People at large who
a) finance the wars and b) fight them.
     The Second and Third Clauses retain the power of the President to
make treaties and to nominate various officials, and to fill vacancies
with temporary appointments. Executive Agreements must now be ratified
by the Senate.

========================================================================

Article II, Section 3, Clauses 1-2

THE PRESIDENT SHALL GIVE ANNUALLY TO THE CONGRESS INFORMATION OF THE
STATE OF THE UNION, AND SHALL RECEIVE AMBASSADORS AND OTHER PUBLIC
MINISTERS. THE PRESIDENT SHALL FAITHFULLY EXECUTE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS TO
THE BEST OF HIS OR HER ABILITY.

NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR ANY OFFICER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS
EMPOWERED TO DISREGARD ANY CLAUSE OF THIS CONSTITUTION, NOR ENFORCE ANY
LAW HE OR SHE LEGITIMATELY DEEMS AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. AN EVALUATION OF
ZERO OR LESS ON ANY LEGISLATION MAY BE CONSIDERED EVIDENCE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.

========================================================================

There are five substantive changes to the Clauses in the Third Section
of Article Two. The first addition formalizes the annual State of the
Union message. The second addition removes the power of the President to
propose legislation to Congress, a provision which has blurred the
Separation of Powers by, once again, transferring a substantial amount
of Legislative power to the Executive Branch. Under THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION, the President has no power to propose the passage of any
legislation to Congress.
     The third addition provides that the President shall "faithfully
execute Constitutional Laws to the best of his or her ability," since
the language "take care" in the Written Constitution is obviously not
strong enough (see Chapter One). The language "shall be responsible for
the faithful execution of the laws" would possibly be desirable, but for
the fact that a strictly observed constitution would hold the President
responsible for every inaction of the Executive Branch, and might result
in an endless series of Recall attempts.
     The fourth addition strikes language that may reasonably be
construed to be inconsistent with the Second Clause in the previous
Section ("the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments . . .", vs. "[The President] shall
Commission all the Officers of the United States.").
     The fifth addition states that neither the President nor any
officer of the Executive Branch has the power to enforce any laws he or
she believes to be unconstitutional (and Evaluations of Zero or less may
be considered evidence of unconstitutionality).
========================================================================


            Article III

                The Judicial Power

========================================================================

Article III, Section 1

THE JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES AS GRANTED HEREIN SHALL BE
VESTED IN ONE SUPREME COURT, WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF NINE JUDGES WITHOUT
FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY WHO ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE POPULATION TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH REGARD TO SEX, RACE,
NATIONAL ORIGIN, AND AGE AS ESTABLISHED IN SECTION B-170, AND IN SUCH
INFERIOR COURTS AS THE CONGRESS SHALL ESTABLISH, WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF
JUDGES WITHOUT FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, AND WHO ARE
IN THEIR TOTALITY EQUALLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POPULATION TO THE
GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. THE JUDGES, BOTH OF THE SUPREME AND INFERIOR
COURTS, SHALL HOLD THEIR OFFICES FOR NINE YEARS, AND SHALL AT STATED
TIMES RECEIVE FOR THEIR SERVICES, A COMPENSATION, THE VALUE OF WHICH
SHALL NOT BE DIMINISHED DURING THEIR CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE. THE TERMS OF
THE SUPREME COURT SHALL BE STAGGERED SUCH THAT ONE JUDGE IS APPOINTED
AND ONE JUDGE LEAVES THE COURT EVERY YEAR, SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTION OF
VACANCY, AS CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW DIRECT.

========================================================================

The Supreme Court under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION formally consists
of nine Judges, preventing court-packing schemes. The Federal Judges
must be representative of the population with regard to the enumerated
demographic categories; if a person has a right to a "jury of his (or
her) peers," then that person should have a proportional opportunity to
have a Judge of his (or her) peers.
     The terms of the Supreme Court are staggered; every year one Judge
leaves, and one Judge is appointed, unless there are vacancies, in which
case more than one Judge would be appointed in a particular year. This
allows for gradual change that insures balance over time, with a
majority of the court changing every five years, preventing not only
radical changes in
     Judicial philosophy, but also the power erroneous Judicial
philosophies (such as the Lochner doctrine ) have to persist for
decades.

========================================================================

Article III, Section 2, Clauses 1-2

THE JUDICIAL POWER SHALL EXTEND TO ALL CASES, IN LAW AND EQUITY, ARISING
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TREATIES
MADE, OR WHICH SHALL BE MADE, UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY; -- TO ALL CASES
AFFECTING AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS; -- TO ALL
CASES OF ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION; -- TO CONTROVERSIES TO
WHICH THE UNITED STATES SHALL BE A PARTY; -- TO CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN TWO
OR MORE STATES; -- BETWEEN CITIZENS OF DIFFERENT STATES, -- BETWEEN
CITIZENS OF THE SAME STATE CLAIMING LANDS UNDER GRANTS OF DIFFERENT
STATES, AND BETWEEN A STATE, OR THE CITIZENS THEREOF, AND FOREIGN
STATES, CITIZENS OR SUBJECTS, AND ALL OTHER CASES DESIGNATED IN SECTION
B-175. THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED TO
EXTEND TO ANY SUIT IN LAW OR EQUITY, COMMENCED OR PROSECUTED AGAINST ONE
OF THE UNITED STATES BY CITIZENS OF ANOTHER STATE, OR BY CITIZENS OR
SUBJECTS OF ANY FOREIGN STATE.

IN CERTAIN CASES AFFECTING AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND
CONSULS, AND THOSE IN WHICH A STATE SHALL BE PARTY, THE SUPREME COURT
SHALL HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. IN ALL CASES, THE SUPREME COURT AND
INFERIOR COURTS SHALL HAVE APPELLATE AND ORIGINAL JURISDICTION, BOTH AS
TO LAW AND FACT, WITH SUCH EXCEPTIONS, AND ONLY UNDER SUCH REGULATIONS
AS THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE THE EXCLUSIVE POWER AND OBLIGATION TO MAKE.

========================================================================

The First Clause incorporates the Eleventh Amendment to the 1787
Constitution. The Second Clause contains one of the most important
additions to the Written Constitution. Under the 1787 Constitution,
Congress has the obligation to create rules for the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction (that is, which cases on appeal from the lower
courts the Supreme Court will be allowed to review). However, over the
years the Supreme Court has created its own rules for hearing cases, and
Congress has basically allowed the court free rein. Some of the rules
are as follows:

1) the court will not issue "advisory opinions";

2) the plaintiff must have "standing";

3) the lawsuit must not be "moot" due to events which have occurred
following institution of the action;

4) the suit must be "ripe," (i.e., sufficiently well-developed and
specific to merit adjudication);

5) the suit must not present a "political question";

6) all remedies in the pertinent lower Federal and/or State courts must
have been exhausted;

7) the Federal question at issue must be "substantial" rather than
"trivial";

8) if a "case or controversy" can be decided upon other than
constitutional grounds, the Court will do so.

Going into the scope of these rules, and the exceptions to them carved
out by the Court, is unfortunately far beyond the scope of this book.
But these rules, and their exceptions, are very important. And real
problems are obvious, as the substantial/trivial distinction makes
clear. What is a "political question"? Does the Court apply these
directives consistently? If so, why wasn't the Roe v. Wade situation
moot? If the Court is allowed to a) create the rules under which it will
decide which cases to hear, and b) actually decide cases using (or not
using) the rules it has written, it has the power to transform the
fundamental laws of the land -- to carve them out as a sculptor carves
stone. Consequently, the Supreme Court is a virtually unchecked body
under the Empirical Constitution. The addition of the language mandates
that if the Supreme Court hears a case, it may do so only if Congress
has provided for jurisdiction; and conversely, if the Supreme Court
refuses to hear a case, it may do so only under such regulations as
Congress (and not the Court) has provided.
     In a system where the Supreme Court has a de facto exclusive power
to decide the cases it will hear, the Court has a virtually unrestricted
freedom to "pick and choose," and can ignore, quite unjustly, legitimate
claims on its attention. Under the Second Clause, a set of rules will be
provided regarding justiciability issues such as "standing," "mootness,"
"ripeness," etc., and a necessary check on unrestricted Judicial power
will be restored.

========================================================================

Article III, Section 3, Clauses 1-3

NO JUDGE IS EMPOWERED TO DISREGARD ANY CLAUSE OF THIS CONSTITUTION, NOR
ENFORCE ANY LAW HE OR SHE LEGITIMATELY DEEMS AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. AN
EVALUATION OF ZERO OR LESS ON ANY LEGISLATION MAY BE CONSIDERED EVIDENCE
OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. IN THE EVENT A JUDGE DETERMINES A LAW TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, OR THAT PROVISIONS OF THIS CONSTITUTION OR THE LAWS OF
THE LAND ARE INCONSISTENT, HE OR SHE MUST IN WRITING NOTIFY THE
DEPARTMENT OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT AND CONGRESS. NO FEDERAL LAW CAN BE
DECLARED VOID FOR REASONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY BY ANY COURT.

CONGRESS MAY EMPOWER THE SUPREME COURT AND INFERIOR COURTS TO ISSUE
INJUNCTIONS WHEN NECESSARY OR PROPER FOR SECURING THE HIGHER INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE.

THE SUPREME COURT, INFERIOR COURTS, AND STATE COURTS ARE EMPOWERED AND
OBLIGATED TO ADD HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES OR EXCEPTIONS TO STATUTES FOR
PURPOSES OF CLARIFICATION OR WHEN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE REQUIRE, AND
TO NOTIFY IN WRITING THE LEGISLATIVE BODY RESPONSIBLE WHEN ADDITIONS TO
STATUTES ARE MADE. STATUTORY ADDITIONS BY THE JUDICIARY MAY BE
AUGMENTED, AMENDED, OR REPEALED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
BODY RESPONSIBLE.

========================================================================

Section Three strips the Supreme Court of its power to void Federal laws
for reasons of unconstitutionality, and to tailor the law as it sees
fit, a power not granted to them by the Constitution, and a power which
has radically altered the system of Checks and Balances as conceived by
the Framers. However, while no Judge may void a Federal law for reasons
of unconstitutionality, no Judge is empowered to enforce any
unconstitutional law. It is within each Judge's power, and at each
Judge's discretion, to recognize or not recognize a law which has
received an Evaluation of less than Zero. If the Judge chooses to
operate under the assumption that the law is invalid, that Judge must
notify the proper authorities in writing. If Judges across the Nation
refuse to enforce the law, a new law obviously needs to be drafted and
passed.
     The New Constitution preserves the power of Courts to issue
injunctions against the behavior of private Citizens and Governments.
     The Third Clause is a final security for the People. Not every law
will be well-drafted, and the interests of Justice will require that
some laws contain exceptions Legislators have not been able to foresee.
The existence of the Third Clause is a recognition that the Legislative
process is two-fold, the first step being the creation of a law, and the
second step being the testing of the law in the real world. This Clause
allows Judges to act as micro-Legislators when micro-legislation is
required. If, for example, a statute says that arson is the crime of
burning materials within a public building, and a person is arrested for
cigarette smoking, a Judge will be empowered to define the statute with
a hypothetical example (i.e., "lighting a cigarette inside a building is
not to be considered a violation of the law against arson"). If this is
done, the Judge must notify the appropriate Legislative body, whether
State or Federal, which will consider the addition, and either let it
stand, change the law, or repeal the addition.


            Article IV

               The Federal Article

========================================================================

Article IV, Section 1

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT SHALL BE GIVEN IN EACH STATE TO THE PUBLIC ACTS,
RECORDS, AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF EVERY OTHER STATE. AND THE CONGRESS
MAY BY GENERAL LAWS PRESCRIBE THE MANNER IN WHICH SUCH ACTS, RECORDS AND
PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE PROVED, AND THE EFFECT THEREOF.

========================================================================

Under this Clause, if a judgment is reached against Mr. X by State A,
that judgment will be accorded identical force and effect against the
person summoned, or property attached, by State B. This Clause, an
important part of Federalism, is retained.

========================================================================

Article IV, Section 2, Clauses 1-2

THE CITIZENS OF EACH STATE SHALL BE ENTITLED TO ALL PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS IN THE SEVERAL STATES, AS DEFINED BY CONGRESS IN
SECTION B-145.

A PERSON CHARGED IN ANY STATE WITH TREASON, FELONY, OR OTHER CRIME, WHO
SHALL FLEE FROM JUSTICE, AND BE FOUND IN ANOTHER STATE, SHALL ON DEMAND
OF THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE FROM WHICH THAT PERSON FLED, BE
DELIVERED UP, TO BE REMOVED TO THE STATE HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE
CRIME.

========================================================================

The First Clause, referred to as the "Comity Clause," is another
important part of Federalism. Under the Comity Clause, a State must not
discriminate against out-of-state Citizens in favor of its own Citizens.
But the term "privileges and immunities" is vague, as Corwin (1978)
noted:

    "[F]our theories have been offered as to its real intention
and meaning. The first is that the clause is a guaranty to the citizens
of the different States of equal treatment by Congress -- is, in other
words, a species of equal protection clause binding on the National
Government. The second is that the clause is a guaranty to the citizens
of each State of all the privileges and immunities of citizenship that
are enjoyed in any State by the citizens thereof -- a view which, if it
had been accepted at the outset, might well have endowed the Supreme
Court with a reviewing power over restrictive State legislation as broad
as that which it later came to exercise under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The third theory of the clause is that it guarantees to the citizen of
any State the rights which he enjoys as such even when sojourning in
another State, that is to say, enables him to carry with him his rights
of State citizenship throughout the Union, without embarrassment by
State lines. Finally, the clause is interpreted as merely forbidding any
State to discriminate against citizens of other States in favor of its
own. Though the first theory received some recognition in one of the
opinions in the Dred Scott case, it is today obsolete. Theories 2 and 3
have been specifically rejected by the Court; the fourth has become a
settled doctrine of Constitutional Law.

What Corwin referred to as "theories" are in fact definitions. The
necessarily vague language has created a need for definition -- but what
is the proper definition, and who is to do the defining? The Supreme
Court? But the Supreme Court has not only not been allocated this
important responsibility by the Written Constitution, but its decisions
are made, of necessity, on an ad hoc basis, and are thus inadequate or
inconsistent. For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
the Court struck down State and District of Columbia laws which had
denied welfare assistance to those persons who had not been State
residents for a year. But in the same decision, the Court also stated:

    "We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or
residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for
tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to
hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling
state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties
upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel."

     The reluctance of the Court to make decisions prospectively creates
confusion, a confusion exacerbated by the inconsistency of existing
decisions. For example, in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) a
statute requiring a $2,500 license fee from nonresident commercial
fisherman seeking shrimp offshore, while residents paid $25, was held
unconstitutional. But in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371
(1978) the court held constitutional a statute requiring nonresidents to
pay $225 license fee (as opposed to a $9 resident fee) for recreational
hunting. Was the distinction made because of the recreationality aspect
in the latter case (even though recreationality may have been a spurious
distinction)? Perhaps. But in LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465
(1919), the court held constitutional a statute requiring a 2-year in-
state residency before a person could be licensed as an insurance
broker. And in Douglas v. New York, 279 U.S. 377 (1929), the court held
constitutional a statute permitting residents, but not nonresidents, to
sue in State courts for damages under the Federal Employers Liability
Act arising in other States. And there have been many other conflicting
decisions.
     Unfortunately, in the process of interpreting these decisions,
State courts have at times done the predictable, and ruled in favor of
their States. As Corwin (1978) reported, "[t]he Illinois Supreme Court
held that a State law giving 'preference for employment of Illinois
residents on public works projects does not violate the privileges and
immunities clause of the Federal Constitution.'" And the Alaska Supreme
Court held in 1977 "that it was not a violation of privileges and
immunities to give residents a preference in jobs if durational
residence requirements were stricken." These latter decisions, and the
failure of the Supreme Court to overrule them, indicates that the Comity
Clause needs to be overhauled.
     To correct these problems, the First Clause gives Congress (and not
the Supreme Court, nor the State Courts) the power to define what are
the privileges and immunities of the Citizens of the several States. By
fixing the boundary-maintenance for State action at the Federal
(Legislative) level, the First Clause brings the rule of law back into
this important area.
     The Second Clause provides for extradition of criminals back to the
jurisdiction where they committed the crime, and is substantially
unchanged.
     Of course, the language providing for the return of slaves in the
event of escape is stricken.

========================================================================

Article IV, Section 3, Clauses 1-2

NEW STATES MAY BE ADMITTED BY THE CONGRESS INTO THIS UNION BUT NO NEW
STATE SHALL BE FORMED OR ERECTED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF ANY OTHER
STATE; NOR ANY STATE BE FORMED BY THE JUNCTION OF TWO OR MORE STATES, OR
PARTS OF STATES, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES
CONCERNED AS WELL AS OF THE CONGRESS.

THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE POWER TO DISPOSE OF AND MAKE ALL NEEDFUL RULES
AND REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE TERRITORY OR OTHER PROPERTY BELONGING TO
THE UNITED STATES, AND NOTHING IN THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL BE SO
CONSTRUED AS TO PREJUDICE ANY CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR OF ANY
PARTICULAR STATE.

========================================================================

Section Three is fairly straightforward, and satisfactory as written.

========================================================================

Article IV, Section 4

THE UNITED STATES SHALL GUARANTEE TO EVERY STATE IN THIS UNION A
REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT, PROVIDED THAT NO GOVERNMENT
BE FORMED WHICH SHALL INFRINGE ON THE RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, AND IMMUNITIES
GRANTED TO EVERY CITIZEN UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION, AND SHALL PROTECT EACH
OF THEM AGAINST INVASION; AND ON APPLICATION OF THE LEGISLATURE, OR OF
THE EXECUTIVE (WHEN THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT BE CONVENED) AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE.

========================================================================

The Guarantee Clause of the 1787 Constitution guaranteed a "Republican"
form of Government. But if a State allows a democratic device such as
the Initiative, Referendum, or Recall, has the State violated Article
Four, Section Four? This murky area is too critical to remain
unresolved. As Cronin (1989) wrote,

    "The precise meaning of the clause has never been wholly
determined, in large part because the Supreme Court has consistently
refused to decide questions that have arisen under it. . . .
    The controversy arises when opponents of direct democracy
devices contend that only a representative legislature acting as the
sole lawmaking branch of a state can qualify the state as having a
republican form. The gist of their argument is that voter initiatives
violate the guarantee clause. In a landmark Oregon court case, they
contended that the Constitution made no provision for overt action by
the people in lawmaking, and further, that the 'Republican Form of
Government' clause was meant to establish the states as republics,
whereas the initiative process in the states in effect transferred power
away from the representative legislature to the people at large and
hence converted republics into pure or at least quasi-pure democracies.
. . .
    State supreme courts have responded to such contentions by
denying that direct democracy devices such as the initiative violate the
principle of a republican form of government. They have ruled that a
republican government is one administered by representatives chosen or
appointed by the people or by their authority. The initiative and
referendum merely reserve to the people a certain share of the
legislative power. Government is still divided into legislative,
executive, and judicial departments, and their duties are still
discharged by representatives selected by the people."

The rewrite in THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION ratifies these latter
decisions, and closes a dangerous loophole which could be used by non-
progressive Judges to declare State Initiative, Referendum, and Recall
legislation unconstitutional.


            Article V

              The Amending Power

========================================================================

Article V, Clauses 1-2

THE CONGRESS, WHENEVER A FULL MAJORITY OF BOTH HOUSES SHALL DEEM IT
NECESSARY, OR UPON THE REQUEST OF A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE
VOTING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, SHALL PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION, OR, ON THE APPLICATION OF THE LEGISLATURES OF TWO THIRDS
OF THE SEVERAL STATES, OR UPON THE REQUEST OF A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY OF
THE PEOPLE VOTING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, SHALL CALL A CONVENTION FOR
PROPOSING AMENDMENTS, WHICH, IN EITHER CASE, SHALL BE VALID WHEN
RATIFIED BY THE LEGISLATURES OF TWO-THIRDS OF THE SEVERAL STATES, OR BY
CONVENTIONS IN TWO-THIRDS THEREOF, OR BY A THREE-FIFTHS MAJORITY OF THE
PEOPLE VOTING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, AS ONE OR THE OTHER MODES OF
RATIFICATION MAY BE PROPOSED BY THE CONGRESS; PROVIDED THAT NO STATE,
WITHOUT ITS CONSENT, SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF ITS EQUAL SUFFRAGE IN THE
SENATE. AMENDMENTS SHALL BE INCORPORATED IN THE TEXT OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND A NEW CONSTITUTION SHALL BE PUBLISHED UPON
RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENTS.

EVERY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION,
THE FOLLOWING QUESTION SHALL BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT IN THE GENERAL
ELECTION: "SHOULD A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION BE CALLED?", WITH THE ONLY
TWO RESPONSES BEING "YES" OR "NO." IF A MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS ANSWER
"YES," CONGRESS SHALL CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION WITHIN SIX MONTHS
AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTION.

========================================================================

Every constitution must contain a process for amendment. No constitution
has been, nor ever will be, perfect; as the times change, so must the
form of Government. The Framers of our own Constitution realized the
importance of an amending clause. On June 5, Elbridge Gerry, a delegate
from Massachusetts, stated at the Federal Convention that "[t]he novelty
& difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision." Mason
echoed this sentiment on June 11: "[t]he plan now to be formed will
certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to
be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to
provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to
trust to chance and violence."
     But Article Five, as originally framed, is perhaps the most
problematic section of the 1787 Constitution. The two-thirds requirement
of both houses of Congress to send amendments to the States for
ratification (applicable to all amendments, even simple amendments), and
the two-thirds requirement by State Legislatures for the mandatory
calling of a Constitutional Convention, have proven to be extremely
rigid, and ultimately, deleterious. This rigidity was apparent less than
100 years after our Constitution was ratified. As British author Walter
Bagehot wrote in 1867,

    "Every alteration [to the Constitution], however urgent or
however trifling, must be sanctioned by a complicated proportion of
States or legislatures. The consequence is that the most obvious evils
cannot be quickly remedied; that the most absurd fictions must be framed
to evade the plain sense of mischievous clauses; that a clumsy working
and curious technicality mark the politics of a rough-and-ready people."

This observation was quite ironic, given that an amendment process that
was too difficult was one of the defects in the Articles of
Confederation that the Framers were supposed to correct! As Hamilton
stated at the Convention on September 10,

    "It had been wished by many and was much to have been
desired that an easier mode for introducing amendments had been provided
by the articles of Confederation. It was equally desirable now that an
easy mode should be established for supplying defects which will
probably appear in the new System."

But an "easy mode" was not established at the Federal Convention. One
problem was the two-thirds requirement for proposal of amendments by
Congress; a second, related problem was that amendments made necessary
by Congressional negligence or malfeasance (such as a Congressional Term
Limitation Amendment or an Amendment mandating Public Financing for
Congressional Elections) would be difficult to attain. As Mason had
stated earlier at the Federal Convention on June 11, "[i]t would be
improper to require the consent of the Natl. Legislature [to proposed
constitutional amendments], because they may abuse their power, and
refuse their consent on that very account." Later, on September 15, two
days before the Convention adjourned, Mason objected to Article Five,
stating that he saw the plan of amending the Constitution as
"exceptionable & dangerous," since "the proposing of amendments is in
both the modes to depend, in the first immediately, and in the second,
ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind would ever be
obtained by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as
he verily believed would be the case." In the margin of his copy of the
draft of the Constitution, Mason wrote on September 12 that

    "By this article Congress only have the power of proposing
amendments at any future time to this constitution and should it prove
ever so oppressive, the whole people of America can't make, or even
propose alterations to it; a doctrine utterly subversive of the
fundamental principles of the rights and liberties of the people."

And though history has proven Mason correct, this objection was
dismissed by the Framers who signed the Constitution. Hamilton wrote in
Federalist 85 that

    "In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments,
it has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of
the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any
portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own
part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may,
upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the
organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on
this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just
stated."

According to Hamilton, "[w]henever nine or rather ten states, were
united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must
infallibly take place." He also wrote that "[t]he national rulers,
whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject.":

    "By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be
obliged 'on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the
States (which at present amount to nine), to call a convention for
proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes,
as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three
fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.' The
words of this article are peremptory. The Congress 'shall call a
convention.' Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of
that body. . . . Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two
thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which
may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such
difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general
liberty or security of the people."

However, Hamilton's prediction was erroneous, notwithstanding the
explicit language of the Constitution. Perhaps Hamilton could not
foresee that the Congress would consider the lifetime of applications
for Constitutional Conventions to be limited. Because of this de facto
constitutional amendment, Congress has been able to circumvent the
strict Article Five language. By 1987, "more than 400 applications
calling for a convention to propose constitutional amendments [had] been
presented to Congress by state legislatures." These 400 petitions
included "supplications from all fifty states," far in excess of the
two-thirds requirement. Had this time-frame requirement not been
implemented, at least two Constitutional Conventions would have been
called in this century; one dealing with the repeal of the Sixteenth
Amendment (the income tax), and the other with apportionment. 35 States
have requested a Constitutional Convention on the tax issue, and 36
States have requested a Convention on the apportionment issue, in each
case more than the two-thirds required. And yet the Congress has refused
to call a Convention, in violation of the mandatory form of Article Five
("The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention . . .").
     The time-frame requirement, however, is only the first hurdle for
State Convention applications, as demonstrated by the time period of
1976-1983 (which fell within the seven year limit typically given for
ratification of constitutional amendments). In that time period, 36
States requested a Constitutional Convention: 30 to consider a Balanced
Budget Amendment, and 6 to consider a constitutional amendment regarding
abortion. This was two more than was necessary for calling a
Constitutional Convention, but the Congress had promulgated another
requirement not contained in Article Five, which is that the subject-
matter of Constitutional Convention applications be identical!
     These "requirements" (not stipulated in Article Five), taken
together, makes it extremely unlikely that a Constitutional Convention
will be called in this, or any other, century. To make matters worse,
Convention applications are not a matter that Congress has taken as
seriously as it should. As Caplan (1988) reported,

    "Congress has never kept regular track of incoming
convention applications, and there exists no official catalogue of the
applications adopted by the states since 1789. No federal official has
ever been designated to receive and keep track of applications
separately . . .
    The application totals for convention campaigns is more
often than not inexact; even the question whether there are thirty-two
valid applications for a convention to propose a balanced budget
amendment is disputed."

As if the above considerations weren't enough, there is the intrinsic
problem of the addition of new States to the Union, which has made the
calling of a Convention a mathematically more difficult proposition. As
Hamilton wrote, it is "one of those rare instances in which a political
truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration." Back
when the United States consisted of 13 States, if one wanted to lobby
the State Legislatures to call a Convention, and one had only enough
funds to reach 9 of the 13 States (9 states only being receptive), the
odds of picking the receptive States were roughly one chance out of
1000. Today, one has to reach 34 of 50 states, and if there are only 34
States that would be receptive (and there are only enough funds to reach
34 States), the odds of picking the 34 receptive States are roughly one
in 5,000,000,000,000 -- a proposition that is over 5,000,000,000 times
more difficult!
     All told, Article Five (coupled with the de facto amendments by
Congress and the Bicameral requirement of Article One) has demonstrated
Mason's point on the necessity of keeping the National Legislature, at
least in part, "out of the loop." Over 10,000 amendments were proposed
in Congress from 1789 to 1981, but only 33 were sent to the States for
ratification. Unfortunately, many more amendments have been needed, as
the existence of the Empirical Constitution conclusively demonstrates.
(As does the behavior of State Governments: in the same time period,
there have been 146 different State constitutions and 5650 amendments to
those constitutions!). The rigidity of the amendment process at the
Federal level has resulted in an enormous transfer of power to the
Judiciary (an unelected Branch of Government), and is even undemocratic
in another way:

    "Chief Justice Marshall characterized the Constitution-
amending machinery as 'unwieldy and cumbrous.' Undoubtedly it is, and
the fact has had an important influence upon our institutions.
Especially has it favored the growth of judicial review, since it has
forced us to rely on the Court to keep the Constitution adapted to
changing conditions. What is more, this machinery is, prima facie at
least, highly undemocratic. A proposed amendment can be added to the
Constitution by 38 States containing considerably less than half of the
population of the country, or can be defeated by 13 States containing
less than one-twentieth of the population of the country."

Thus, in allowing a minuscule Minority (less than five percent of the
population) to have such an enormous -- and deleterious -- effect on the
public good, the language of Article Five acts to violate one of the
chief Objectives of the Constitution established in the Preamble: that
it promote the General, and not the Local, Welfare.
     In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that Article Five needs to
be rewritten. In fact, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION contains extensive
amendments to Article Five (the Constitutional Supplement is, in effect,
an extensive rewrite of Article Five). The forty-eight Clauses of THE
21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION referenced to the Constitutional Supplement
may be amended far more easily than otherwise allowed by this Article,
since they are the Clauses which require the most flexibility over time.
     There are four other changes to Article Five. The first is that
only a full Majority of both houses of Congress are needed to send an
amendment to the States for ratification. This change is made necessary
not only because of the increased need for amendments in a high-
technology age, but also because the size of the House of
Representatives has been increased to 1000 members. The second change is
that the People can circumvent Congress on the proposal of amendments or
the calling of a Constitutional Convention, via the National Initiative
(with a two-thirds Majority).
     The third change is that a constitutional amendment may be ratified
by three-fifths of the People voting in the General Election, which is
obviously consistent with the language in the Preamble that it is the
People who "ordain and establish" Constitutions, and which removes the
filter of Legislators from the ratification process.
     The fourth change, the addition of the question at the General
Election regarding the calling of a Constitutional Convention, is the
final guarantee to the People that the calling of a Constitutional
Convention will not be dependent on the whims of Legislators. In
addition, this Clause recognizes that the right of self-determination is
a right that belongs to every generation. It is a right which is not
only the "supreme Law of the Land" as enumerated in the Preamble, but is
also one of the inalienable rights referred to in the Declaration of
Independence -- and therefore a right which cannot be taken away from the
People under any circumstances. In a letter to Madison dated September
6, 1789, Jefferson noted that

    "The question Whether one generation of men has a right to
bind another, seems never to have been started either on this or our
side of the water. Yet it is a question of such consequences as not only
to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental principles of
every government."

In a letter to Major John Cartwright dated June 15, 1824, Jefferson
answered the question in the negative:

    "[C]an [constitutions] be made unchangeable? Can one
generation bind another, and all others, in succession forever? I think
not. The Creator has made the earth for the living, not the dead. Rights
and powers can only belong to persons, not to things, not to mere
matter, unendowed with will. The dead are not even things. The particles
of matter which composed their bodies, make part now of the bodies of
other animals, vegetables, or minerals of a thousand forms. To what then
are attached the rights and powers they held while in the form of men? A
generation may bind itself as long as its majority continues in life;
when that has disappeared, another majority is in place, holds all the
rights their predecessors once held, and may change their laws and
institutions to suit themselves. Nothing then is unchangeable but the
inherent and unalienable rights of man."

And Jefferson concluded in his letter to Madison that constitutional
revitalization must occur with every new generation:

    "The earth always belongs to the living generation. They
manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please . . . They are
masters too of their own persons, and consequently may govern them as
they please. But persons and property make the sum of the objects of
government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors
extinguished then in their natural course with those who gave them
being. This could preserve that being till it ceased to be itself, and
no longer. Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at
the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force,
not of right."

Thus, under the Second Clause, every American who lives an average
lifetime will have the chance to vote at least twice on this important
issue, providing for a perpetual Ratification of the Constitution by the
People.

            Article VI

             The Supremacy of the National Government

========================================================================

Article VI, Clauses 1-3

ALL DEBTS CONTRACTED AND ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO, BEFORE THE ADOPTION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION, SHALL BE AS VALID AGAINST THE UNITED STATES UNDER
THIS CONSTITUTION, AS UNDER THE PRIOR CONSTITUTION.

     THIS CONSTITUTION, AND THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH SHALL BE
MADE IN PURSUANCE THEREOF; AND ALL TREATIES MADE, OR WHICH SHALL BE
MADE, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES, SHALL BE THE SUPREME LAW
OF THE LAND; AND THE PERSONS, LEGISLATORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICERS, AND
JUDGES IN EVERY STATE SHALL BE BOUND THEREBY, ANY THING IN THE
CONSTITUTION OR LAWS OF ANY STATE TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING.

THE SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE MENTIONED, AND THE MEMBERS OF
THE SEVERAL STATE LEGISLATURES, AND ALL EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS,
BOTH OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES, SHALL BE BOUND BY
OATH OR AFFIRMATION, TO SUPPORT THIS CONSTITUTION; BUT NO RELIGIOUS TEST
SHALL EVER BE REQUIRED AS A QUALIFICATION TO ANY OFFICE OR PUBLIC TRUST
UNDER THE UNITED STATES.

========================================================================

The Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land, and everyone is bound
by it. No person is above the Law.
     As under the 1787 Constitution, all public officials are required
to take the oath of office to support the Constitution.

            Article VII

          The Constitutional Supplement

========================================================================

Article VII, Clauses 1-4

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPLEMENT SHALL CONSIST OF SECTIONS A, B, AND C;
SHALL BE BOUND SEPARATELY FROM THIS CONSTITUTION; AND SHALL BE DULY
INCORPORATED IN THIS CONSTITUTION AS IF SET FORTH HEREIN.

ALL PROVISIONS IN SECTION A SHALL BE AUGMENTED, AMENDED, OR REPEALED BY
A FULL MAJORITY VOTE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE, AND
THE CONCURRENCE OF A THREE-FIFTHS MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE VOTING IN THE
GENERAL ELECTION. THERE SHALL BE NO NUMBERS IN SECTION A OTHER THAN
THOSE PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION.

ALL PROVISIONS IN SECTION B SHALL BE AUGMENTED, AMENDED, OR REPEALED BY
A FULL MAJORITY VOTE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE.
THERE SHALL BE NO NUMBERS IN SECTION B OTHER THAN THOSE PROVIDED IN THIS
CONSTITUTION.

ALL PROVISIONS IN SECTION C SHALL BE AUGMENTED, AMENDED, OR REPEALED BY
A FULL MAJORITY VOTE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNLESS THIS
CONSTITUTION SHALL OTHERWISE PROVIDE.

SECTIONS A-100, 105, 120, 125, 130, AND 170, AND SECTION C-110, SHALL BE
FILLED IN PROVISIONALLY BY A FULL MAJORITY VOTE OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE WITHIN NINETY DAYS AFTER RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION.

========================================================================

The addition of the Constitutional Supplement insures that THE 21ST
CENTURY CONSTITUTION will remain current and responsive to changing
times -- but, since different provisions are more subject to change than
others, a variable ease and/or difficulty of amendability needs to be
instituted. Thus, the provisions contained in Section A are the most
difficult to amend, and the provisions in Section C the easiest.
     The Constitutional Supplement also serves another extremely
important function, by formalizing the bodies responsible for
constitutional amendment, and providing the appropriate Separation of
Powers and Checks and Balances necessary for these widely disparate
constitutional changes. For example, equal access regulations are
annexed to Constitutional Supplement Section C-145, which means that the
Senate, and only the Senate, is responsible for passing those
regulations. This is important, because a) it is consistent with the
Senate's Oversight function, and therefore b) preserves the Principle of
Accountability, by determining who is responsible for the passage of
those regulations. If the regulations are in some way inadequate, the
People know who is responsible, and can act accordingly. The other
significant reason that one body is given this particular power is that,
as previously indicated, certain regulations will need to be more
flexible to keep up with the changes in technology and society;
consequently, the provisions should be more readily amendable. This
flexibility is provided by the Unicameral requirement of Sections C-100
through 200 (see Article One, Section Three, Clause Six).
     In addition, the Constitutional Supplement insures that the People
will be consulted regarding those constitutional amendments which have a
profound impact on their rights or duties. Three notable examples are
the limitations on Government restriction of speech, which crimes will
be triable by jury ("serious" v. "petty"), and what power (if any) the
President has to commit Americans to military action. Any such changes
require the consent of the House and the Senate and a significant
Majority of the People, insuring that any such changes are well-
deliberated over (and well-filtered through the proper bodies) before
being enacted.
     Because of their importance, certain enumerated Clauses are to be
filled in provisionally, since they will need to be in place for the
operation of Government. Subsequent amendments to those Sections will be
ratified as required under Article Seven.

            Article VIII

              Rules of Construction

========================================================================

Article VIII, Clauses 1-2

IN THIS CONSTITUTION, AFFIRMATIVE PROVISIONS ARE LIMITED BY THOSE
PROVISIONS WHICH CIRCUMSCRIBE THEM. THE TERMS "ORDER," "RESOLUTION,"
"ASSOCIATE," "ESTABLISHMENT," "DUE PROCESS," "SPEEDY," "EXCESSIVE,"
"CRUEL," "UNUSUAL," "DISPROPORTIONATE," AND OTHER TERMS IN THIS
CONSTITUTION DEEMED AMBIGUOUS BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE AS DETERMINED
IN THE NATIONAL POLL OR BY A MAJORITY OF THE SENATE, SHALL BE DEFINED IN
SECTION B-145, BUT NO DEFINITION MAY BE PROMULGATED WHICH WOULD PROVIDE
LESS PROTECTION TO CITIZENS THAN THAT EXISTING AT THE TIME OF
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, NOR MAY ANY DEFINITION BE PROMULGATED
WHICH DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE SENSE PREDOMINATING AT THE TIME OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION. THE TERM "AVERAGE," AS USED IN
THIS CONSTITUTION, SHALL REFER TO THE MEAN OBTAINED BY ADDING SEVERAL
QUANTITIES TOGETHER AND DIVIDING THE SUM BY THE NUMBER OF QUANTITIES.
THE TERM "SHALL," AS USED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN
ITS MANDATORY SENSE. THE TERMS "LAW" AND "LEGISLATION," AS USED IN THIS
CONSTITUTION, SHALL REFER TO LEGISLATION PASSED BY CONGRESS, OR ANY
REGULATORY ACTIVITY, OR ANY ACTIVITY BY ANY BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT WHICH
MAY BE CONSIDERED LEGISLATIVE OR QUASI-LEGISLATIVE IN CHARACTER. THE
TERM "GOVERNMENT," AS USED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, REFERS TO ALL
GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING STATE, FEDERAL, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS AND AGENCIES. THE TERM "SPEECH," AS USED IN THIS
CONSTITUTION, SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERIC TERM FOR THE
COMMUNICATION OF ANY FORM OR TYPE OF INFORMATION IN ANY MODE OR MEDIA,
AND THE TERM "SPEAKER" SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERIC TERM FOR ANY
PERSON WHO COMMUNICATES INFORMATION. THE TERM "NATIONAL INTEREST," AS
USED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, SHALL BE BROADLY CONSTRUED TO SERVE THE
HIGHEST STANDARDS OF JUSTICE.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, STRICT TERMS SUCH AS
"NO" OR "ALL" SHALL BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED, AND BROAD TERMS SUCH AS
"LIBERTY" AND "JUSTICE" SHALL BE BROADLY CONSTRUED TO SERVE THE HIGHER
ENDS OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

========================================================================

One of the major omissions in the current Constitution is the failure to
provide for Rules of Construction. How is the Constitution to be
interpreted? Strictly? Broadly? With reference to the "original intent"
of the Framers? This question is of critical importance, since the
method of interpretation used can determine the content of the
constitutional language! For example, if one adopts the "original
intent" argument, it is conceivable that the right to bear arms would
not exist on the State level (even though the express language of the
Constitution is to the contrary), since there is some historical
evidence to indicate that the Bill of Rights was not binding on the
States (see Barron v. Baltimore, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833) ). But, if one
adopts the "strict construction" line of interpretation, the right does
exist at the State level, since the amendment does not expressly apply
to the States or the Federal Government, as does the First Amendment.
Over the years, the following "theories" of constitutional
interpretation have been advanced, either explicitly or implicitly:

    strict construction
    broad construction
    narrow construction
    natural law (a/k/a the doctrine of "fundamental" rights)
    original intent of the framers of the constitution
    original intent of the ratifiers of the constitution
    original understanding
    stare decisis (applying applicable precedents)
    anti-stare decisis (ignoring applicable precedents)
    pragmatism/public policy ("balancing")
    evolution/historical precedent
    refusal to interpret ("political questions," "standing,"
        other justiciability issues)

The problem is that since no one Rule of Construction has been mandated,
the Supreme Court has "interpreted" the Constitution in any way it sees
fit! So, Article One, Section One is interpreted "pragmatically."
Article One, Section Three is "strictly construed," and Article One,
Section Eight is "broadly construed." Article Three, Section Two is
interpreted "historically," and Article Five will not be construed at
all (since its interpretation is a "political question" beyond the
purview of the Court). Where certain other provisions are concerned, the
Constitution itself is not even consulted, and the rule of "stare
decisis" is used (prior Supreme Court rulings are seen as the law).
Still other times, the Supreme Court ignores (or "distinguishes")
applicable precedents (formerly seen as "the law") when it does not want
to formally overrule them.
     Given this extensive menu of "interpretive" options, none of which
are authorized, mandated, or regulated by the Constitution, the Supreme
Court is free to re-write the Constitution as it pleases. Functionally
speaking, the ultimate mode of interpretation of the Constitution by the
Supreme Court is "the way we want to interpret it." As Tugwell stated,
". . . a student trying to understand the Constitution is at times
unable to conclude whether strict or loose constructions remain the
controlling theory. Perhaps this is one reason why the Court has been
able to remain the source of enlarged constructions when specific
directives are lacking in the document itself."
     Article Eight brings order to the critical area of constitutional
interpretation, and recognizes that there are two broad categories of
terms in the constitution. Where a term is broad (or ambiguous), that
term will either be defined in Section B-145, or will be broadly
construed. Strict terms such as "no," "all," "supreme," "sole," and
"exclusive" are to be strictly construed (the reason strict language was
chosen).


            Article IX

            The Ratification Article

Article I

========================================================================

THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION BY THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE SECOND FEDERAL CONVENTION ACT, SHALL BE
SUFFICIENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS CONSTITUTION. PROVISIONS OF
THIS CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THE PASSAGE OF CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES BECOME
OPERATIVE ONLY UPON THE FULFILLMENT OF THOSE CONTINGENCIES. UNTIL SUCH
TIME AS THESE CONTINGENCIES ARE SATISFIED, PREVIOUS OPERATIVE CLAUSES OF
THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION REMAIN IN EFFECT.

========================================================================

The Second Federal Convention Act is the legislation that will provide
the dates, times, rules, and funding for what will be only the Second
Federal Constitutional Convention in our history -- a Convention long
overdue.
     The Second Federal Convention Act will, at minimum, contain the
following strictures:

1) There will be at least 1200 delegates to the Convention (the number
of people necessary to insure that the delegates are, statistically, a
mirror of the populace), to be chosen from the millions of people who
will have applied with Congress to serve at the Convention. The
selection process shall insure that there is demographical
representation of the population with regard to the following factors:
sex, race, national origin, regional representation, age, and financial
status. In addition, the Congress shall insure that no single
occupation, such as attorneys, comprises more than five percent of the
delegates to the Convention. Once demographic representation is insured,
the candidates for each seat at the Convention (Seat One will be a white
male from Florida over the age of forty-five, Seat Two will be a black
female from California under the age of thirty, etc.) will be tested on
their knowledge of the Constitution, constitutional policy, and
constitutional draftsmanship. The highest scoring candidates eligible
for each seat will serve at the Convention.

2) Prior to attending the Convention, each delegate will be charged with
studying various texts on the drafting of constitutions, including, but
not limited to, The Federalist, The Antifederalist Papers, Madison's
Notes on the Debates at the Federal Convention, and The 21st Century
Constitution.

3) The Convention will deliberate over dozens of draft constitutions
(including THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION), and hundreds of proposals for
amendments submitted by academics, politicians, and members of the
public.

4) At the conclusion of their deliberations (between two and six
months), the Convention will submit between three and five constitutions
to the voting population. The only restriction on the constitutions to
be issued will be that the same ratification Clause (direct ratification
by the People in a General Election) be contained in every constitution,
and that the States retain equal suffrage in the Senate. To preserve the
Principle of Accountability, Congress shall be responsible for
establishing and enforcing restrictions on delegate behavior, and no
court shall have jurisdiction over any case arising out of, or in
regards to, The Second Federal Convention Act.

5) The Second Federal Convention Act will contain equal-time regulations
for the broadcast media, and insure that all constitutions are equally,
fairly, and extensively discussed, compared, and contrasted. After a
three month period of extensive public debate, the Federal Government
will hold Primary and General Elections. The constitutions, including
our present Written Constitution with the New Ratification Clause, will
go to a vote. The two constitutions which receive the highest vote will
go to the General Election. The winning Constitution will be considered
ratified by the People of the United States -- those who "ordain and
establish" constitutions. Those provisions of THE 21ST CONSTITUTION
requiring the satisfaction of certain contingencies (e.g., the
Qualifications Clauses requiring a group of Federal Academy graduates),
become effective only when the contingencies are satisfied. Until such
time, clauses of the 1787 Constitution which are operative remain in
effect.

THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION changes the requirement for Ratification
from three-fourths of the States to Ratification by the People of the
United States. This Clause pays homage to the Framers of our
Constitution, obeying their major premise (as expressed by Madison in
Federalist 40) that:

    "[I]n all great changes of established governments, forms
ought to give way to substance . . . a rigid adherence in such cases to
the former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and
precious right of the people to 'abolish or alter their governments as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,'
since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to
move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential that
such changes be instituted by some informal and unauthorised
propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number
of citizens. . . .
    Had the convention . . . taken the cold and sullen
resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance
to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the
uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events; let me ask the man who
can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in his
bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced
by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous
citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly [?] . . .
    [I]f they had exceeded their powers, they were not only
warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their country,
by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty
which they assumed; and . . . finally, if they had violated both their
powers and their obligations in proposing a Constitution, this ought
nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views
and happiness of the people of America."

As Madison stated later in Federalist 43, "[t]he safety and happiness of
society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to
which all such institutions must be sacrificed."  This was consistent
with the previously quoted view of Hamilton expressed in Federalist 22
that:

    "It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the
existing federal system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE.
. . . The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity
of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the
mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire
ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The
streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure,
original fountain of all legitimate authority."

This right is formally stated in the Preamble to our Written
Constitution. This is a right appropriate not only for our Century, but
also the 21st Century -- and for all Centuries.

========================== CHAPTER THREE ===============================

                              EPILOGUE

========================================================================

    "It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who
raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call
to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not
necessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the
latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver
or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to
quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and commodious
building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of
the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceiling a little
higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them."

-- James Madison, Federalist 38

    "[T]he choice must always be made, if not of the lesser
evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT good . . . ."

-- James Madison, Federalist 41

    "[T]he evils we experience do not proceed from minute or
partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of
the building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by alteration in
the first principles and main pillars of the fabric."

-- Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 15

    "Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a
judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiassed by
considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing
more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan
offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests,
innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its
discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views,
passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth."

-- Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 1

    "Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that
the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the
political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of
the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to
accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed
language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys . . . ."

-- James Madison, Federalist 14

    "The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound
peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the
completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety."

-- Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 85

THE DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING A NEW CONSTITUTION:
     PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL IMPEDIMENTS

We have come a long way. Over the course of this book, a great deal of
evidence has been presented that indicates there are serious defects in
our political system, and that substantive societal change for the
better is impossible without remediating these defects. Without
substantive political change, our past is our future. If Government
wasted money in the past, it will waste it again. If Government refused
to take action on critical problems in the past, it will continue to do
so. If Government in the past raised our taxes and lowered our standard
of living to finance its inefficiencies, you, the taxpayer, can expect
more of the same in the years to come. The tragedy is that this insanity
is completely unnecessary.
     In the perfect world, every American would read this book,
seriously evaluate the arguments contained within it, and then take
action to convene a Constitutional Convention that would formally and
rigorously investigate the issues raised here, and that would propose
such amendments as it viewed necessary or efficacious. That's the
perfect world -- the world we don't live in. In the imperfect world, the
world we do live in, only a few Americans would read this book. Of those
who did read the book, only a few would have the will and wherewithal to
act on the arguments and imperatives it espoused. But those who read the
book and then attempted to act on what they knew would find that
evidence, even piles of evidence, would prove a flimsy tool in the face
of sociopolitical inertia.
     Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to enacting a New
Constitution. Even more formidable than the legal obstacles contained in
Article Five are the psychological and logical impediments that obscure
rational thought. An earlier draft of this book contained a 150 page
discussion of these obstacles. Here's a brief listing of these
psychological/cognitive impediments: the need to belong, cognitive
dissonance, escalation, pluralistic ignorance, the frame, closed systems
of thought, irrational individualism, the inability to conceive of rival
hypotheses, availability biases, overconfidence, the inability to access
latent knowledge, faulty mental models, fear of the unknown, phobias,
projection, repression, avoidance, vertical thinking, the rubber band
effect, innumeracy, genetic undertow, defeatism, societal apathy, the
self-fulfilling prophecy, the one-node flow-chart, habit, the need to
relax, confusion of happiness with "the good," short-term thinking, the
need to win, tunnel vision, minority vision, the QWERTY problem,
reification, identification with the other, boredom, egocentrism, short-
term memory, implausible what-if scenarios, and the need to believe.
     Here is one way that these obstacles, working together, can create
a conceptual network impervious to rational discourse:

    Mr. X, due to irrational individualism, utilizes the framing
technique to create a particular closed system of thought which serves
to secure his short-term financial self-interest (in this case, a closed
system which rationalizes the logically inconsistent co-existence of a
1787 Constitution with an Empirical Constitution). Though this is
unethical, he rationalizes away his guilt, to reduce cognitive
dissonance. Other individuals, unable to conceive of rival hypotheses,
see the closed system as "legitimate," in a striking case of
overconfidence. Because they are unable to access latent knowledge, they
cannot see the inconsistencies in their newly-acquired belief system.
And, due to the need to belong, neither they nor anyone else objects to
the system in public, so that everyone believes that everyone else
believes its true. In a society beset with this pluralistic ignorance,
people perpetually think that "someone else" will solve their problems,
and, because they have faulty mental models of reality, these same
people do not understand the true nature of the problems; furthermore,
due to the tendency to blame the self, they see themselves as the cause
of their problems. As escalation occurs, these problems get worse, but
no one objects, because the people have previously accepted the status
quo. The fear of the unknown created by an undue familiarity with the
status quo makes people more susceptible to phobias, which abort the
quest for fundamental solutions. Finally, because of availability
biases, those initially interested, when confronted with the societal
apathy produced by the preceding factors, put the issue on the "back
burner" -- where it evaporates.

Yet these psychological impediments, formidable as they are, are only
the first hurdle, because these impediments also function as the engine
of rationalization -- that is, they provide the emotional motor powering
the creation and acceptance of conceptions reducing cognitive
dissonance, leading to the second hurdle -- the rationalizations
themselves.
     Most people are familiar with this concept of cognitive dissonance
through the concept of rationalization, and the old story illustrating
it, "The Fox and the Grapes." In that fable, the Fox attempted to jump
for grapes, but could not reach them. After several "fruitless"
attempts, the Fox stalked off, muttering "aah, those grapes were
probably sour anyway." But this hypothesis was a spurious one: if the
grapes were "probably sour," why did the Fox begin jumping for them in
the first place? Faced with this question, the Fox might conceive of new
rationalizations: "I wanted to get exercise." Or, "I had nothing better
to do." Or, "I like jumping for grapes."
     What motivated the Fox to conceive his before and after-the-fact
hypotheses? The answer is cognitive dissonance, a conflict between two
opposing premises:

    1.the desire for grapes; and

    2.the desire to conserve energy.

Had both these desires not been mediated by the Fox through his power to
rationalize, the Fox would have been in a state of terminal anxiety. His
desire for grapes would have been opposed by his desire to remain
inactive, and the Fox would have vacillated between the two until
collapsing in a state of nervous exhaustion. Aronson (1980) gave the
following description of cognitive dissonance:

    "[C]ognitive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs
whenever an individual simultaneously holds two cognitions (ideas,
attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent. . .
. Because the occurrence of cognitive dissonance is unpleasant, people
are motivated to reduce it . . . here, the driving force arises from
cognitive discomfort rather than from physiological needs. To hold two
ideas that contradict each other is to flirt with absurdity . . ."

The upshot of this theory bodes ill for constitutional analysis in three
ways. First, people are likely to support decisions made by Governmental
bodies because they have a psychological need to do so, not because they
feel that those decisions are legitimate. As Chemerinsky (1987) wrote:

    "Decisions that might otherwise be opposed, and thus
threaten the stability of the government, gain support from the
realization that the result is based on constitutional interpretation.
People who disagree with the result, but support the Constitution and
judicial review, face a situation labeled by social psychologists as
cognitive dissonance. There is a tension between their negative beliefs
about the outcome of a case and their positive attitudes about the
institution and its basis for decision. Some people might resolve this
dissonance by changing their mind and accepting the court's decision. At
the least, their support for the government's structures and processes
might lessen their opposition to the particular result."

Secondly, an inability of people to affect social change due to a
fundamentally unresponsive Government may lead to a "you can't fight
city hall" mentality, which reduces dissonance by relieving the Citizen
of the need to devote time to changing a defective Government: if you
"can't" fight Government, then there is no point in fighting it. By this
reasoning, some people's worship of the 1787 Constitution may be a
direct consequence of the fact that they don't think that there is
anything they can do about it! Taken to its extreme consequences, people
may resort to the ego defense mechanism of denial: refusing to see
reality for what it is. At a subconscious level, people may warp their
own previously-formed value judgments. Hazlitt (1942) comprehended the
ultimate consequence:

    "One result of this impotence of the people to make their
opinions effective, as we have seen, is to pervert the nature of the
opinions themselves. There is a pathology of masses as well as of
individuals. When an individual feels powerless to correct a certain
situation in his private life, he often refuses to face the situation
realistically. He argues to himself that the situation is not so bad as
it seems."

The third consequence of cognitive dissonance is that people can then
form what is known as a schema, which Duke and Nowicki (1979) defined as
a frame of mind that adversely affects a person's "ability to see the
world accurately." One particular form of schema is known as attitudinal
distortion; a frame of mind that lets in only the information confirming
a pre-existing belief.
     This psychological phenomenon means that the more a person is
committed to a belief, the more resistant the person will be to
information that threatens that belief. The effect this will have on
constitutional analysis is that, in any public debate on the topic,
whether discussions on TV, at social gatherings, letters to the editor,
etc., a large number of people will be committed, for various reasons,
to the Old Constitution. Now, many arguments will be made for and
against the proposition that alternatives to our present Constitution(s)
be explored. However, if people have been committed to the status quo
first, all the evidence for and against the idea will be filtered
through this perception. Many people will do to a proposed New
Constitution what the supporters of the Articles of Confederation did to
the 1787 Constitution! As Madison stated in 1787, "they . . . scanned
the proposed Constitution, not only with a predisposition to censure,
but with a predetermination to condemn . . .", as opposed to
implementing an objective, criteria-based, evidentiary and/or
operational constitutional analysis.
     Due to this "predetermination to condemn" (a predetermination that
will be broadcast by the Establishment Media), various logical
impediments will be created, and then disseminated among the populace.
Here is a short list of the impediments we can expect to find: Begging
the Question, Argument by Metaphor, Argument by Abstraction, the Las
Vegas Fallacy, the loaded term, the double-bind, doublethink,
distortion, the Straw Man, equivocation, analysis within a single frame,
circular reasoning, illicit contrast, argument by innuendo, distinction
without a reasonable difference, the Fallacy of Composition, the Fallacy
of Division, wishful thinking, inference from a label, the contrary-to-
fact hypothesis, causal oversimplification, post hoc ergo propter hoc,
Poisoning the Well, ad hominem, tu quoque argument, distortion,
unrepresentative statistics, the Red Herring, Von Domarus reasoning, the
Is/Ought Fallacy, the Opinion/Fact Fallacy, the Language/Reality
Fallacy, the Subjective/Objective Fallacy, the Relevant/Irrelevant
Fallacy, the Essential Similarity/No Functional Identity Fallacy, the
Act/Omission to Act Fallacy, faulty analogy, neglect of relevant
evidence, special pleading, pseudoreasoning, false dichotomy, and the
false dilemma.
     The number of ill-conceived remarks that may be made in reply to
the arguments for a New Constitution boggles the mind. The most popular
fallacies employed are Begging the Question (e.g., "the Constitution is
fine the way it is"), Argument by Abstraction (e.g., "the Constitution
safeguards our precious rights and should not be tampered with"), the
Red Herring (e.g., "you have not proposed a perfect Constitution"), and
the Las Vegas Fallacy (e.g., "people can elect officials who will pass
the necessary legislation without the need to amend the Constitution").
Consider the following question-begging "argument" made before a
Congressional Subcommittee on the Constitution by Nobel Prize-winning
economist Paul Samuelson:

    "[T]here is no inherent flaw in our checks and balances and
division of responsibility among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government that makes inevitable a process of
'logrolling' designed to swell the level of expenditures and taxes
beyond that truly desired by the effective majority of the electorate."

This comment is not even an argument (a claim buttressed by evidence),
and therefore cannot possibly be a good argument. Nor can Samuelson's
observation regarding the inevitability of logrolling, which is only one
of several causes underlying the deficits we have run for decades, be
(in and of itself) a compelling argument against revising the form of
Government. That an occurrence is "not inevitable" is no rationale for
pursuing a course of action; if it were, we would all play the Lottery,
because losing was "not inevitable"; jog in Central Park at midnight,
because getting mugged was "not inevitable"; and smoke two packs of
cigarettes a day, because dying of lung cancer -- according to the
Tobacco Institute, at any rate -- was "not inevitable."
     In truth, "not inevitable" fails utterly to meet the standard of a
useful barometer for action, and is, therefore, invalid as a tool for
constitutional analysis. It may arguably, even plausibly, be argued of
our constitutional form that under it, logrolling is "not inevitable."
But what is at issue is not the inevitability of X, but the probability
of X. And under the 1787 Constitution, experience has amply demonstrated
that logrolling is, and has been, a fact of life in our Nation's
Capitol, and shows no signs of abating. Indeed, in a situation where
there are many incentives for a behavior, and no sanctions against, how
could it be otherwise? If a Representative "logrolls," he or she gets
Federal dollars for his or her District, and therefore increases the
chances of being re-elected. Is there any reason to believe that this
system of incentives without punishments will produce a change in
behavior in the near future contrary to 200 years experience? Samuelson
offers no such evidence; instead, we are offered the trivial (and
potentially inaccurate) observation that a phenomenon which has occurred
for 200 years is "not inevitable." But what occurrence is? For all we
know, the sun, which has risen for billions of years, may not rise
tomorrow. But that something may or may not occur cannot, in and of
itself, operate as a guiding principle in life, except for
hypochondriacs, chronic gamblers, and the xenophobic (those most
susceptible to this line of "reasoning").
     Hopefully the eminent economist Samuelson will recognize that those
of us footing the bill for this current Constitution may wish to
disagree with his "analysis," and institute measures that will decrease
the probability of logrolling, if not eliminate it entirely.
     Unfortunately, it is not only eminent economists who wish to purvey
their sophistry on an unsuspecting public. Many other people will, quite
readily, see their opinions as facts, oversimplify issues, verbally
attack those who threaten their unsubstantiated pre-existing beliefs,
and throw out all sorts of smokescreens to divert discussion from the
issues at hand. To intelligently discuss the need for a new form of
Government, one needs to be not just a political scientist, but also a
logician.

THE DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING A NEW CONSTITUTION:
     LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS

Of course, even if one can get past the psycho/logical impediments, the
legal impediments to structural reform remain. And they are serious
indeed -- so serious, in fact, that the legal impediments may buttress
the psycho/logical impediments by creating a learned helplessness
effect. As Sundquist (1986) observed,

    "Even those most profoundly convinced that the United States
government has serious structural weaknesses come to ask themselves and
one another: Why even try to change the Constitution? Why not take for
granted that it cannot be altered, and settle for whatever improvements
can be made by lesser means -- by passing laws, or changing party rules
and structures, or concentrating on electing better officials to high
office? The process of amending the country's two-hundred-year-old
charter is so formidable that reformers can be excused for being daunted
at the outset, and theorists forgiven for devoting their analytical
energies to other subjects. Not only may an amendment be blocked by 34
percent of the voting members of one house of Congress but, if it passes
that hurdle, it can still be defeated by the adverse vote, or simple
inaction, of as few as thirteen of the ninety-nine state legislative
houses, or fewer than 14 percent."

The institutional structure makes forging the necessary Majority
coalitions near-impossible, because any substantive change, whatever its
nature, will have a short-term adverse effect on powerful political
Minorities -- who are able to nip in the bud any such efforts. And the
subtle nature of institutional reform means that it will be difficult to
arouse popular support for what seem to be ephemeral considerations:

    "Institutional structure is not an issue likely to arouse
popular fervor, in the absence of a patent breakdown in the functioning
of government, and even then -- as at the time of Watergate -- most people
are inclined to place the blame on the failure of individual leaders
rather than of institutions. Proposals for structural change may not
arouse fervent opposition either, but in the absence of popular support
any organized institutional opposition is likely to be sufficient to
prevail. If either of the major parties sees its interests jeopardized
by a proposal, or incumbent legislators discern a loss of power for
their branch, or the president and defenders of presidential power
foresee a weakening of the executive, the proposal is doomed. Any
significant ideological bloc, also, would surely have enough strength in
enough states to block an amendment; so no proposal has much chance of
success if it arouses conservative concern that it hides a bias toward
big government, or liberal concern that it favors weak government, or
elitist worry that it embodies an excess of democracy, or
antiestablishment fear that it upsets the balance the other way.
    But institutional changes are seldom neutral, and even if
one could be conceived that is truly neutral -- and would be perceived
that way -- neutrality is not enough. Each of the elements of the
institutional system, and each major ideological group as well, must see
some benefit. Unless something is to be gained, why risk change at all?
But gains for everyone is a logical impossibility. True, the government
as a whole can accrue power, as it has been doing for most of two
centuries, but the division among institutions and officeholders of the
right to exercise any given aggregate of power becomes a zero-sum game.
If one institution or one political party or one ideological group
gains, another loses. That, at bottom, is why there has not been a
single amendment in two hundred years that redistributed governmental
power. The two amendments that can be classed as even affecting the
institutional structure at all -- the Seventeenth and the Twenty-second --
concerned only the selection of the individuals who would wield
institutional power, not the scope of the institutional authority
itself.
    But the distribution of power among the elements of the
governmental system is what . . . constitutional changes . . . would, in
one or another degree, affect. The scale of the benefit to governmental
effectiveness to be derived from any measure or set of measures would
depend on the magnitude of that effect. But so would the vigor of the
opposition each measure would incite. It becomes an axiom of
constitutional reform, then, that any structural amendment that would
bring major benefits cannot be adopted -- again, barring a governmental
collapse that can be clearly attributed to the constitutional design --
while any measure that stands a chance of passage is likely to be
innocuous."

Nor can we expect our representatives in Washington, who are ostensibly
in charge of promoting "the general Welfare," to promote the general
Welfare by changing the nature of their job descriptions:

    "The proposal for change will certainly not come from the
existing heads of the multitude of permanent committees in Congress.
These heads of committees have come to their positions not on their
merits as recognized by their present fellow members but by the rule of
seniority. They are 'sitting pretty,' and mean to hold on to their
prerogatives and power. The situation is not likely to be challenged,
either, by the majority members next in line under the seniority rule,
or by the ranking minority members of the committees, who stand to be
the actual heads if there is a shift in the balance of parties in
Congress. Why, then, does not the new member, the 'outsider,' the man
who has got poor committee assignments, challenge the arrangement?
Because, unless his campaign can be assured of success in advance, no
individual member wants 'to stick his neck out' by incurring the
displeasure of the existing Congressional leaders and committee heads,
who have it in their power to decide whether or not he shall get a good
appointment and be an influential member of Congress. It may be almost
as difficult to effect this change, in short, as it would be to amend
the Constitution directly."

The upshot of the political reality is that any movement for substantive
political change must come from those who "ordain and establish"
constitutions, the PEOPLE:

    "Government by the people means that the people themselves
must play their part in deciding what is to be done with their
government. And that means the people must be informed and must
themselves act.
    The methods for changing our governmental institutions must
be orderly and thoughtful and the changes themselves must be
statesmanlike and forward-looking. This cannot be done hurriedly or
haphazardly.
    What could be better disposed to meet these grave national
responsibilities than a Second Constitutional Convention?"

The convening of a Constitutional Convention is the People's sacred
right, and the Constitutional method for circumventing a corrupt and/or
ineffective Legislative Branch. But is there a way to force Congress to
call this Convention? The answer is YES.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SAFETY-VALVE

Luckily for Americans in the 21st Century, the Framers provided a
safety-valve in the Constitution in the event the Federal Government
ignored its constitutional strictures -- perhaps the most significant
check on Governmental irresponsibility in that document. This safety
valve lies in the House of Representatives. With smaller voting
Districts (making communication between the People easier), a two-year
term (increasing the Accountability of the Representative to the
People), and the control over revenue (and thus Appropriations) granted
to the House in Article One, Section Seven, the People were given the
ultimate tool to prevail upon the House of Representatives to prevail
upon the other Branches of Government to take those actions that became
necessary to force a return to basic principles. As Madison wrote,

    "The house of representatives can not only refuse, but they
alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government.
They, in a word, hold the purse; that powerful instrument by which we
behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble
representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its
activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to
have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the
government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the
most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm
the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of
every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary
measure."

Madison later stated that "the house of representatives, with the people
on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution
to its primitive form and principles." Under this Madisonian strategy,
the frequency of elections provided by the two-year term of the House
would furnish the means of bringing Government back to its roots.
     The brilliance of the strategy implied by Madison is that it is not
necessary to get 140 million people to agree on a political course of
action, a well-nigh impossible task, and which, if required, would doom
the chances for any grass-roots movement. Luckily, no such effort is
required. Due to the way the House is elected, and the fact that
millions of people have dropped out of the political process, it will be
possible to force Congress to call a Constitutional Convention with only
22,236,000 people voting strategically: still a high number, to be sure,
but only twelve percent of the voting age population in 1988.
     The reason for this is that only 218 of the 435 Districts have to
be captured to secure a Majority in the House. And voter turnout for
Representative elections has historically been poor, especially in those
years when there is no concurrent Presidential election. In 1986, only
33.4 percent of the voting-age population turned out to vote for their
Representatives on a National basis; and many Districts had even lower
voter turnouts. In 1986, for example, 50,738 people voted for
Representative Thomas Manton in the Ninth District of New York. The
District had a population of approximately 525,000, with a resultant
voting age population of 394,000. This means that Representative Manton
was elected by only thirteen percent of the eligible voters in his
District! Put another way, a mere fourteen percent of the voters in the
Ninth District could have elected a Representative who had pledged to
work for the passage of the Second Federal Convention Act, the
legislation creating the rules for, and convening, a Constitutional
Convention.
     If the 51,000 voters required to elect an alternative candidate had
held for each of the 218 Districts in 1986, this would have meant that a
Majority of the House of Representatives would have been composed of
alternative candidates had 11,118,000 people pursued the strategy on a
National basis in that election! Of course, these totals are misleading,
because few Districts in the United States had the incredibly low
turnout of New York's Ninth District. Still, even assuming that 102,000
voters would be required, on average, to elect an alternative candidate
in the 218 Districts with the lowest voter turnout, this means that only
22,236,000 Americans would need to pursue the political strategy. A
formidable number, certainly, but not an insurmountable hurdle.
     Assuming that this twelve percent of the population could organize
itself to pursue this particular political strategy, what would the
Congressional outcome be in the event the strategy is successful? Simply
this: if the alternative candidates are elected, the candidates would
vow to vote no on EVERY piece of legislation but the Second Federal
Convention Act, until the Senate would also agree to vote for the Second
Federal Convention Act, and the President would agree to sign it into
law. If 218 Districts are represented by the alternative candidates, the
Senate and the President would have no choice but to support the Act,
since the Government would come to a standstill, given that the source
of revenue, the House of Representatives, had turned off the spigot.
With millions of Federal employees no longer drawing a salary, and
thousands of Government services no longer being offered, the Senate and
the President could ill-afford to withstand the political fallout that
would accrue to them. In short, the Senate and President would be forced
to capitulate, and the Convention would be called under the provisions
of the Act. The Convention, itself a demographic mirror of the People,
would turn out one or more constitutions for the People to consider. A
vote would be taken. If the People decided to vote for the 1787
Constitution, that, as they say, would be that. This latter eventuality
would be extremely unlikely, but if it happened, at least the People
(not their representatives) would be responsible for the subsequent
political consequences.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

If you feel that working for a New Constitution is a goal worth
pursuing, there are at least five actions you can pursue, in order of
the amount of effort required:

Talk About It

One of the simplest strategies to pursue is to talk about the need for a
New Constitution in discussions with friends, fellow students, and co-
workers. Discuss the social problems found in society today, and trace
their genesis to a constitutional form that does not allow for the ready
amelioration of social problems. Having read this book, and being newly
informed, you will be surprised at the level of ignorance in society on
this most critical of issues. This level of ignorance is truly humbling,
and even a bit intimidating; but the only way to deal with it is through
communication, which of necessity must begin on an individual basis.

The Vote-Out-Incumbent Strategy

Another simple strategy to pursue, but an enormously effective political
strategy that requires virtually no effort at all, is (as previously
discussed) to simply refuse to vote for Incumbents, and to pursue that
strategy tenaciously, without regard to political party, the "character"
of the Incumbent, or similar factors irrelevant to the success of the
strategy. One can refuse to vote for an Incumbent simply by staying home
on Election Day, but an even more effective route is to go into the
voting booth and pull the lever next to the challenger's name, whomever
s/he happens to be. If only twelve percent of the population pursues
this strategy, big changes will occur in Washington, as politicians
realize that Americans will no longer tolerate the waste of their hard-
earned dollars, and have decided to finally exercise that small amount
of political power they have been allowed to retain. Since this strategy
(like any political strategy) is effective only if pursued on a National
basis, it must be communicated -- a goal one can achieve simply by
discussing it in conversations, but far more quickly and effectively by
pursuing the three strategies to come.
     The exception to the Vote-Out-Incumbent strategy, of course, is if
the Incumbent has agreed to vote for the Second Federal Convention Act
AND has voted (and will continue to vote) "No" on all other legislation
until the Act is passed. Such an Incumbent deserves your vote.
     This implementation of this strategy (which received a jump-start
in 1992 thanks to the Congressional Check-Bouncing Scandal of that year)
will require no investment of time nor money, but will be devastatingly
effective -- and its implementation will in all probability be essential
for achieving substantive change.

The Letter-to-the-Editor Strategy

The next strategy to pursue, one requiring a bit more effort, is to
write a Letter to the Editor at least once a year, publicizing the
issues raised in this book, and even the existence of this book, and
letting the readers know that there is someone else out there interested
in these issues. (A variation of this idea is to write letters to
national newspapers and newsmagazines, and/or to raise the issue on
television call-in shows). People like to know that there is someone
else out there who is thinking along the same lines, and, in fact, will
act only if they know they are "not alone."

The Bulletin Board Strategy

The fourth strategy to pursue, requiring a larger investment of time and
expense (it will be worth it!) is to get a home computer and a modem, if
you don't already have one. The computer is the world's greatest
communications tool, given the existence of something known as a
Bulletin Board: an electronic database which allows any person to
communicate a message to thousands, even millions of people. There are
currently millions of Americans who are members of these Bulletin
Boards, but if you are not, then you are not tapped into this source of
information. The most popular Bulletin Boards are, in order, Prodigy,
Compuserve, GEnie, and America Online. The best by far is GEnie, which
costs only $8.95 a month, and which uses an easy-to-follow
message/reply/message/reply format. There are currently several topics
on GEnie on the very issues presented in this book (in addition to
literally thousands of other topics), and the reader is well-advised to
get on-line. If everyone gets on the Bulletin Board, political
organization becomes eminently feasible.
     To contact GEnie, dial 1-800-638-9636. This number may be busy; if
you can't get through, keep trying.

THE BENEFITS OF ACTION

It is difficult to capsulize the effect(s) THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION
will have on society in a few short pages. The best way to gauge the
operational effects of the provisions -- the impact they will have on
society -- is to discuss this book with other interested parties. If you
are a student in a political science class, you are ahead of the game.
If not, you may want to mention this book to your friends or co-workers,
and discuss the various provisions with them: what role will the
National Database play? How will the Federal Academy work? What will be
broadcast on the National Channel, and what effect will it have on the
education of the populace? How will the National Poll help politicians
implement the desires of the People? It is also important to note that
these provisions, significant as they are standing alone, are
substantially more powerful in their totality of operation. Here's a
brief explanation of how certain provisions of THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION can work together to greatly increase the probability that
one of the more significant problems of our day -- the problem of child
abuse -- will be solved (note that these procedural changes have far-
reaching effects):

-- The Legislative Review Board (Article One, Section Seven)
     streamlines the passage of legislation. Under the new system,
     "pork barrel" Bills will no longer exist, freeing funds for worthy
     causes, such as the amelioration of child abuse. Ridiculous waste,
     such as the B-2 program and "Star Wars," will no longer be
     funded.

-- The Federal Academy (Article One, Section Ten) will educate
     politicians in the nature and causes of social problems, and they
     will be more inclined and better able to take action on those
     problems.

-- The National Database (Article One, Section Eleven) makes
     articles on the topic available to the general public. The facts
     will be readily accessible to all.

-- The National Channel (Article One, Section Eleven) allows social
     interest groups to broadcast their messages to the entire Nation.
     The issue will no longer be abstract, and will appear as compelling
     as it actually is (for some measure of the National impact, compare
     the effect the Rodney King videotape had on the National
     consciousness regarding police brutality).

-- The Legislative Committee provisions (Article One, Section
     Fifteen) allow groups of concerned Citizens to draft legislation on
     particular topics and have them submitted to Congress, where they
     will be voted upon. Children's organizations could draft
     legislation
     providing for a National child abuse hotline, increased penalties
     for child abuse, preliminary intervention before abuse is allowed
     to reach critical levels, etc.

-- The Electronic Post Office (Article One, Section Nine, Clause
     Seven) allows organizations to send electronic mail to hundreds of
     thousands of people at a fraction of the current postal rates. More
     people will have the capacity to join these organizations due to
     the increased ease and reduced cost of communicating.

-- The addition of the Right to an Education (Article One, Section
     Eleven) means that it will be easier to persuade Citizens of the
     necessity of legislation, since functional illiteracy will be
     drastically  reduced, and everyone's general knowledge will be
     greatly increased.

The New Constitution thus provides many avenues for the amelioration of
social problems (including others not listed, such as the relaxed
standing requirement, the Department of Rights Enforcement, equal
representation provisions, etc.). In this manner, THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION gives individuals with heightened social awareness the
tools to attain worthy social goals. A thorough discussion of the
interrelated provisions with one's contemporaries will aid the analysis
that will reveal these effects.

Other than discussion of operational effects with friends and
associates, there is another useful way to provisionally evaluate THE
21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION (or any constitution, for that matter) -- by
analysis with reference to the criteria necessary for good Government. A
useful technique is to posit essential criteria that a constitution
should satisfy (such as efficiency in Government), and then ask, "Does
this Constitution I am evaluating satisfy these criteria?" The best
constitutions, provisionally, are those which best satisfy the criteria.
Here is a list of criteria that may be used to evaluate the Constitution
proposed in this book (with selected provisions that secure them), and
future constitutions that may be proposed by a Constitutional
Convention:

CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA

ESTABLISH JUSTICE
     Equal rights under the law and equal access to the justice system
are sine qua non aspects of a constitutional system. No person should
receive more or less justice based on irrelevant criteria such as race,
wealth, etc. All Citizens have a right to arbitration of their disputes
by a Judicial tribunal, without having to invest an inordinate amount of
time, or inordinate expense, in the resolution of those disputes.

[Department of Rights Enforcement; Relaxed Standing Requirement; Common-
Law Codification; Equal Representation Provisions; Obligations of
Congress; Right to an Education]

PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE
     When people enter into a social contract, they do so because the
benefits of organizing and cooperation outweigh the risks of division
and disunity. That being the case, the role of Government is to improve
the society in a way not otherwise attainable without the social
cooperation regulated and enforced by Government. In addition, a
National constitution must secure the National Interest first, and
afterwards, local interests. If America is not healthy, no State or City
within it can be healthy.

[Revised Bill Procedure; Legislative Review Board; Evaluation;
Performance Ratings; Vote-Trading Prohibition; Conflict-of-Interest
Prohibition; Prohibition Against Political Party Membership; Obligations
of Congress; Legislative Responsibilities; National Objectives]

PROVIDE FOR EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT
     The Constitution should remove all procedural roadblocks to the
contemplation and passage of Constitutional legislation. High technology
times and a more competitive world economic environment demand that the
Legislative process be responsive to these changing times. It should
implement all procedural legislation necessary for achieving this goal.

[Timetables; Evaluation; Revised Separation of Powers; Oversight by
Senate; Federal Academy; Delegation Allowed with Legislative Veto;
Revised Bill Procedure; Revised Article Five]

INSURE FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
     It goes without saying that one of the primary considerations in
forming a constitution is that it contains mechanisms that help to
insure fiscal responsibility by preventing "log-rolling," deficit
spending, and other institutional effects that increase the probability
of fiscal imprudence.

[Auditor; Revised Borrow Clause; Revised Tax Clause; Legislative Review
Board; Quarterly Publication of Receipts and Expenditures; Vote-Trading
Prohibition; Federal Academy]

ACCOUNTABILITY
     Necessary legislation must be passed, and must be enforced. If
either of these situations fail to obtain, the constitutional process
must be constructed to provide for immediate determination of the source
of the failure, and to provide for swift correction of the problem.

[Annual Term for Representatives; One-Subject Bills; Evaluation;
Oversight by Senate; National Database; Electronic Post Office; National
Objectives]

PROVIDE MECHANISMS FOR SELF-ENFORCEMENT
     A good Constitution will establish Governmental bodies that will
enforce its provisions. If, as an example, the Supreme Court is given
the power of declaring laws unconstitutional -- and does not do so when
the exercise of the power is indicated -- then the Constitution is
flawed. If Judicial interpretation changes the meaning of the
Constitution, the Constitution should provide a swift mechanism for
restoring the original parameters.

[Department of Rights Enforcement; Oversight by Senate; Annual Term for
Representatives; Federal Academy Rule Proposal; Performance Ratings;
Federal Elections Commission; Legislative Committees; Electronic Post
Office; National Database; National Referendum; National Recall; Relaxed
Standing Requirement; Constitutional Convention Query on Ballot]

STABILITY
     A Constitution must ensure that the Government of the United States
proceed in a stable, orderly fashion.

[Revised Articles One, Two, and Three; Alternate]

FLEXIBLE AMENDABILITY
     Not every aspect of a constitution is as necessary for the security
of liberty as another; in addition, some aspects of a constitution will
become outdated before others. A Constitution should be "modular" to the
extent that it allows for this varying amendability.

[Constitutional Supplement; Variable Term Lengths]

INSURE THAT ALL PEOPLE ARE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED
     Every United States Citizen is equal under the eyes of the law;
consequently, every Citizen has the right to be heard by his or her
Government; and no Citizen shall have any more of a voice in the
Government than any other Citizen.

[Equal Representation Provisions]

GUARANTEE FAIRNESS TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE
     The law should not only represent people equally, but treat them
equally. No Constitution can permit the unfair treatment of one group of
people by another.

[Equal Protection Clause; Equal Representation Provisions]

DECREASE THE IRRATIONAL FORCES WHICH MOLD LEGISLATION
     In any civilized society, various groups will attempt to influence
the passage of legislation by use of irrational cues such as party
affiliation, or by the use of logical fallacies, direct misstatements,
and even bribery. A Constitution should ensure that those who make our
laws consider only the facts, the values of their constituents, and
their Constitutional mandate while creating legislation.

[Federal Academy; Federal Academy Proposal of Rules; Prohibition Against
Political Party Membership; Vote Trading Prohibition; Term Limitation
Provisions; Public Financing; Federal Elections Commission; Ethics
Legislation]

MINIMIZE OR ELIMINATE CORRUPTION
     Corruption, the most insidious form of tyranny, is the bane of all
civilized Governments. The most delicately balanced constitution that
could be devised will be toppled if it contains no mechanisms that
operate to minimize or eliminate the political cancer which has
historically afflicted societies. With privately financed elections,
newly-elected Officers of Government are beholden to the interests which
put them there. This is no less a distortion of the Legislative process
than a direct bribe is in the Judicial process. Since the proper
functioning of the State is dependent on the balanced representation of
the population, the Government must provide for the financing of
elections.

[Public Financing Provisions; Oversight by Senate; Prohibition Against
Political Party Membership; Increased Number of Representatives; Term
Limitation Provisions; Ethics Legislation; Performance Ratings;
Nominating Process]

PROVIDE FOR DIRECT CITIZEN INPUT
     A constitution is a document of, by, and for the People; as such,
it should provide for ways in which groups of Citizens united on a
particular issue can place issues on the National Agenda.

[Legislative Committees; Electronic Post Office; National Channel;
National Database; National Objectives]

PROVIDE FOR DIRECT VOTER DECISIONMAKING
     Because Legislatures are not always responsive to their
constituents when they ought to be, and because certain volatile issues
are best left out of the Legislative process, a constitution should
provide for direct legislation by the Citizens. A constitution is only
as good as the legislation which it authorizes; the People of America,
being the greatest source of new ideas, should be encouraged to take
part in the political process. Among other things, this will have the
salutary effect of restoring Citizen confidence in Government, and of
decreasing voter apathy.

[National Initiative; Recall; Legislative Committees]

CITIZEN VETO POWER
     To reduce the need for "single-issue" voting, a constitution should
allow Citizens to directly veto legislation.

[National Referendum]

GUARANTEE THE EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE
     An informed populace necessary for any process which claims to be
democratic in nature, a constitution should insure that all its Citizens
receive (to the greatest extent possible) the education they need to
achieve their highest potential, both as Citizens and as human beings.
In addition, a constitution should provide continuing education (and
access to the resources which make education possible) for the People.

[Right to an Education; National Database; National Channel; Electronic
Post Office]

FILTERING
     While the constitution must be responsive to the wishes of its
Citizens, it must also filter all the requests for future legislation
through a set of criteria; among them, constitutionality, necessity,
simplicity, cost-effectiveness, and the General Welfare of society.
Thus, Bills introduced by Citizens should be examined according to the
above criteria, and evaluated accordingly before being acted upon.

[Legislative Review Board; Evaluation; Performance Ratings; Timetables;
Revised Bill Procedure; Federal Academy]

ENSURE THAT OFFICEHOLDERS ARE ADEQUATELY EDUCATED FOR THEIR POSITIONS
     In society, we don't trust our bodies to doctors who have not been
properly trained; nor do we trust enforcement of our rights to attorneys
who have not been educated for the task. Similarly, we should not trust
the promulgation of our country's laws to those who have not received
the training necessary for their positions. A constitution must provide
for the rigorous schooling of those who will shape society by their
decisions.

[Federal Academy Graduation Requirement; Alternate]

PROVIDE A NOMINATING PROCESS FOR ALL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
     As the primary step in securing candidates for office, the
nominating process needs to be clearly articulated in the constitution.
Without such a provision, there is no guarantee that the initial
selection of candidates will have been educated properly, nor be fairly
representative of the populace, nor be free of "hidden agendas" favoring
special or local interests.

SEPARATION OF POWERS
     For reasons of efficiency and to prevent concentration of power,
power should be dispersed, and the integrity of the Branches must remain
intact.

[Revised Articles One, Two, and Three; Common-Law Codification]

ENUMERATION OF POWERS
     A Constitution should clearly designate specific powers to specific
Branches of Government, and clearly delineate the boundaries beyond
which the power may not extend.

[Revised Articles One, Two, and Three]

CHECKS AND BALANCES
     A constitution should not only separate powers, but distribute
those powers when necessary to preserve the integrity of the Branches --
and to disperse political power when necessary for reasons of
efficiency.

[Revised Articles One, Two, and Three; Revised Impeachment Process;
Timetables; Evaluation; Branches Not Empowered to Enforce
Unconstitutional Legislation; National Recall; Relaxed Standing
Requirement; Senate Restrictions on Delegates]

RESOLVE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES WITHIN THE DOCUMENT
     To the greatest extent possible, constitutions should be drafted to
avoid internal inconsistencies. One contemporary example would be a
journalist's right to report a trial interfering with the accused's
right to a fair hearing. If internal inconsistencies are unavoidable,
the Constitution should provide for their resolution within the document
to the greatest extent possible.

[Rules of Construction; Definition in Constitutional Supplement Section
B-145; Hypothetical Example Requirement]

ACCESSIBILITY OF CONSTITUTION
     The Constitution should be written in a language understandable by
the average literate American.

SPECIFICITY
     It is a fundamental Principle of jurisprudence that the laws we
live under be as unambiguous as possible. The more vague the term, the
more latitude granted the Judicial power; if a construction is vague
enough (e.g., "speedy trial"), the court is forced to legislate and give
content to the provision, violating the Principle of Separation of
Powers. Because the use of ambiguous terms is unavoidable, however, a
mechanism for definition should be made within the Constitution itself,
to prevent the creation of informal mechanisms.

[Definition in Constitutional Supplement Section B-145; Hypothetical
Example Requirement; Rules of Construction]

FORMAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
     Certain constitutional matters, such as the mode of textual
interpretation, must be articulated in the document itself, and not
enunciated on an ad hoc basis.

[Article Eight]

MAJORITY REPRESENTATION
     Minority Rule, or rule by the few, is found in oligarchy, monarchy,
and tyranny. Majority Rule is the Principle of Democracy, and must be
preserved to the greatest extent possible. This being the case, a
constitution must provide a mechanism for gauging the National Will, and
thus determining the Will of the Majority.

[National Poll; National Objectives; Right to Vote; Annual Term for
Representatives; Increased Number of Representatives; National
Initiative]

GUARANTEE ALL THE RIGHTS TO WHICH PEOPLE ARE DUE
     Since all people fall into one Minority classification or another,
a corollary of Majority rule is a proper constitutional respect for
legitimate Minority rights, which function to limit the scope of
Federal, State, and Local power. No Constitution can enumerate every
right to which Americans are entitled; it can, however, articulate and
secure all those rights which the People deem as fundamental to insure a
society of political equality. As part of the guarantee, the
articulation of a right must include sanctions for those who violate the
right.

[Penalties for Violation of Rights; Department of Rights Enforcement;
Revised Bill of Rights; Relaxed Standing Requirement]

When THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION is analyzed with reference to the
preceding criteria, one can see that the provisions established within
it were designed specifically to secure their existence. By this
analysis, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION is both successful and
desirable.
     Both analytical approaches have their strengths -- analysis by
reference to criteria is more objective, but the operational mode of
evaluation is more vivid. Utilizing the operational approach, it is
useful to filter existing reality through the proposed constitutional
provisions, and to imagine the results under those provisions. When ugly
National incidents take place like the videotaped beating of Rodney
King, ask what the outcome will be under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION --
ask yourself what will happen to the perpetrators of that offense. Call
into mind the relevant constitutional provisions: the Department of
Rights Enforcement, the Legislative Committees, the National Objectives.
When you read about the Savings and Loan scandal and the billions of
taxpayer dollars required to bail out the banks, and the hundreds of
thousands of dollars the banks lavished on the politicians who arranged
this bailout, ask yourself "is it reasonable to believe that such a
fiasco would happen under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION?" After careful
thought and close analysis of the provisions, you'll see that the short
answer is "No!" Ask yourself, "Will we have a $4,000,000,000,000
National Debt under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION?" Answer: No. "Will
billions of dollars be wasted on unnecessary defense projects under THE
21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION?" Answer: No. "Will billions of dollars be
wasted on unnecessary animal research under THE 21ST CENTURY
CONSTITUTION?" Answer: No. "Would the EPA identify only seven hazardous
chemicals as 'hazardous' under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION?" Answer:
No. "Would there be a feeling of helplessness in the face of Government
inaction under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION?" Answer: No. "Would the
networks be able to monopolize the airwaves and exclude alternative
political dialogue under THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION?" Answer: No.
     In short, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION is the key -- it is the
tool, an absolutely necessary tool, for the social change we so
desperately need. To fail to work for this New Constitution is to
condemn one's future self to the past -- a past that is in many ways, and
for many people, extraordinarily unpleasant.
     The 1787 Constitution has changed your role in life -- from master
to servant. Your employees issue commands -- commands which you are
compelled to obey ("pay your taxes!"), even if the commands have no
basis in reason. You have no choice, because organizing against this
structure is made extraordinarily difficult, given that the financial
resources necessary to retain control of the structure are withheld from
your paycheck! And the resulting monolith (the
Political/Educational/Media complex) controls the flow of information --
we are not provided with the facts (nor even the concepts) necessary to
evaluate what's happening.
     Children without hope? Or Children who can create Paradise? To what
World will you send our future generations? A World where every move to
create a rational and just society is fought at every turn, or a World
where good ideas are evaluated, considered, and implemented?
     Do you want a better World? Do you have a dream? Then give yourself
the tool to make your dream a reality.
     Ask yourself the critical question -- what World was always
possible? Imagine that World. Then ask yourself, is it plausible that it
will be achieved under our present political system? If it is not -- and
the mass of evidence points directly to that conclusion -- then it's time
to roll up your sleeves.
     Human beings have enormous capacities. Our Greatness is unexplored.
If you don't work to make this New World a reality, it will not happen.
Apathy is expensive. In fact, if people knew the cost of apathy, they
would work 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to avoid paying its cost.
     You sow what you reap. If you don't work for the Good, the Good
will remain unborn. The Good, today only a dim possibility, yells out to
the World currently existing: "Fight for me!"
     But if you pick up the remote control instead, the Good will remain
invisible. The Good will be the World you never saw -- and never will.
     A New Millennium gives us a new mindset, and therefore gives us
hope -- and a chance to achieve enormously significant social change for
the better that comes along only once every 1000 years. Ignore that
hope? Let it die?
     That would be the greatest Tragedy of all.



                                THE BEGINNING



        We are stardust
        We are golden
        And we've got to get ourselves
        Back to the Garden

            -- Joni Mitchell



Further Reading

THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION attempts to summarize many of the
arguments against our current constitutional structure, but it is
impossible to do justice to all of these arguments in a 300 page book --
indeed, for reasons of space, many significant issues have been given
short shrift, or left out entirely. Certain topics, such as the
existence of the Empirical Constitution and the vastly different role of
the Supreme Court under that Constitution, are worthy of their own
books. No study of the Constitution ends with one book, and the reader
is urged (strongly urged) to gain further knowledge of the problems with
our constitutional structure.

The following bibliography contains the books that were the most helpful
in writing THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION. For historical background, the
most essential reading is Madison's Notes on the Debates of the Federal
Convention, which is also found in Max Farrand's Records of the Federal
Convention. Another essential read is Ralph Ketcham's The Anti-
Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, an
extremely concise and well-edited discussion of the Constitution, pro
and con. Also essential is The Federalist, which contains many nuggets
of political wisdom useful for drafting and evaluating New
Constitutions. Veit, Bowling and Bickford's Creating the Bill of Rights
is the documentary record from the first Federal Congress, and contains
all the discussion on the drafting of those provisions, as well as the
text of over 100 proposed amendments to the Constitution that were,
ultimately, rejected. The Founder's Constitution is a five-volume
compendium, clause by clause, of virtually all the historical material
relating to the Constitution -- a must-read for constitutional scholars.

The best single view of what comprises the Empirical Constitution, aside
from Ladanyi's The 1987 Constitution, is Corwin's The Constitution and
What It Means Today, an extraordinarily detailed analysis of Supreme
Court "interpretations" of the Constitution. Congressional Quarterly's
Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court contains a great deal of interesting and
valuable information on the scope of the Court's expanded power, up to
and including de facto constitutional rewrites. Louis Fisher's
Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President gives dozens
of examples of disparities between the Written and Empirical
Constitution. Two other books of interest are Siegan's The Supreme
Court's Constitution, and Tugwell's The Compromising of the
Constitution. Also useful in this regard are two summaries of
Constitutional Law used by law students, Gilbert's and Emanuel's
Constitutional Law.

The best books on the defects of the Constitution are, in order, The
Constitution Under Pressure, Government for the Third American Century,
A New Constitution Now, and Cracks in the Constitution. Laurence Dodd's
essay "Congress and the Quest for Power" is a concise attack on the
Committee System in Congress. The two law review articles, "Return to
Philadelphia" and "Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit" are must-
reading. Wilson's Congressional Government is a classic criticism of our
political system, and Beard's Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution is of equal stature. Chapter Six of the Economic
Interpretation, 36 pages in length, is the single best summary of the
political science of the Framers extant today. No study of the 1787
Constitution is complete without it.

Some excellent studies of the political process today are (in no
particular order), Stern's The Best Congress Money Can Buy and The Rape
of the Taxpayer, Greenberg's The American Political System, Kerbo's
Social Stratification and Inequality, Parenti's Inventing Reality,
Strick's Injustice for All, Pascall's The Trillion Dollar Budget, and
Domhoff's Who Rules America Now?. For a nice dose of politics as it
really is, subscribe to the Congressional Record, and read the debates
on the various issues -- see the political system in action. Another good
idea is to walk into a university bookstore, and peruse the political
science section for books on our political process. Look for those which
contain extensive quotations. The Statistical Abstract of the United
States contains many valuable statistics on our country. Plunkitt of
Tammany Hall is probably the most ruthless expose of politics as it
really is -- very readable, and very scary.

The two best books on a Constitutional Convention are Constitutional
Brinksmanship, and Unfounded Fears. If you fear a Constitutional
Convention, read these books.

Decisions of the Supreme Court and other Federal Courts contain much
explication of the Written (and Empirical) Constitution, and make fine
reading. The Atkins and Chadha decisions cited in the bibliography are
two extremely important Separation-of-Powers decisions, and well worth
studying. Also interesting are certain decisions of the Supreme Court,
which, contrary to popular opinion, do nothing to preserve our "rights,"
but in fact limit them. Among these decisions are U.S. v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669 (1987); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Barron v. Baltimore, 8 L. Ed.
672 (1833); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1973); Muntz v.
Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); CSC v.
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Miami Herald v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971); DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989); Korematsu v.
U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944); San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
O'Callahan v. Parker, Warden, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Poulous v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983); Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
U.S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); and
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). (The latest such decision, as
of this writing, is Lechmere v. National Labor Relations Board, No. 90-
970, decided January 27, 1992 -- more to follow!). These decisions make a
good starting point for those readers who want to find out what the role
of the Supreme Court really is. Of course, the decisions listed only
scratch the surface -- readers further interested should read The
Constitution and What It Means Today.

Finally, readers should acquire some general books on informal fallacies
and the art of critical thinking. The study of informal fallacies and
the study of critical thinking are the single most important topics that
can be studied by a human being, bar none. Without this study, one is
helpless in the face of rhetoriticians like William F. Buckley, Pat
Buchanan, and Tom Wicker, who have studied these fallacies, and who use
them to their (short-term) benefit. Take it from your humble author --
your ignorance is not "bliss." Some excellent books on informal
fallacies are: Kahane's Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric, Damer's
Attacking Faulty Reasoning, Johnson and Blair's Logical Self-Defense,
Rothwell's Telling It Like It Isn't, Huck and Sandler's Rival
Hypotheses, Chase's The Tyranny of Words, Weddle's Argument: A Guide to
Critical Thinking, and Moore and Parker's Critical Thinking. One of the
best books around that can teach you "how to think" is the third edition
of Hosper's An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Baron and
Sternberg's Teaching Thinking Skills, while addressed to the teachers of
the art of critical thinking, contains many valuable insights everyone
can use. (These books, and books like them, can be found in university
bookstores).

One cannot seriously evaluate the legitimacy of claims, political or
otherwise, without serious study of the art of critical thinking. If you
do not have at least four of these books in your library, consider
yourself at an extraordinary disadvantage; not only in political
discussions, but in everyday life. Rest assured that when the time comes
to evaluate new constitutions, the fallacies will fly fast and thick. Be
prepared!

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
     The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. by Max Farrand
(Yale: 1966).
     Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, James Madison
(Norton: 1987).
     The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay
(Bantam: 1988).
     The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention
Debates, Ralph Ketcham
     (Mentor: 1986).
     The Founder's Constitution, ed. by Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner
(University of Chicago: 1987).
     Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First
Federal Congress, ed. by Helen
     Veit, Kenneth Bowling, and Charlene Bickford (Johns Hopkins: 1991).
     A Detailed Analysis of the Constitution, Edward Cooke, 5th Edition
(Helix: 1984).
     Amending America, Richard Bernstein and Jerome Agel (Times Books:
1993)
     Are We to Be a Nation?, Richard Bernstein and Kym Rice (Harvard:
1987)

HISTORICAL CRITICISM OF THE CONSTITUTION
     The Anti-Federalist, ed. by Herbert Storing (University of Chicago:
1985).
     The Anti-Federalists, Jackson Turner Main (Norton: 1974).
     Congressional Government, Woodrow Wilson (1886).
     The English Constitution, Walter Bagehot (1867).
     The American Commonwealth, James Bryce (1889).
     A New Constitution for a New America, William McDonald (1921).

CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM OF THE CONSTITUTION
     The Constitution Under Pressure, Marcia Whicker, Ruth Strickland,
and Raymond Moore (Praeger: 1987).
     Rewriting the United States Constitution, John Vile (Praeger: 1991)
     Government for the Third American Century, ed. by Donald Robinson
(Westview Press: 1989)
     Reforming American Government, ed. by Donald Robinson (Westview:
1985).
     A New Constitution Now, Henry Hazlitt, 2nd Edition (Arlington:
1974).
     Cracks in the Constitution, Ferdinand Lundberg (Lyle Stuart: 1980).
     An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States, Charles Beard (Free Press: 1986).
     Time for Change, Alexander Hehmeyer (Farrar & Rinehart: 1943).
     The United States Constitution, ed. by Bertell Ollman and Jonathan
Birnbaum (New York University Press: 1990).
     Toward An American Revolution: Exposing the Constitution and Other
Illusions, Jerry Fresia (South End Press: 1988).
     "Congress and the Quest for Power," Lawrence C. Dodd, Studies of
Congress (Congressional Quarterly: 1985), p. 516.
     "Return to Philadelphia," Thomas Brennan, 1 Cooley Law Review 1
(1982).
     "Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit." E. Donald Elliot,
1985 Duke Law Journal 1077 (1985).
     "Time for a People's Convention," Gore Vidal, The Nation, Jan. 27,
1992.

REALITY CHECK 1: THE EMPIRICAL CONSTITUTION
     The 1987 Constitution, Thomas Ladanyi (Tribonian: 1987). This book
may be difficult to find. The latest address for Tribonian Press
Publishers is Rockefeller Center, NY, NY, Box 4459, 10185-0038.
     Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court, Elder Witt, 2nd Edition
(Congressional Quarterly: 1990).
     The Constitution and What It Means Today, Edward Corwin, revised by
Harold Chase and Craig Ducat (Princeton: 1978).
     Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, Louis
Fisher, 3rd Edition (University Press of Kansas: 1991).
     "Flowcharting the First Amendment," Fred Zacharias, 72 Cornell Law
Review 936 (1987)
     The Compromising of the Constitution, Rexford Tugwell (Notre Dame:
1976).
     The Supreme Court's Constitution, Bernard Siegan (Transaction:
1987).
     Constitutional Law, Jesse Choper (Gilbert: 1989). This book is a
legal outline available at law school bookstores only.
     Constitutional Law, Steven Emanuel (Emanuel: 1990). Outline -- law
school bookstores only.

REALITY CHECK 2: THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
     The Best Congress Money Can Buy, Philip Stern (Pantheon: 1988).
     Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of PACs in Congress, Larry Makinson
     (Congressional Quarterly: 1990).
     Reconsidering American Politics, Nicholas Henry and John Hall
(Allyn and Bacon: 1985).
     The American Political System, Edward Greenberg, 4th Edition
(Little, Brown, & Co.: 1986).
     Guide to Congress, 3rd Edition (Congressional Quarterly: 1982).
     Politics and Structure: Essentials of American National Government,
Robert O'Connor and Thomas Ingersoll, 3rd Edition (Brooks/Cole: 1983).
     Studies of Congress, ed. by Glenn Parker (Congressional Quarterly:
1985).
     Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, William Riordon (Dutton: 1963).
     Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional Struggle, by Barbara
Craig
     (Oxford University Press: 1988).
     Direct Democracy, Thomas Cronin (Harvard: 1989).
     Reason in Law, Lief Carter (Little Brown: 1979).
     Statistical Abstract of the United States (United States Department
of Commerce: 1991).
     Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970
     (U.S. Government Printing Office: 1975).
     INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
     Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d. 1028 (1977).
     "Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional
Analysis", Jacob Javits and Gary Klein, 52 New York University Law
Review 455 (1977).

REALITY CHECK 3: WHAT'S WRONG WITH AMERICA
     America: What Went Wrong?, Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele
(Andrews and McMeel: 1992)
     Injustice for All, Anne Strick (Penguin: 1977).
     The Rape of the Taxpayer, Philip Stern (Random House: 1973).
     The Trillion Dollar Budget: How to Stop the Bankrupting of America,
Glenn Pascall (University of Washington: 1985).
     Who Rules America Now?, G. William Domhoff (Simon and Schuster:
1983).
     Social Stratification and Inequality, Harold Kerbo (McGraw-Hill:
1983).
     The Great Income Tax Hoax, Irwin Schiff (Freedom Books: 1984).
     Who Robbed America?, Michael Waldman (Random House: 1990).
     Crisis in the Classroom, Charles Silberman (Vintage:1971).
     Death at an Early Age, Jonathan Kozol (Bantam: 1967).
     Savage Inequalities, Jonathan Kozol (Crown: 1991).
     How Children Fail, John Holt (Dell: 1964).
     Animal Factories, Jim Mason and Peter Singer (Crown: 1980).
     The Farm Fiasco, James Bovard (ICS Press: 1991)
     Corruption and Racketeering in the New York City Construction
Industry, New York State Organized Crime Task Force (NYU: 1990)
     Corporate Crime, Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager (Free Press:
1980).
     "Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattel or
Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen?", The Hon. Charles D. Gill, 17
Ohio Northern Univ. Law Review 543 (1991).
     1984, George Orwell (Signet: 1949).

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
     Constitutional Brinksmanship, Russell Caplan (Oxford: 1988).
     Unfounded Fears, Paul Weber and Barbara Perry (Greenwood: 1989).

HOW THE MEDIA DISTORTS REALITY
     The Whole World Is Watching, Todd Gitlin (University of California:
1980).
     Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media, Michael Parenti
(St. Martin's: 1986).
     The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, Tom Gervasi (Perennial
Library: 1986).